In the history of religions, it is a commonplace that practices survive the advent of new ideologies and are then reinterpreted. Ancient Roman authors were already aware that in their culture new names had been given to old cults; and, in the seventeenth century, it was the program of the Jesuits to give Christian meanings to the religious practices of India and China. Because part of the very raison d'être of a ritual is its repetition, its "timelessness," ritual systems seem endowed with a life of their own, a capacity for survival independent of the meaning they are given. Christmas trees and Easter eggs have survived the transition from paganism to Christianity and, in many cases, from Christianity to secularism. But, for the great oriental religions, comparatively few such transitions have been documented, since their study lags far behind that of Christianity.

The moral responsibility of the individual is a basic feature of early Buddhist doctrine, the teaching of the Pali Canon (and other
versions of the canon in as far as they are known to us). It is the Buddha’s solution to the problem of evil: one’s suffering is due to one’s former sin, in this or a previous life, just as one’s well-being is due to one’s former goodness. This is the Buddhist doctrine of karma ("action"); the term denotes both the original moral act and its power for subsequent reward or punishment. Moreover, the morality of an action depends solely on the intention behind it: intention (cetanā) is karma.¹ On the other hand, it is widely known that Buddhists developed what seems prima facie to run clean counter to the doctrine of karma, the idea and practice of transferring merit (good karma), so that one’s good actions build up a kind of spiritual bank account from which one can make payments to others. (Incidentally, this is why the goodness of good acts has been reified into "merit.")) Thus, apparently, a sinner may reap where another man has sown, and perhaps even obviate the maturation of the seeds of evil he sowed himself. In the history of Buddhism, this “transference of merit” is often associated with the belief in bodhisattvas, who do good not only for their own spiritual advance toward nirvana but also to alleviate the sufferings of others. However in the Theravāda Buddhism of Ceylon, with which this article is primarily concerned, the “transference of merit” is fully developed, but the bodhisattva is of only minor importance.

My thesis is that the later, observable position logically can be, and in fact is, so interpreted (rationalized) as to conform to the former, canonical doctrine; and that this situation has evolved through the reinterpretation of ritual, a reinterpretation which can be traced through ancient texts and which is betrayed by shifts in the meaning of certain religious technical terms.

Since an article has recently been devoted to precisely this subject matter,² let me not attempt to do again what has already been well done, but use Dr. Malalasekere’s article as far as it can take us and see where it leaves the problem. He thus describes the doctrine of “transference of merit” in Ceylonese Buddhism. “The doer of the good deed has merely to wish that the merit he had thereby gained should accrue to someone in particular, if he so wishes, or to ‘all beings’” (p. 85). “The fact of ‘transference’ does not in the slightest degree mean that the ‘transferer’ is deprived of the merit he had originally acquired by his good deed. On the

¹ Anguttara Nikāya III. 415.
contrary, the very act of 'transference' is a good deed in itself and, therefore, enhances the merit already earned' (p. 86). One might add that the classical simile for this act of transfer, patti in Pali, is the lighting of one lamp from another.

A doctrinally associated way of earning merit is anumodanā or pattanumodanā, "which means 'rejoicing in'; the 'joy of rapport'. Here, the recipient of the transfer becomes a participant of the original deed by associating himself with the deed done" (p. 86).

Malalasekere raises the question (p. 89) "whether this doctrine . . . is a teaching of 'primitive' Buddhism," that is, whether it has always been a part of Buddhist doctrine. His implied answer is in the affirmative. Yet, to support this affirmation, he adduces only two pieces of evidence: the Milindapañha, which as he says is generally attributed to the first century A.D., and the higher ordination ceremony (upasampadā), at which the ordinand says that he offers his merit to his teacher and rejoices in his teacher's merit. This statement by the ordinand comes twice in the lower ordination ceremony (pabbajjā) which is reenacted before the upasampadā proper begins, not in the upasampadā itself. The rest of the text of these ceremonies is to be found in the first book of the Mahāvagga, part of the canonical Vinaya Piṭaka, but the statements about transferring merit are not. Similar statements are, in fact, appended to all Sinhalese Buddhist rituals. Without denying the formula's "great antiquity" (p. 89), if the argument below is accepted, we may reach the unsurprising conclusion that the ordination ceremony contains at least one addition made after the time (whenever that was) when the ceremony was first standardized in roughly its present form. Thus, both Malalasekere's pieces of evidence are late, not "primitive."

Malalasekere not only reminds us that in Buddhism morality is a function of ethical intention alone, but also shows (p. 86) that this doctrine has been carried so far as to hold that rejoicing in the good deed of another may be more meritorious than performing the deed oneself. For example, a Sinhalese village monk who had spent 5,000 rupees on a public religious ceremony to celebrate his fiftieth birthday told me that a villager who felt sympathetic joy in the merit he was earning might thereby earn more merit than he did himself, without spending a cent. This seems to go further than the New Testament story of the widow's mite. Even if, like Kant, we accept an ethic of intention, the doctrine is not obvious;

3 J. F. Dickson, Ordination in Theravāda Buddhism, ed. Piyadassi Thera, Wheel Publication, no. 56 (Kandy, 1963), pp. 12, 14.
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indeed, many moralists might find it startling. Moreover, I do not think that it was part of the original Buddhist doctrine.

Malalasekere has cited (p. 86) as "the classic example of the transference of merit" the ritual by which it is transferred to dead relatives; and he further implies (top of p. 88) that this is where the doctrine originated. I agree with his implication. Unfortunately, in his presentation of the ritual and its aetiological myth, he has conflated canonical and commentatorial texts, giving no references, to build up a single synchronic picture. I submit that, if we re-cover this ground with more discrimination, we shall see that the doctrine of merit transference has a detectable history.

To understand that history we must keep in mind the distinction between what people say and believe (conscious lies apart), which I call the cognitive level; how they act, which I call the behavioral level; and what their actions suggest to an outside observer that they believe, which I call the affective level. (Affective beliefs need not be consciously held or explicitly formulated.) I hope to show that the doctrine has developed through an interaction of these levels—behavior has affected doctrine and vice versa—and that its present status illustrates the disparity between cognitive and affective beliefs.

The Pali terms patti (proffering merit to others) and pathānu-modanā (empathizing in another’s merit) are not found in these technical meanings in what we might call the oldest organized stratum of the Pali Canon—the four Nikāyas and the Vinaya Piṭaka. The cognate verb anumodati is used in these early texts with two closely related meanings: "to agree with," and "to receive with gratitude," that is, "to thank." In the first meaning, Sāriputta says of a doctrinal debate: na me koci bhikkhu anumodati: "no monk agrees with me." Parallel to the second meaning is the noun anumodana, "gratitude" or "thanks." This word, from the beginning, is mainly used as a technical term for the thanks uttered by a monk on being given alms. This usage has been preserved unchanged until today in the Sinhalese anumōdan. The passage in the Vinaya Piṭaka in which the Buddha prescribes the utterance of the anumodana and says that it should be said by the eldest monk present does not specify the content of what is said; although the Buddha doubtless composed his thanks

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4 Anguttara Nikāya III. 194.
5 Rarer forms parallel to anumodana (neuter) are anumodanā (feminine) and anumodanīya (neuter).
6 Vinaya Piṭaka (ed. Oldenberg) II. 212.
variously to suit the occasion, one may assume the early use of some benedictory formula to the effect “May your desires be fulfilled,” as is said today.

After any act of merit, typically a dānē (feeding monks), the doer of the merit transfers it to the gods, either by reciting the following Pali verse or by giving assent (“Sādhu sādhu”) when it is recited by a monk:

Ākāsaṅgā ca bhūmatthā devā nāgā mahiddhikā
Puṇṇāṁ tāṁ anumoditā cirāṁ rakkhantu sāsanaṁ.
May sky-dwelling and earth-dwelling gods, [and] nāgas (supernatural serpents) of great power, having rejoiced at the merit, long protect the Teaching.

The verse may be repeated with “me” substituted for “the Teaching.”

This transfer of merit to the gods is canonical. In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, the Buddha receives a meal from two ministers. “The Blessed One thanked (anumodi) them with these verses: Wherever a wise man dwells he should feed the virtuous and restrained ascetics there, and dedicate the gift (dakkhināṃ ādise) to whatever deities are there; when worshipped they worship, when honoured they honour him.”

The text does not use the term patti, although the meaning expressed is the same: patti, however, is the commentator’s gloss: Tāsaṁ dakkhināṃ ādise ti sanghassa dinne cattāro paccaye tāsaṁ gharadevatānāṁ apadiseyya pattiṁ daṭṭeyya. ‘He should dedicate the gift’ means that when the Sangha have been given the four requisites one should dedicate, give the merit to those house-deities.” And the commentator significantly continues: ‘When worshipped they worship’: they think, ‘These people are not even our relatives, and even so they give us merit.’

The commentator is, of course, much later than the text, but I think he is right about the implied origin of merit transference. We come, here, to a complex of ideas centering on those funeral feasts for dead relatives which are common to so many cultures. Prima facie they are perhaps an unexpected phenomenon in a religion which preaches constant rebirth, but Buddhism inherited them from its Indian Hindu background at a time when the rebirth doctrine was new. Professor von Führer-Haimendorf describes how Chetris, a high Hindu caste in Nepal, can gain merit by having

7 Dīgha Nīkāya II. 88 (sutta XVI. 1. 31).
8 Sumangala-vilāsini II. 542.
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brahmins recite sacred texts for a week (saptāha): “If performed as a memorial rite the saptāha involves the gift of an entire set of household goods to the senior brahmin priest, and it is popular belief that as a result of this donation corresponding objects of personal use will be available to the departed for his life in the next world. The fact that such an idea is inconsistent with the belief in the immediate reincarnation of every human being in a shape conditioned by his earlier deeds does not seem to disturb the Chetris, who like other Hindus see nothing incongruous in the holding of apparently inconsistent views.”

Buddhists, preserving a similar rite, are more concerned with doctrinal consistency.

One of the classes of living creatures (below gods, animals, and men but above demons) in the Buddhist universe is the preta (Pali, petta), a kind of hideous ghost usually suffering from hunger and other discomforts. The word literally means “gone forth,” that is, dead; but the choice of term has been determined by a linguistic coincidence in Pali which links pretas with Sanskrit pitaras—literally, “fathers”—the ancestors of the Hindu and the recipient of his funerary libations. The Buddhist preta, then, although in theory the reincarnation of anyone’s relation, is in practice one’s own dead relation, typically a dead parent.

The transfer of merit at the dānē for the dead (mataka dānē) must now be recapitulated. Such dānēs are given at certain fixed intervals of time after the death of a relative; their number and size depend mainly on the wealth and social status of the family, but the one after seven days is obligatory—it might be called the mataka dānē par excellence. It is preceded by the recitation of sacred texts, and at the end of their meal the monks are usually given “requisites” (towels, pillowcases, etc.), analogously with Chetri custom. Sometimes a little of the meal—for example, a handful of rice—is thrown outside the house; this is variously said to be for the pretas or for the crows. The crucial ritual takes place after the monks have been given everything: the head of the bereaved household slowly pours water into some small vessel until it overflows, while the monks intone in unison:

Yathā vāriṇāhā pārā paripürenti sāgaraṁ
Evaṁ eva ēva dīnaṁ petānaṁ upakappati.10

As the full water-bearing [rivers] fill the ocean, so indeed does what is given here benefit the dead (preta).

Upānane udakāṁ vaṭṭam yathā nīmaṁ parattati
Evaṁ eva ēva dīnaṁ petānaṁ upakappati.10

10 An alternative version has it as a wish: upakappatu, “may it benefit.”
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As water rained on a height reaches the low land, so indeed does what is given here benefit the dead (pretā).

The proceedings conclude with a short sermon on transience (anityatā) to console the mourners. At the end, instead of the general formula transferring merit to the gods given above, the householder (perhaps prompted by a monk) says:

Idam meī11 nātīnām hotu. Sukhitā hon tu nātayo.
May this be for my relatives. May my relatives be happy.

While the pouring of water in Sinhalese ritual frequently signalizes a solemn act (e.g., marriage), here it seems more relevant to recall the libations poured to the Manes in other, older cultures. Here it has been reinterpreted as the verses explain. The reinterpretation of this symbolic gesture is a minor example of the type of reinterpretation which has operated on the ritual as a whole.

A Sinhalese village monk explained the proceedings to me thus. The death is primarily an occasion for doing merit (pīna) oneself; secondarily, for offering it in case the dead man is expecting it. He can however only rejoice and benefit from the merit if reborn as a pretā, because if he is higher than that he does not need the merit; if he is lower, in hell (apāya), he cannot get it. [There is in fact a further refinement: only the top class of pretā, “those who live on merit given by others” (paradattopajīvin) are able to sympathize with the merit of others.12] But this does not mean, he said, that the relatives giving the dānē assume that the dead man is now a pretā, for if we pay a call we take the food along as a gift, but if the person is out we eat it ourselves; similarly, the pinkama earns merit for the living, whatever the fate of the dead. The origin of the custom of offering it to the dead is this, he said. Once King Bimbisāra gave the Buddha a dānē, and his ancestors, who were pretas, came to see it. He offered them no pīn; so they were sorely disappointed. In the night there was a great noise round his palace, so next morning he went to the Buddha and asked if this boded ill for himself or his kingdom. The Buddha said not so, but explained what had happened. So, to remedy his oversight, Bimbisāra gave him a dānē that day too and offered the pīn to the pretas.

The above statement contains small but telling points of

11 Thus a Sinhalese manual in my possession. The Pali Text Society edition of the Petawathu has vo “youm” (plural) for me “my,” but the general meaning is unaffected since vo agrees with nātīnām.

12 Thus, e.g., Mīladapaṭṭha, p. 284. The monk’s explanation in the next four lines also occurs on the same page.
doctrinal inconsistency: it is not clear why \textit{pretas} who have already come to the \textit{dānē} (as in the story of Bimbisāra) should be unable to rejoice at the merit unless it is specifically offered; nor why gods, who in other contexts are always offered merit, are in this context said not to need it. However, the latter discrepancy can be removed by saying that, while the gods are in no hurry for the merit, the \textit{pretas} need it urgently, because they are suffering in a state of woe from which only \textit{pattānumodanā} can relieve them, because they have little or no opportunity for performing meritorious actions independently. Remember, moreover, that length of life is one of the things that decrease as one goes down the cosmic scale; the Reverend Walpola Rahula has told me of a belief that \textit{pretas} live only seven days, which makes it essential to catch them at that point before they sink further. He very plausibly connects this with a belief found in other schools of Buddhism (Mahāyāna and Sarvāstivāda) in an \textit{“in-between state”} (\textit{antarābhava}) lasting seven days; during this period the person is suspended between death and rebirth, and any improvement in karma will of course make the next birth a better one. I must stress that this \textit{antarābhava} is not a Theravāda belief; it goes toward explaining the seven days \textit{dānē} on the historical, not on the doctrinal, level. From this historical angle, it is also interesting to notice that in the Pali words just quoted the donor transfers merit to all his relatives, not just the recently dead man, thus reminding us that Hindu offerings are to ancestors (\textit{pitaras}).

The \textit{mataka dānē}, although not described in every ritual detail, is canonical in Theravāda Buddhism. In one sutta,\textsuperscript{13} a brahmin says to the Buddha that brahmins give funeral feasts (\textit{srāddhā}; Pali, \textit{saddhā}), praying that the gifts [given to brahmins on their behalf] may be enjoyed by their dead relatives, and he asks whether this really works. The Buddha at first replies that it does not work if the relative is reborn in hell, as an animal, as a human, or as a god, but works if he is reborn as a \textit{preta}, in which case he lives on what his friends and kinsmen supply. In reply to further questions, the Buddha says that if the particular relative the donor had in mind is not a \textit{preta}, other relatives who are \textit{pretas} will enjoy it, and it cannot happen that no relatives are reborn as \textit{pretas}; but anyway no donor is without reward (\textit{dāyako anippaha}). In this text, no reference is made to the merit of the act; the gift is said to benefit (\textit{upakappati}) the relatives and they to enjoy (\textit{pari-}

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Anguttara Nikāya} V. 269–73 (sutta CLXXVII).
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bhūñjati) it, so presumably the object passes to them direct. That all this is addressed to a brahmin points up the fact that the Buddhists were consciously adapting Hindu custom.

There are many references to the custom in a canonical book, the Petavanthu, which consists entirely of poems about pretas. The three verses cited above come from a poem entitled the Āṭī-dhamma Sutta ("The sutta of behavior due to relatives"),14 which also occurs under the title, taken from the first words, of Tiṭṭokṣoka Sutta as the seventh item in the nine-item canonical chrestomathy, the Khuddakapāṭha. Here is Bhikkhu Ṛṇamoli's translation of the whole poem.

1. Without the walls they stand and wait,
   And at the junctions and road forks;
   Returning to their erstwhile homes,
   They wait beside the jambs of gates.

2. But when a rich feast is set out
   With food and drink of every kind,
   The fact that no man does recall
   These creatures stems from their past acts.

3. So they who are compassionate
   At heart do give for relatives
   Such food and drink as may be pure
   And good and fitting at these times:

4. 'Then let this be for relatives;
   'May relatives have happiness.'
   These ghosts of the departed kin
   Foregathered and assembled there

5. Will eagerly their blessing give
   For (plentiful) rich food and drink:
   'So may our relatives live long,
   'Owing to whom we have this gain;'

6. 'For honour to us has been done,
   'No giver ever lacked the fruit.'
   Now there is never ploughing there,
   Nor any cattle-herding found,

7. Nor merchandizing just the same,
   Nor bartering for coin of gold:
   The ghosts of the departed kin
   Live there on giving given here;

8. As water showered on the hill
   Flows down to reach the hollow vale,
   So giving given here can serve
   The ghosts of the departed kin.

14 Petavanthu I. 5.
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9. As river-beds when full can bear
  The water down to fill the sea,
  So giving given here can serve
  The ghosts of the departed kin.

10. 'He gave to me, he worked for me,
    'He was my kin, friend, intimate.'
    Give gifts, then, for departed ones,
    Recalling what they used to do.

11. No weeping, nor yet sorrowing,
    Nor any kind of mourning aids
    Departed ones, whose kin remain
    (Unhelpful to them acting) thus.

12. But when this offering is given
    Well placed in the Community
    For them, then it can serve them long
    In future and at once as well.

13. The True Idea for relatives has thus been shown,
    And how high honour to departed ones is done,
    And how the bhikkhus can be given strength as well,
    And how great merit can be stored away by you.\textsuperscript{15}

The verses cited above were, in order, the ninth, eighth, and first half of the fourth. As Stede has remarked,\textsuperscript{16} verses 11 and 12 (his 10 and 11) look like an addition. Moreover, until verse 12 there is no trace of Buddhism; dead relatives are to get food and drink and benefit their donors in return. Not until the end is there mention of the Sangha or of merit, and they are not well integrated. In the context of the poem, the "this" which is given to the relative in verse 4, line 1, is food and drink; only in the ritual as now performed and explained is it merit or, rather, the chance to rejoice at merit. It is this rather complicated explanation which has circumvented a doctrinal incongruity which originally must have been glaring. A vestige of the originally Hindu practice of actually offering food has moreover been preserved in the optional custom, noted above, of throwing a little food outside the house. Those who say this is for the crows are rationalizing, although in accordance with Buddhist ethics (kindness to animals); that it is for the pretas must be the ancient explanation. Note that the custom has persisted, with no logical congruity, throughout the doctrinal discussions about to be presented; but, since their effect has been to shift the emphasis of the ritual entirely away from the food, it is not surprising that the handful of food for the pretas has declined to a barely noticed, even an optional, detail.

\textsuperscript{15} Nānāmoli, trans., \textit{Minor Readings and Illustrator} (London, 1960), pp. 7–8.
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The story of the origin of the matakā dānē told me by the monk is taken from the commentary on the Tirokuḍḍa Sutta, Buddhaghosa’s Paramatthajotikā. In the commentary, the thing offered is still explained as the food, etc., not the merit; but this is perhaps not an important point, since the general interpretation is clearly the modern one: the king gives a dānē to the Buddha and dedicates it (uddisati) to the pretas. More important is the story of this event given in the commentary to the Dhammapada. The Buddha explained to Bimbisāra that after he had given the first feast the pretas had made a row because “when you gave the food they did not get the merit” (dāne dinne pattiṃ alabhamānā). When Bimbisāra therefore fed the Buddha the next day, “he gave the merit, saying ‘Sir, may the divine food and drink from here accrue to those pretas’” (Bhante, ito tesam petānaṃ dibbannapānāṃ sampajjatā ti pattiṃ adāsi ). They get the food, then show themselves to the king naked. The king therefore gives robes (cīvarāni) the next day to the Buddha and his disciples, and the pretas accordingly are clothed in heavenly garments. At this, they leave the condition of preta (petattabhāva) and become gods (dibbattabhāva). “The teacher, giving thanks, used the words of thanks, ‘Outside they stand,’ etc.” (Satthā anumodanāṃ karonto: tirokuḍḍesu titṭhantiti tirokuḍḍanumodanāṃ akāsi).

In this account, the spirits are getting not mere merit but more tangible benefits—food and clothes. However, they get the food and clothes as a result of getting merit—plainly an ambiguous situation. The question whether the pretas could actually eat the food was controversial in ancient times, even though that they could do so is the natural interpretation of the sutta I have quoted. In Nyanaponika’s summary of the Kathāvagbhū, a late canonical book (probably third century b.c.), question 69 is, “Can alms which are given here be enjoyed by beings elsewhere (e.g., by the . . . Petas)?” And we are told that two sects think that they can, but that Theravādins hold that “the mind of the Petas might be favourably influenced, but the material food cannot be enjoyed by them.” Although this seems to contradict the Theravādin commentaries just quoted, which in their present form are many centuries younger than the Kathāvagbhū, it is very likely that the commentaries on this ancient custom are quoting an old story. But, whatever the date of the final victory of orthodoxy, it is clear that

17 Dhammapada Atthakathā I. 103-4.
sensible Theravādin monks decided that food being visibly consumed by a monk could not possibly be eaten by someone else, so that, if people persisted in their habit of feeding dead relatives, the custom required reinterpretation. What the relatives were really getting was something else—merit.

Although we saw above that the offering of merit to the gods occurs in the four Nikāyas, the doctrine of patañjumodana, the acquisition of merit by anyone through empathizing in another’s merit, does not. According to modern doctrine, such empathy can take place whether one is “offered” the merit or not. But the whole point of the story about Bimbisāra’s ancestors was that they had to be offered the merit before they could get it, and the implication of offering merit to the gods is that they, too, cannot get it just by being present—which they are in any case (note that the reference in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta is specifically to the local gods). Moreover, even now in all standardized situations a verse or formula is recited offering the merit to specific benefactors. Why should the Pali verse be recited at the dānā offering the merit to the gods? The doctrinal answer (given by the monk already quoted) is that one is simply drawing their attention to the merit. The same reason can be given for the less institutionalized practice of carrying round among the laymen present an offering which one is about to make to the Buddha or the Sangha: the laymen fold their hands, touch or make to touch the offering with their fingertips, and then raise their hands to their foreheads in the gesture of worship; the person who is physically making the offering is drawing the attention of the others to his act of merit, and their gestures symbolize their participation. In this case, the doctrinal rationale fits. It does not, however, adequately explain what goes on at the ritual for the dead.

The reinterpretation of the mātaka dānā is the nub of this problem; it can be followed by tracing the evolution of the meaning of anumodati from “thank” to “empathize,” “rejoice in another’s merit.” In the poem quoted above, the verb anumodati is used of the pretaś (poorly translated by Nānamoli as “their blessing give”). Then, in the commentary, the Buddha, too, does an anumodana. Now observe what happens. The Buddhist givers of funeral feasts have been told by the monks that their relatives are not getting the food but are getting something else—merit. The whole point of the rite is to give your dead relative something, so the donors are satisfied, provided they still have the feeling they are giving. They give their merit away to the dead, like goods or cash,
and the dead—presumably—say thank you (anumodanti). But no, say the monks; the doctrine of karma will not allow this; you cannot really give your merit away; you are just allowing the dead to improve their minds by expressing sympathetic joy at your good action in feeding us. So, although the text used in the rite says that the pretas anumodanti, this does not mean that they thank you for a gift, for nothing passes between you; they are just rejoicing.

This is where the meaning of anumodati undergoes its crucial change: as part of the doctrinal response to undoctrinal behavior. Once anumodati comes to refer just to a pure mental state, to empathy in doing good, it is of course open to anyone to do it at any time, without having to wait for an offer, and this is the modern position: the villagers could rejoice at the monk’s fiftieth birthday celebrations without specific invitation.

But since anumodati was originally used both of the monk who gets the food and of the god or preta who gets the merit, the way is now open to linguistic confusion. That is, indeed, what we find in modern Sinhalese; for, while what the monk recites at a dānē is still called the anumōdana, according to modern doctrine it is not he who anumodati, rejoices, but the gods,—the third parties. We thus get the table (which I owe to a conversation with the Rev. Rahula) (table 1). In the table, the three participants (or groups

| TABLE 1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACTIONS PERFORMED |
| PARTICIPANTS | Pali | Sinhalese | English | TYPE OF GOOD DEED |
| Donor......deti | denavā | gives | dāna |
| Monk .........anumodāpeti | anumōdan karavanavā | causes to rejoice | desanā |
| Donor.........anumodeti | anumōdan karavanavā | causes to rejoice | patti |
| Gods ..........anumodanti | anumōdan venavā | rejoice | pattānumodanā |

of participants) are on the left; in the center are the actions they are performing in Pali, Sinhalese, and a literal English translation; on the right is the type of good deed (according to the Pali list of
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the Ten Good Deeds) which the action represents. The lines from top to bottom are in chronological sequence.

The Pali alone suffices to show that something has been twisted up here. In fact, the double causative form anumodāpeti is not in the dictionaries, and the plain causative anumodeti is cited only once, \(^{19}\) in the quite different meaning “get the approval of.”

The popular understanding of what goes on is rather different. It also corresponds to the historical view. The monk is understood to be saying “thank you,” as indeed he was by original doctrine. The donor is then understood to be giving the gods his merit as a quid pro quo, as if he were buying their protection for cash. However, doctrine has been so successful that what I have just called “the popular understanding” is actually not explicit: when questioned, people either confess ignorance or give the orthodox explanation. The view of merit as spiritual cash is affective belief only. But its antiquity is nevertheless demonstrable.

Before drawing our conclusions from this contrast between cognitive and affective beliefs, it remains to document from Pali texts the changes in the use of the terms patī and pattānumodanā which culminated in the linguistic confusion just tabulated. The transaction of exchanging merit for supernatural protection is only possible after the complete separation of the merit earned by a gift from the gift itself, a separation which we saw took place at the mātaka dāné. In that context, the “transference of merit” was made in the Kathāvatthu to conform to karma doctrine by talking of the good intentions of all concerned. But this explanation becomes more strained in our next example, in which the merit of a gift is given retrospectively. In a Jātaka\(^{20}\) story, the bodhisattva, born as a brahmin merchant, has gained merit by feeding a pratyekabuddha; he is shipwrecked, and while swimming in the sea with an attendant is picked up by a deity whose duty it is to protect virtuous men in misfortune; she did not notice the attendant, so the “brahmin gave him the merit of his good deed, and he received it gratefully” (brahmaṇo attanā katakalyāṇato tassa patim adāsi, so anumodi) and was picked up.\(^{21}\) Here we are very close to the idea of a fund of merit, like a bank account, to be drawn on at will. I stress that even this passage can be rational-

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\(^{19}\) Paranattha-dīpanī VI (Therigāthā Atthakathā) 201, line 9. Even this is uncertain, since there is a variant reading.

\(^{20}\) Jātaka IV. 15–22.

\(^{21}\) Jātaka IV. 21.
ized by reference to the doctrine of intention; but the more obvious interpretation of the passage would be to regard merit as a kind of spiritual money. And a characteristic of money is that when you have used it you no longer have it.

The equation of merit with money becomes virtually explicit in a story from the commentary to the Dhammapada about two brothers and some sugarcane. When the younger brother feeds a pratyekabuddha sugarcane from his brother’s field, he thinks, “If my elder brother demands the price [of the cane] I shall give him the price, if the merit I shall give the merit” (sace me jethabhātiko mulaṁ āharāpesati mulaṁ dassāmi sace pattim āharāpesati pattim dassāmi). Of course, this again is not a doctrinal treatise; but it is clear that the merit and the money are on an equal footing and that the giving of the merit will have nothing to do with benevolence or purity of thoughts. Here the incongruity of the transaction with doctrine may even be said to reach the cognitive level, for which I know of no modern parallel.

Finally, let me quote from a late commentary a passage in which both patti and anumodana occur. The words, though purporting to describe Visākhā and her friends after Visākhā has built a vihāra for the Sangha, could, translated into Sinhalese, be an exact transcription of modern procedure. Visākhā says to her companions, “The merit I have earned, rejoice at it, I give you the gift of this merit.” With gladly trusting minds they all rejoiced, ‘Oh, it is good, oh, it is good.’ One good lady who was there concentrated especially on that gift of merit. Soon after she died and was reborn in the Heaven of the Thirty Three” (Yaṁ mayā puṇñam pasutam, tāṁ anumodatha, pattidānam vo dammī ti. Aho sādhū aho sādhū ti pasannacittā sabbā pi anumodimissu. Tattha aśāñtarā upāsikā pi visesato tāṁ pattidānam manasā akāśi). This anumodana of hers she describes as a “pure rejoicing” (suddh’ anumodanā) and hence truly meritorious. (This is in the canonical text, not merely the commentary). Although in this case the merit was offered, that “rejoicing” and not “thanking” is the appropriate translation is clear both from this passage and from the two previous passages cited.

We have here traced a correspondence between affective religion and an early behavioral deviation, appearing in Buddhist stories
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but never explicitly accepted by doctrine; doctrine has then made a comeback and harmonized practice with canonical theory, although not without becoming exceedingly tortuous (and philologically barbarous). The stages through which behavior evolved have been traced above: the behavior represented in passages dealing with patti represent gradual deviation from doctrinal orthodoxy, while the changed meanings of anumodana and its verbs represent the rationalizations of doctrine to accommodate the behavioral deviations. On the behavioral level, the passages first quoted for patti represent someone’s giving their merit to another person and that person’s saying thank you. Since the idea that one can give away merit contradicts a fundamental doctrine, this clear implication has to be explained away, which is done, most ingeniously, by changing the meaning of anumodati. Although I know of no passage which is quite explicit on the point, the identity of the last passage quoted with modern practice strongly suggests that the modern doctrine, too, had been evolved by the time it was written. For this, it is significant that the good lady attributes her rebirth in heaven to the purity of her rejoicing (anumodanā). This comes not in the commentary but in a canonical text, albeit a late one, the Vimāṇavatthu. The entire evolution of doctrine and behavior with which we are concerned therefore took place, in all probability, within the ancient period, that is, the period up to the final closure of the Pali Canon and the stabilization of its exegesis; and what I have called the “modern” doctrine, although clearly different from the original doctrine, may be as much as 2,000 years old.

Malalasekere concludes (p. 89) that “there cannot, strictly speaking, be an arbitrary division of ‘your’ merit and ‘mine.’” This is his own philosophical interpretation rather than a reproduction of canonical doctrine. We have tried, rather, to show that merit has always been thought of in personal terms, as belonging to an agent, and indeed has finally been reified to a remarkable extent, affectively becoming a transferable commodity.

The pure doctrine of karma has been preserved: man is entirely and solely responsible for his own fate, creating his own future by the moral quality of his intentions. But the very rigor of this doctrine of total self-reliance has called into being an alternate, parallel system, by which there are ways out. If doctrine cannot get rid of these ways out, it has to ignore them or, better, to reinterpret them. The transfer of merit to one’s dead parents and the expectation that one will, in turn, receive merit from one’s
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children is an excellent example of this alternate system and of its reinterpretation.

Finally, let me put it another way. The original doctrine of karma solved the intellectual problem of evil, but the solution was too perfect for emotional comfort, because it makes all suffering one's own fault. The doctrines of \textit{patti} and \textit{pattānumodana} in turn solve, or at least alleviate, this emotional problem by mitigating the rigor of the original doctrine and, in particular, by making it possible to improve one's karma after death; at the same time, they solve, by reinterpreting them, the intellectual problem of justifying surviving rituals for the dead. Moreover, a sociologist might add that, although the Buddhist doctrine of karma is purely individualistic, merit transference can make merit appear as the common property of a social group, so that \textit{patti} is functional for kinship solidarity. I consider its problem-solving function for the individual to be more clearly demonstrable and more important. But, certainly, the present situation is overdetermined, which accounts for its survival for over 2,000 years.