Toward the end of the Cullavagga there is an account describing preparations for the so-called First Buddhist Council held during the rains in Rājagaha shortly after the Buddha’s death. At the suggestion of some of the monks, Mahākassapa invited Ānanda to be the five hundredth monk because, though still a learner (sekha), he had mastered much of the teaching and discipline while attending the Buddha. In this account, “although Ānanda is accepted as a council member in spite of the fact that he is not yet an arahant, when he comes to actually participate in the council, his arahanthood has been acquired.” Ānanda, it seems, felt it was not suitable for someone who was still only a learner to attend and, in the interval before his head touched the mattress and while his feet were still off the ground, achieved freedom from the taints and attachments which bound him to rebirth. Ānanda’s newly acquired arahanthood “did not appear to have commanded much respect,” however, for he was questioned in detail at the council about his many previous offenses. Horner notes that such confession of pre-liberation offenses by an arahant was almost unheard of, and that the “episode . . . not only puts the accusing elders in a very dubious light, [but] it also indicates that [Ānanda’s] offences of wrong-doing could . . . [have been] invented after Gotama’s death.”

It has been suggested that the uneven characterization of Ānanda in the Cullavagga account is the result of conflicting tendencies during the compilation of the Canon: while each school felt free to render Ānanda in light of its own particular concerns, it also had to acknowledge a relatively stable tradition about Ānanda which had been handed down orally since the time of the Buddha. Within this process, it is argued, the stories of the rebuking of Ānanda reflect sectarian infighting about the relative importance of dhamma (for bahuṣrutas, salvation derived from what had been heard) and the vinaya (for śiladharas, it derived from the observance of prohibitions), an infighting which is expressed narratively in Mahākassapa’s
treatment of Ānanda. The Sarvāstivādins, for example, depict a Mahākassapa who is relatively open to Ānanda, while schools like the Mahīśāsakas and the Mahāsāṅghikas portray a Mahākassapa who is hostile to Ānanda. In particular, suggests Przyluski, since the vinaya-centered Theravāda tradition tended to emphasize disciplinary over doctrinal aspects of the Buddha’s teaching, the censorship of Ānanda in the Cullavagga for forgetting to ask the Buddha about the lesser and minor rules reflects the Theravāda settling of the dhamma/vinaya debate in favor of Mahākassapa, whose name is traditionally linked with issues of behavior and morality. As Freedman notes, “Ānanda fails to pass the knowledge test [in this text] because it is to the benefit of the authors and/or compilers of the school(s) which they represent to have Ānanda fail.” Moreover, Przyluski’s hypothesis that the gāthā portions of the First Council accounts may be earlier than the prose materials around them would confirm the Ānanda rebukings as sectarian interpolation, for the gāthās go back to an epoch during which the detractors of Ānanda had not yet set up against him the bill of indictment, which reappears in different forms in all the subsequent accounts of the Council.

Our concern here, however, is not primarily in the historical layering of the tradition which Cullavagga rebukings may reflect, but in the dhammic implications of the rebukings for Ānanda, and in particular in what they may imply about the religious attributes of his character as cast in some of the Pāli narratives. Likewise, our concern here is not with the overall quality of Ānanda’s mind which, following Nāgārjuna, may have been great in wisdom (paññā; i.e., Ānanda as bahussutta) but weak in concentration of thought (cittasamgraha). That Ānanda may have had trouble mastering samādhi is very important ultimately, to be sure, and it may well be that this general defect includes within it the various issues of saddhā addressed here.

At present, however, we confine our discussion to the stories in which Ānanda regularly suffers rebuke for missed opportunities, inappropriate desires, and lack of perception in the Cullavagga as well as in that most fertile collection of rebukes, the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta. Here, three famous rebuking stories belong to the events of the Buddha’s last days and death: Ānanda’s failure (at the right time)
to ask the Buddha to live out his appointed kappa, Ānanda's weeping at the doorpost of the vihāra, and the nature of Ānanda’s understanding of the questioning and silence of the monks. Using these narratives, we will examine Ānanda's hindrance to spiritual progress in the light of current understandings of saddhā in early Buddhism.

I. THE REBUKING OF ĀNANDA

The Mahāparinibbāna Sutta opens with a Buddha who is old and close to death. In the first story, he hints to Ānanda that, if asked, he could use his iddhi to remain for the duration of his appointed time. Incapable of comprehending, Ānanda does not ask, nor does he ask at the next two of the Buddha’s hints. Some time later, after the most recent visit of Māra, Ānanda realizes that the death of the Buddha is close at hand, and beseeches him urgently to remain for the kappa. The Buddha tells him that it is now too late to ask, and when Ānanda begs two more times, two more times the Buddha refuses. On the third occasion the Buddha ask Ānanda if he has faith (saddhāsī) in the wisdom of the Tathāgata, and Ānanda answers that he does indeed. The Buddha then rebukes Ānanda for two things: first, for having to ask the Buddha more than once when the Buddha has already said that it is too late, and, second, for not beseeching the Buddha to stay all those earlier times he hinted, for which he is now at fault (dukkata) and for which he has now committed an offense (aparāddha). The Buddha then proceeds to enumerate each occasion in detail and to cite on each occasion Ānanda’s fault and offense in not taking the hint. Had Ānanda asked at any of those earlier times, the Buddha says, he would have refused the first two requests but would have granted the third. This rebuke of Ānanda, then, focuses on three issues: first, Ānanda’s inability to comprehend or to understand the Buddha’s initial suggestions about the use of iddhi; second, Ānanda’s then not asking the Buddha to stay the kappa; and, finally, Ānanda’s not having faith enough in the Buddha’s initial refusal to stop asking then and there. The second of these faults carries with it Ānanda’s lack of trust both in the implications of the Buddha’s own words and in the strength of the Buddha’s own iddhi.

In the next Mahāparinibbāna Sutta incident, Ānanda is found by a
monk of the community leaning against a doorway into the vihāra and weeping at the thought of the Buddha’s impending death. Ānanda, apparently, is worried that he is still a learner (sekha) who has yet to work out his own perfection (parinibbāna), and now faces the prospect of doing so without the Buddha. Brought before the Buddha, Ānanda is told not to weep or to be further troubled, and is encouraged to break all attachments: “For a long time, Ānanda, have you been very near to me by acts (or words or thoughts) of love, kind and good, that never varies, and is beyond all measure . . . You have done well, Ānanda! Be earnest in effort, and you too shall soon be free from the intoxications.”19 Though not here expressly stated, Ānanda’s fault is a lack of knowledge (an inability to comprehend the transitory nature of things) and an irresolution of his emotion (an inability to overcome attachment).20 For these inner turmoils and tears, Ānanda is rebuked by the Buddha for what must be an overly zealous affective nature commensurate with the previous story’s vision of Ānanda as one who has faith (saddhā).

In the third incident, the Buddha asks members of the community if there are any last doubts or misgivings about him, the doctrine, the path, or the method.21 The monks are silent. Three times they are asked and three times they are silent. In the final silence, Ānanda turns to the Buddha and says how wonderful it is that there are no doubts or misgivings, and receives in his turn a last rebuke. You have spoken, the Buddha says, “out of the fullness of faith” (pasāda) not out of the certainty of knowledge (ñāṇa). His fault, again, is that he is filled with affective emotion rather than with the much preferred rational thought and logically-held wisdom.

Turning back, finally, to the offenses (dukkaṭa) enumerated in the Cullavagga just after Ānanda has recited the suttas, we find that there are five main issues under discussion: that Ānanda did not ask the Buddha about the lesser or minor rules of training, that Ānanda sewed the Buddha’s cloth for the rains after having stepped on it, that Ānanda had the Buddha’s body honored first by women so that it became defiled by their tears, that Ānanda did not take the Buddha’s broad hint to ask him to stay through the kappa, and that Ānanda worked hard on behalf of the going forth of women. In all five cases, Ananda defends himself by saying that he did not see the offense
(dukkata) in his actions; the elders each time, however, insist that he confess the offense of his wrong-doing, which Ananda does. In each case, however, it is clear that Ananda is doing so not because he now sees that he did anything wrong but out of some other motivation, to wit, "out of faith in the venerable ones" (ayasmanta nam saddhya.)

Once again Ananda responds in ways that are at cross-purpose to the mainline tradition. For the monks, Ananda made mistakes of judgment, mistakes of the mind in which he did not properly discriminate or perceive; for Ananda, however, the solution to these offenses against the community (which were made for whatever specific and situational reasons, and which even in the end he does not concede to be mistakes in any way), is a solution of the heart.

Why, then, is Ananda rebuked? In each of these cases the answer is either given or implied. In the kappa incident, it is Ananda's faith which is at fault (saddha): it was too strong to allow Ananda to see the wisdom of the Buddha's initial hint, not strong enough to believe in the Buddha's iddhi and to know that now was the time to ask him to stay on through the kappa, and, later, not strong enough to ask the Buddha only once. In the doorpost incident, it is Ananda's attachment and inability to go it alone that are too great, having as he does a well-developed affective nature and a clear dependency on others. In the questions and silence incident, Ananda's assessment of the silence is done out of the fullness of faith (pasada) rather than out of knowledge (nana). And in the Cullavagga list Ananda, now apparently an arahant, is willing to confess to each offense only because he has faith (saddha) in the venerable ones. Whether too strong, or not strong enough, faith (however valued) seems to be an early Pali attribute of Ananda.

Of the several words for faith in the Pali Canon (saddha, "faith, belief"; bhatti, "devotion"; pema, "filial affection"; and pasada, "mental appreciation"), only two are used in the material here, and of these saddha is used in two different settings. Working under the assumption that it may be saddha which governs the general Pali views, we now ask what elements in its ancient sacrificial and meditative background might help illuminate the use of saddha in early Buddhism and especially in the context of these failings of Ananda.
Although śraddhā is not a central Vedic concept, it is a fairly consistent notion which has recognizable thematic elements. These elements, moreover, undergo the expected transformation as religiosity moves from external ritual concerns in the Vedic śrauta system to the later internal more philosophical concerns of the Upaniṣadic era, which takes place around the time of the Buddha and which may well have been influential in the Ananda material.

The first of the early elements of śraddhā is its focus on an other, its calling upon an other for blessings and prosperity. Ordinarily, this other is one of the Vedic gods: in the Ṛg Veda, for example, śraddhā is almost always associated with the god Indra, who energetically responds to the petitioner’s context of faith with the requisite rewards.24 Śraddhā is next most often associated with Soma,25 whose intoxications help produce the religious zeal basic to faith in both the god and the petitioner,26 and occasionally with the Pitrṣ in an invocation that may well have set the tone for the later śraddhā offerings (the Pindapitṛyajñā) to the Vedic ancestral dead.27 There is even a hymn to Faith herself (RV 10.151.1–5) in which Śraddhā personifies Rgvedic belief in the gods and trust in the sacrifice as performed by knowledgeable priests and singers. This focus on an other which places faith in an external source also invests in that source a supernal authority which has power over the believer. Vedic faith can’t work unless this other, Indra, for example, is seen as a more authoritative center than the believer and unless the believer operates with regard to that other out of respect for its authority. Although, as Das Gupta has argued,28 this is not the bhaktic faith of later Hindu theism with its loving and often feverish devotion, Vedic śraddhā is, nevertheless, a faith in an other which is both dependent and beyond reason.

A second theme common to Vedic uses of śraddhā is its importance to the maintenance of the sacrificial system. Faith spans and drives the śrauta ritual and the śrauta ritual is tied together by faith: without faith this large machine “spread” (tan) among the three worlds would not function and could not produce the interconnections of cause and effect so important to Vedic lives. Soma is pressed with faith, ritual words are spoken with faith, offerings are given in faith,
and because of consistent faith the gods return with blessings to mankind. Faith continues to be placed in god here, but in time faith in the effectiveness of the ritual system predominates for without faith the ritual system as conceived would fall apart: if we believe the world operates the way it does, the world will operate the way it does. Faith, thus, individualizes the worshipper's perception of the world and removes that perception from rational inquiry.

The sacrificial context for faith continues into the Upanishadic era. In the older prose Upaniṣads faith still links the ritual, its priestly operators, and the offerings they (not the gods) receive. In time, however, when meditational practice replaces ritual as the preferred religious technique, śraddhā becomes coupled with two other older ideas which also weather this transformation: austerity (tapas) and chastity (brahmacarya). While tapas moves from the effective heat generated in the ritual to the effective heat of yoga and brahmacarya from studenthood which happens to carry celibacy to celibacy as a prerequisite for religious knowledge, faith (śraddhā) in the ritual system is redirected to faith (śraddhā) in the scheme of Brahman-ātman. Though newly oriented in this way, śraddhā retains its linchpin status with regard to perceptual structures: the Brahman-ātman schema cannot be realized without initial faith in the workability of the system.

The third element characteristic of Vedic śraddhā is its description of a posture or attitude which fills the believer and makes him receptive to religious transformation. We find it early on, for example, in RV 6.26.6ab: "You, O Indra, inspired by his faithfulnesses and Soma offerings put the Cumuri to sleep for Dabhīti," śraddhābhīr here referring either to the many faithful times the petitioner worshipped Indra with Soma, or, more significantly, to the faithful attitudes with which the petitioner often came to Indra and because of which Indra could successfully deal with the petitioner's enemy. In a note to his translation of Atharva Veda 5.7.5, Bloomfield defines śraddhā as the "'faith, religious zeal,' that makes the sacrificer liberal to the priests . . . This zeal is naturally bestowed by the brown soma . . . and through the inspiration that comes from the hymns . . . sung while drinking soma.” In addition to highlighting the sacrificial context of śraddhā, what this definition focuses on is the inner state of the
religious participant: his zeal, that is, his commitment to the religious
system he is in, and his strenuous participation to make that system
work.

śraddhā as religious posture also appears several times in the
Upaniṣads, but nowhere more conspicuously than in the \textit{Katha
Upaniṣad} with the episode of Naciketas. Son of the orthodox Vājaśra-
vasa, Naciketas worries that his father's strict ritualism is not enough,
and so searches in the realm of death for knowledge authentic enough
to benefit his father. Naciketas' search is successful only because he is
filled with śraddhā, which Radhakrishnan defines here as "not blind
belief but the faith which asks whether the outer performance without
the living spirit is enough." Faith is an inner attitude which was
synonymous with works in the early Vedic period but which has
become separate from the unthinking performance of the ritual by the
time of the Upaniṣads. It is about this time also that śraddhā is identi-
fied with the heart as the agent of its effectiveness, an identification
which will be important for later theistic and Tantric traditions.

By the time of the \textit{Bhagavad Gītā}, compiled well after earliest Pāli
suttas, but whose synthesis of Brahmānic and non-Brahmānic tenden-
cies in Indian culture reflects some of the religious elements available
to subsequent strata of the Canon, the nascent \textit{bhakti} tradition has
firmly implanted śraddhā as a necessary component of devotion. The
"other-orientation" of the Vedic period is especially pronounced in the
\textit{Gītā} passages where the object of faith is Kṛṣṇa. This faith in Kṛṣṇa
or in some other Īṣṭadevata "other" is a prerequisite to religious
wisdom in that the \textit{Gītā}'s highest wisdom is precisely wisdom of the
other, which cannot be developed without the affective, non-rational
experience of śraddhā. Most interesting, however, in relation to both
the maintenance of working perceptual systems and the religious
posture of the devotee, is the \textit{Gītā}'s theory about the centrality of faith
in the make-up of the human being:

A person's faith conforms to his essential nature; each person is a believer: as his faith
is, so is he.

Faith, then, is part of the \textit{Gītā}'s definition of man. This is obvious if
we remember that the \textit{Gītā}'s great secret is the "Me-doctrine" of
Kṛṣṇa: if faith is intricately tied to the knowledge of Kṛṣṇa, then faith
is equally intricately tied to the knower of Kṛṣṇa. Especially significant, however, is another implication of these verses (Gītā 17.1–3), that man is a believing animal: that, consonant with our discussion of the third element of śraddhā, man creates a vision of the world that first becomes his and then becomes real only through faith. These observations in the Gītā about the psychological adaptiveness of worldviews, then, may well reflect insights already present in the Pāli material.

III. THE NATURE OF ĀNANDA’S FAITH

How, then, do the conceptions of faith in the Pāli Ānanda material compare to those of their Vedic and Hindu environments? Concerning the first theme, there is no doubt that the issue of “other-orientation” belongs to the Pāli saddhā. In each of the above offenses committed by Ānanda some affection for or service to an “other” is involved: in the kappa incident, Ānanda’s sensitivity to and faith in an other (the Buddha) was first, too strong to see what the Buddha was hinting at and, second, not strong enough to believe what he said the first time through; in the doorpost incident, Ānanda weeps at the impending loss of an other (the Buddha); in the questions incident, Ānanda’s faith is in the rightness of the silence of others (the members of the community); and in the Cullavagga list, not only do Ānanda’s omissions and defilements concern an other (the Buddha and, in the case of the admission of women, Mahāpajāpatī), but his solution to these offenses is based on his trust in others (the 499 arahants at the council). That Ānanda is truly an “other-oriented” person is without doubt; his religious world is tied to the experience of others and acquires importance from a trustful faith in the authority of significant others within his tradition. Of him, as perhaps of no other monk in the Pāli narratives, can be said that darśan is central: a visual contact with an external religious authority commensurate with the best of the bhaktic tradition.

The problem with Ānanda’s other-orientation, of course, is that it conflicts with the kaivalya tendencies of the Pāli tradition. The Dīgha Nikāya, in particular, is explicit in its admonition to find authority only in the self and not in any other person or thing:
Therefore, O Ānanda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the Truth as a lamp. Hold fast as a refuge to the Truth. Look not for refuge to any one besides yourselves.\(^{39}\)

This admonition to look inward and not outward for truth is developed further in a conversation Ānanda has with the Buddha on what it takes for monks to live comfortably. When Ānanda asks to what extent monks can live comfortably, the Buddha answers that they do so when they have achieved virtue by means of the self (\textit{attanā}) alone and have not resorted to another (\textit{paramī}) for more.\(^{40}\)

It may seem that this attempt to move Ānanda away from other-orientation and toward the more correct inwardly-directed authority is contradicted, for example, by the standard \textit{tisaranam} verse by which a Buddhist takes refuge in the Buddha, the teaching, and the community: one might say that taking refuge in one of these three jewels is very much like putting faith in the authority of an other. The \textit{Khuddakapāṭha} commentary explains that the going for refuge to each of the jewels is the arising of cognizance with confidence therein and giving preponderance thereto, from which defilement is eliminated and eradicated, and which occurs in the mode of taking that as the highest value, whether or not someone else is a condition for so doing.\(^{41}\)

Although there appears to be the attribution of authority to the refuges here (\textit{esa me saraṇam esa me parāyanan}), all these refuges — remembering the parable of \textit{dhamma} as a raft — are to be cast aside when they are no longer useful.

In his analysis of the Pāli treatment of \textit{saddhā}, Jayatilleke points out the “dislike of authority on the part of the Buddha,”\(^{42}\) particularly as developed in the \textit{Mahāparinibbāna Sutta}. The Buddha, he says in his discussion of the \textit{Kālāma Sutta},

\begin{quote}

\textit{does not want his own statements accepted on his authority nor rejected but seems to demand that they be tested and accepted if they are found to be true and presumably rejected if they are found to be false.}^{43}
\end{quote}

Correct belief in the Buddha, then, is not attachment to his person but rather a belief “that what the Buddha says is true.”\(^{44}\) To replace faith
in an other with faith in the truthfulness of the system taught by an other is, moreover, to make the Vedic move from śraddhā in Indra to śraddhā in the śrauta system at large. Consonant with our discussion of this second element, then, the dhammic system is seen not to work effectively for Ānanda because his faith is misdirected: not toward the teaching but toward the figure of the Buddha. An aberration of this, in fact, occurs in the Cullavagga incident where faith in the system of the Saṅgha is expressed as if it were the earlier faith in the ritual system (i.e., faith in the operative structure of one's life). The only problem is that for Ānanda this particular expression of saddhā in the system violates his own sense of the integrity of his earlier actions for which he is now being criticized. In Ānanda's case, however, there remains the hope that, as Hoffman has argued, "one consequence of sufficient faith in the Tathāgata . . . (may be eventual and thorough) faith in the doctrine."45

More significant, perhaps, is the third element arising from the Vedic material, that of faith which opens the individual to transformation. Again, arguing for the correct view of the Pāli Canon as found in the Kālāma Sutta, Jayatilleke says:

... while we should not accept the statements of anyone as true on the grounds of authority, we should test the consequences of statements in the light of our own knowledge and experience in order to verify whether they are true or false.46

In this light it seems helpful to understand saddhā as Warder does: "confidence in the enlightenment of the thus-gone," or a trust in the truthfulness of the dhamma that has not yet been confirmed by one's own experience.47 This, in fact, is Hoffman's main argument about saddhā in early Buddhism, "that it involves an initial openness to test things religious for oneself by personal experience."48 As with Naciketas, this understanding would certainly fit the Buddha's statement to Ānanda that a monk who is an unbeliever cannot grow in the teaching and discipline,49 or the monk who says that earlier he was ignorant, but when he got faith in the Buddha he became a monk.50

If we turn to the case of Ānanda himself, we find saddhā functioning in two ways. In the Cullavagga incident, saddhā can be interpreted as a trust or confidence in the wise authority of the arahants at the council. In the kappa incident, and by implication in the doorpost
incident, however, Ānanda’s sādhā has a clear and distinct object, the Buddha, to which there is obvious and overt emotional attachment (much like the later hoped-for śraddhā of the Gītā). This faith belongs to Norman’s second understanding of sādhā,

based upon the meaning “desire” which is attested for Sanskrit śraddhā from the late Vedic period and also for Prakrit sādhā, but has not hitherto been recognised in Pāli.51

While Norman sees this understanding of sādhā as preferable to the more traditional one when analyzing the context of aśaddhā (“without desire,” Dhammapada 97), both understandings are probably operative in the Ānanda material. Moreover, the attached or desiring offenses of Ānanda’s sādhā are unique in this way: they are non-repeatable, “historical offenses” which could happen only once and which are made specifically in relation to the person of this Buddha. Not only are there chronological limitations to the committing of Ānanda’s offenses, but it seems that they are peculiar to the offender himself: only Ānanda could have done these specific things. This attaching sādhā is grounded, then, in Ānanda’s own personal experience of this particular Buddha (again prefiguring Ārjuna’s personal, one-time-only experience of Kṛṣṇa), but a personal experience that has not yet tested the truthfulness of the Buddha’s dhamma, but is instead the very noose of Ānanda’s attachment.52

The highly charged emotional quality of this second kind of sādhā is clearly an issue in Ānanda’s failings.53 In the questioning and silence episode just before the Buddha’s death, in particular, it is made explicit that Ānanda has rendered a judgment “out of the fullness of faith” (pasāda) rather than out of knowledge (nāṇa),54 thus highlighting the importance of emotion in his person.55 In faith emotion is at a premium, so much so, in fact, that it tends to obscure truth rather than to reveal it. Not only do emotions hinder the spiritual quest more easily than reason, but they engage the seeker more tempestuously in the rise and fall of pleasure and pain. In a conversation on feelings, the Buddha describes to Ānanda the satisfaction and misery that feelings can bring and, in their rolling undulation, the overwhelming experience of impermanence.56 By directing emotion towards an other, as Ānanda does, he is more likely than otherwise to be caught up in
the cycle of pleasure and pain. While the enormity of the extremes might, perhaps, ultimately work to break one of that attachment (as Tantric theory suggests), Ānanda at this point seems to have an expansive capacity for dukkha. What the Buddha has in fact understood about Ānanda in this incident is that rather than preparing him for truly understanding the intent of dhamma (as it does in a parallel fashion for Naciketas), faith has cast a deluding net over Ānanda which prevents rather than facilitates his search for, and ultimately experience of, wisdom. Faith has become for Ānanda a cognitive structure which falsely veils, a perception of the world so powerful that it becomes real. For the Buddha all such structures, like the dhamma itself, must be cast aside when as rafts they are no longer useful. This Ānanda has yet to do.

The kappa incident, however, remains the most complicated of all the rebuking stories. Here the double nature of Ānanda’s faith is at work. On the one hand, Ānanda has too much of the emotionally attaching saddhā which precludes knowledge and which prevents Ānanda from comprehending the Buddha’s many suggestions that he be asked to stay the kappa. On the other hand, Ānanda has too little of the traditionally accepted Buddhist saddhā which puts trust in the wise authority of the more spiritually advanced when he doesn’t believe the Buddha the first time he said it was too late to ask. If we were to apply Hoffman’s three levels of saddhā in action (i.e., 1. “in coming to hear the doctrine,” 2. as “necessary for making progress on the path,” and 3. as “realized faith . . . if one is to teach the doctrine effectively”), we might place Ānanda between the first and the second: he has come to hear the doctrine, to be sure, but has not found a way to use saddhā fully for progress on the path.

Outside of the Ānanda material, saddhā often appears as a progressive virtue to be grown out of as wisdom advances. Primarily an admonition for lay men and women, saddhā is one of the five virtues recommended to householders (folks with a home, supported by a believing clan-chief, saddham kulapatim nissāya antojano) as part of their ethical and intellectual growth. One such list, among the many beginning with saddhā which Jayatilleke has gathered, is given in the Aṅguttara Nikāya as follows: saddhā, sīla, suta, cāga, and paññā. That this list is a progressive list which begins with faith places faith in
a relatively humble position with regard to spiritual advancement: even brahmans, for example, place *saddhā* at the beginning of a list used for testing and discovering truth, to wit, faith, inclination, report, consideration of reasons, and reflection on the approval of an opinion.\(^{50}\)

The progressive quality of faith is apparent in another *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* story relating to the Buddha where it is a virtue discussed for lay and monks as a combined group. In responding to laments about the vacuum which will appear in the lives of ordinary followers when the Buddha dies, the Buddha says that there are four places which should be seen by and which create emotion in believing clansmen (*saddhassa kulaputtassa*): where the Tathāgata was born, where he attained supreme and perfect enlightenment, where he set the wheel of *dhamma* in motion, and where he finally passed away. “Ordinary people,” Kalupahana argues here, “are generally [the ones to be] led by their emotions (*samvega*),”\(^{61}\) but the Pāli text goes on to say that visiting these four sites is likely to arouse emotions even when the visitors are monks and nuns (*bhikkhu-bhikkhuniyo*) or lay men and women (*ūpāsaka-ūpāsikāyo*), as well as simple people of faith (*saddhā*). Moreover, anyone who dies with a believing heart on a pilgrimage to one of these four places shall be reborn in the happy realms of heaven (*sugatikā saggā lokuţ*).\(^{62}\) Although there are admonitions to

Ānanda and the others not to bother themselves with worshipping the bodily relics of the Tathāgata since there were wise kṣatriyans, brahmans and householders who were devoted to the Tathāgata and who would perform such worship,\(^{63}\)

this particular passage clearly encourages and expects householders, lay men and women, *and* monks and nuns to engage in such worshipful activities.

One might wonder whether the proper location of *saddhā* is in the lay or in the monastic life. Saddhatissa, for example, consistently lists these five as virtues for the lay householder,\(^{64}\) while others argue that they are faculties (*indriya*) or strengths (*bala*) which are unspecified as to their audience. Saddhatissa’s view, for example, is supported by passages like the following from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. Here the Buddha tells a group of monks that there are five advantages for a clansman who believes (*saddhe kulaputte*): one’s faith inspires compas-
sion towards one in others (i.e., monks); when visiting, others first approach the believer; when receiving, others accept first the alms of the believer; when teaching dhamma, others teach first the believer; and after death the believer goes to a heavenly world. The great majority of passages, however, indicate that saddhā is a progressive virtue for all Buddhists, regardless of vocation, and though "not a necessary condition for the religious process" certainly a potentially effective one.

As the tradition develops, interest in the variation among human types becomes stronger. Already in the Majjhima and Anguttara Nikāyas, for example, there are standard formulations for different religious personalities, classified according to the nature of each one's peculiar spiritual quest. Among those enumerated is one known as "walking in faith" (saddhānusāri), one who reaches the first stage of sanctification because he moves by saddhā. Different from the person who is "freed by faith" (saddhāvimutto), also included in the list, who understands the origin and cessation of suffering and is well on his way to winning full vision, the saddhānusāri is a stream-attainer (patipanna) in whom the believing faculty (saddhindriya) is well-developed, but who appears to be some distance from fruition. Developed further in another Abhidhamma text, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, the gloss on this faculty of faith (saddhindriya), i.e., a trusting in (saddhanā), a professing of confidence in (okappanā), and having a sense of assurance in (abhippasāda), describes the kind of faith we presume the Buddha hoped for for Ānanda: a faith that was open in its trust of the world and yet confident enough of itself to be able to let go.

This is important to the Ānanda material in two ways. First, it indicates that "the saddhānusāri . . . is reckoned the last of those who have some spiritual attainment," a conclusion which is implied at least by the face-value of the many rebukings of Ānanda. Second, however, it indicates that Ānanda is an example of this early casting of types, someone who benefits from the increasingly well-delineated possibility of many ways to wisdom. For each type there is seen to be an upāya, an expedient means, related to the type that helps chart the specific path to wisdom; at least one of Ānanda's means, then, is saddhā, which Hoffman has already shown to have pragmatic, that is,
soteriological, efficacy in early Buddhism. In the rebuking stories examined here, Ānanda is caught out for a variety of different failings and seems to be cast, at least in some cases, as a negative model, an example of how not to be. While he may appear to be a misfit in a tradition where spiritual independence is at a premium, who must wait until a later time before the saddhindriya, the faith faculty, and the tie to others is fully recognized, Ānanda’s message from the Buddha is clear. Ānanda’s hindrance is not that he has faith, but that he misunderstands and misuses his faith in the religious process. As an upāya, saddhā must be activated in the proper way to be beneficial in the search for peace.

If faith is, in fact, a progressive virtue, falling at the beginning of the process rather than at the end, questions can be raised about Ānanda’s attainment of arahanthood, said to have preceded his statement of faith in the elders in the Cullavagga account. Rather than undermining the authenticity of the rebukes of Ānanda at the council, as both Horner and Przyluski have argued (rebukes which, in fact, fit the pattern of those in the Mahāparinibbana Sutta), the nature of Ānanda’s faith statement may undermine instead the experience of his arahanthood, an account which, in any event, is accompanied by extra-normal physical circumstances. If this is the case, then a different account of the First Council, like that of the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, for example, in which there is no mention of Ānanda’s arahanthood, may, in the end, be more plausible.

Of all the many lists of the Pāli Canon there are two very important ones from which faith is absent: the list of the five traditional hindrances (nīvaraṇa) and the list of the seven factors (ariya) of enlightenment. Faith is not, then, a consistently hindering element on the path, nor is it a consistently enabling element to enlightenment, but rather a more ambiguous element which depends on the holder’s spiritual state for its evaluation. That the list faith does appear on is a progressive list which in application involves both lay and monastic life, shows even more clearly that faith is not a clear-cut element in early Buddhism. In the right person and used in the right way, faith can enhance religious transformation; used improperly it can hold one
back. In these stories, then, Ānanda is still a learner, working ever-more to discover exactly how his faith can lead to wisdom.

NOTES

1 *Vinaya Piṭaka* (VP) 2.284—293 (P = Pāli), 5.393—406 (E = English). All references to texts in the Pāli Canon are to publications in the Pali Text Society, London, series. The references are to volume and page.

2 Michael Freedman, “The Characterization of Ānanda in the Pāli Canon of the Theravāda: A Hagiographic Study” (Ph.D. diss., McMaster University, 1977), pp. 492—93. Freedman discusses at length the various sectarian interpretations of Ānanda’s late arahanthood and its possible relationship to his attendance upon the Buddha. The questions of the openness of Mahākassapa to inviting Ānanda to the council, the receptivity of the other arahants to Ānanda’s coming even without attaining arahanthood, the instigation behind Ānanda’s meditation to become an arahant on the eve of the council, and the singly important category of bahussuta (“having heard much”) which made Ānanda a most desirable attendee are discussed at length in Freedman (pp. 447—484) as these issues are reflected in the often contradictory sources of early Buddhism.


4 VP 2.288-89 (P), 5.400-401 (E).

5 Horner, *Cullavagga*, p. xvii.

6 Freedman, pp. 489—490.


10 Freedman, p. 480


14 We use hindrance (*nivarana*) here not in its technical sense of one of the five traditional barriers to progress in clear understanding (e.g., kāmacchanda, vyāpāda, thinamidha, uddhaccakukkucca, and vicikicchā), but in the looser sense of any obstacle on the spiritual quest.

15 As with the *Cullavagga* rebuking, the kappa incident is replete with problems. Historically, for example, the rebukes of Ānanda may reflect sectarian squabbling between the Theravādins and the Mūlasarvāstivādins over dhamma/vinaya issues:
... the view that the Buddha could prolong his life ... is not part of the 'early' tradition but ... [from] a period when the nature of the Buddha was undergoing development along docetic lines. Further, the implication that Ānanda was responsible for the premature death of the Buddha is merely a fabrication designed to ... explain the disappearance of the Buddha and to denigrate Ānanda (Freedman, p. 398).

Textually, there seems to be no other place in Sutta or Abhidhamma literature where iddhi can be used to extend one's life. Doctrinally, consideration of an arbitrary extension of one's life ignores the principle of anicca and raises multiple problems with the doctrine of kamma; moreover, as Freedman notes (p. 393), the Buddha (through his iddhi) should have known the nature of Ānanda's mind beforehand, that it was clouded by Mara and unable to comprehend hints, and not forced an unproductive issue. And, finally, in terms of the preservation of the tradition, this narrative raises what was apparently a substantial concern about the Buddha dying before his teaching had had time to spread sufficiently.

16 Dīgha Nikāya (DN) 2.103–104 (P), 2.110–112 (E); Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN) 4.308–310 (P), 4.205–206 (E); Saṁyutta Nikāya (SN) 5.258–260 (P), 5.230–232 (E); Udāna (U) pp. 62–63 (P), pp. 74–76 (E).


18 DN 2.112–15 (P), 2.120–22 (E).


20 DN 2.143–44 (P), 2.157–59 (E).

21 DN 2.154–55 (P), 2.172–73 (E); see also AN 2.79–80 (P), 2.88–89 (E).

22 VP 2.288–89 (P), 5.400–401 (E).


24 E.g., Theodor Aufrecht, ed., Die Hymnen des Rigveda (RV), 2 vols. (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1877) 1.102.2d, 1.104.6d, 1.108.6c, 6.26.6a, 7.32.14c, and 8.1.31b. All non-Pāli textual references are to verse numbers.

25 E.g., RV 1.108.6c, 6.26.6a, and 9.113.2d, 4c.


27 E.g., RV 2.26.3d.


29 E.g., RV 2.26.3; 6.26.6; 7.32.14; 8.1.31; 9.113.2, 4; and 10.151.1–5.


31 CU 5.10.1; Praśna Upaniṣad 1.2, 1.10, 5.3; Mundaka Upaniṣad 1.2.11, 2.1.7, 3.2.10.

32 In discussing this verse Köhler says:
Ehe šraddhā in einer Epoche extremer Werkgerechtigkeit zu einem Zentralbegriff werden konnte, musste sich ein Prozess vollziehen, der šraddhā umdeutete von einem blossen, mehr oder minder starken Gefühl zu einer Herzensverfassung, die dazu drängt, dieses Vertrauen zu den Göttern auch in Opfer und Spenden zu manifestieren... Dabhiti bindet ein besonders enges Vertrauensverhältnis an Indra: er ist sein Schützling... Dabhiti hat immer wieder sein Vertrauen zu Indra bewiesen, indem er ihm Verehrung und Opfer darbrachte.


33 Bloomfield, Atharva-Veda, p. 424.
34 E.g., BU 3.9.21; CU 7.19.1.
35 Radhakrishnan, Upaniṣads, p. 595; KU 1.1.2, 13.
36 See BU 3.9.21.
38 Gītā, p. 17.3.
39 Rhys Davids, Dialogues, part 2, p. 108; see also DN 3.77 (P), 3.74—75 (E).
40 AN 3.132—34 (P), 3.102—103 (E).
42 Jayatilleke, p. 401.
43 Jayatilleke, p. 390.
44 Jayatilleke, p. 389.
46 Jayatilleke, p. 391.
48 Hoffman, p. 399.
49 AN 5.152 (P), 5.103—104 (E).
50 MN 3.33 (P).
51 Norman, p. 329; cf. Köhler, p. 3.
52 Note here the passage in the Dīgha Nikāya, for example, where the Buddha tells some other monks that just as other Buddhas in the past have had attendants (upatthākā) devoted to them (eta-paramā), so also does he have Ānanda in this birth (DN 2.144 (P), 2.159 (E)). Such attendance utilizes, perhaps, the peculiar nature of Ānanda’s late arahanthood and his full-time attendance on the Buddha, see Freedman, pp. 71 ff., who unfortunately does not deal with Ānanda’s saddhā within the parameters of his study.

The emotional and attaching quality of Ānanda’s faith may well carry Dutt’s first meaning of saddhā as a faith producing serene pleasure (pīti) as opposed to a faith producing energy (viriya). Jayatilleke identifies this as the affective aspect of faith (the
second as the conative, and a third, the cognitive, as the most helpful in illuminating early Buddhist theories of knowledge), and argues that any attachment, even attachment to the Buddha, is a hindrance to salvation. See Nalinaksha Dutt, “Place of Faith in Buddhism,” Indian Historical Quarterly 16: 639; Jayatilleke, pp. 387–88; and Hoffman, p. 402.

Where Ananda falls within Jayatilleke’s three types of *saddhā* is not altogether clear, but we can say, perhaps, that while the affective and conative aspects appear, directed usually towards the figure of the Buddha, the cognitive is for the most part absent. The helpfulness of using these three aspects as soteriologically chronological or progressive in value in this instance is uncertain, but given the dynamic cultural context of these centuries, we can at least argue that Ananda’s affective *saddhā* is a posture whose time in textual Buddhism had not yet come. The existence of a cult of Ananda at Mathura, as suggested in the *Aśokāvadāna* (Przyluski, *Aśoka*, pp. 28–30), however, raises interesting questions about the connections among Ananda, *saddhā*, and local bhaktic practices.

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There may well be a connection between the differing casts of Ananda’s *saddhā* and the general unevenness of his treatment in the Pāli Canon. On the two versions of *saddhā*, see Köhler, pp. 61–62.


*SN* 4.219—221 (P), 4.148—49 (E).

Hoffman, p. 405.

Jayatilleke, pp. 396—398.

*AN* 3.44 (P), 3.36 (E).

*MN* 2.170 (P), 2.360 (E).


*DN* 2.140—41 (P), 2.153—54 (E).


*AN* 3.42 (P), 3.34 (E).


*MN* 1.477 (P), 2.151 (E); *AN* 1.477 (P).

See the *Puggalapaññatti*, p. 15 (P), p. 23 (E).


Jayatilleke, p. 396.

See the discussion about later developments in *saddhā* in, for example, Jayatilleke,


*Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.*