Who understands the four alternatives of the Buddhist texts?

INTRODUCTION

The Buddhist four alternatives are often referred to by their Sanskrit name *catuskoti*, and given in the form that something is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not, with observation that each of these terms may be denied. As we proceed we shall see that this is not the only manner of presenting a *catuskoti*. Since so many authorities and scholars of ancient and modern times have discussed this cardinal matter, sometimes heatedly, it is not possible to deal with all the previous studies. Certain discussions will be considered herein within the scope of my five sections: I. The four alternatives and logic, II. The four alternatives in a disjunctive system, III. The four alternatives applied to causation, each denied, IV. The four alternatives applied to existence, each denied, V. The three kinds of *catuskoti*, various considerations.

My findings differ from the Western treatments that have come to my notice, and the differences stem from my current preparations for publication of a translation of a Tibetan work that deals in several places with the formula. In fact, Tson-kha-pa's separation of the causation and existence aspects of four alternatives, each denied, goes back to Atiśa (11th century), who in his *Bodhimarga-pradipa-paṇḍjikā-nāma* presents four ways of realizing insight (*prajñā*), as follows:

1) the principle that denies existence by four alternatives discussed in section IV herein.
2) the principle called 'diamond grain' (*vajrakāṇa*). He illustrates this in his text by Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā* (M.K.), I. 1, with alternatives applied to causation (discussed in section III herein).
3) the principle free from singleness and multiplicity. He appeals to such an author as Santideva (especially his *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Chap. IX).
4) the principle of Dependent Origination (*pratīt-yasamutpāda*). Here he means, for example, that the dharmas arise dependently and are void of self-existence.

Atiśa's classification is revealing of the meditative use put to the denial of four alternatives when applied to causation or to existence. The fact, then, that his listing does not allude to the disjunctive system of the four alternatives that I discuss in section II, may be simply because this system was not put to meditative use.

The two topics of causation and existence relate to Buddhist teachings that are essentially distinct. Thus, in Buddhism the problem of how a Tathāgata or Buddha arises by reason of merit and knowledge, that is, the problem of cause, is distinct from the problem of the existence, for example, of the Tathāgata after death. Naturally, the causal topic is first, since a Tathāgata has to have arisen before there is a point to inquiring whether he exists after death. Historically, the first topic represents what the Buddha preferred to talk about, and
the second topic includes matters which the Buddha sometimes refused to talk about.

As suggested earlier, my main sources are from Asian languages. I am also indebted to certain Western writers, namely, Hermann Weyl for the limitations of symbolic systems, Bernard Bosanquet for treatment of disjunctive statements, and Willard Van Orman Quine for his use of the word "logic" (bibliography herein).

I. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES AND LOGIC

Jayatilleke says, "there is little evidence that Nāgārjuna understood the logic of the four alternatives as formulated and utilized in early Buddhism." This scholar was not content with putting down Nāgārjuna, founder of the Mādhyamika school, for he concludes that scarcely any Western scholars, classical Indian scholars, or modern Indian and Japanese writers have comprehended this logic either. Richard H. Robinson, one of the Western scholars whose theories on the matter were rejected for the most part by Jayatilleke, subsequently replied to him, among other things questioning the use of the word "logic" to refer to the four alternatives, although himself having written an article entitled, "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System," which included a discussion of the four alternatives, and himself having a section entitled "Nāgārjuna's Logic" in his book (Early Mādhyamika ...). Chatalian, in turn, asserts that Robinson did not justify his use of the word "logic" in his book. While agreeing with Chatalian thus far, I still am puzzled by a seeming overattention by Robinson and Chatalian to other persons' use of the word "logic." Quine points out that while writers have used the term "logic" with varying scope, a common part of their usage is called "the science of necessary inference," although he admits that this is a vague description. He then states that it is less vague to call logical certain locutions, including 'if', 'then', 'and', 'or', 'not', 'unless', 'some', 'all', 'every', 'any', 'it', etc. Furthermore, he mentions that a set pattern of employing these locutions allows us to speak of the logical structure. This is tantamount to saying that every grammatical English sentence in the indicative mood has a logical structure. Then, when Nāgārjuna writes (Madhyamaka-kārikā, XVIII, 8), in an English translation, "all is genuine or is not genuine..." this has a logical structure. Indeed, every statement with the pattern, "Every X is an a or a b," has the same logical structure. Quine further qualifies a statement as logically true if its logical structure alone yields truth; and thus his use of the term "logic" involves truth and falsehood in this sense. Other writers have used such terms as "formally valid," "analytic proposition," or "tautology" as closely related to this usage of "logic." Accordingly, the application of symbolic logic to Nāgārjuna's statements. to prove them logically true or false, goes along with such a title as "the logic of the four alternatives"; and this application of symbolic logic has been engaged in by H. Nakamura, Robinson, Jayatilleke, R. S. Y. Chi,
among others, including Shohei Ichimura in his recent dissertation, “A Study on Nāgārjuna’s Method of Refutation.” It does seem that both Jayatilleke and Robinson were justified in using the term “logic” in a study of these matters when they employed symbolic logic.

This still leaves the important problem of whether Nāgārjuna’s statements are indeed logically true, and thus have truth or falseness according to their logical structure regardless of content, regardless of what is given. By “given,” what is meant here is the usual ‘granted, assumed’. This involves a problem of translation, because when Nāgārjuna’s statements are assumed to be at hand, the mere fact that there are marks on a page in the English language purported to be his statements does not prove that they faithfully relay Nāgārjuna’s intention by marks on a page in the original Sanskrit language. Here there are two points: If the statements do not have an easily isolated logical structure, it is hazardous and probably contraindicated to apply symbolic logic. Even if they do have an easily isolated logical structure, one asks if they are also so complicated that one requires a symbolic representation to sift or show truth and falsehood.

We may start to solve this problem with its two points, by recourse to Weyl’s remarks regarding “constructive cognition”:10 “By the introduction of symbols the assertions are split so that one part of the [mental] operations is shifted to the symbols and thereby made independent of the given and its continued existence. Thereby the free manipulation of concepts is contrasted with their application, ideas become detached from reality and acquire a relative independence.” Thus Weyl, an eminent mathematician, is frank to admit that the pure operations of mathematics are independent of the existence of the given. In the case of the catuskoti, the given is a rather considerable corpus of material in the Pāli scriptures and then in Nāgārjuna’s works, not to speak of contributions by later Asian authors. And there is the assumption that this corpus is at hand in a translated form of English sentences that are susceptible, in whole or part, of being converted from their natural form to the artificial language of a symbolic system.

Now to the first point. Let us assume that the catuskoti statements do not have an isolatable logical structure, and yet symbolic logic is utilized. If one would grant the applicability of Weyl’s remarks, even if there were a valid utilization of symbolic logic, it could not account for the full corpus of the given, as the “given” has been explicated earlier. So it may be merely a section or subset of the given whose logical structure is not isolatable. But then the application of symbolic logic is a matter of mastering the art of the symbols. And so one may presume that it is an arrogated comprehension of the given—although in fact the symbols are independent, partially or wholly, of the given—whereby an undeniably brilliant writer as Jayatilleke takes the stance that he virtually alone understands “the logic of the four alternatives,” while claiming that such a renowned author as Nāgārjuna cannot understand it! Or
claiming that a modern writer like Robinson cannot understand, because he
does not apply the formal symbolic system right, that is, has not mastered the
art. Thus the symbolic system becomes a vested interest, the users jealous of
its misuse, while they champion its misapplication to the given, and even to
what may not be at hand, for example, a correct translation of a passage from
an ancient text.

Then to the second point. I do not propose to denigrate, in general, the
employment of symbolic systems for representing propositions of Indian
philosophy. But are the catuskoti statements so complicated that a symbolic
restatement is necessary, with the implication of an understanding already at
hand to certify the necessity? Perhaps there is working a psychological factor
which could be called "wonder." What mathematics student getting the "right
answer" with calculus has not at times felt a wonder at the ability of the mathe-
matics—beyond his native capacities—say, to determine the intercepted volume
of the cone. As Buytendijk has been cited: "Wonder is characterized by a
halting of the thing observed. This halting, which men call attention, is at the
same time permeated by a premonition that light may be shed on this thing."11
But this premonition of light through the symbolic system is a will-o'-the-wisp,
a subtle infatuation. Because light can only be shed on the given, and the
symbolic system is independent, in whole or part, of the given as it has been
described earlier. It is like a person fascinated by a brilliant lamp and therefore
is not seeing anything illuminated by the lamp. The master of the art is himself
mastered and uses the symbolism willy-nilly: even for the simplest computation,
he needs the computer. For centuries the Buddhists believed that the given of
the four alternatives, including the traditional exegesis, provides sufficient
material for understanding—if a person can understand. Some of the modern
writers have rendered the discussions into an artificial language, and then
have dwelt on false issues of whether this or that scholar's formulation is a
"logic."

II. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES IN A DISJUNCTIVE SYSTEM

Here by a "disjunctive system" is meant a system of statements subject to the
judgment "A is either B or C." Either B or C is left and one of these two is
excluded. Such a judgment appears to be involved in the Indian syllogism,
whose 'reason' (hetu) is relevant to the 'thesis' (sādhya) when the case referred
to in the thesis is agreed to be present in similar cases and absent in dissimilar
cases.12 Anyway, the disjunctive judgment is a form of inference (anumāna),
and for a particular system it is necessary to state the rule of the disjunction.
Jayatilleke has shown that various systems of four alternatives found in the
early Buddhist texts are in a disjunctive system whose rule seems to be that
when one of the alternatives is taken as "true" the rest are certainly false. He
points to such systems as, "A person is wholly happy; ... unhappy; ... both
happy and unhappy; ... neither happy nor unhappy." "X is a person who
torments himself; ... torments others; ... both torments himself as well as others; ... who neither torments himself nor others.\textsuperscript{13} Bosanquet has an apt illustration: \textsuperscript{14} “I suppose that the essence of such a system lies in arrangements for necessarily closing every track to all but one at a time of any tracts which cross it or converge into it. The track X receives trains from A, B, C, D; if the entrance for those from A is open, B, C, and D are ipso facto closed; if A, B, and C are closed, D is open, and so on.”

But the matter is not without complications. The Pāli work Kathāvatthu records a dispute between the two Buddhist sects Theravāda and Andhaka about the nature of the meditative state which is called in Pāli nevasaññānāsaññāyatana (the base of neither the saññā nor non-saññā), where saññā means something like “idea,” and the disagreement was over the presence or absence of saññā in that state. The section concludes with an appeal to the case of the “neutral feeling” (the neither-pleasure-nor-pain), thus consistent with the traditional Indian syllogism which uses, as example, something well known to society (lokaprasiddha). Just as it would not be cogent to ask if that neutral feeling were either pleasure or pain, so is it not proper to assert there either is or is not saññā on the basis of neither the saññā nor non-saññā.\textsuperscript{15} This conclusion agrees with the previous observation that only one of the four alternatives is the case at a particular time. Besides, we learn that the “neither . . . nor” alternative points to a neutrality with indeterminate content.

Jayatilleke quite properly explains the third alternative: “S is partly P and partly non-P.”\textsuperscript{16} Thus for the content of the third alternative, stated as “the universe is both finite and infinite,” the Brahma-jala Sutta explains this as when one has the idea (saññī) that the world is finite in the upward and downward directions, and has the idea that the world is infinite across. In agreement, Nāgārjuna states in his Madhyamaka-kārikā, XXVII, 17–18:

If the same place (ekadesa) that is divine were the same place that is human, it would be (both) permanent and impermanent. That is not feasible. If ‘both the permanent and the impermanent’ were proven, one must also grant that the pair ‘neither the permanent nor the impermanent’ is proven.

One should note about this passage (Jayatilleke mistranslates and misunderstands it),\textsuperscript{17} that Nāgārjuna does not here deny an alternative of “both the permanent and the impermanent” per se; he denies this for one and the same place. This can be illustrated by his own verse (MK XXV, 14, cited later), implying that nirvāṇa is present in the Buddha and absent in ordinary persons, but not present and absent in the same place. Nāgārjuna, in the present verses (XXVII, 17–18), also makes explicit his position that the fourth alternative (neither the permanent nor the impermanent) is derived from the third one, and that the third one (both the permanent and the impermanent) combines the presumed first one (the permanent) and the second one (the impermanent).

This brings up Nāgārjuna’s remarkable verse (MK XVIII, 8):
All (sarva) is genuine (tathāyam), or is not genuine, or is both genuine and not genuine, or is neither genuine nor not-genuine. That is the ranked instruction (anusāsana) of the Buddha.

According to Candrakīrti’s commentary “all” means the personality aggregates (skandha), the realms (dhātu), and the sense bases (āyatana). See, along the same lines, Kalupahana’s discussion about the “Discourse on ‘Everything’” (Sabbasutta), available both in the Pāli canon and in the Āgama version in Chinese translation. Therefore the word “all” in Nāgārjuna’s verse amounts to “anything,” where the “anything” is any entity chosen from the set of ‘all’ entities according to the Buddhist meaning, as just expounded. This agrees with Bosanquet’s observation that the content of the disjunctive judgment “A is either B or C” “is naturally taken as an individual, being necessarily concrete.”

Next, the interpretation of the word anusāsana as ‘ranked instruction’ comes from observing it among the three ‘marvels’ (prātihārya) of the Buddha’s teaching, of which the first one is ‘magical performance’ (rddhi), the second is ‘mind reading’ (ādesanā), and the third, ‘ranked instruction’ (anusāsana), apparently made possible by the preceding ‘mind reading’. This interpretation is confirmed in Vasubandhu’s Buddhānusmṛti-tīkā, saying in part, “... with the three kinds of marvels observing the streams of consciousness of the noble Śāriputra, and so on, and of other fortunate sentient beings, teaches the true nature of the Śrāvakayāna exactly according to their expectations and their potentialities.” This only clarifies why Candrakīrti’s commentary on the verse interprets it as a ranking, and not why his commentary interprets the ranking as follows:

(a) The Buddha taught to worldly beings the personality aggregates, the realms, and sense bases, with their various enumerations, in a manner that ‘all is genuine’ in order to lead them onto the path by having them admire his omniscience about all these elements. (b) After these beings had come to trust the Lord, it was safe to inform them about all those divisions of the world that ‘all is not genuine’, i.e. ‘all is spurious’, because they momentarily perish and change. (c) Certain select disciples could be told ‘all is both genuine and not-genuine’. That is, that the same element which is genuine to the ordinary person is not-genuine or spurious to the noble person who is the Buddha’s disciple. He tells them this, so they may become detached, i.e. not see it in just one way. (d) To certain advanced disciples, far progressed in viewing reality and scarcely obscured, he taught that ‘all is neither genuine nor not-genuine’, just as in the case of the son of a barren woman, one asserts that the son is neither white nor black (= non-white).

However, he seems to be following, in his own way, the four ‘allegories’ or ‘veiled intentions’ (abhisamādhi) which are listed and then defined in the Mahāyāna-Sūtraśāntaka, XII, 16–17. The first one is avatārana-abhī (the veiled intention so they will enter), explained as teaching that form, and so forth, is existent, so as not to scare the śrāvakas from entering the Teaching. The second one is laksana-abhī (the veiled intention about the character, namely, of
dharmas), explained as teaching that all dharmas are without self-existence, without origination, etc. The third one is pratipakṣa-abhīṣ (the veiled intention about opponents, namely, to faults), explained as teaching by taking into account the taming of faults. So far these terms agree quite well with Candrakīrti’s exposition. For example, in the case of the third one, the application to Nāgārjuna’s line “all is both genuine and not-genuine” is the opposition (pratipakṣa) to the fault of one-sidedness. It is the fourth one whose relevance is obscure: this is the parināmana-abhīṣ (the veiled intention about changeover, namely, to reality). In illustration, the Sūtrālāṃkāra cites a verse: “Those who take the pithless as having a pith abide in waywardness. Those who are mortified with the pains [of austere endeavor] [abide] in the best enlightenment.” Candrakīrti is at least partially consistent by saying “to certain advanced disciples, far progressed in viewing reality,” because these ones would take the pithless as pithless.

Jayatilleke26 refers to the same passage of Candrakīrti’s and to a different commentary on Nāgārjuna’s verse in the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, both as presented in Robinson’s book,27 to deny that in the verse cited above, the four alternatives are in a “relation of exclusive disjunction” and to claim that they amount to the non-Buddhist relativistic logic of the Jains. However, Candrakīrti’s commentary is consistent with Nāgārjuna’s MK XXVII, 17–18 (translated earlier, herein) concerning the dependence of the subsequent alternative on the previous one or ones.

Jayatilleke’s hostility to Candrakīrti’s commentary on the verse may stem from the modern Theravādin’s reluctance to attribute a ranked instruction to the Buddha. Ordinarily the canonical passage cited in this connection is, as Thomas renders it: “Buddha replied, ‘What does the Order expect of me? I have taught the Doctrine without making any inner and outer, and herein the Tathāgata has not the closed fist of a teacher with regard to doctrines.’”28 From the modern Theravādin standpoint, Candrakīrti’s explanation attributes to the Buddha precisely such an inner and outer, because it portrays the Buddha teaching worldly beings (= the outer) in the realistic manner, and then teaching those beings once they had become disciples (= the inner) in the illusional manner. And going on with a still different teaching to certain advanced disciples. But that same scriptural passage from the traditional, last sermon of the Buddha could be taken differently than it usually is, and perhaps consistently with Nāgārjuna’s verse as Candrakīrti understood it. That is because the original Pāli (Dīgha-Nikāya, ii, 100) reads: mayā dharmo anantarāṃ abāhirām karitvā (By me was the Dhamma preached without inner, without outer). The phrase “without inner, without outer” can be restated as “with neither an inner nor an outer.” And then just as the “neutral feeling” (neither pleasure nor pain) is not either pleasure or pain, so also one could not determine if the Buddha’s doctrine was either inner or outer, and one homogeneous character, wearisome by repetition of the same doctrine over and over again. Nāgārjuna’s
verse, by use of the word *anusāsana*, seems to mean that the Tathāgata, without the closed fist, would gladly communicate in a graduated manner so that disciples in different stages of progress could have a teaching suited to their particular level. While this position may not be agreeable to some modern exponents of the Theravāda tradition, it is not a ‘Mahāyāna’ quarrel with the earlier ‘Hinayāna’ school, because also Buddhaghosa of the Theravāda tradition in his *Atthasālīni* insists that the Buddha’s teaching was fittingly modified in accordance with the varying inclinations of both men and gods.20

III. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES APPLIED TO CAUSATION, EACH DENIED

Starting with the Buddha’s first sermon, the four Noble Truths have been a basic ingredient of Buddhist thinking and attitudes. Of these Truths, the first is the Noble Truth of Suffering; and of the fourth Truth, the Noble Truth of Path explained with eight members, the first member is called ‘right views’ (*samyag-drṣṭi*). Sometimes ‘right views’ were established by determining and eliminating the wrong views. So in the Pāli *Samyutta-Nikāya* (II, 19–21),30 the Buddha, replying to questions by Kassapa (Kāśyapa), denied that suffering is caused by oneself, by another, by both oneself and another, or neither by oneself nor by another. Then, in answer to further questions, the Buddha stated that he knows suffering and sees it. Then Kassapa asked the Buddha to explain suffering to him, and was told that claiming the suffering was done by oneself amounts to believing that one is the same person as before, which is the eternalistic view; while claiming that the experiencer of the suffering is different from the one who caused it, amounts to the nihilistic view. Thereupon the Buddha taught the Dharma by a mean, namely, the series of twelve members which begin with the statement ‘having nescience as condition the motivations arise’ and continue with similar statements through the rest of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). The Buddha proceeded to teach that by the cessation of nescience, the motivations cease, and so on, with the cessation of this entire mass of suffering. In agreement, Nagarjuna’s *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, I, 1 states:

There is no entity anywhere that arises from itself, from another, from both (itself and another), or by chance.

In this case the given element is called the ‘entity’ (*bhāva*). The first two of the denied alternatives have the given element of ‘cessation’ (*nirodha*) in MK VII, 32. The element is ‘suffering’ (*duḥkha*) or ‘external entity’ (*bāhya-bhāva*) in MK XII. The meaning of the denial here is aptly stated by Bosanquet: “Negation of a disjunction would mean throwing aside the whole of some definite group of thoughts as fallacious, and going back to begin again with a judgment of the simplest kind. It amounts to saying, ‘None of your distinctions touch the point; you must begin afresh.’”31 In the discourse to Kassapa, to begin afresh amounts to accepting “dependent origination.” This is also Nāgārjuna’s
position, following the ancient discourse to Katyāyana, as mentioned later in the Madhyamaka-kārikā, and as stated in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, VI, 114:

Since entities do not arise by chance, (i.e.) from a lord, and so on (primal matter, time, atoms, svabhāva, Puruṣa, Nārāyaṇa, etc.), or from themselves, others, or both (themselves and others), then they arise in dependence (on causes and conditions).

Besides, to begin afresh amounts to the establishment of voidness (śūnyatā), for so the Anavatapta (nāgarāja) paripṛcchā is cited: “Any (thing) that is born (in dependence) on conditions, is not born (to wit): The birth of this (thing) does not occur by self-existence (svabhāva). Any (thing) that is dependent on conditions, is declared void. Any person who understands voidness, is heedful.” Since Nāgārjuna begins his Madhyamaka-kārikā with this theory of causation, it is reasonable to assume that it is essential for the rest of his work. Also, since voidness (śūnyatā) is established in the course of the causal denials, it is taken for granted in the denial in terms of existence, and so the attempt to establish voidness by way of existence becomes a faulty point of view (drṣṭi), as in MK XXII, 11:

One should not say “It’s void,” nor “It’s non-void,” nor “It’s both (void and non-void),” nor “It’s neither.” But it may be said in the meaning of designation.

Besides, the denial of the four alternatives in the scope of causation (confer, MK I, 1, earlier) was aimed at four philosophical positions, as follows:

1. The denial of arising from itself is the rejection of the Śāṅkhaṇya position, which is the satkāryavāda (causation of the effect already existent). Murti is certainly right on this point.
2. The denial of arising from another rejects the creator being (Īśvara), and Kalupahana increases the list from a Jaina source for ‘caused by another’: destiny (niyati), time (kāla), God (Īśvara), nature (svabhāva), and action (karma). The later Buddhist logicians held a theory of 'efficiency' that belongs here. Murti incorrectly puts this kind of denial under the heading of asatkāryavāda (the nonexistence of an effect before its production).
3. The denial of arising from both itself and another is the rejection of the Vaiśeṣika, who say the clay pot arises from itself (clay) and from the potter, wheel, sticks, etc. In fact, this theory is in both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which Dasgupta, in agreement with Shastri, calls the asatkāryavāda, the opposite of the Śāṅkhaṇya’s satkāryavāda. Here, the clay is the material cause; the stick, wheel, etc., the instrumental cause.
4. The denial of arising without a cause (or by chance), is the rejection of the Lokāyata (the ancient materialistic school), which espouses the arising
from self-nature. That school held that consciousness is just a mode of the four elements (fire, air, water, earth): consciousness is not the effect of another consciousness.

Hence, there is no denial of arising per se, but the alternatives are meant to deny the arising falsely ascribed to certain agencies, to wit, itself, another, both itself and another, or by chance. This, then, is one of the 'right views'.

V. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES APPLIED TO EXISTENCE, EACH DENIED

The Buddha rejected each of the four alternatives regarding the existence after death of the Tathāgata, because none of the four are relevant (na upeti), or defined (avyākata). Nāgārjuna devotes Madhyamaka-kārikā, chap. XXV to the same topic, saying generally (XXV, 22): "Since all given things (*vastu) are void, what is endless, what with end, what both endless and with end, what neither endless or with end?" This refers to the celebrated fourteen 'undefined given things' (avyākṛta-vastūni). So in the chapter, nirvāṇa is treated in verses 5, 8, 13, 16; and the Lord before and after cessation, in verses 17, 18. For example, this is verse 17: "One should not infer that the Lord exists after cessation (i.e. in Nirvāṇa). One should not infer that he does not exist, or both (exists and does not exist), or neither." Hence the rejections, again, are aimed against all philosophical positions that resort to inference or to ordinary human reason in such matters. The failure of reasoning is clearly expressed in the Mahāyāna work Ratnagotravibhāga (chap. I, verse 9) when denying the four alternatives about the Dharma-sun as the ultimate nature:

I bow to that Dharma-sun which is not existence and not non-existence, not both existence and non-existence, neither different from existence nor from non-existence; which cannot be reasoned (asakyas tarkayitum), is free from definition (nirukty-apagatah), revealed by introspection, and quiescent; and which, pervasively shining with immaculate vision, removes the attachment, antipathy, and (eye-) cauls toward all objects.

The question arises whether it is proper to interpret this to involve denial in Bosanquet's meaning, what he calls "contrary negation": "As we always speak and think within a general subject or universe of discourse, it follows that every denial substitutes some affirmation for the judgment which it denies." One could argue that simply to deny one judgment and thereby affirm another judgment would be a process of thinking that is negated by the goal alluded to in the preceding passage, since the Dharma-sun "cannot be reasoned." However, if Bosanquet's statement were altered to read "every denial substitutes some affirmation for the denial," it then appears to suit the state of affairs alluded to in the passage above. In short, the whole system of four alternatives would be denied in this contrary negation, thus to suggest the retirement of convention (samvṛti) in favor of absolute truth (paramārtha-satya).

In the preceding illustrations, it is the Tathāgata or the Dharma or Nirvāṇa which is affirmed as the affirmation of absolute truth in the process of the
denials, because these denials are a meditative act—and acts succeed where theories fail—which downgrades the role of inference and human reason generally, and upholds the role of vision, so—as Atśiśa indicated—to promote insight (prajñā).

Therefore, it is now possible to evaluate two interpretations which seem to be starkly contrasted: (1) Murti’s “The Mādhyamika denies metaphysics not because there is no real for him; but because it is inaccessible to Reason. He is convinced of a higher faculty, Intuition (prajñā). . . .”50 (2) Streng’s, “In Nāgārjuna’s negative dialectic the power of reason is an efficient force for realizing Ultimate Truth.”51 One could argue that the disagreement is deceptive, since if reason is to be taken as the mental process of making the denials which substitute an affirmation of the Real or Ultimate Truth, then indeed while the Real is inaccessible to reason, it cannot be denied that reason brought about that higher faculty, the supernal insight (prajñā), to which the Real is accessible. This very point is made in the Kāśyapa-parivarta:

“Kāśyapa, it is this way: for example, when two trees are rubbed together by the wind, and fire arises (from the friction), (that fire) having arisen, burns the two trees. In the same way, Kāśyapa, (when given things are analysed) by the most pure discrimination (praty’ālekṣaṇā), the faculty of noble insight is born; and (that Fire) having been born, (it) burns up that most pure discrimination itself.”52

Hence, the very discrimination which is the kind of reasoning that denies the alternatives is described metaphorically as a friction which arouses the fire of insight that in turn destroys this kind of reasoning.

Turning to Tson-kha-pa’s section,53 defending the denial of the four alternatives, this concerns the presence and absence of entities. Tson-kha-pa states that there are only two possibilities for an entity, that is, accomplished by own-nature, and efficient. Then, if the first alternative is stated in the form, “An entity exists,” this is denied; the denial meaning to the Prāśaṅgika-Mādhyamika that, in the case of both truths (saṃvṛti and paramārtha), one denies that an entity exists accomplished by own-nature, while the efficient entity is denied in the paramārtha or absolute sense but not conventionally.

Likewise, the Prāśaṅgika-Mādhyamika rejects the nonexistence of an entity, should someone affirm the nonexistence of an entity accomplished by own-nature among the unconstructed (asamskṛta) natures (dharma).

Likewise, this Mādhyamika rejects the simultaneity of existence of that sort of entity with the nonexistence of the other sort of entity. And he rejects that there are neither, even one accomplished by own-nature.

While I have insisted that the ultimate nature is affirmed by the four denials, it should be granted that the acceptance of this absolute in Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamika is a matter much disputed by Western scholars; de Jong’s thoughtful article54 on the topic deserves consultation. In any case, Candrakirti’s position is clear, as he states in his own commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra:
Regarding this sort of svabhāva (self-existence) as written in particular (Madhyamaka-kārikā, XV, 1–2), received from the mouth of the acārya (= Nāgārjuna), does it exist? (In answer:) As to its authorization, the Bhagavat proclaimed that whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, this true nature of dhammas abides, and so on, extensively. The “true nature” (dharmatā) (of that text, = svabhāva) (necessarily) exists. Which (elements) have this “true nature”? These, the eye, etc. have this svabhāva. And what is their svabhāva? Their uncreate nature and their non-dependence on another; the self-nature which is to be understood by knowledge (in āryasamāpatti) free from the caul of nescience (and its associated habit-energy). When it is asked, “Does that sort of thing exist?” who would answer, “No.”? If it does not exist, for which goal do the Bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? For what reason do the Bodhisattvas, in order to comprehend the true-nature, assume myriads of difficulties that way?55

In short, Candrakīrti explains the svabhāva of MK XV, 1–2, as the “true nature” of the scriptures, and in a manner equivalent to the dharma-sun of the Ratnagotravibhāga passage.56

Finally, the denials concerning existence are also referred to as the rejection of four ‘views’ (drṣṭi). So MK XXVII, 13:

Thus whatever the view concerning the past, whether ‘I existed’, ‘I did not exist’, ‘I both (existed and did not exist)’, ‘I neither (existed, nor did not exist)’, it is not valid.

Such passages undoubtedly support the frequent claim that the Madhyamika rejects all ‘views’. But note that the views here are of existence, not of causation; and that Nāgārjuna elsewhere adheres to the view of Dependent Origination, which in Buddhism would be counted as a ‘right view’ (samyag-drṣṭi).

V. THE THREE KINDS OF CATUŚKOṬI, VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

It might be argued that there are not really three ‘kinds’ of catuṣkoṭi but simply different applications of the catuṣkoṭi. Perhaps an exaggeration of contrast is involved in using the word ‘kinds’. Still I feel the word is necessary to counter the frequent discussion of the catuṣkoṭi as though the catuṣkoṭi is at hand and the only difficulty is in how to explain it. Hence we may observe that the first kind of catuṣkoṭi, in a disjunctive system, is explanatory of the individual propositions, and thus serves as an introduction to the next two kinds or uses of the catuṣkoṭi, to wit, to apply to the problem of causation or to the problem of existence. There were disputes concerning each of the three kinds, but it is especially the causation and existence applications of the four alternatives that occasioned spirited disagreements between the two main schools of the Madhyamika—the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika—disagreements which would require too many technical explanations to be treated in this article.

Moreover, all three kinds of catuṣkoṭi are found in early Buddhism and later in the Madhyamika school. The first case where the four alternatives constitute a disjunctive system, with the individual terms not necessarily
denied, was well represented in passages of early Buddhism, as preserved in the Pāli canon; and then was included in Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka-kārikā in the verse about the ranked instruction of the Buddha. The second case, denial of alternatives regarding causation, starting with the discourses to Kassapa and to Kaccāyana, is made much of by Nāgārjuna as the basis of the Mādhyamika, but does not seem to have been stressed as much in other schools of Buddhism. The third case, denial of four alternatives, has important examples in both early and later Buddhism, and, of course, is generously treated in the Mādhyamika. Therefore, when Jayatilleke says, “It is evident that Nāgārjuna and some of his commentators, ancient and modern, refer to this logic with little understanding of its real nature and significance,” these remarks define the limitations of Jayatilleke’s own views of these problems, outside of which is his own “little understanding.” Robinson answered Jayatilleke in a different way: “And since the catuskoti is not a doctrine but just a form, later writers were at liberty to use it in new ways, doing which does not itself prove that they misunderstood the early forms.” This is well stated and is meant not only to reject Jayatilleke’s criticism of Nāgārjuna and others, but apparently also to justify the application of symbolic logic. However, I have brought up sufficient evidence to show that Nāgārjuna, in the matter of the catuskoti, is heir to and the continuator of teachings in the early Buddhist canon (in Pāli, the four Nikāyas; in Sanskrit, the four Āgamas). Furthermore, I cannot concede that the catuskoti is just a form. Indeed, if Nāgārjuna had used it in new ways, Jayatilleke would have been more justified in his attribution of misunderstanding to Nāgārjuna.

Next, we observe by the foregoing materials that the first kind of catuskoti is a disjunctive system that was used to explain the Buddha’s teaching. The second, applied to causation, each of the alternatives denied, is a meditative exercise, and besides serves to classify some of the philosophical positions rejected by the Madhyamika. The third kind, applied to existence, each of the alternatives denied, is another meditative exercise, and besides serves to establish the absolute by negating the notional activity of the mind (samjña-skandha) and its net of imputed qualifications.

The priority of the causality to existence treatments—as I have already insisted upon—is consistent with Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka-kārikā, which devotes chapter I to conditional causes (pratyaya), beginning with the denial of four alternatives concerning origination of entities, but in the same chapter begins to treat alternatives of existence, nonexistence, etc. So MK I,6: “Neither an existent nor a non-existent entity has a valid condition (pratyaya). What non-existent has a condition? What is the use of a condition for an existent?” The next verse (I,7) shifts to the word dharma: “Whenever a feature (dharma) neither existent nor non-existent, or both existent and non-existent, operates, in that case how could an operator-cause be valid?” (and it is not valid.) MK chapters III, IV, and V, deal with the products of causes, namely, the sense
bases, personality aggregates, and elements, that amount to “all entities” (sarva-bhāva, IV, 7). Here again, “all entities” presuppose their arising as products, so the causality. The establishment of causality in conventional terms and of existence in absolute terms is therefore implied in MK XXIV, 10: “Without reliance on convention, the supreme (paramārtha) is not pointed to.”

I propose that it was by not distinguishing these uses of the catuṣkoṭi that there has been in the past various improper or misleading attributions to this formula. For example, there is the problem of which kind of two negations is involved: the prasajya-pratisedha (negation by denial) or paryuddaśa-pratisedha (negation by implication). Matilal concludes that the catuṣkoṭi is of the prasajya type and that so understood the catuṣkoṭi is free from contradiction.60 Staal after admirably explaining the two kinds of negation (the paryuddaśa type negates a term; the prasajya type negates the predicate) agrees with Matilal that the catuṣkoṭi exhibits the prasajya type, but disagrees that this frees the formula of contradiction.61 However, when one considers this along with my preceding materials, one can promptly agree with Matilal and then with Staal that it is the prasajya negation which is involved with the catuṣkoṭi, nota bene, the four alternatives in their explicit form applied to existence, because the proposition “I bow to that Dharma-sun which is not existence” is of the prasajya type (confer, Staal: ‘x is not F’). But when one examines the propositions of the four alternatives in their explicit form applied to causation, one can promptly disagree with Matilal and then with Staal, because the proposition “There is no entity anywhere that arises form itself,” is of the paryuddaśa type (confer, Staal: ‘not-x is F’). And this paryuddaśa type is of the variety implying action, for which there is the stock example, “Fat Devadatta does not eat food in the daytime.” But ‘fat Devadatta’ must eat sometime, so when? The world responds, “at night!”62 Also, the entities that do not arise from self, another, both, or by chance, must arise somehow, so how? Buddhism responds, “in the manner of Dependent Origination (pratītyasamutpāda).” In illustration, the first two members of Dependent Origination are: (1) ‘nescience’ (avidyā), and (2) ‘motivations’ (saṃskāra). ‘Motivations’ do not arise from self (motivations) or from another (nescience), or from both self and another (motivations and nescience), or without a cause (that is, by chance); ‘motivations’ do arise with ‘nescience’ as condition (pratyaya); and since ‘motivations’ are a karma member, have a cause (hetu) which is karma, hence the other karma-member, which is (10) ‘gestation’ (bhava) or ‘re-existence’ (punarbhava).63

But then what of Staal’s position that even so (that is, allowing the prasajya interpretation for the catuṣkoṭi of existence), this does not save the prasajya propositions from mutual contradiction? Saying, “In rejecting the third clause, the denial of the principle of non-contradiction is rejected, not the principle of non-contradiction itself,”64 he interprets the third proposition in its literal form, denial that something both exists and does not exist. However, at least
in the Tson-kha-pa Prāśaṅgika-Mādhyamika explanation that I gave earlier, it is not possible to understand the four denials in terms of existence just by their literal form, because one must bring in the theory of two truths (samvṛtti and paramārtha) to understand Nāgārjuna’s position. In such a case, the denial of the third proposition amounts in commentarial expansion to: This Mādhyamika rejects, in the absolute sense (paramārthatas), the simultaneity of existence by own-nature of that efficient entity with the nonexistence by own-nature of the unconstructed entity. In short, it is here claimed that ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ refer to contrasting entities. Along the same lines, Nāgārjuna says (*MK* XXV, 14):

> How could Nirvāṇa be both a presence and an absence? Like light and darkness, there is no existence of the two in the same place.

Thus the third alternative of this type of *catuskoti* can be resolved in various ways, for example, one may deny both a presence and an absence of nirvāṇa, adding “that is, in the same place”; or, with a different subject, adding perhaps, “that is, at the same time”; or, with still other subjects, perhaps drawing upon the two truths, “that is, with the same truth.” All these additions are consistent with Nāgārjuna’s verses in the *MK* Thus, in such interpretations it is not the intention of the denial, as Staal claims, to save a principle of human reason from default; but rather it is held that such is really the meaning of the third proposition, to wit, that a qualification of place, time, or truth must be added. However, it follows that the denials of alternatives applied to existence, while in their explicit form constituting the *prasajya* type of denial, turn out, by reason of the qualifications added in the Mādhyamika school, to be *paruyḍāsa* negations. Indeed, study of the two main traditions of the Mādhyamika, Candrakīrti’s Prāśaṅgika and Bhāvaviveka’s Svātantrika, will show that both of them insist on adding qualifications, especially in terms of the two truths (samvṛtti and paramārtha), their disagreement stemming from how such qualifications are made. But that a qualification should be added is consistent with most of the attempts of Westerners to explain the *catuskoti*, because they usually added something, to wit, their theory of the *catuskoti*. So the Mādhyamika commentators and the Western writers share this solicitude to rationalize, even in the case of the absolute, which was supposed to cut off the net of qualifications. Even so, as was indicated previously, the Mādhyamika is not against reason as the faculty which denies a self, denies the alternatives, and so on, because this reason leads to the insight which realizes the absolute.

**CONCLUSION**

Now we must revert to the initial question: Who understands the four alternatives of the Buddhist texts? It is easier to define the persons who do not understand: as was shown, they are the ones who do not want to understand, or are not confident of their own ability to understand. Besides, no one under-
stands the four alternatives, but perchance one does understand the four alternatives in a disjunctive system, or the four alternatives applied to causation, or the four alternatives applied to existence. The four alternatives, disjunctively considered, constitute a preliminary orientation. The alternatives of causation, each denied, are a meditation with upholding of human reason with its inferences, definitions, and the like. The alternatives of existence, each denied, are a meditation with ultimate downgrading of human reason. Then to answer more along the lines of the way Candrakīrti writes:—Whether one who understands arises or does not arise, “this true nature of dhammas abides,”—the svabhāva of that sort. So Candrakīrti says in his Prasannapadā commentary on Madhyamaka-kārikā, chapter XV:

By svabhāva one understands this innate nature, uncreate, which has not deviated in the fire in the past, present, and future; which did not arise earlier and will not arise later; which is not dependent on causes and conditions as are the heat of water, (one or another) of this side and the other side, long and short. Well, then, does this own-nature of fire that is of such manner (i.e. uncreate, not dependent) exist? (In reply:) This (svabhāva of such sort) neither exists nor does not exist by reason of own-nature. While that is the case, still in order to avoid frightening the hearers, we conventionally make affirmations (such as ‘It is svabhāva’ and ‘It is dharmatā’) and say it exists.65

NOTES

1. Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s Lam rim chen mo, the sections ‘Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real’. The four-alternatives discussion occurs in the ‘Discerning the Real’ section.


17. Ibid., p. 82.
18. My rendition ‘genuine’ is close to the dictionary. Confer, the negative forms atathya (‘untrue, unreal’) and avitatta (‘not untrue, not futile’).
22. See Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 392, under prātihārya. Here the form anusāsāni is used.
24. I have summarized. In full translation, see de Jong, Cinq chapitres, pp. 27–28.
32. Here translated from the Tibetan in the context of Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s Lam rim chen mo, ‘Discerning the Real’ section.
33. For the various occurrences of the important verse, see Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Mūla-madhyamatka-rākāsā of Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4 (St-Pétersbourg, 1903–1913), p. 239.
34. Here I accept Matilal’s correction of my earlier stated position; confer, Bimal Krishna Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 148–149; hereafter cited as Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar. But now my understanding only partially agrees with his, to wit, “Dependent origination = Emptiness = Dependent designation = The Middle Way.” Because I would say that as far as Nāgārjuna is concerned, dependent origination is the way things happen and that it is voidness, while the dharmas so arising are void, whether one recognizes this to be the case. But while his school designates dependent origination voidness, this is not what every other Buddhist sect does; and Nāgārjuna goes on to add that the act of so designating, when there is the dependence, is indeed the middle path. So it is not voidness that is designation.
35. Here I have taken suggestions from the context of the Lam rim chen mo when MK I, 1 is cited, and from the annotational comments of the Tibetan work called Mchan bzi.
37. Confer, David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 5, 46. For the theory of the Buddhist logicians as later expressed by Ratnakīrti, see Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 1:158–159. This is a theory that ‘efficiency’ (arthakriyākārīvā) can produce anything, and so a momentary, efficient entity is the ‘other’ from which something may arise. The stream of consciousness is held to be of this nature, with one ‘moment’ of consciousness giving rise to the next one. Hereafter cited as Kalupahana, Causality.
38. Murti, *The Central Philosophy*, p. 170, misused the term *asaṃkāryavāda* (for the correct usage, see below).


41. See now Kalupahana, *Causality*, pp. 25ff. for a valuable discussion of the *svabhāvavāda* in connection with the ancient Materialists, and on p. 31 he admits for them the appellation ‘non-causationists’ (*ahetuvāda*).


44. While the verse in Sanskrit has the locative plural *dharmaḥ* rather than *vastuḥ*, Candrakīrti’s commentary makes it clear that the latter word is intended, because he promptly talks of the fourteen *asyaṃkāra-vastūni* and does not mention any *dharma-s*; while in the Tibetan translation of the verse, instead of the standard translation for *dharma* (*T. chos*), one finds the term *chos po*, which is frequently used to translate *vastu*; confer, Takashi Hirano, *An Index to the Bodhicaryavatārā Panjikā, Chapter IX* (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1966), pp. 273–276.


46. My translation ‘should not infer’ is for the Sanskrit *nohyate*. The verb *ābhī-* has a number of meanings, including ‘to infer’; and the latter meaning is more associated with the verb root when there is the prefix *abhi-*, with such a form as *abhiyāhya* ‘having inferred’.

47. This conclusion, however, goes against various speculative solutions that have been advanced to determine particular schools to go with the various denials applied to existence, namely, those of Jayatillake, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 243ff.; Murti, *The Central Philosophy*, pp. 130–131; K. V. Ramanan, *Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy* (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971), pp. 155–158. It is noteworthy that there is little agreement between these authors’ solutions, and their arbitrariness itself stems from human reason, while to counter such positions Nāgārjuna would also have had to use ordinary human reason.


52. The passage is translated in its citation in Tson-kha-pa’s *Lam rim chen mo*. It is number 69 in A. Staël-Holstein, ed., *Kāśyapaparivārā*, (Commercial Press, 1926), but original Sanskrit is not extant for this passage.

53. Referred to in note 1, herein. There were many Tibetan controversies on this issue.


55. The passage occurs in the Tibetan Tanjur, photo edition, vol. 98, pp. 151–2–3 to 151–2–7, immediately preceded by Candrakīrti’s citation of *MK* XV, 1–2. I have translated it in *Lam rim chen mo* context.

56. While it is not possible to deal here with the many misconceptions in Ives Waldo, “Nāgārjuna and Analytic Philosophy,” *Philosophy East and West* 25, no. 3 (July, 1975), one may observe that Candrakīrti’s passage directly contradicts his remarks (p. 283) that the acceptance of ‘relational conditions’ (*pratyaya*) entails a denial both of *svabhāva* and of nonrelational ‘significant events’. Because Candrakīrti accepts, as does Buddhism generally, the *pratyaya* in the causal chain of Dependent Origination, and yet he also insists here upon the *svabhāva* as well as on a significance (the *bodhisattva’s* goal) that is perhaps nonrelational.


59. This is well stated in the Tibetan language by Red-mda‘-ba’s Commentary to Āryadeva’s ‘Four Hundred Verses’, ed. Jetsun Rendawa Shonnu Lodo (Sarnath: Sakya Students’ Union, 1974), p. 170: “The form and variety of natures (dharma) are posited as different by dint of samjñā (notions, ideas), but not by reason of the own-form (svarūpa) of given things (vastu)—because all of them being illusory, it is not possible to distinguish their own-forms.”


63. For Nāgārjuna’s classification of the two members, nos. 2 and 10, as karma, see, for example, A. Wayman, “Buddhist Dependent Origination,” History of Religions 10, no. 3 (Feb., 1971):188. I have gone much more into the cause and effect (hetu-phala) side of the formula in my forthcoming “Dependent Origination—the Indo-Tibetan Tradition,” (special issue of Journal of Chinese Philosophy).

64. Staal, Exploring Mysticism, p. 47.

65. La Vallée Poussin, Mālamadhyamakakārikās, pp. 263.5 to 264.4.