“Citta, Mano, Vinnana—A Psychosemantic Investigation”
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Citta, Mano, Vinnana—a Psychosemantic Investigation

In this report, an attempt will be made to clarify the psychological contents of the above Pali terms. The approach is psychological rather than linguistic.

Citta is most commonly translated by: thought(s), mind, heart, mood, emotion, idea, reasoning, attitude, consciousness.

Mano: mind, thought, inner sense.


Many of the English terms are very vague. The reason may be either that the corresponding Pali terms are equally vague or that the exact meaning of them is not known. Some of the English terms for the same Pali terms have a very different meaning (e.g. “mind” means an independent psychological agency; “thought” is probably intended to mean conscious processes of a predominantly cognitive character, “heart” an emotional, evaluative center in human personality; if we then, for instance, find the passage in S II 273: “Ariye tuṇhībhāve cittaṃ saṅṭhapeti, ariye tuṇhībhāve cittaṃ ekodhiṃ karohi, ariye tuṇhībhāve cittaṃ samādaha” translated by “Establish thy mind in the Ariyan silence. Lift up thy heart therein. Plant thy thought therein” — then we may well ask ourselves whether these different meanings of citta were intended by the Pali-writer or if the translator is just careless.) Psychological passages in translations of Pali texts have often proved meaningless to me. Therefore, an investigation has seemed desirable.

Method

Passages illustrating the use of the terms included in the investigation have been collected from the following works: Digha-nikāya, Majjhima-
nikāya, Aṅguttara-nikāya, Saṁyutta-nikāya, Dhammapada, Suttanipāta, Udāna and Itivuttaka (the PTS editions have been used: quotations refer to pages in these, only for Dhammapada and Suttanipāta to number of stanza). It was considered that these were homogeneous enough to permit a non-historical treatment. As this is not a statistical investigation, no completeness was aimed at, but an attempt was made to include as many different contexts as possible: I aimed at semantic completeness.

The theoretical framework of this study was provided by C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum, The measurement of meaning (Urbana 1957). Their method can of course not be used on historical material, but their insistence that meaning can be defined by relating a studied concept to a semantic space is a fruitful point of departure. Now the dimensionality of the semantic space of psychological terms is not known, but some sort of provisional "semantic differential" can still be constructed. I have tried to follow the intentions of Osgood by putting systematic questions to the texts and by especially studying relations between terms as expressed in the texts.

Citta

1. Superordinated concept: dhamma (e.g. A I 10) which is a vague term used mainly as a collective term for all conscious phenomena. It is used for all psychological terms, even nibbāna.

2. Entity or process?

We usually think of a machine as an entity: it has a certain structure and functions as a unit; it is limited in space and has a certain duration over time. If we, on the other hand, were unable to see the machine itself but could study its functioning and its products, then we would speak in terms of processes: we could describe certain movements, the change from raw materials to finished products. We can make the same distinction in psychological matters, and choose our words accordingly. When we use a word like "mind", we think of something rather permanent, and the momentary perceptions, feelings, impulses and imaginations are said to be produced in it. The mind has a structure, it can produce processes, and it can be used as an instrument—so it is a typical entity.

On the other hand, the difference may not be so great on the psychological plane as on the physical. If you study your conscious experiences, perhaps you will at first find only a stream of processes. But after a while,
you will discover recurrent themes and process-sequences and you will find regularities and habits of thoughts. The processes are then fitted into a structure which is seen to be more or less fixed, more or less like an “entity”. So, although most of the continuity depends on processes or structures that are not conscious and therefore “behind the curtain”, we may firmly believe in an entity like the “mind”.

In order to decide whether cittā is an entity or not, we must investigate whether it is described as independent or dependent, permanent or momentary, productive or produced, initiating or passive, actor or act.

It is possible to find passages where cittā is clearly said to be a product: “Mā ... akusalaṁ cittāṁ cinteyyatha” (S V 418), “Don’t think unskilled cittā”.—“Samudaya-dhammānapassī vā cittasmīṁ viharati, vaya-dhammānapassī vā cittasmīṁ viharati.” (D II 299). “He keeps on seeing an arising phenomenon in cittā, or he keeps on seeing a passing phenomenon in cittā.” Here, cittā seems to mean “thought”. Usually cittā seems much more personified to an independent agency. It has a will of its own: “Bhikkhu cittāṁ vāse vatteti, no ... cittussa vāsenā vattati” (A IV 34), “A monk makes his cittā turn according to his wish; he does not turn by the cittā’s wish”. Further: “ ... cittena niyati loko” (S I 39), “the world is led by cittā”. According to D II 36, “Vipassissa ... cittam nami no dhammasanāya,” “The cittā of Vipassi was inclined not to preach the doctrine”.—Cittā is an authority that can be pleased or displeased: “ ... ayam me puggalo cittam nārādheti” (M I 341), “that person does not appeal to my cittā”. And: “ ... mayi cittam pasannam” (M II 145), “your cittā was pleased with me.”

Cittā reacts as an emotional center according to S I 53: “Niccam utrastam idam cittam”. “This cittā is always terrified”, — and S II 226 “na ca na uppanno lābhassakkarasiloko cittam pariyādaṁ ṭhassatī”, “and when gains, favours, and flattery come to us, they shall not take lasting hold of our cittā”.

In the very numerous passages where the improvement and development of cittā is described, it is often done in wordings reminding us of some instrument which is to be improved by removing obstructing particles (rāga, dosa, moha, e.g. M II 27), by cleaning (cittam parisodheti, D I 71; cittāni virajayitvā “cleansing their cittas”, D II 274), by giving it support (ādhāro, S V 20), by making it straight (cittam attano ujukam aKaṁsu,
3. Is citta the self?

Only once is it explicitly denied that citta is the self (S II 94), while it is very often denied that viññāna and the other khandhā are the self. When H. V. Guenther in “Philosophy and psychology in the Abhidhamma” (Lucknow 1957) constructs diagrams illustrating different Abhidhamma-views on the mind, he places citta in the center of a number of concentric circles. This can only mean that he considers citta as the self around which everything is arranged. In the Nikāyas there are only indirect indications that the person identifies himself with citta. It happens, e.g., that the grammatical subject in coordinated sentences is first citta, then seemingly without any special reason becomes the person himself: “Ujugataṁ ev' assa tasmān samaye cittaṁ hoti Tathāgatam ārabbha, ujugatacitto kho pana ... ariya-sāvako labhati athhavedaṁ, labhati dhammavedaṁ ... ” “At such time his citta is firmly fixed on the Tathāgata; with upright heart the Ariyan disciple wins knowledge of the welfare, he wins knowledge of the doctrine ... ” (A V 329). See also “Kāmarāgena ḍayhāmi, cittaṁ me pariḍāyhati”. “I am burning with desire, my citta is consumed” (S I 188). In the love-song, D II 266, it is said “Tayi gathita-citto 'smi cittaṁ viparinimitam”. “I am provided with a citta tied to you: my citta is changed”. We find here the same change of grammatical subject, and in a case like this it becomes clear how closely related the citta sometimes is to the self. — On the other hand, it is never said that citta is the self. On the contrary, the texts usually
take care to distinguish between the person and his citta. A few examples will illustrate this. “Aham iminā cittena nikato vañcito paladdho”. “I have been defrauded, deceived and cheated by this mind” (M I 511). “Cittaṃ te tatthe gamenti dūre”, “They send their citta far away in that (dispute)” (SN 390). See also A IV 34, quoted above.

In conclusion: citta is not the self but it often stands for the person and the identification is then not far away.

4. *The monk’s problem-child*

As we have seen in some of the above quotations, the monk can certainly not identify himself with this citta — on the contrary it sometimes gives him life-long trouble. It has to be tamed, but it is dūrakkha, “difficult to guard” and dunnivāraya, “difficult to hold back” (Dh 33), dussamādaha “hard to compose” (S I 148), niggahetabba, paggahetabba, sampahamsitabba, ajjhukekkhitabba, “to be checked”, “to be exerted”, “to be gladdened”, “to be looked after” (A III 435). It is a difficult but important task to train citta, because “cittte ... arakkhihe kāyakammapi arakkhitam hoti vācikammapi arakkhitam hoti manokammapi arakkhitam hoti” (A I 261), “when citta is unguarded, bodily action is also unguarded, speech and mental action are also unguarded”, and we shall see in a later section how great the difference is between the trained and the natural citta.

5. *Is citta consciousness?*

It is said in Dh 37 that citta is asarīra, “incorporeal”. It is often contrasted with the body. In S IV 293 f, a distinction is made between kāya saṅkhāro, “activity of body”, vacīsaṅkhāro, “activity of speech”, and cittasaṅkhāro, and the latter is defined in the following way: “Saṅnah ca vedanā ca cetasikā ete dhāma cittapaṭibaddhā, tasmā saṅnah ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāre ti” which has been translated “Perception and feeling are mental processes dependent on mind. Therefore are they called ‘the activity of mind’”.

No indication has been found that citta could be either a physiological or a purely behavioral entity. As we shall find later, citta is sometimes spoken of as moving in space (e.g., phandana, “trembling”, Dh 33, dūran-gama, “far-travelling” Dh 37), but it probably means non-physical movement. When describing moral and emotional traits in citta, terms are sometimes used which imply a certain type of behavior, but it is the attitude behind that seems to belong to citta.
It is more difficult to decide, to what extent subconscious processes in the psychological sense belong to citta. We can, of course, consider it self-evident that when traits like anger, pride, desire are ascribed to citta, it does not mean that they must be manifest all the time: the tendency, the disposition is enough. In this way, we have introduced the subconscious, but the distinction was seldom made. There is an early Pali term for latent tendencies of this type,anusaya, which is attributed to ceto, never to citta (they are more or less synonyms, see discussion below!) We find a typical context in S III 13: “Rūpaḥaṭṭuyā ... yo chando yo rāgo yā nandi yā tānḥā ye upāyupūdānā cetaso adhitthānābhīhinivesānusayaḥ tesāṁ khayā virāgā nirodha paṭīnissagga cittām suvimuttam”. “By the destruction of, the indifference to, the cessation, the giving up, the utter surrender of that wish, that desire, that pleasure, that craving, that approach and grasping, that decision, indulgence and disposition in ceto directed to the form-element, the citta is fully freed”. We shall also find later, that several of the traits, which often are called anusaya (or rather the traits to which tendencies — anusaya — are mentioned), are attributed to citta. In the main, citta must be understood as an unanalyzed conscious entity.

6. The attributes of the untrained citta.

Citta is described with a wealth of attributes. We have seen that citta can, and should, be trained, so we must distinguish between the natural and the trained citta. Generally, citta is found to be too independent and mobile (Dh 326 “... acārī caritaṁ yenicchakaṁ yathakāmaṁ yathāsukhaṁ”, “... would wander formerly as it liked, as it desired, as it pleased”), too unsteady (capala, Dh 33) and easily distracted (vikkhitta, A IV 32).

(a) Perception. We have already quoted S IV 293 f where it is said that saññā (perception) and vedanā (feeling) are dependent on citta. In S IV 125 we find that rūpa (forms) touch (phassati) citta, and only a trained citta can avoid to be influenced. In the natural state, therefore, citta is sensitive to impression, without being a center of perception.

Citta can be directed and is then an instrument of attention. In A IV 422 the phrases cittām paṭīvāpeti (“he turns his citta away from”) and cittām upasamharati (“he concentrates his citta on”) are used in this meaning. Cf. the opposites sankhitta — vikkhitta (“attentive — unattentive”) used about citta in D I 97.

(b) Intellectual traits. In A I 9 the expression cittena ... ūnassati, “understand with citta” is used. The phrase aṅṅācittāṁ upaṭṭhapeti, “he
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applies the citta to understanding” is often found, e.g. A III 437. In A IV 402 paññāya suparicita, “well provided with wisdom” is said about citta. These are all quotations from descriptions of the developed citta, but the potentialities of intelligence are of course there from the beginning.

(c) Memory. Citta is an instrument for the recollection of former existences which is made possible through training. See M I 22 “pubbe-nivāsānussatiññāya cittam abhinimmāmesi”, “I directed my citta to the knowledge and recollection of former habitations”. The higher knowledge which is called abhiñā is attributed to citta (A IV 421, A I 254). Free ideas are a function of citta, as in A V 107, where citta is said to be “provided with” (paricita) ideas (sāña) of impermanence, not-self, danger, disinterestedness and so on. What is said in Dh 326, “idam pure cittam acāri cāritam ... yathākhāmaṇi ...”, “this citta would wander formerly as it liked ...” probably refers to the free imaginative function of citta.

All the functions quoted here are referred to the trained citta. The fundamental dispositions must, however, be there from the beginning, although nothing seems to be ever said about the untrained citta in these respects. We go on to describe the natural citta proper.

(d) Intellectual qualities of the untrained citta.

Two of the āsavā, namely diṭṭhāsava and avijjasava (the obsessions of false views and lack of true knowledge) are of a more intellectual character (D I 84, D II 81). Further: moha (lack of correct judgment, D III 270), vicikiccha (doubt, D I 71), vikkhitta (unattentive, D I 79).

(e) Emotional qualities.

We must distinguish between feelings and emotions. Feeling is the evaluation from the individual point of view that normally accompanies every perception or cognitive process: we call them “pleasant” and “unpleasant”. This evaluative aspect is not so often attributed to citta, but we find, e.g. in M II 145, that citta may be “pasanna”, “pleased”, that it suffers (“pahanātī”, S IV 73), that “sārīrīkā dukkha vedanā cittān na pariyādāya tīṭhanti” (S V 302), “painful feelings make no impression on my citta”.

By emotion proper we understand a state of affectivity or lack of balance. This side of human psychology is usually attributed to citta

paritassanā, trembling, nervousness (S III 16),
uddhaccakukkucca, excitement and worry (D I 71).
padosa, anger (D I 71).
kāmmāsava, obsession of sensual pleasures (D I 84).
sapattaka, hostile (D I 228).
savera, full of anger (D I 247).
āvīla, turbid (A I 9).
utrasta, terrified (S I 53).
abbhuta, astonished (S I 178).
uddhata, unbalanced (S V 112).
līna, sluggish (S V 112).
phandana, trembling (Dh 33).
capala, unsteady (Dh 33).

(f) Dynamic qualities.
Dynamic are the traits called which lead or motivate to actions, e.g. needs and drives. The border between these and the emotional traits is, of course, never very well defined.

Tañhā, the most common word for “desire”, is not often ascribed to citta, but in Dh 154, citta is said to have “attained to the extinction of all desires” (cittān tañhānāṁ khaye ajjha). More commonly attributed to citta are abhijjhā (covetousness) and lobha (greed), found together in M I 36. Very common is rāga, sometimes translated by the more emotional word “passion”, sometimes by the more dynamic word “desire” (S I 185). One of the āsavā is bhavāsava, clinging to existence (D I 84).— Absence of dynamic qualities could be called thinamiddha (“lethargy and drowsiness”, D I 71) or pāmāda (“indolence”, M I 36).— The most important dynamic traits are, therefore, more or less regularly attributed to citta.

(g) Moral traits. The moral “defilements” (upakkilesā) seem all to belong to citta: Most of them are enumerated in M I 36 together with some that are mentioned already:

byāpāda, “malevolence”
upanāha, “malice”
makkha, “hypocrisy”
pāḷāsa, “spite”
issā, “envy”
maccariya, “stinginess”
māyā, “deceit”
sātheyya, “treachery”
7. The attributes of the trained citta.

(a) Cognitive and intellectual qualities. On the highest level of the eightfold path (sammāsamādhi), the adept attains to cittassaka ekaggata, “one-pointedness” (D II 217). He is not disturbed by his sense-perceptions: “Evam sammāvinutta-cittassa ... bhikkhu no bhusa ce pi cakkhuvinneyyā rūpā cakkhu cīkhati ev’ assa cittam pariyaṇiyanti, amis-sikatam ev’ assa cittam hoti, thitaṁ ānejjappattanti, vayaṁ c’ assānupassati”. (A III 377). “If objects cognizable by the eye come very strongly into the range of vision of a monk with wholly freed citta, they do not obsess his citta, and his citta is untroubled, firm, having won to composure; and he watches it go”. (The last assa seems to refer to citta; if so, citta means “conscious processes”). Temporarily he may attain to saññāvedayatanirodha, and “Yo ca kho vayam ... bhikkhu saññāvedayatanirodham samāpanno, tassa pi kāyasāṅkhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho vacīsāṅkhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho cittasāṅkhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho” (S IV 294). “In him who has attained the ceasing of perception and feeling, the activity of body has also ceased, become calmed. So also have the activities of speech and citta.”

His citta has been trained to be an instrument for higher knowledge (abhiññā), for the attainment of iddhi, for hearing heavenly sounds, for understanding others’ citta, for remembering his own former births, for seeing other beings pass from existence to existence, and so on (described, e.g. D I 77-84). His citta is not directed outwards (apaṇhitam bahiddhā, S V, 159). He can direct his citta and he “brings it towards the deathless element” (amatāya dhātuyā cittati apasankaratī (A IV 422). His citta is characterized by paññā (wisdom, D II 81) and aṭṭā (knowledge, D III 53).

(b) Emotional traits. Citta becomes free from āsavā and tanhā (D II 81, Dh 154). It does not react emotionally on sense-impressions (S V 302). It is vūpasanta (calmed D I 71), samāhita (serene, D I 76), ānejjappattā (imperturbable D I 76), avera (free from anger D I 247), danta gutta rakkhita saññīvuta (tamed, controlled, guarded, restrained A I 7), anāvila (untroubled, A I 9), sukhāvaha (bringer of happiness Dh 35). The general impression is unemotionality and stability.
(c) Dynamic traits. The needs and desires were characteristic of the natural citta. The trained citta is, however, also motivated to action, and motivations are still to be found, although the desires have gone. This is often expressed in a negative way: "Yam cittaṃ vitarāgaṃ vitadosaṃ viramoham — itosamuttāhāna kusalaśīla (M II 27). "That citta which is free from desire, free from hate and free from illusion—originating from this are the skilled moral habits.” This is an interesting passage showing that the motivation to good actions is to be found in citta and that these purely negative expressions have a very positive meaning. It is also interesting to note that they are all considered dynamic, although dosa is more emotional and mōha more intellectual.

Other dynamic words, positively expressed, are found in D III 239 where citta is said to “incline towards ardour, devotion, perseverance and exertion” (namati atappāya anuyogāya sātaccāya padhānāya).

On the dynamic side, the training therefore results in a change from impulses and desires to will and determination, from immaturity to maturity, from fickleness to character.

(d) Moral traits. Citta is made an effective (kammāniya, mudu) instrument for skillful (kusala) action, Citta has been made asaṅkiliṭṭha (pure, D I 247), avyāpanna (free from malice, D I 71), assava (obedient, S N 23), ananga (free from blemish, A II 211). One of its chief characteristics is metta (friendliness, D III 237). At the same time it is vivekaninna vivekapabbhāra vupakattha (tending to aloofness, leaning to aloofness, inclining to aloofness, remote, M III 111), which probably indicates a certain aversion to all social activity, good as well as bad.

8. Is citta personal?

Citta could be an inner core, e.g. some sort of life-force, very much similar in all individuals, or it could be an individually formed center. The latter is true. It is naturally open to impressions from the outside (S IV 293) and it has a great number of emotional, dynamic and intellectual characteristics that give it an individual form. It can also be understood, interpreted: "cittəṃ me samāno Gotamo jānāti” (S I 178) “the recluse Gotama knows my citta” (or possibly: what I am thinking”). "Idha ... bhikkhu parasattānāṃ parapuggalānāṃ cittam pi ādisati ... iti pi te cittan ti” (D I 213). “Here a monk tells (reads) the citta of other beings, of other individuals ... saying: — 'so is your citta”; — “No ce ... bhikkhu paracittapariyāya-
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kusalo hoti, atha 'sacittaparinyaṇākusalo bhavissāmi'ti" (A V 92) "though a monk be not skilled in (knowing) other people's citta, he can decide: 'I will be skilled in (knowing) my own citta'.

The training of citta seems to result in a greater homogeneity. But the result depends on the type of training. One-sided training, for instance, may give wrong result. So if a monk trains only samādhi, then "tāṁ cittaṁ kosajjāya samāvatteyya", "his citta will be liable to indolence", if he trains only pāgāha (energy), then "tāṁ cittaṁ uddhaccāya saṁvatteyya", "his citta will be liable to distraction"; and if he trains only upekkhā (equanimity), then tāṁ cittaṁ na samā samādhiyeyya āsavanāṁ khayāya", "his citta will not be perfectly poised for the destruction of the āsavā" (A I 256). — Even a liberated citta can still be identified, see S I 194, "tesam ... cetasa cittaṁ samanassati vippamuttaṁ nirupadhima", "he intuitively discerned the citta of these as being freed, desireless". Therefore, the individuality remains, even in arahants.

9. Is citta an instrument?

We have repeatedly referred to citta as an instrument; for attention understanding, for attaining higher knowledge and certain supernatural powers. The instrument-aspect is no doubt there, but it is less conspicuous than its independence. Its development is an end in itself and for the citta's own good. Just as the training of a child may consist in making him do things, so the citta is used as an instrument for its own development.

10. The ultimate fate of citta.

What happens to citta in death? S V 370 provides an answer: "... tassa yo hi khvāyām kāyo rūpi ... tāṁ idheva kākā va khādanti ... yaṁca khvassa cittaṁ digharattam Saddhāparibhāvitam sila- sut-a āga-paribhā-vitaṁ, tāṁ uddhagāmi hoti vissagāmi", "though this formed body of his be devoured by crows (or other animals), — yet his citta, if longtime practiced in faith, virtue, learning and renunciation, moves upward and goes to distinction". Here we are very close to an un-Buddhistic soul-theory, according to which citta survives death. It can be found also in other passages, where it is connected with the idea of rebirth. "Avidvā manaso vitakke hurāhuramī dhāvati bhanta-citto" (U 37). "Without understanding the thoughts of mano he runs with restless citta from existence to existence". — "Anāvattidhammaṁ me cittaṁ kāmabhavāya-ti paññāya cittaṁ suparicitaṁ hoti" (A IV 402) "'My citta is not of such nature that it will return to the plane of sense-pleasures'—(knowing this) his citta is well
provided with wisdom". In these passages we find an indication that *citta* in normal cases is reborn. The same is implied in D III 258 "Tassa evaṁ hoti—'Aho vatāhaṁ kāyassa bhedā paramaṁ maraṇā khattiya-mahāsālānaṁ vā brahmaṇaṁmahāsālānaṁ vā gahapati-mahāsālānaṁ vā sahavyaṁ uppajjeyyuṁ ti'. So taṁ cittaṁ dahati, taṁ cittaṁ adhiṣṭhati, taṁ cittaṁ bhāveti. Tassa taṁ cittaṁ hine vinuttaṁ uttarīṁ abhavitaṁ tatr' uppattiyā saṁvattati". "He thinks, 'Ah! if only I may be reborn at the dissolution of the body after death as one amongst wealthy nobles, or brahmins, or householders!" This *citta* he holds fixed, firmly established, and develops it.—His *citta* set free in a lower range, and not developed to anything higher, conduces to rebirth within that range." This passage is, however, a little doubtful, as *citta* here, at least in the middle sentence, has a clear process-meaning and therefore may be used simply for viññāna.

When, in other contexts, the process-meaning seems to be intended, e.g., in D II 299, it is stressed that *citta* "is something that comes to be" (samudaya-dhamma) and "something that passes away" (vaya-dhamma).

It is often said that *citta* is suvimutta, "liberated" or viñuccati "is liberated". What does it mean?

"Pañña-paribhāvitaṁ cittaṁ sammad eva āsavāṁ viñuccati seyyathidaṁ kāmāsavā bhāvaśsavā diṭṭhāsavā avijjasavā ti" (D II 81). "Citta, when thoroughly developed through wisdom, is set quite free from obsessions, that is to say from the obsessions of sensuality, becoming, wrong views and ignorance". Another definition is already quoted from S III 13, according to which *citta* is freed through the destruction of the desire directed towards the five khandhā. Still more clear is the passage S III 45: "Rūpadhatuyā (later, the whole sentence is repeated for: vedanādhātuyā, saṁjñādhatuyā, sankhāradhatuyā, viññānadhatuyā) ce ... bhikkhuno cittaṁ virattāṁ vinuttaṁ hoti anupaṭāya āsavāṁ, vinuttaṁ thim, ṭhittattaṁ santussitaṁ, santussitattā na paritassati aparitassam paccattāṁ ṭeva parinibbāyatī". "If a monk's *citta* is unattached to the form-element (feeling, perception, the activities, consciousness) and is free from it without giving it support through the āsavā—then it is steadfast by its freedom, content by its steadfastness, through its contentment it does not crave further: and free from craving it by itself attains to parinibbāna". As freedom from the āsavā is usually mentioned as the final attainment through which arahant-ship is won, we have ample evidence that *citta* is thought to be that which reaches the state of nībbāna. A characteristic of Buddhist meditation is that the meditating
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person knows through all the levels how far he has attained. When the ultimate realization has come, even then he knows that it has come and what it means. Therefore, some part of his conscious personality is left, and everything points to the fact that this function is attributed to citta. In addition to the already quoted evidence, let us point to a passage in A I 8, where it is said: “paññihitena cittena ... nibbānam sacchikarissati”, “with a citta that is well directed ... he will realize nibbāna.” So, when the work is done, the instrument is still there, registering the fact.

II. Abnormal states of citta.

There are some references to abnormalities in citta. According to S III 1, citta may be ill (ātūra), and a certain householder is admonished, so to train himself that his citta is healthy although his body is ill: the illness is to identify the khandhā with attā.

In D I 20, it is said about a group of gods called Manopadosikā: “Te aññamaññamhi paduttha-cittā kilantakāyā kilanta-cittā”. “Wicked-minded toward each other, they are weak-bodied and weak-minded”. It is not known what is meant here: possibly the basic idea is that a certain amount of energy is required in order to stay on a certain level of development; changes in this karmic force manifests itself in certain mental and bodily changes; if the moral behaviour is not up to requirements, the karmic force weakens and the being is reborn in a lower state.

In Dh 137 and 138 it is said that a man who inflicts pain on the innocent and harmless, will be punished by suffering, loss, bodily injury, difficult illness or cittakkhepa; “loss of citta”. A similar expression is found in S I 126, where it is described how the daughters of Māra try to seduce the Buddha and afterwards comment on their lack of success with the words: “Yam hi mayaṃ samṇāṃ vā brāhmaṇāṃ vā avītarāgaṃ iminā upakkamaṇa upakkameyyāma hadayaṃ vassa phaleyya, unham lohitam vā mukhato uggaccheyya, unnādam vā pāpuṇeyeyya cittavikkhepaṃ vā.” “For if we had approached after this fashion any recluse or brahmin who had not extirpated lust, either his heart would have cleft asunder, or hot blood had flowed from his mouth or he had become crazy or have lost his citta”. If a person has developed mettā cetoṇimuttī, i.e., “mind-release through friendliness”, his citta is not khipitabba (“to be upset”, S II 265). In S I 207 it is said: “If you do not reply, I will either upset your citta (cittam khipissami) or split your heart”. In this case citta is something that can be lost, thrown away. This use of the word becomes natural, if citta is taken to be the personal core
of purposeful consistency, some sort of superordinated organizing agency. We have already noticed (see e.g. M III 156 cited above) that in some contexts this interpretation seems probable (although it is often implied that this superordinate force takes citta to task and induces it to development or uses it as an instrument), and we are again very close to an identification between citta and the self. In strong emotional experiences it is this normal purposefulness and organized behaviour that is upset.

12. *Has citta inner organization?*

We have seen that citta is conceived as individually formed and that a great number of traits, especially of an emotional, dynamic and moral character, are attributed to it. It is sometimes described as the guiding purposiveness in life. Therefore, it comes very close to the psychological concept of personality.

By personality is meant an individual organization of traits: there is a guiding purposiveness, a hierarchy of motives, a more or less consistent "style of living". Personality may change and can be "developed" and "deranged", but there is continuity and unity. It is both psychological and physical, both structural and functional.

Like personality, citta is an organizing factor and it has an individual structure: we have seen that a person's citta can be recognized and interpreted by others. We find, on the other hand, few traces of an organization of all the traits that are said to belong to it: it is often even doubtful whether the traits really are meant to form part of citta or whether they are conceived as external. If citta, for instance, gets rid of the five upakkilesā, is citta itself changed through the process? But in many cases, the formulation indicates that a real change takes place: the frequent use of bhāveti, "cultivate", "make grow", indicates that: A III 245 subhāvīta, "well developed", M III 149 cittabhāvanā, "development of citta". When it is said that citta becomes one-pointed (D II 217), this can only refer to a concentration and unification of all forces within citta, a redispersion of the inner organization.

In S V 92, we find citta compared to gold with certain impurities; if these are removed, the gold becomes soft, pliable, luminous and workable: "Evam eva kho ... pañcime cittassa upakkilesā, yehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṅthaṁ cittiṁ na ceva mudu hoti, na ca kampaniyāṁ na ca pabhassaram pabhāṅgu ca na ca sammā samādhiyati āsavānaṁ khayāya." "In the same
way, there are these five impurities of the \textit{citta}, tainted by which \textit{citta} is neither fine, nor pliable, nor luminous, nor frail, nor perfectly composed for the destruction of the \textit{āsava"}. This passage may imply that \textit{citta} is transformed through the impurities; but an implication that \textit{citta} by itself and originally was pure as gold need not be read into it.

The development of \textit{citta} consists in getting rid of bad traits and replacing them by good ones. In descriptions of this process we find that certain bad traits are more fundamental and difficult to get rid of than others: the last ones to disappear are the \textit{āsava}. The traits that are developed are, among others, \textit{mettā} and \textit{paññā}. Therefore we find traces of an hierarchical organization in \textit{citta}.

So far, \textit{citta} has turned out to be rather similar to personality. But there are differences also:

(a) We may speak about "our" personality as about something outside us, but in reality, we always identify ourselves with our personality, and the psychological ego is contained in it. \textit{Citta} is much more frequently placed as object of activities and conceived as "outside" the speaker (it should, e.g., be "restrained"). But as we have found, identification is also frequently implied.

(b) \textit{Citta} is a more limited concept, as it mainly covers only conscious phenomena. The individual differences are not much elaborated upon in the Nikāyas.

(c) The instrumental aspect, common in \textit{citta}, is not frequent with regard to personality.

(d) \textit{Citta} is often said to be independable and to change quickly. Personality may also change and it may be "unstable", but continuity is

We may conclude that \textit{citta} rather may be called a center within personality a conscious center for activity, purposiveness, continuity and emotionality. The vague term "mind" may, after all, be the best translation, although it does not cover the emotional and moral aspects.

A note on \textit{ceto}

\textit{Ceto} is a derivation of the root \textit{cit} just as \textit{citta}, but it is much more limited in use. It is to be found only in genitive and instrumental case, and
in compounds, and it seems to be used in a rather limited number of contexts. The following observations are based on material mostly collected from D and M.

_Ceto_ is often consciously and intentionally treated as a synonym of _citta_. In S III 232, the need and desire produced through the senses is called _cittassa upakkileso_ but in the following sentence it is referred to as _cetaso upakkileso_. In S IV 125 it is said that _rupā_ touch _citta_ again and again but: _cittam na pariyādāya tiṣṭhanti_, “without completely taking hold of _citta_”. This is then summed up with the expression _cetaso apariyādāna_, “by their failure to take hold of _ceto_”.

In A V 207 _vigatābhijjhena cetasā_ is immediately followed by _abhijjhāya citta_ _parisodheti_.

The following comparisons give also an impression of the close relations between _ceto_ and _citta_.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceto</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cetaso ekodibhāva,</td>
<td>cittam ekodihihoti,</td>
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<tr>
<td>D I 74</td>
<td>A I 254</td>
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<tr>
<td>mettāsahagatena cetasā</td>
<td>mettā-cittam bhāveti</td>
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<td>D I 251</td>
<td>D I 167</td>
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<td>cetovimutti</td>
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<td>M III 146</td>
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<td>parisuddhena cetasā</td>
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<td>cctosamādhim</td>
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<td>ceto-panidhi</td>
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<td>cetaso upakkilese</td>
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<td>cetaso pariyādāna</td>
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<td>S III 16</td>
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<td>cetasā averena, avyāpajjhena</td>
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<td>D I 251</td>
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<tr>
<td>cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim</td>
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<tr>
<td>D III 78</td>
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We find that ceto at least to some extent is just a synonym of citta: the upakilesa are attributed to both, and also some emotional traits. Both must be concentrated and both attain liberation. Further, both are engaged in supernatural perception, e.g., mind-reading (cetasā ceto paricca vidito, “by my ceto, of ... is known to me” M I 210, and frequently; compare A I 170, “evam pi te mano, ithham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti”, “thus is your mano, such and such is your mano, thus is your citta; in some contexts citta and ceto are combined, e.g. S I 194, “... cetasā cittam sammanesati vippamuttam ... “he discerned with his ceto the citta of these as being freed ...”

Ceto has a number of traits (cognitive, emotional, dynamic, and moral) of the same type as those attributed to citta. We find, for instance, the five ceto-khila, “the obstructions of ceto”; doubt about the master, about the doctrine, about the order, about the training, and anger towards the fellow-monsks (D III 237 f). And further, the five cetaso vinibandhā, “bondages”: desire for sensual pleasures, for the body, for visual things; excessive eating and sleeping; living a religious life for rebirth as a god (D III 238). The group adhiṭṭhāna, abhinivesa and anusaya (decision, indulgence and disposition) is consistently attributed to ceto (e.g. M III 32). In D III 259 we find ceto-panidhi, “aspiration of ceto”. In M III 50, we are told that akusalā dhammā follow if somebody lives with abhijjhāsahagatena cetasā, vyāpādasahagatena cetasā and vihesasahagatena vetasā (ceto given over to covetousness, malevolence, harmfulness): they are all called cittuppāda, “creation of citta”. All this makes ceto appear as a dynamic center, not very unlike citta.

In some special aspects, ceto has a profile of its own.

1. The instrumental aspect is much more pronounced, especially for knowledge, thinking and concentration, “... dhamma cetasā anuvitakketi anuvicaretī ...” (D III 242), “he reflects and meditates over the doctrine in his ceto”, “... mama cetasā cetoparivitakkaṃ aññāya” (M I 168), “... who knew with his ceto the reasoning in my ceto”, “... addasaṃ Bhagavantaṃ ... Magadhake paricārake ārabhha aṭṭhikatvā manasikatvā sabba-cetaso samannāharitvā nissannam: ‘Gatiṃ tesāṃ jānissāmi abhisamparāyaṃ, yamgatikā te bhavanto yamabhisamparāyāti’”. (D II 207). “I saw the Lord ... sitting down to think over, to cogitate upon, to concentrate his whole ceto upon the deceased Magadhese adherents: “I will know their fate, their future; where these people are going, what their future will be.”
2. This stress on concentration and supernatural knowledge becomes especially prominent in contexts where the ways to liberation are described. Very often we find the combination ceto-vimutti paññā-vimutti, usually translated “freedom of mind and freedom through intuitive wisdom”. It is often (e.g. M I 73, D III 78) said to depend on the destruction of āsava and is therefore the same process as described in D I 84 “kāmāsavā pi cittāṃ vimuccati bhavāsavā pi cittāṃ vimuccati avijjāsavā pi cittāṃ vimuccati. ‘Vimuttoṭṭha vimuttam’ iti nānāṃ hoti”, “citta is freed from the influx of sensual pleasure, from the influx of rebirth, from the influx of ignorance; he knows: ‘in liberation it is freed’”. Cetovimutti is analyzed into five types in M I 296-298:

(a) adukkhamasukhā cetovimutti which is attained in the fourth jhāna.
(b) animittā cetovimutti: the monk does not pay any attention to any signs (conditions) and enters on animittāṃ cetośamādhi, the concentration that is signless.
(c) ākiñcañña cetovimutti: the monk passes quite beyond the plane of infinite consciousness and thinks ‘There is nothing at all’.
(d) suññatā cetovimutti: the monk meditates “suññamidam attena vā attaniyena vā”, “this is void of self or of what pertains to self”
(e) appamāṇā cetovimutti: the monk suffuses the whole world with a ceto that is mettā-sahagata, karunā-sahagata, muditā-sahagata, upekkhā-sahagata, “filled with friendliness, compassion, joy, equanimity”.

We find that all these belong to different levels of meditation. The appamāṇā cetovimutti is an idea that returns quite often and is unique for ceto: the conscious processes of a meditating person are here conceived as a sort of energy that can be directed and fill the whole world “just as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard”, D I 251) and is probably thought to have beneficial influence on its objects. In the 4th jhāna the monk is said to suffuse his whole body “pariśuddhena cetasā pariśuddhena”, “with utterly clean and pure ceto” (M III 94), just as somebody might wrap up his whole body with a white cloth.

To sum up: Ceto is a synonym of citta but is used especially for its instrumental, cognitive, meditative, and supernatural functions.
Mano.

Mano seems to be much easier to grasp than the other concepts discussed in this paper. Its essential function, as inner sense, is the same as is commonly met with in earlier Indian psychology.

1. Is mano consciousness?

In for instance D I 70 mano is described as an instrument for knowledge of dharmā: “manasa dhammaṁ viñṇāya”, “when he cognizes a phenomenon with his mano ...” Mano is generally found mentioned as one of the senses, and just as the eye has rūpa as object, mano characteristically has dhāma. In D III 242, it is used with anupekkhati: “dhammaṁ ...... manasa anupekkhati”, “he contemplates the doctrine in mano”. In SN 834 we find “manasa diṭṭhigatāni cintayanto”, “thinking over the theories in mano”. Mano is therefore a center for conscious processes.

2. Is mano an entity?

When using the word “center” above, we implied that mano has more character of entity than of process. Is that justified? By center we mean a more or less permanent although changing structure used as an instrument for producing or containing processes of a certain type: a sense is a structure transforming physical energy to signals that can be interpreted by the organism. Mano is sensitive to and a repository of dharmā received from the other senses: “Imesam kho ... pañcannam indriyānaṁ nānāvisayaṁ na aññamaṁ sa gocaravisayaṁ paccanubhotānaṁ mano paṭisaṁsaṁ, mano ca nesaṁ gocaravisayam paccanubhotiti” (M I 195). “Of these five senses, different in range, different in field (=modality), not reacting to the field and range of each other, mano is the refuge (center?), and mano reacts to their field and range”. Mano is, therefore, a coordinating center for the other senses, and perhaps an instrument for recollecting past events (=memory).

The same idea of an instrumental center returns, for instance, in SN 1142. “Passāmi naṁ manasa cakkhuṁva”. “I see him with mano as with my eye”. Similarly in SN 1005 “manasa pucchite paṁhe vācaya vissajessati”, “he will answer in words the questions you have asked in mano”. Cf. M I 191 “Ajhattiko ce ... mano aparibhinno hoti ...” “If the internal mano is unbroken ... ” and S I 197 “... vanap paviṭṭho, atha me mano niccharati bahiddhā”, “(I have) gone into the forest, but my mano goes astray outside”. I have not found any passage where mano is used
with a clear process-meaning, but there are very many contexts, where a process-meaning could well be implied. *Mano* in S I 197 just quoted, seems to be personified and objectified, but a meaning “thought”, “imagination” is not excluded. In all the cases where *manomaya* is used, it may mean “produced by the mano” or “consisting of a mental image”, which in reality could be the same thing. The question may be more or less artificial but I conclude that *mano* is primarily thought of as an entity.

3. Is mano an instrument?

We have already quoted passages proving that *mano* is an instrument of ideation. As a matter of fact, the instrumental meaning clearly dominate all other usages. It can be seen in some very frequently occurring compounds, e.g. mano-ṣaṅkhāra (activity of mano), mano-vitakka (thoughts of mano), mano-sucarita (good action by means of mano).

There are, however, also indications of a more independent meaning.” Sabbaloke ca me mano nābhirimissati, sabbalokā ca me mano vutṭhahissati” (A III 443). “My mano shall find no delight in any world; my mano shall rise above every world”.—“Haranti maññe mano vanāṇi samādhiṁ alabhasaṁnassu bhikkhuno” (M I 16) — “I think forests distract the mano of a monk who does not attain samādhi”.—“Na brahmaṇass’ etad akiñci seyyo yādā nisedho mano piyehi” (Dh 390) “It is no slight benefit to a brahmin when he holds his mano back from the pleasures of life”.

In sum, the word mano is used for some conscious agency, mainly instrumental to the purposes of other agencies, but sometimes used without instrumental implications.

4. Functions of mano.

We have stressed that mano is chiefly conceived as an inner center with a predominantly instrumental function. We shall now investigate the areas of function more closely.

(a) Perception. In M III 216, 18 applications of mano (manopavicārā) are mentioned: “Cakkhunā rūpaṁ disvā somanassatthāniyāṁ rūpaṁ upavicarati domanassatthāniyāṁ rūpaṁ upavicarati, upekhaṭṭhāniyāṁ rūpaṁ upavicarati; sotena saddāṁ sutvā—pe—; ghānena gandhaṁ ghā yitvā—pe—; jivhāya rasāṁ sāyitvā—pe—; kāyena phoṭṭhabbāṁ phusītvā—pe—; manasā dhammaṁ viñṇāya somanassatthāniyāṁ dhammaṁ upavicarati domanassatthāniyāṁ dhammaṁ upavicaratiupekhaṭṭhāniyāṁ
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dhammaṁ upavicarati”. “Having seen a form with the eye, one experiences the form as (standing on—) connected with pleasure, distress or neutral feeling. Having heard a sound with the ear, — having smelt a smell with the nose, — having tasted a flavour with the tongue, — having felt a touch the body, — having become conscious of a dhamma with mano, one experiences a mental state connected with pleasure, distress or neutral feeling.” Here, two functions of mano are clearly indicated: the function of knowing or cognizing mental states, ideas and so on, which are referred to above, and the function of receiving and experiencing the impressions directly from the other senses. According to Buddhist way of thinking all perception involves an immediate evaluation from the individual point of view: perception and feeling together belong therefore to the manopavāra. In M I 191 it is stated that if the internal mano is intact and external dhamma come in focus and there is an appropriate contact, then the appropriate part of viññāṇa will appear. (“Tato ... ajhattiko ce mano aparibhinno hoti bhāhirā ca dhamma āpāthām āgacchanti tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti, evaṃ tajjassa viññānabhāgassā pātubhāvo hoti”). This seems to be a good description of a perceptual process: if we are to be conscious of something, a functioning sense-organ is required; this must be focussed on the object; and there must be proper contact (contact probably refers to the physical impingement of the object on the sense-organ by which the primitive sensations are produced). The dhamma is in this case described as external; so it may be be used as a comprehensive term for all external stimuli.

(b) Attention. In S II 24 we find the exhortation: “sūnātha sādhukam manasi karotha bhāsissāmiti”, “listen, give your mano thoroughly, and I will speak.” The phrase manasi-karoti is used in many forms to express attention, e.g. in the frequently found formula: “atappam anvāya padhānam anvāya anvāya anvāya appamādam anvāya sammā-manasikāraṃ anvāya tathārūpaṇi ceto-samādiḥiḥ phusati yathā samāhite citte aneka-vihitaṃ pubbe nivāsam anussarati”, “by means of ardour, of exertion, of application, of vigilance, of highest attention, he attains such concentration of mind that he, with concentrated citta remembers his various existences in the past”. We may conclude that attention and concentration are connected with mano.

(c) Intelligence and thinking are also clearly functions of mano. See SN 834, “Atha tvamā pavitakkam āgamā, manasa diṭṭhigatāni cintayanto” “Then you started to speculate, reflecting on the views in your mano”. Mano is often combined with vitakka, “reflective thought”: “ito samuḥ-
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thane manovitakkā ... snehajā attasambhūtā ...” “hence spring the reflective thoughts of mano: born of love and arisen in self” (S I 207). The already quoted passage in SN 1005 gives an instance of mental questioning, which we would call a thought-process.

(d) Memory and ideation. Memory is not directly attributed to mano, but as the “repository” of the other senses (S V 218) and the center of all kinds of ideational activity, memory must be very much involved in its activities. In D II 176 it is said about a lady: “manasā pi no aticāri, kuto pana kāyena”, “she was never, even with her mano, unfaithful, how much less with the body”, and here evidently that type of ideation that we call imagination is referred to. The same imaginative function we have already met in S I 197: “(I have) gone into the forest, but my mano goes astray outside”. A little more vague is an interesting passage in SN 1144: “jīnaṃsā me dubbalathāmakassa ten’ eva kāyo na paleti tattha, saṃkappayattāya vajāmi niccam, mano hi me ... tena yutto”. “Because I am old and feeble, my body does not go there, but in my intentions I always go there, for my mano is joined to him”. Samkappa is here used for the planning and longing thought-activity; mano could refer to a daydreaming function or to emotional attachment. The word manomaya is frequently used about images created by mano. “Puna ca paraṃ ... akkhātā mayā sāvakānam paṭipadā, yathā paṭipannā me sāvakā imaṃṭhā kāyā aṅgānā kāyam abhinimminanti rūpim manomayaṃ sabbanga-paccangim abhinindriyam”. (M II 17).

“And again, a method has been described by me for disciples, practicing which disciples of mine from this body produce another body, with form and made by mano, having all its major and minor parts, not deficient in any sense. The origin of these images was probably the ability to create clear mental images: but it is evident from, for instance, A III 122 that the pictures so created were believed to have independent reality, filling space although without material body: “kālakato aṇāṭaram manomayaṃ kāyam upapanno, tassa evaṃ attabhāvapatiłābho hoti, seyyathā pi nāma dve vā tīni vā Māgadhikāni gāmakkhettāni” ... “when he died he was reborn in a body made by/of mano, and the form that he took was such that it filled two or three Magadhan village fields”.

(e) Feelings and emotions

M III 216 was quoted above, where the 18 manopavīcārā were given and which proves that the feelings also were considered as felt by mano. Cf. S V 74 “Manasā dhammaṃ viññāya manāpaṃ ...”, “with mano cognizing a pleasant phenomenon ...”, and “Agati yaththa Mārassa, tattha me
nirato mano”, “Out of reach of Māra my mano is pleased (S I 133). — “Padhānāya gamissāmi, ettha me rañjati mano” (SN 424). “I will go and exert myself, in this my mano delights jhāna”. — “dandham hi karoto puññam pāpasmiṁ ramati mano” (Dh 116), “If a man is slack in doing good, his mano delights in evil”.

Even emotions are sometimes attributed to mano: “Ayam eva mahattaro kali, yo sugatesu manam padoṣaye” (SN 639) “This is a greater sin: to make mano angry towards the happy ones”, — “manopakopam rak-kheyya” (Dh 233) “let one be watchful of irritation in mano” — “santaṁ tassa manam hoti” (Dh 96), “his mano is calm”.

It is clear from these passages that mano can feel pleased or displeased, irritated or calm.

(f) Needs, purposiveness and will.

Dynamic traits are often attributed to mano. See, for instance, D II 275 “Puccha ... mani pañham yam kiści manas’ icchai”, “Ask me whatever question you wish in your mano”. — D I 18: “Iti mamma ca mano-panidhi, ime ca sattā ithattam āgata”, “So was my mano’s wish, and these beings came there”. — D III 103: “Yathā imassa bhoto mano-saṁkhārā pañhītā, tathā imassa cittassa anantarā amunī nāma vitakkaṁ vitakkessati”, “Just as this good man’s mano-activity is directed, so will he later direct the thought of this citta”. — SN 228: Ye suppayuttā manasā dalhena nikkāmino Gotama — sāsanamhi ...” “Those who have applied themselves well with a firm mano to the discipline of Gotama and are freed from desire ...” — We also often find the compound mano-sañcetana (e.g., D III 228) meaning “will” or “purposiveness”.

Mano is generally conceived as an active agency, not only as a sense, content with passively receiving impressions and passing them on. We need only point to the frequent occurrence of expressions for actions performed by mano, kāya and vācā: “Papičahi thānehi kula-puttena uparimā disā samāna- brāhmaṇa paccupaṭṭhabbā: mettena kāya-kammena, mettena vācī-kammena, mettena mano-kammena ...” (D III 191), “In five ways should a clansman minister to recluses and brahmins as the zenith: by friendly acts in behaviour, speech and mano ...” — “Parisuddha no mano-saṁcāro bhavissati ...” (M I 272). “Our conduct in mano shall be perfectly pure ...”
We conclude, that active attitude is one of the aspects of mano. This leads us naturally over to the question of the moral implications of the thoughts and acts of mano.

(g) Mano as moral agency

Mano can perform good and bad actions. “Manoduuccaritaṁ hitvā, manasā sucaritaṁ care” (Dh 233). “Having abandoned the bad actions of mano he should practise good actions with mano”. Khattiyo ... kāyena duccaritaṁ caritvā, vācāya duccaritaṁ caritvā, manasā duccaritaṁ caritvā ... (D III 96) “a khattiya who has led a bad life in deed, word and mano ...” In M I 373 it is said that a mano-kammam is more blamable if it is bad, than works of body or speech. It follows that the evil purpose is felt to be the only real evil and that it is attributed to mano. This connection between purpose and the activity of mano perhaps lies behind the compound padunhanmana-sanakkappo in M III 49: “Vyāpannacitto kho pana pudūṭha-mana-sanakkappo: Ime sattā haṁnantu vā vajjhantu vā uccihjantu vā vinassantu vā mā ahesuṁ vā ti, iti vā evarūpaṁ ... manosamācāram sevato akusalā dhammā abhivaḍḍhanti kusalā dhammā parihamiyanti.” “He is malevolent in his citta, corrupt in mano and intentions (or: intentions of mano ?), and thinks: ‘May these beings be killed or slaughtered or annihilated or destroyed, or may they not exist at all’. If this kind of conduct of mano is followed, unskilled states of mind grow much, skilled states of mind decrease”.

5. Is mano personal?

The answer to this question is yes, because everything that comes in through the senses passes through mano: it must therefore be individually formed. There is also direct evidence. According to A I 170, both mano and citta are interpreted in thought-reading: “Katamaṁ ca ... ādesanāpāṭi-hāriyam? Idha ... ekacco nimittena ādisati, evaṁ pi te mano ittham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti”. “And what is the marvel of thought-reading? In this case somebody can declare by means of a sign: ‘Thus is your mano. Such and such is your mano. That is your citta’.” From this follows also that mano must have some interior organisation, but nothing is ever said directly about this matter.

6. The fate of mano.

Mano is described as changing and ephemeral. “Manāṭica paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviṁnaṇam; mano aniccā vipariṇāmī aūṇathābhāvi; dhammā aniccā vipariṇāmino aūṇathābhāvino” (S IV 69). De-
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Pendent upon mano and mental states, mano-viññāṇa arises. Mano is impermanent, changing, becoming something different. The mental states are impermanent, changing, becoming something different". — Cf. S I 116 “Tav’ eva pāpima mano tava dhammā tava mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyatanā; yattha ca kho pāpima naththi mano naththi dhammā naththi mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyatanam agati tava tattha pāpima ti”. “To you, O evil one belong (the senses and their objects and) mano, the mental states, and the field of consciousness created by contact with mano. But where there is no mano, no mental states, no field of consciousness created by contact with mano, there is no access for you, Evil One”. — Mano is therefore normally subject to change and death, but there is another possibility: to calm mano by training (in Dh 96, it is said about the arahant: “santaṇī tassa manamhi hoti”, “his mano is calm”).

7. Can mano be influenced and trained?

There are many indications in the texts that mano is to be trained and plays an important part in meditation. “Manasā saṃvuto siyā” (Dh 233). “May he practice restraint of mano”. — “Na brāhmaṇass etad akiñcī sēyyo yadā nisedho manaso piyehi” (Dh 390) “It is no slight benefit to a brahmin, when he holds his mano back from pleasures”. — “Yad āvilattām manaso-vijañña, ‘kañhassa pakkho’ ti vinodayeyya”. (SN 967) “What he recognizes to be disturbance of mano, may he drive that off as an associate of Mara”. — We find that mano should be concentrated, turned from outside things and “developed” (mano-bhāvanīyā bhikkhū, “monks who are developing mano”, D III 36). But it is also said, that one should not restrain mano from everything but only from what is evil: “Na sabbato mano nivāraye; na mano sayatattam āgatam; yato yato ca pāpakaṇī, tato tato mano nivāraye” (S I 14) “One should not restrain mano from everything: not when mano has attained self-control. Whatever is evil, one should restrain mano from that”. Mano plays in this respect a purely instrumental part: it has to do its work and then stay in the background. It is never said that mano attains liberation or that it survives death.

Vinnāṇa

General characteristics.

Vinnāṇa is a more complex concept than the two others discussed in this paper, and its unity has sometimes been denied. Here we shall first test the hypothesis that it may have been conceived as a unit. After that, we shall compare it with the other two concepts by confronting it with the same questions as we used earlier. We start by quoting some crucial passages suitable as corner-stones for a coming definition:
1. Kittāvatā nu kho viññāṇaṃ-ti vuccatiti. — Vijānāti vijānātī kho, tasmā viññāṇaṃ-ti vuccati, kiṃ ca vijānāti: sukhan-ti pi vijānāti, dukkhan-ti pi vijānāti, adukkham-asukhan-ti pi vijānāti (M I 292). “In what respect it is called viññāṇa?" “It is called viññāṇa because it notices, it notices (vijānāti: discriminates, becomes aware). And what does it notice? It notices pleasure, pain and neutral feeling”.

(In a similar definition, S III 87, a number of tastes are given as examples).

Viññāṇa therefore definitely has something to do with consciousness.

2. This is further elaborated upon in numerous passages like D III 243: “Cha viññāṇa-kāyā. Cakkhu viññāṇaṃ, sotaghāna-, jivhā-, kāya-, mano viññāṇaṃ.”

“(There are) six manifestations of viññāṇa: visual, auditory, olfactory, sapid, tactual and mental (belonging to the inner sense).”

Viññāṇa is, therefore, awareness of inner processes coming from the senses (perceptual processes) or from memory (ideational processes).

3. In S III 103 viññāṇa (just as the other khandhā) is called anicca dukkha viparināmadhamma, “impermanent, painful, liable to change”, and in the same context a way of escaping from viññāṇa (viññāṇaṃ nissaraṇam) is mentioned. Viññāṇa is, therefore, certainly a process, not an entity.

4. Through its inclusion in the paṭiccasamuppāda, between saṅkhārā and nāma-rūpa (see e.g. S II 3 f), viññāṇa is understood to be conditioned and itself a condition.

5. “Viññāṇāhāro āyatim punabhāvabhānibbattiyya paccayo.” (S II 13 “The type of food called viññāṇa is the support (cause) of renewed becoming, of birth in the future”. Viññāṇam ... mātu kuchhim na okkanissathā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātu kucchismiṃ samuccissathati?” (D II 63) “Were viññāṇa not to descend into the mother’s womb, would nāma-rūpa arise therein?” (rhetorical question).

We can conclude that viññāṇa is, in some way or other, the important agency in the Buddhist conception of rebirth.
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6. In M I 256, the view is refuted that "tad-ev' idaṃ viññānaṃ sandhāvatī samsarati, anaññān-ti", "this viññāna itself runs on, fares on, nothing else", by referring to what the Buddha had said, "paṭiccasamuppāda viññāna", "viññāna arises through condition".

Although viññāna is the agency of rebirth, it is not itself reborn: it is not some sort of permanent soul that migrates through a number of existences (the view that viññāna is atta, i.e. a permanent self, is frequently refuted, e.g. M III 18).

The background

In order to visualize a concept like this, we must keep the following considerations in mind:

1. The universe as conceived by the Buddha is governed by ethical laws. All individual life can be compared with waves of energy running through time but without material unity, consisting of individual organisms, each working its way, and by means of its activity, which is always viewed from the aspect of its ethical effectiveness, forging its own future. Although the individuals, at any chosen moment of time, are considered as separate, and although the ethics of Buddhism is not purely social, they are much closer to each other and dependent on each other than is commonly held in Western psychology: ethics is all-important. The continuity in the material diversity of the series of rebirths must be something that can transmit ethical resultants just as a wave of energy can run through different types of matter and on its way change its form because of the momentary matter and itself cause changes in the matter. This "wave of energy" is called viññāṇa.

2. We would expect that the idea of an agency of rebirth would be shaped under the impression of certain introspective observations. We would expect that certain mental contents that seemed to indicate or explain the function of kāmama in an ethical universe and, at the same time, give a foundation to the Buddhist doctrine of liberation, would have been collected to form the concept of viññāṇa. Observations of this type were maybe:

(a) the continuity of the conscious processes, (e.g. the laws of association)

(b) the inner causality, the experience of inner force (drives, needs) which are felt to be causes of actions,
An hypothesis

We formulate the hypothesis that the concept of viññāna is a unitary and empirical concept formed under the influence of observations of this type. If this is true, we would expect viññāna to be:

1. a continually flowing process (not a static structure),
2. principally dynamic, experienced as force,
3. principally conscious, but with a subconscious component, because most of the content is not always present (former existences are rarely remembered; the act of rebirth is not conscious); it should be able to remember former existences,
4. transmitter of karmic effects, modifiable by experiences,
5. a free-moving force, not bound in time and space (e.g., connected with dreams and free imaginations),
6. an explanation of rebirth in terms of consciousness,
7. a process that can be stopped and thereby the whole karmic process.

The hypothesis tested

1. Is viññāna a process?

We have already seen that viññāna is produced through the work of the senses and that it is perishable, changeable and conditioned. It was, therefore certainly not conceived as static. This view is confirmed in M I 259, "cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjate viññāṇaṃ, cakkviññāṇan-’eva saṅkhāṃ gacchati”, “if viññāna arises dependent on eye and forms it is known as visual consciousness”. In D III 105, viññāna is compared to a stream: “purisassa ca viññāṇasotaṃ pajānaṭi ubhayato abbocchhimam idhala-loke patiṭṭhitan ca paraloke patiṭṭhitaḥ ca”, “he understands a man’s viññāna-stream as uninterrupted at both ends and supported both in this world and in the other world”. Here, viññāna is visualized as a stream flowing through a string of existences, in time. What constitutes a stream is not the water-particles, which may be endlessly rearranged and even replaced by some completely different type of particles, but the energy and the momentary form.
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There are other metaphorical descriptions of viññāṇa which seem to suggest a more static structure. See e.g. A I 223: “kammaṁ khetavān viññāṇaṁ bijaṁ taṇhā sineho avijjāṁ-varaṇaṁ sattānaṁ taṇhāsaṁyojanaṁ hiṁya dhātuya viññāṇaṁ patiṭṭhitam”. “Kamma is the field, viññāṇa the seed, taṇhā the moisture. Of beings that are hindered by avijjā, fettered by taṇhā, viññāṇa gets support in low conditions”. The seed is of course changing, but still an entity. — In a parable, S IV 195, viññāṇa is personified and called the lord of the city (nagarasāmi). — In S I 122, Māra is looking for the viññāṇa of Godhika who had died. But Godhika was parinibbuta, and therefore his viññāṇa was appatiṭṭhita, i.e. “without support”, but it is taken for granted that, had it not been so, viññāṇa would have survived as an entity and therefore an easy prey to Māra. As belonging to the popular pulpit style, this should certainly not be taken too literally: usually it is emphatically stressed that khandha, of which viññāṇa is one, are dissolved at death; here viññāṇa has been used as citta is used in many similar contexts.

2. Is viññāṇa dynamic?

Viññāṇa is not described as principally dynamic, as demanded by hypothesis no. 2. This follows already from the above-mentioned definition M I 292 and from passages like D III 243, where it is given a purely cognitive and ideational function. Dynamic traits can, however, also be found. In M III 226, viññāṇa is given the attribute anusāri, “striving after”. In S III 9 f, viññāṇa is said to be rāga-vinibaddha (“tied with desire”) to rūpadhātu, vedanādhātu, saṁādhi, and sankhāradhātu, which are called the home (oka) of viññāṇa. This must mean that rāga is experienced through viññāṇa. Cf. S III 103, “yo viññāṇasmin chaḍarāgavinayo chaḍarāgapahānaṁ”, “the restraint of wish and desire, the removal of wish and desire which are in viññāṇa”, which probably refers to the confrontation of chaḍarāga with a counterforce within viññāṇa. — “Tassato upakkham abhinandato ahivadato ajjhosāya tiṭṭhato taṁ nissitaṁ hoti viññāṇan tad upādānam”. (M II 265) “If he rejoices in this equanimity, approves of it and clings to it, viññāṇa is dependent on it and grasps after it”. Here the function of clinging is attributed to viññāṇa. In S III 47, viññāṇa (and the other khanda) is given the attributes “sāsava upādāniya”, “connected with asavā and upādāna”, which could mean that these factors, as concious, work through viññāṇa. Both are at least partly dynamic qualities: upādāna means, (a) “attachment”, “clinging”, (b) “material”, “fuel”. Clinging naturally arises from taṇhā (as is said in the paticcasamuppāda-series): this conscious attachment is material for bhava; which means simply that if we want to live, we shall go on living. Cf. SN 1055:
“viññānam bhave na titthe”, “do not set your viññāya on bhava!” i.e. “do not affect a new birth by consciously striving for it!” Of special interest in this context are the four āhāra (foods, sustenances), mentioned e.g. in MI 261: kabaliṅkāra āhāra (material food), phassa (sensory contact), mano-saṅcetanā (mental striving), viññāya. It is said that they all arise from taṇhā (ime cattāro āhāra taṇhānidāna taṇhāsamudayā taṇhājātiṅka taṇhā- pabhavā) and that their purpose is to maintain creatures that have come to be, or to assist those seeking birth (“bhūtānāṁ vā sattānāṁ thitiyā sambhavesīnāṁ vā anuggahāyā”). They are, therefore, active in the process of rebirth. S II 13 is more specific and mentions only viññāṇa as having this function, while S II 101 treats them all as equally important: as targets of taṇhā, by means of which “patiṭṭhitam tattha viññāṇaṃ virūḷham” (“viññāṇa is supported and becomes fruitful”) and then “atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkantu” (“there is descent of name-and-shape”).

The meaning is perhaps that taṇhā operates through viññāṇa, although not really belonging to viññāṇa. Taṇhā may become conscious through viññāṇa: in that case we would find active processes in viññāṇa.

On the other hand, mano-saṅcetanā, which means “conscious striving”, is distinguished from viññāṇa, and therefore we must presuppose active processes outside viññāṇa. In S III 60, we find saṅcetanā identified with saṅkhāra, and the close contact between saṅkhāra and viññāṇa is well documented through the paticcasamuppaṭṭa-series. It can also be seen from the use of abhisāṅkhāra in S III 53 f. “Tad-apatiṭṭhitam viññāṇam avirūḷham anabhisaṅkhāraṅca vimuttaṁ”, “Without that support viññāṇa has no growth, is without saṅkhāra and is freed”. According to M III 279 f, vedana, sañña, saṅkhāra and viññāṇa arise because of phassa (mano-samphassa- paccayā): so they are all parallel and, at least partly, conscious.

Saṅkhāra has not been included for analysis in this study, but we can refer to a study by Jayatilleke (“Some problems of translation and interpretation”, UCR, vol. VII, 1949, p. 208-225), where it is shown that saṅkhāra is a dynamic concept, best described by words like “purposive activity”, “dispositions”, “vital impulse” and that it covers also subconscious processes. If we need not imply a time-sequence but could treat viññāṇa and saṅkhāra as complementary concepts (this will be discussed below), the two together would satisfy our search for a dynamic agency. Jayatilleke seems to imply this interpretation when he says that “… the probability is...that this part of the stream of Consciousness consisted of these dynamic saṅkhāras ...”
3. Has viññāṇa a subconscious component?

We have noted that viññāṇa in principle is consciousness and need not collect more evidence for this. But in order to explain the continuity, the influence of kamma, and the possibility to remember former existences, we assumed an unconscious component in viññāṇa. This is rarely mentioned. It can, however, be seen from D III 134, that viññāṇa is used in connection with recollection of former existences: “Atitam ... addhānaṃ ārabhba Tathāgatassa satānusāriviññāṇanā hoti”, “concerning the past, the Tathāgata has viññāṇa reminiscent of existences”. Concerning a possible unconscious component, we have found only one passage worth discussing. In S II 65, two factors of importance for rebirth are distinguished, “Yañca ... ceteti yañ ca pakappeti yañca anuseti, ārammaṇanā etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā, ārammaṇe sati paṭitthā viññāṇassa hoti”. “That which we will and that which we intend and that which lies as dormant tendencies — this becomes a basis for a state (prevalence, duration) of viññāṇa. If the basis is there, there will be a state of viññāṇa”. A few lines further down, this group of verbs is divided into two, and it turns out that ceteti and pakappeti are not necessary as basis for the state of viññāṇa: anuseti is sufficient: “No ce ... ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇanā etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā, ārammaṇe sati paṭitthā viññāṇassa hoti”. “Even if we do not will or intend, but there still is a dormant tendency — this becomes a basis for a state of viññāṇa. If the basis is there, there will be a state of viññāṇa”. As anuseti probably refers to unconscious, i.e. latent, processes: tendencies and dispositions (the translation of Woodward misses the point), this could be taken as a proof of the close connection between viññāṇa and the unconscious.

The attempt to find an unconscious component in viññāṇa has not been very successful. One explanation could be the process-character and indistinctness of viññāṇa: the unconscious aspects may be there without being expressed. Another explanation may be found in the close association between viññāṇa and saṅkhāra: as mentioned above, saṅkhāra has an unconscious component.

4. Is viññāṇa the transmitter of karma?

The karmic effects (the karmic memory) are connected to viññāṇa. “Avijjā-gato yañ ... purisapuggalo puññāṃ ce saṅkhāram abhisāṅkharoti, puññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇam. Apuññāṇaṃ ce saṅkhāram abhisāṅkharoti, apuññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇam”. (S II 82) “If an ignorant man performs an act of merit, viññāṇa becomes pure (“acquires merit”). If he performs
5. Is free ideation attributed to viññāṇa?

Little is said in the Nikāyas about dreams, but free ideation is often connected with viññāṇa. We find, for instance, the expression mano-viññāṇa, “the viññāṇa of the inner sense”, see e.g. M III 32: “mano-viññāṇa-viññātabba dhamma”, “conscious processes cognizable through the viññāṇa of the inner sense”. An example of what may be included in mano-viññāṇa is given in M I 293: “Nissāṭṭhena ... pañcahi indriyehi parissuddhena mano-viññāṇena kim neyyan-ti. — Nissāṭṭhena ... pañcahi indriyehi parissuddhena mano-viññāṇena ananto ākāso ti ākāsānācayatamaṁ neyyan, anantaṁ viññāṇan-ti viññāṇacayatanaṁ neyyan, nathi kūcīti akiñcānā ṇāyatanaṁ neyyam-ti”. “What is knowable by purified viññāṇa of the inner sense, without use of the five sense-organs? — Thinking, ‘Space is unlimited’, the plane of unlimited space is knowable by pure (meaning “by itself” or “clear”) viññāṇa of the inner sense without use of the five sense-organs; thinking, ‘Viññāṇa is unlimited’; the plane of unlimited viññāṇa is knowable; thinking, ‘There is nothing at all’, the plane of emptiness is knowable”. Here we find examples of purely conscious activity without direct support from the senses. Probably all such “free” activity is a function of viññāṇa. This interpretation seems to be confirmed in S III 68, where different types of viññāṇa are enumerated (the formulation indicates that the enumeration is intended to be complete): “Yaṁ kiṁci viññāṇam atitānāgatarappacchannam ajjhattam vā bahiddhā vā olārikam vā sukhumāṁ vā hīnaṁ vā paniṭaṁ vā, yaṁ dūre santiṁ vā ...” “Every viññāṇa whatever, be it past, future or present, be it inward or outward, gross or subtle, low or high, far or near ...” This enumeration is strange if it were to mean the different types of viññāṇa found in different people rather than the changing conscious contents, e.g., ideas concerning the past, ideas concerning the remote, concerning low things, external things, and so on.

We conclude that free mental activity is a function of viññāṇa and that our hypothesis is satisfied on this point.

6. Can viññāṇa explain rebirth?

Essential for rebirth are, according to A I 223, already quoted, kamma, avijjā, tanha, and viññāṇa. “We note the presence of the dynamic factor
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tañhā here. More often, the three factors saïkhāra, viññāna and nāma-rūpa are said to constitute the mechanism of rebirth (cf. D II 63 quoted above). Saïkhāra corresponds to kamma in the former enumeration.

There is an affinity between kamma and the next existence: “kamma dāyādā sattā ti vadāmi” (M I 390). “I say: creatures are heirs to actions”. For instance, a person who performs aggressive acts of body, speech and thought is reborn in an aggressive world (savyāpajjhān lokam uppajjati): there he is affected by aggressive phassā, and from them aggressive vedanā arise (A I 122, M I 389).

The conscious wish for rebirth plays an important part in the rebirth-process. One of the āsavā is bhavāsava. This wish comes to expression through viññāna, and you can “set viññāna on becoming”, with the phrasing used in SN 1055 quoted above. In other cases, citta is used in this context: “Tassa evaṁ hoti: Aho vatāhan, kāyassa bhedā parammaranā khattiya-mahāsālānam sahavyatam uppajjeyyan ti. So tāṁ cittaṁ dathati, tāṁ cittam adhiṭṭhāti tāṁ cittaṁ bhāveti; tassa te saïkhārā ca viññā phāvitā bāhulikatā tatr' uppattiya saṁvattanti. Ayaṁ ... maggo ayaṁ paṭipada tatr' uppattiya saṁvattati” (M III 99 f). “It occurs to him: “O that at the breaking up of the body after dying I might arise in companionship with the nobles’. This citta he holds fixed, firmly established, and develops it. These aspirations (saïkhārā) and this insisting of his, developed thus, zealously practiced, conduce to rebirth there. This is the way, this is the course that conduces to rebirth there”. Cf. the similar passage in D III 258 and D I 20, both already quoted. The actions of a person may also bear fruit in this life: Aṅgulimāla, for instance (M II 97-105) was a robber who became an arahant. This did not save him from being severely wounded by sticks and stones that were not aimed at him. The Buddha explained it as a fruit of his kamma.

Rebirth is to Buddhism not a metaphysical theory but an empirical fact. An adequately trained person can recall his former existences and even those of other persons. The general idea of mental causality was probably common at the time of the Buddha, and he had only to stress that it functions according to strict ethical rules. Its functioning can often be observed in the present life, where many happenings seem to be rewards and punishments. As the law of kamma is causal and moral and works through consciousness by means of affinities, it is well known and can be manipulated. Consciousness was felt to be the medium of this law, pro-
bably of the following reasons: (a) The actions (behaviour, speech, thoughts) are, or can become, conscious. (b) They are automatically judged in consciousness as good or bad (or, more scientifically, as kusala or akusala). (c) Consciousness is felt to change through the influence of dynamic factors, and of impressions from the outside. (d) Consciousness is felt to be able to influence matter and transcend matter, (e) Consciousness can be changed through training.

As viññāṇa is in its rebirth-aspect felt to be empirical and to consist of processes only, without much inner unity, there is no reason to distinguish between the perceptual viññāṇa and rebirth-viññāṇa. These are the following positive reasons for not doing so: (a) When viññāṇa in paticcasamuppāda-context is analyzed, it is done according to sense-fields (S II 3 f). This may not mean that viññāṇa consists of these parts, but only that any conscious process may be seen from these aspects. (b) Satikhāra, which in some contexts is analyzed into bodily, verbal and mental activity (S II 3 f), in other contexts according to sense-fields (S III 60), can influence viññāṇa through ordinary sense-channels. (c) As we have already seen, viññāṇa is connected with and influenced by upādāna and taṇhā which are both ordinary conscious processes, said to condition rebirth. (d) Rebirth can partly be directed through conscious wishes as described above. (e) In nibbāna the rebirth-viññāṇa has ceased. This is expressed in the following way in S I 116: “Tav’eva pāpima mano tava dhāmmā tava mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyatanam. Yattha ca kho pāpima natthi mano natthi dhāmmā natthi mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyatanam agati tava tattha pāpima ti”. “Yours, O Evil One, is only mano, the mental content and the field of viññāṇa produced through contact with mano (the other sense-fields mentioned before in the same way). But where none of them exist, there is no access for you, Evil One.” — A person who has attained nibbāna is therefore free from perception-viññāṇa and free from Māra. So the two types of viññāṇa are quite clearly considered as identical.

Sometimes viññāṇa is found twice in the same context, and it may be difficult to decide, whether the same meaning is intended or not. See, e.g., M III 260: “Na viññāṇam upādiyissāmi, na ca me viññāṇanissitāṁ viññānaṁ bhavissati”. “I will not grasp after viññāṇa and so will have no viññāṇa dependent on viññāṇa”. The same is said about a large number of cognitive factors and the other khandhā. That is, to say, that there is a form of viññāṇa dependent on cognitive processes, and probably viññāṇa in its rebirth-aspect is intended, as the context deals with meditation. As
the factors mentioned are mostly perceptions and ideas without much mystery about them, rebirth-viññāṇa probably also simply is ordinary consciousness. It would be strange to maintain, e.g., that a metaphysical viññāṇa could arise from the cognitive viññāṇa: they must both consist of similar conscious processes.

This explanation can apply also to passages as the following. “Yo viññāṇe chañḍarāgavinyo chañḍarāgapañchañāṇam, idaṃ viññāṇe nissaranāṃ” (M III 18). “The removal and rejection of need and desire for viññāṇa is an escape from viññāṇa”. The rebirth-aspect is probably intended in the second place. But a simpler explanation is that it is possible to get rid of viññāṇa (in all aspects) (just as the other khandhā) simply by not needing it. The same idea is more elaborately expressed in S III 53: “(Rūpaññhātuyā ..., Vedanāyā dhātuyā ..., Saññāñhātuyā ..., Sañkhārāñhātuyā ...), Viññāṇa-dhātuyā ce ... bhikkhuno rāgo pahino hoti, rāgassa pahānā vacchijjatā-rammaṇām patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti”. “If desire for (body, feeling, perception, activities and viññāṇa be abandoned by a monk, by that abandonment of desire its foothold is cut off, and there is no support for viññāṇa.” This could mean that through freedom from the sense-perception-viññāṇa (together with the other khandhā), viññāṇa (in its rebirth-aspect) is without support and — as the text continues — becomes anabhisaṅkhāra (free from kamma-accumulations) and parinibbāyati (attains parinibbāna). This is an interesting attempt to connect the khandha-series with the paṭiccasamuppādaseries.

A way of attaining this cessation of viññāṇa (with reference both to the khandha-context and its paṭiccasamuppāda-context) is perhaps hinted at in D I 223, where it is asked where the elements find no footing. The answer is: “Viññāṇam anidassanam anantaṃ sabbato paham. Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vayo na gādhati. Ettha dighaṁ ca rassāṁ ca anuṁ thūlaṁ subhāśubham. Ettha nāmaṁ ca rūpaṁ ca asesāṁ uparujjhāti. Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth’ etāṁ uparujjhāti”. “Viññāṇa is without attributes, endless, drawing back from everything. Here earth, water, fire, and wind, and long and short, fine and coarse, pleasant and unpleasant find no footing. Here nāma and rūpa are destroyed without trace. By the cessation of viññāṇa all this also ceases to be”. According to the commentary viññāṇassa nirodha means nībbaṇa. In the first line a special level of meditation seems to be intended (the limitless viññāṇa, where no specified objects are experienced. This practice may end up in the cessation of viññāṇa: that is, rebirth-viññāṇa is made to cease by means of emptying the empirical viññāṇa — because they are identical).
7. Can viññāṇa be stopped?

Because of its prominent part in the mechanism of rebirth, viññāṇa is a central concept in the process of liberation. "Yam kiñci dukkhaṁ sam-bhoti, sabbam viññāṇa-paccaya (SN 734), "Whatever pain arises, is all in consequence of viññāṇa: A way to become free from suffering is to calm viññāṇa: "Etam ādīnavaṁ ēvatā dukkhaṁ viññāṇapaccaya' viññāṇapasadām bhikkhu nicchāto parinibbuto" (SN 735). "Knowing this evil consequence that suffering is born of viññāṇa, the monk after calming viññāṇa is free from desire and attains parinibbāna". — "Bahiddhā ... viññāṇe avikkhitte avisate sati ajjhattam asaññhite, anupādāya aparitassato āyatim jātijāmaraṇa-dukkhasamudaya-sambhavo na hoti" (M III 223). "If viññāṇa is undistracted and unbound externally and free internally, then for him who thus does not crave and grasp, there will be no origin or rise of the suffering connected with birth, old age and death". The calming of viññāṇa is here described as freeing from craving and grasping.

In other contexts, the frequently occurring word nirodha, "cessation", is used: "Ajjhattaṁ ca bahiddhā ca vedanāṁ nābhīnandato, evam satassa carato viññāṇam uparujhati" (SN 1111). "For him who both inwardly and outwardly does not delight in vedanā (sensation, feeling), for him who thus lives mindful, viññāṇa ceases". — "Ye ca kho keci ... saṁaññā vā brahmaṁ vā evam viññāṇan abhiññāya evam viññānasamudayaṁ abhiññāya evam viññāṇanirodhāṁ abhiññāya evam viññāṇa-nirodhaminnāni paṭipadaṁ abhiññāya viññāṇassa nibbidā viagā nirodha anupaṭā vimuttā te suvimuttā." (S III 61) "Moreover, whatsoever recluses or brahmans, by thus fully understanding viññāṇa, its arising, its ceasing and the way leading to its ceasing by the disgust, at by the fading out of, by the ceasing of viññāṇa are liberated without grasping, — they are truly liberated". As pointed out in connection with D I 223, there may not be any fundamental contradiction between calming and cessation.

In, for instance, S III 61 and M I 53, the way to the cessation of viññāṇa is indicated: the noble eightfold way ("Ayam eva ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo viññāṇanirodhagāmini paṭipadā"). Most important in this connection are the exercises belonging to samādhi, where viññāṇa frequently is mentioned. See, for instance, M I 293, referred to above, where three of the higher levels of meditation are attributed to viññāṇa: the level of unlimited space, of unlimited viññāṇa and of emptiness. We find frequently a more complete description of the different levels, where however the experiences are
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said to be achieved by means of saññā. To sum up the sequence, we find that separate ideas first are gradually expelled from consciousness, starting with the cognitive ideas: feelings remain but give way to a general experience of equanimity; by expelling all cognitive ideas of separate objects, it is possible to visualize the empty and infinite space. (D I 183: bhikkhu sabbaso rūpasaññānaṁ samatikkamma patīgha-saññānaṁ athagamaṁ nānattasaññānaṁ amanasi-kārā 'ananto ākoso ti ākāsanañcañpayatananm upasampajja viharati”, “the monk, by passing beyond the perception of form, by putting an end to sense-reaction, by paying no attention to perceptions of diversity thinks: “The space is infinite”, and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of infinite space”). This experience is then made still more abstract and contentless by being directed inwards and changed to a visualization of consciousness (always: viññāna) as infinite. Here, the distinction between internal and external has gone (D I 183 f: “bhikkhu sabbaso ākāsanañcañpayatanam samatikkamma ‘anantaṁ viññāpan’tī viññānañcañpayatanam upasampajja viharati’, “the monk, by passing quite beyond the mental state of infinite space thinks: ‘consciousness is infinite’ and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of infinite consciousness”). Then the monk tries to get rid also of the visualization of viññāna and replaces it with the experience that neither this endless consciousness nor anything else exists: he is then above both objects and their names and visualizes endless emptiness (D I 184: “bhikkhu sabbaso viññānañcañpayatanam samatikkamma ‘nā‘atthi kiñciti’ ākīñcaññāyatanam upasampajja viharati”, “the monk, by passing quite beyond the mental state of infinite consciousness, thinks: ‘nothing exists’, and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of nothingness”). The normal function of consciousness, to present information in images and symbols, is now nearly thrown out of gear by letting one single image, which is so vague it is nearly no information at all (“nothing is”), fill the whole consciousness. Through its very vagueness, the image is close to abolishing itself; and with it, consciousness in the ordinary sense also goes. This is what happens in the next stage, a transitional stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (S IV 217: “nevasaññānasaññāyatananm samāpannassa ākīñcaññāyatanasaññā niruddhā hoti”, “when one has attained the mental state of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the consciousness of nothingness has ceased”). Then the summit is reached:

“So kho ahaṁ Ānanda apareṇa samayena sabbaso nevasaññānā- saññāyatananm samatikkamma saññāvedayitanirodham upasampajja viharāmi, paññāya ca me disvā āsava parikhayaṁ agamanṣu.” (A IV 448). “And presently, Ananda, passing wholly beyond the mental state
of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, I entered and abode in the cessation of perception and feeling and I saw by wisdom that the obsessions were completely destroyed”.

The last passage describes a state of trance where the ordinary, everyday consciousness does not function (further description follows). It is of special interest to note, that this experience here is said to be accompanied by the knowledge that āsavā are destroyed. This usually means that the person has attained nibbāna.

This passage may be compared with M III 32, a part of which has been discussed already. It is said that when the desire (tanha, among others) for all the sense data has been stopped — “then I know that my citta is freed”. And the whole passage is summarized in the following words: “Evaṃ kho me ... jānato evam passato imesu chasu ajjhattikabāhi resu āyatanesu anupādāya āsavachī cittaṁ vimuttan ti”. “So, as I know thus and see thus in respect of these six internal and external sense-fields, I can say that my citta is freed from the āsavā without grasping”. Here, the experience of liberation is put in direct connection with the facts of sense-perception and sense-vīññāna: liberation is attained by stopping the need for them.

So far, it seems that saññāvedayitanirodha is identical with vīññāna-nirodha. There is nothing impossible in that interpretation, as consciousness (in the ordinary sense) certainly is made to stop in the summit of meditation, and when consciousness goes, the desires that work through it, and the feeling of pain must also go. Vīññāna is sometimes identified with saññā and vedanā: “Yā ca ... vedanā yā ca saññā yañca vīññānam ime dhammā samsattā no visamsattā, na ca labbā imesam dhammānaṁ vīññhujitvā vīññhujitvā nānākaraṇaṁ paññāpetum” (M I 293). “That which is feeling and that which is perception and that which is vīññāna — these states are related, not unrelated, and it is not possible to lay down a difference between these states, having analyzed them again and again”.

According to D III 228 (to be discussed later), on the other hand, vīññāna depends on saññā.

In M I 296, a dead man is compared with a man who has attained saññāvedayitanirodha:

(a) The living body has:
āyu, vitality
usmā, heat
vīññāṇa.
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(b) In the dead body:
- kāyasāṅkhārā niruddhā, bodily action has ceased
- vacīsāṅkhārā niruddhā, verbal activity has ceased
- cittasaṅkhārā niruddhā, mental activity has ceased
- āyu parikkhīno, the vitality is destroyed
- usmā vūpasantā, the heat is calmed
- indriyāni viparībhinnāni, the sense-functions are broken asunder.

(c) In the person who has attained saññāvedayitanirodha:
- kāyasāṅkhārā niruddhā, bodily action has ceased
- vacīsāṅkhārā niruddhā, verbal activity has ceased
- cittasaṅkhārā niruddhā, mental activity has ceased
- āyu aparikkhīno, the vitality is not destroyed
- usmā avūpasantā, the heat is not calmed
- indriyāni vipassannāni, the sense functions are purified.

We find that the question about the fate of viññāna is evaded. The expression “indriyāni vipassannāni” seems rather to imply that the chances of fine and accurate perceptions have become better. On the other hand it would, strictly speaking, follow from the cessation of the three saṅkhāra that viññāna also has ceased.

From this discussion, the conclusion cannot be drawn that saññāvedayitanirodha could be identified with nibbāna and nibbāna therefore be some sort of unconsciousness. The saññāvedayitanirodha is a state of short duration, and it does not seem to have been much cultivated. But the levels below this have been highly estimated as workable means to get rid of desires and worries (dissolve them, not “repress” them) and to deprive sense—objects of their interest. The ideal was perhaps to make consciousness permanently free from attributes and limits (D I 223). So, even conscience would stop working (Dh 267) and the monk would not be aware of any karmic consequences of his acts.

A systematic summary

We shall now try to define viññāna by asking the same questions as used earlier in this paper.

1. Is viññāna consciousness?

We have already quoted evidence for a positive answer (M 292, D III 243). There is small evidence for an unconscious component (S II 65).
2. **Is viññāya an entity?**

It is possible to find passages, e.g. S IV 195 and S I 122, already quoted, which could favour an entity-theory, but in general, *viññāya* is described in process-terms. It arises as a product: “cakkhuṇca paṭicca rūpe ca uppaį- ati viññāṇam, cakkhuviññāṇan-ṭ’eva saṅkham gacchati” (M I 259), “if viññāna arises dependent on eye and forms, it is called eye-viññāna”; and so on for the other senses. It depends on the body: “Ayaṁ kho me kāyo rūpi ..., idāñ ca pana me viññāṇam ettha sitāṁ ettha paṭibaddhaṁ” (D I 76). “This body of mine has form ...; and therein is this viññāya of mine bound up, on that does it depend”. It appears and disappears depending on conditions: “Ṣaṅkhārasamudayā viññāṇasamudayo, sankhāranirodha viññāṇanirodho, ayam-eva ariyo aṭṭhānākho maggo viññāṇa-nirodha gāmīni paṭipada” (M I 53), “From the arising of activities viññāya arises; from the stopping of activities, viññāya stops; from the stopping of activities, viññāya stops; the way leading to the stopping of viññāya is this noble eightfold path”.

3. **Is viññāya an instrument?**

When *viññāya* is described in process-terms, an instrumental function is usually not pointed out. However, as consciousness, it has the function of “making things known” to the person (M I 292, quoted above). This is said quite clearly in M III 242: “Athāparam viññāna yeva avasissati parisuddham pariyoḍataṁ, tena viññāṇena kiñci jānati. — Sukhaṁ ti pi vijānati; dukkhaṁ ti pi vijānati; adukkhā-asaṅkhaṁ ti pi vijānati”, “Thereupon viññāna alone will be left which is quite pure and clean. With that viññāna he knows something: he becomes aware of pleasure, he becomes aware of pain and he becomes aware of neutral feeling.”

4. **Functions of viññāya**

(a) **Perception.** *Viññāya* has a perceptive function and its processes are classified according to senses. In M I 293, quoted above, it is stated that it is not possible to lay down any difference between *vedanā*, *saṅñana* and *viññāna*. According to D II 338, the body (kāya) can perceive things through the senses and become aware of mental states through mano (manasā pi dhammatikā vijanāti), only if it has life, heat and viññāna. — In M III 32 a distinction is made between (need for) “cakkhusmiṁ ..., rūpe, cakkhuviññāne, cakkhuviññāna-viññātabbesu dhammesu” and so on down to “manasmiṁ ... dhamme manoviññāne manoviññāna-viññātabbesu dhammesu”. “Eye, form, visual viññāna, ideas cognizable through visual *viññāna*
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... mano, idea, mano-viññāna, ideas cognizable through mano-viññāna”. What is meant here is probably:

For the five senses:

- sense-organ
- object, stimulus
- perceptual images
- mental images

For mano:

- the inner sense
- ideas, mental images
- conscious manipulation. (Cf. M I 293)
- images of memory, imagination, etc.

To every sense-field belong dhamma, i.e. mental images, which can be experienced and “understood” through the viññāna of that field, and, as dhamma, constituting the field also of mano. Mano receives the perceptual images belonging to the senses; they are interpreted and manipulated (for instance, in thinking) by manoviññāna; but mano has also dhamma of its own, namely the images produced in memory and imagination; these may be referred to here as manoviññānaviññātabba dhamma.

Sānā and vedanā could perhaps be called part-functions of viññāna, although by viññāna is understood mainly the end-product of the perceptual process: the resulting images and ideas, and has perhaps an interpreting, understanding and manipulating function. It is therefore further removed from the real objects than the two other functions. Mano is here described as especially concerned with the images of memory, imagination and thinking. It is doing the basic work for viññāna, just as the other senses, but is, according to modern ways of viewing these matters, on a higher level as it is working with material that has probably already been conscious in one form or another or formed in the “subconscious”.

Further support for the view that viññāna is in some way based on sānā and vedanā is provided by the following two passages. In D III 228 are mentioned the four supports of viññāna, among them: “Saññūpāyaṃ vā ... viññānaṃ tiṣṭhammaṇaṃ tiṣṭhita saññārammaṇaṃ saññāpatiṭhāṃ nandūpavesaṇaṃ vuddhiṃ virūhīṃ vepulaṃ āpajjati”. “Viññāna is firmly supported by means of sānā, with sānā as object, with sānā as support, it attains to happiness, growth, increase and full development”. In S III 9 f, rūpadhātu, vedanādhātu, saññādhātu and sañkhāradhātu are called the “home” of viññāna. — It should on the other hand not be forgotten that sānā often is used for “higher” mental functions than perception.
This view about saṁñña and viññāṇa does not agree with a passage in E. R. Sarathchandra, “Buddhist psychology of perception” (1958), where it is said; “In the Nikāya formulas of sense-perception saṁñña is said to occur after viññāṇa, and ... we might infer that saṁñña meant a later stage in the process ...” (p. 16). He bases this view on M I 111 f: “cakkhu ca paṭice ca uppaṭjati cakkhuviññāṇanam, tuṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccaya vedanā, yaṁ vedeti taṁ sañjānati, yaṁ sañjānati taṁ vitakketi”. “Dependent on the eye and forms arises visual perception, the concurrence of the three is contact, dependent on contact is feeling (and sensation), what one feels one recognizes and what one recognizes one thinks about”. If a temporal sequence were implied here, saṁñña would come after viññāṇa. But as Professor Jayatilleke has pointed out (‘Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge’, London, 1963, p. 435 f), vedanā, saṁñña and vitakka could be meant to occur simultaneously with phassa. Grammatically, “tuṇṇaṁ ... vitakketi” can be taken as an appositional expansion of “cakkhuviññāṇanam”, explaining the whole viññāṇa-process.

(b) Higher intellectual functions

Attention is not usually attributed to viññāṇa, but as every conscious function it can be disturbed. “Tathā tathā ... bhikkhu upaparikkheyya, yathā yathā upaparikkhatō bahiddhā cassa viññāṇam avikkhittam hoti avisaṭṭam ajjhattam asaññhitam anupādāya aparitassato āyatam jātijarā-maraṇaḍukkhasamudayaṃ asambhavo na hoti”. (I 93 f). “A monk should investigate (things) in such a way that his viññāṇa, as he investigates, is not scattered and rambling externally and also not unconcentrated internally. And without grasping, as he is without craving, there shall be no arising in the future of suffering resulting from birth, old age and death”. What is referred to here, is not so much attention in connection with perception but in connection with intellection. This free ideational activity is often attributed to viññāṇa, as already mentioned (M I 293, S III 68). As to memory, it is said that viññāṇa remembers former existences (D III 134), but viññāṇa does not operate through the ordinary memory.

(c) Feelings and emotions

We have already shown that feelings belong to viññāṇa (M III 242, M I 292). Emotions are never mentioned in connection with viññāṇa.

(d) Dynamic and moral traits

We refer to a previous discussion which shows that viññāṇa to some extent has a dynamic side. It is rarely mentioned in connection with the moral side of man’s behaviour.
5. Is viññāṇa personal?

Viññāṇa must be personal as so great a part of the conscious life of the person is contained in it. It is also sometimes — against the general trend — personified to some sort of personality (S IV 195, S I 122, as quoted above). Usually it is stressed that viññāṇa should not be identified with the self: “na viññāṇam attato samanupassati, na viññāṇavantāṁ vā attānāṁ, nattani vā viññāṇam, na viññāṇasmim vā attānām”. (M III 18) “He does not regard viññāṇa as self, nor self as having viññāṇa, nor viññāṇa as in self, nor self as in viññāṇa”. And S III 68 “... sabban viññāṇam netam mama neso’ham’asmi na neso attāti evam etam yathābhūtāṁ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbam”. “All viññāṇa must be thus regarded, as it really is, by right insight: “this is not mine; this is not I; this is not my self”. Its inner organisation is of course effectively masked through its subdivision according to sense-fields, and therefore its personal uniqueness can be denied as thoroughly as is done here. Still, the viññāṇa that is effective in the process of birth is entirely personal.

6. Can viññāṇa be influenced or trained?

As viññāṇa has nothing to do with emotions and the moral behaviour of man, it need not be trained in the same way as citta. The process of meditation, however, is much concerned with viññāṇa. As we have already seen, the purpose of these exercises is to stop and tranquillize the conscious processes, and then empty the internal space and break its limitations. In this way, calmness and detachment can be effected. Finally, consciousness temporarily can be made to cease completely. A rich variation of methods has been devised for this purpose.

Comparisons

Table 1 is a semantic differential offered as a summary of our findings. It is constructed as a quantitative rating-scale: to the left we find the variables which we have considered in this work, and the columns correspond to the degree in which the concepts are endowed with the attribute.

Column O: no trace of this attribute has been found in connection with the concept, or, a clear statement is found that this attribute is lacking.

1: doubtful references to the attribute are found in connection with the concept.

2: It is fairly certain that the attribute can be ascribed to the concept.

3: It is clearly and unequivocally stated that the concept has this attribute.
A rating-scale is meant to be exact and looks very quantitative and reliable, so it must be clearly stated that a good deal of subjective judgement is involved in it. To make it easier for the reader to form his own judgement (and perhaps make his own ratings), we append a few references which can be looked up in this paper.

In some cases, a concept has been given two ratings, namely, when clear statements for both can be found. There is then a contradiction in the concept itself.

From the chart we find that all our concepts are conscious (including or consisting of conscious processes), changing, personal and complex (in the sense that they have many functions and are not described without contradictions).

None of them corresponds to our concepts of personality and the ego, although both citta and viññāṇa are very central concepts (i.e. have central functions, essential for the person, and therefore close to identification with the ego). They are all more or less empirical concepts, although metaphysical aspects are mentioned in connection with viññāṇa and citta. Mano seems to be more instrumental, more like a center with defined functions than the other two: it is just given, like the other senses, and is never said to be caused or conditioned: it seems to be an organ like eyes and ears and therefore given in birth; whether it can be changed or improved by training is also doubtful.

As to the functions, the chart gives a fairly clear picture. Mano is the center for perception (to which also feeling belongs), attention, ideation, memory, and thinking, so far clearly a cognitive center. It has also an active and directive side, but engaged only in the higher directive processes, in which the original needs are less important than planning, consistency, will and character; it is therefore important as a moral agency.

Citta is sensitive to information and can be developed more than the others. It can be made an instrument for thought processes and especially super-knowledge. But originally it is afflicted with all the primitive and morally objectionable emotions and selfish needs. It can be trained to stability and purposive energy and plays then a more central part in the moral behaviour than mano.

Viññāṇa is less active than the other two. It is engaged in perception (and feeling) and ideation but plays no prominent part in the higher cognitive processes. Except for its karma-transmitting functions (about which very little is said and in which perhaps saṅkhāra plays a more important part), it would have been simply a name for perceptive and ideative processes.


## A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

### Chart 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semantic Differential</th>
<th>0</th>
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<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>v</td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td>m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>m</td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td>v</td>
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<td>Conscious</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td>m</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>v</td>
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<td>v</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>m</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surviving</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>(v)</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td>m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused</td>
<td>m</td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>c</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>m</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Can be trained</td>
<td></td>
<td>m</td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
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<td>Attains liberation</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>(v)</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>m</td>
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<td></td>
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### Functions

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<td>c</td>
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<td>m</td>
<td>v</td>
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<td>Intelligence, thought</td>
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<td>m</td>
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<td>m</td>
<td>v</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c</td>
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<td>m</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moral traits</td>
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### The concept

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<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>m</td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td>v</td>
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</table>
A. citta


B. mano


C. viññāṇa

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Relations

1. Viññāṇa forms part of both the khandha-series: rūpa, vedanā, saṁkṣāra, saṅkhāra, viññāṇa, and the paṭiccasamuppāda-series. The former is the factors constituting personality or the aspects under which it may be seen. The latter is a similar but much more elaborate series of psychological factors, arranged in a sequence of dependence. It has sometimes been called a causal nexus, but positive correlation rather than causal necessity is implied in paṭicca. Therefore, the series should primarily be taken as a series of correlative interdependences: a time-sequence is certainly implied in some cases but in principle all the links may well be simultaneous. The purpose of the series seems to have been to explain man’s natural state of dukkha (bhava, jāti, jāra-maraṇa etc.) and show a way to overcome it. The starting point is sometimes said to be avijjā, sometimes viññāṇa, and it is usually stressed that dukkha can be eradicated by the cessation (niruddha) of these and the other factors.

A strict time-sequence cannot have been intended, as different arrangements can be found, and an interdependence is sometimes stressed. In M I 261, for instance, it is said “cattāro āhāra taṇḍhānādā taṇḍhāsambudaya taṇḍhājātikā taṇḍhāpabhava”, “the four types of provision (to which phassa, manosaṅcetanā and viññāṇa belong) have thirst as the provenance, thirst as source, thirst as birth, thirst as origin”. In the paṭiccasamuppāda-series, taṇḍhā comes later than viññāṇa. And according to S II 13 “viññāṇabhāro āyatim punabhāvābhīnabbatiyā paccayo”, “the consciousness-provision is the condition of renewed becoming and birth in the future”: only after that, the six sense-fields and contact are mentioned. In D II 32 and 63 it is stated that nāmarūpa depends on viññāṇa, which itself depends on nāmarūpa. — In M I 261 we find the sequence phassa—vedanā—taṇḍhā—viññāṇa—nāhaṇā. — In S II 3 ff, saṅkhāra is analyzed into kāya-, vāc- and citta-saṅkhāra (of which the last-mentioned in S IV 293 is analyzed into saṁkṣāra and vedanā).

— Nāma is divided into vedanā, saṁkṣāra, cetasā, phassa and manasikāra. The result is, that vedanā comes to be contained three times in the series, saṁkṣāra twice and phassa twice. The interpretation of avijjā and saṅkhāra as belonging to a previous existence is impossible, as it would make nībbanā unattainable in this life: nībbanā is the cessation of dukkha which is effected through the cessation of avijjā. But it is impossible to eradicate the avijjā of a former existence. It must be maintained that the present dukkha depends on a present avijjā: that is the condition for making them both cease. We conclude that interdependence rather than a strict time-sequence was intended.
Both the khandha-enumeration and the paticcasamuppāda-series can be seen as an analysis of personality. The emphasis is different, and they are constructed for different purposes, but the contents are the same in principle. All the khandhā can be found at least once in the paticcasamuppāda-series as explained in S II 3 ff. The correlational aspect can be found also in the khandhā as viññāna is said to depend on the other khandhā (S III 55).

In the following formulations the common ground of the two series is stressed: “n’ atthi khandhādisā dukkha” (Dh 202), “there is no pain like khandhā”; “paticcasamuppānā ... pañc’-upādānakhandhā” (M I 191) “the origin of the five khandhā is conditioned”, “ime ... upādānakhandhā chandamūlaka” (M III 16), “these khandhā have desire as root”. In the last quotation chanda is used for “desire”, but its meaning is not far removed from tanhā which we find in the paticcasamuppāda-series. Citta is freed by loosing interest in the khandhā (M III 30), that are dissolved only in death (M I 49, “khandhānam bhedo ... idam vucaeti maraṇam”). In S III 59-61, on the other hand, the cessation of the khandhā is aimed at: “Ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo rūpa-(vedana-, saññā-, saṅkhāra-, viññāna-) nirodhagāmini paṭipada”, “this noble eightfold path is the way to the cessation of form (feeling, perception, purposive activity, viññān).”

It is interesting to note that viññāṇa in some cases is said to depend on tanhā, in other cases on saṅkhāra, as these are the two active, dynamic factors in the paticcasamuppāda-series, partly because we here find the dynamic counterpart to viññāṇa which itself is conceived as rather passive, partly because we are reminded of the current psychoanalytic theory that consciousness has originated as vicarious satisfactions of frustrated needs.

2. It is a distinctive feature of the processes belonging to mano (M III 216), saññā (A III 413), phassa, vedanā, viññāṇa, tanhā (S II 3 ff), that when analyzed, they always have been broken up according to the six sense-fields (saḷāyatanam). By breaking them up in this abstract way, their unity can be denied and their identification with the self be prevented. Only citta is never analyzed in this way. Table 2 is an attempt to show the relations between the concepts treated in this paper. A few explanations follow. (a) The general outline of the chart has been derived from M III 32, where the crucial concepts are put in relation to each other. In this passage, which has already been discussed, it is said that citta through tanhā is bound to the senses, their objects, the perceptions and the perceptual images (also included in the dhamma), and further to mano and its functions. Citta is freed from the āsavā through the ending of tanhā. Therefore citta is placed to the
right; connected by the "adhesive tape" of tanhā to the perceptual and ideational functions which here are subdivided according to sense fields.

(b) To the extreme left we find the physical stimuli. It sometimes seems doubtful if the words rūpa, sātta, etc., are meant to refer to the physical stimuli or the perceptual image they produce in the observer: rūpa, e.g., is sometimes translated by "body", "matter", sometimes by "form". Guenther (op. cit. p. 151) tries to avoid the dualism by offering the translation "Gestalt" for rūpa. This is, however, not possible, as Gestalt in psychology is a subjective term meaning "mental form," and is used to stress that the experienced form may not correspond to the material form (it can also equally well be used for all sense-fields). In the Nikāyas, the distinction has been made, but the two concepts have not always been kept apart: the same words are used for both. In M I 190 f, rūpa, and so on, including dhamma, are called bāhirā, "external", in contrast to the senses which are called ajjhattika, "internal" or "personal". And when it in S IV 68 is said that cakkhuviññāna originates from cakkhu and rūpa, there is no doubt that the external objects are referred to. In D II 110, a clear distinction between external and internal rūpa is made: "Ajjhattam rūpasāṇī eko bahiddhā-rūpāni passati..." "When a man who perceives forms internally, sees external forms ..." The same distinction is made in M I 138 f: "yaṁ kiñci rūpasam atītānāgata pacchannā, ajjhattāṁ vā bahiddhā vā, oḷārikaṁ vā sukhumaṁ vā, hīnaṁ vā pañītaṁ vā yaṁ dūre santike vā ..., "whatever form, past, future, present, internal or external, gross or subtle, mean or excellent, far or near ...". By ajjhattāṁ the forms are referred to as conscious mental images in contrast to the objects as physical facts. — The rūpa included in the paṭiccasamuppāda-series (in nāmarūpa) must refer to the internal form, otherwise it could not be conditioned by the purely psychological viññāna and not disappear in nibbāna.

For the internal rūpa, cakkhuviññāna may sometimes be used, but this term covers the feelings as well and may refer to non-perceptive images. We therefore need rūpa, sātta etc. in two places in our chart.

(c) In M I 101 it is said that there will be no perception without proper contact (samannāhāra, more often called phassa or samphassa): this is therefore to be placed between the two rūpa, sātta etc.

(d) Dhammā are of two types: the perceptual dhammā, which are the perceptual images produced through the perceptual process, and the ideational dhammā consisting of memory images and new productions through imagination and thought. Mano is a center of both perception and free
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Ideation, and it perceives, stores, and manipulates both types of dhamma. Here, the sensations are given their feeling-tones, and therefore, both sañña and vedanā may be functions of mano, (as indicated in M III 279 f). The enumeration of the 18 mano-upavicārā (M III 216) has been followed here.

(e) It is not possible to lay down a definite order between mano-upavicārā and the processes of viññāna: they may be more or less the same, and it is also stated that no difference can be laid down between vedanā, sañña, and viññāna. For reasons already mentioned, viññāna has, however, been put to the right of the processes of mano.

(f) Citta is here not conceived as an end-product of the other processes but as an agency influenced by and normally interested in the activities sometimes described as performing them. This is in agreement with the general trend, expressed, for instance, in S III 46: "thāmaśe parāmaśe asati rūpaśmiṃ (vedanāya, saññāya, sañkhāresu, viññānasmiṃ) cittaṃ virajjati vimucaṭi anupādaśa āsavēhi". "As there is no more stubborn perversity in him, his citta turns away from form (feeling, perception, activities, viññāna) and is released by not grasping at the āsavā". Here the khandhā are clearly conceived as factors outside citta. — Sañña and vedanā sometimes (e.g., S IV 293) called citta-saṅkhāra, "activities of citta".

In as far as the process-meaning of citta is implied, the processes of viññāna, especially mano-viññāna, must be included, but also some special activities, particularly the higher cognitive processes and dynamic processes.

(g) We may note that all the five khandhā are mentioned in the chart; only kāya-saṅkhāra, "bodily behaviour", and vaci-saṅkhāra, "verbal behaviour", to which also thought-processes are counted (an extreme behaviourism before Watson!) are not there. It is, however, outside the scope of this work to pursue the problem of relationships between our concepts and the khandhā any further.

While all perceptive functions, most ideative functions, feelings and most dynamic processes are included in the chart, many vital parts of the human psyche are left outside. Of the dynamic traits only the natural inborn needs are mentioned: where should we place motivations for good actions? Where is the will? Where is the moral judge? And where are the channels through which the normal qualities influence viññāna? And how could we fit in the rest of the pāṭiccasamuppāda-factors? Only further research can complete the picture.

RUNE E. A. JOHANSSON