

KNOWLEDGE AS SALVATION: A STUDY IN EARLY BUDDHISM

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PREFACE

The purpose of this study should not be misconstrued. It is not an attempt to delineate epistemological theories peculiar to early Buddhism. Rather, it is intended primarily as a study of the nature and function of knowledge as part of the Buddhist path to salvation. A study of early Buddhist epistemology has recently been most ably done by Professor K. N. Jayatilleke of the University of Ceylon entitled, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, and there is no need to attempt what would be at best a poor second to this excellent monograph. Furthermore, although a reasonable amount of work has been done on the topic of knowledge in Buddhist thought, so far as I am aware no one has yet attempted a study of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in early Buddhism from the typological or phenomenological perspective I have adopted. The principal preoccupation of both occidental and oriental scholars of Buddhist thought has been to expose its philosophical dimensions. For example, the structures of sentient existence which typify the Theravāda tradition are expounded as an attempt to present a "modal" ontology in contrast to a "substantive" ontology (e.g. Vedānta). While not disputing such a claim nor discrediting the importance of understanding Buddhist thought in the light of its contemporary philosophical milieu, it, nevertheless, does an injustice to Buddhism as a religion to become overly

preoccupied with a philosophical interpretation of its doctrines. In effect, I have attempted to examine what is usually considered as a philosophical problem from the perspective of the central religious question, namely, "What can I do to be saved?" The fundamental focus of this study, then, is not knowledge in early Buddhism, but the role of knowledge in relationship to the salvation-quest in early Buddhism. In this task the insights of the phenomenological approach to the study of religion as discussed in Chapter I have proved to be very helpful.

This study is particularly concerned with one of the universal problems in religion, namely, the relationship between two different modes or types of knowledge in the light of the "eschatological hope." Our task is to study the relationship between rational or analytical and supra-rational or intuitive forms of knowledge from the perspective of the ultimate goal to be attained. It is not unusual for students of the phenomenon of religious experience to designate the experience of the ultimate as a supra-rational type of illumination. Following this experience are more rational attempts to describe and explain it which lead to the development of mythologies, theologies and religious philosophies. This particular view of the relationship between these two forms of knowledge, while valid for a religious founder such as the Buddha or the mystic seer, offers little help in trying to understand a religious tradition as a channel for the

attainment of salvation. Assuming that we have a religious tradition before us, such as early Buddhism, our question is not what relationship mystical and analytical modes of knowledge had for the Buddha, but, rather, how these two modes of knowledge function in relationship to the attainment of nibbāna. The problem we have set before us is also examined in the light of the milieu in which Buddhism arose as well as later important developments in early Buddhism resulting on the one hand in Theravāda scholasticism and the beginnings of Mahāyāna on the other. These core chapters are prefaced by a preparatory delineation of early Buddhism pointing in the direction of the central problem being studied and concluded with a brief postscript in which a contemporary religious quest is criticized in the light of our study of Buddhism.

A comment needs to be made regarding the use of Pāli and Sanskrit terms. As consistently as possible I have attempted to use Pāli forms when referring to the Pāli tradition of Theravāda Buddhism and Sanskrit when discussing the Sanskrit traditions of Hinduism or Mahāyāna Buddhism. Occasionally it was ambiguous as to whether Pāli or Sanskrit should be used. In those instances I have used the form which appears most frequently. For example, when the Mādhyamikas criticize the categories of the "realists," I have used the Pāli word, dhamma, rather than the Sanskrit, dharma. On occasion and somewhat arbitrarily, Pāli and Sanskrit words

have both been used, e.g. karma/kamma. When referring to Pāli and Sanskrit forms, I have tried consistently to use the unmodified form of a word unless indicated otherwise by quotation or indentation. When there has been a choice regarding unmodified forms (e.g. manas, mano), I have made every effort to use either one or the other throughout. Pāli and Sanskrit words, because they appear so frequently, have not been underlined nor have they been capitalized unless at the beginning of a line or referring to a title or a term used as a proper noun.

This study would not have been possible without the help of numerous persons: my wife, Nancy, who helped in typing the manuscript; Professor Kenneth Ch'en who, as my advisor, could not have expedited my progress more quickly than he did; Professor Philip Ashby whose unstinting encouragement has helped me greatly over the years; Oberlin Professor emeritus Clarence Hamilton who graciously read and made corrections on Chapter V; the graduate department of religion at Princeton University for making it possible to pursue this study and by supplementing my research with a travel grant the summer of 1965; and the Danforth Foundation for their financial support of my graduate study and research.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF RELIGION AND ITS STUDY

APPROACH

To discuss the nature of religion is out of vogue these days. It is considered to be antithetical to "scientific" scholarship, hence the historian of religion is supposed to describe rather than define religious phenomena. The problem with a purely descriptive, objectively verifiable approach to the study of religion, however, is that it ignores the question of meaning which is implicitly, if not explicitly, a part of every serious intellectual endeavor. To assume that it is possible simply to report or describe what one sees or studies neglects the investigator who is doing the seeing or studying. A study of religious phenomena depends not only on the describable and verifiable data itself but on the investigator who is studying it.

The above claim does not imply, of course, that there is no such thing as an "objective" study of religion, nor does it mean that some studies of religion may lay a greater claim to objectivity than others. For example, few would dispute the claim that Malinowski's study of the Trobriand

Islanders in terms of the interpretive categories of "magic, science and religion"¹ is more objective than Freud's discussion of the incest taboo in totemic society based on Fraser's anthropological data.² In each case, nevertheless, interpretation is taking place. Neither Malinowski nor Freud was simply describing religious phenomena. Rather, they were attempting to find a meaningful and significant scheme or frame of reference in order to organize and interpret the data at their disposal.

Basically all phenomenologically oriented studies of religion are involved in both description and interpretation.³ Brede Kristensen has defined the so-called "phenomenology of religion" as follows: "...its task is to classify and group the numerous and widely divergent data in such a way that an over-all view can be obtained of their religious content and the religious values they contain."⁴ The key to this definition is the word, "classify", for it is in the assigning of

¹Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954).

²Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962).

³In a recent article, "Prolegomenon to a Religious Hermeneutic," History of Religions, VI (February, 1967), Charles Long attempts to resolve the tension between the phenomenological and socio-anthropological approaches to the study of religion.

⁴W. Brede Kristensen, The Meaning of Religion, trans. John B. Carman (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 1.

names and the forming of categories by which to organize data (or what van der Leeuw would call "brackets")¹ that the phenomenologist of religion hopes to ascribe meaning to observed reality. Phenomenology as a discipline of study, if we may call it that, is, therefore, neither metaphysics nor simply an appreciation of empirical reality but the understanding of "events" arising from the interaction of the researcher and the data he is studying.² The discipline of phenomenology attempts to be objective but as an interpretative rather than as a purely descriptive science. As van der Leeuw says, "Phenomenology...is man's true vital activity, consisting in losing himself neither in things nor in the ego, neither in hovering above objects like a god nor dealing with them like an animal, but in doing what is given to neither animal nor god: standing aside and understanding what appears to view."³

In the terms of the above description, this study is a phenomenological analysis of a particular problem in Buddhism. It attempts to be truly descriptive, but it is also interpretative. As this study is primarily concerned with the meaning of the phenomena being investigated, it is

¹G. van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, trans. J. E. Turner (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), II, 675.

²Ibid., 676.

³Ibid.

necessarily related to the broader question of the meaning of religion in general. While accepting the fact that there is no such entity as "religion in general", nevertheless, the interpretative categories used by the phenomenologist of religion are much more inclusive than the particular phenomena being studied. Since a study of particular data cannot be separated from the question of the nature of religion, we shall first direct our attention to this latter issue.

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

The fundamental religious question continues to be in one form or another, "What can I do to be saved?" The question arises because the religious man conceives of his existence as suspended between two realities which might well be labeled the "profane" and the "sacred".¹ He seeks to be saved from the power of the profane in order to share in or partake of the power of the sacred.² The profane for the religious man is in most cases thought of as the material, the empirical or the phenomenal world. It is the world of sensory-perceived realities to which the individual becomes attached and in terms of which the religious man feels himself to be in bondage. This bondage may result from "desire"

¹These categories have been used rather widely by students of religion. In particular they have been popularized by Mircea Eliade through such books as The Sacred and the Profane, trans. W. R. Trask (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961).

²G. van der Leeuw conceives of power as the basis of religion in Religion in Essence and Manifestation, I, 23.

or perhaps "ignorance" which in various religious traditions is conceived of as binding a person to the profane and preventing him from attaining the sacred.

The profane is frequently characterized by two primary qualities, dis-order and un-freedom. It is disordered precisely because it represents the "world", the vast sphere of empirical "objects" which in this state bear no internal relationship to one another. In essence, the profane is phenomenal diversity without coherence, without meaning beyond objective representation. Over this condition the individual has no power. He is simply a reactive agent, totally dominated by empirical realities. His rewards are the rewards of this world; his pleasures are the pleasures of the senses; his goals are those inevitably conditioned by the tangible.

By way of contrast, the sacred represents both order and freedom. Its order derives from a non-empirical paradigm on which it is dependent. This paradigm assumes many forms. In archaic traditions it may be represented by myth, in particular the cosmogonic myth.¹ For example, cosmic order is represented as being established in the cosmogonic myth of the Old Testament (Genesis 1:1f), the Indra-Vṛtra myth of the Rig Veda (R. V. 1:32), and the Marduk-Tiamat myth of the

¹Eliade goes so far as to claim that for the religious man of archaic cultures every creative act is a repetition of a mythological paradigm of a cosmogonic nature. The Sacred and the Profane, p. 96.

Gilgamesh Epic. Even without mythological form, however, the sacred is an ordered cosmos because of its relationship to an Ur-grund, an ultimate reality. Thus, for example, when the authority of Indra and other Vedic gods declined in the late Rig Veda, there was still a profound awareness of other ordering principles such as Tad Ekam and Brahman, and the Christian theologians of medieval Europe talked about the order of nature not in the terms of the Genesis myth but in terms of natural law.

At least in part, the freedom represented by the sacred results from its order. Precisely because the sacred is ordered in relationship to a non-empirical ultimate ground, the chaos of empirical multiplicity loses its power. The religious man no longer finds himself bound by sensory-perceptible realities because he perceives them only in relationship to the paradigm of the sacred. In this respect, freedom is liberation from bondage to chaotic ends through the order inherent in the sacred. Thus, for example, Torah in the Old Testament gave order to all aspects of the world in which the Hebrew peoples lived. Similarly, Li in Confucianism and Dharma in Hinduism served to provide an ordered cosmos which filled the life of the Chinese and the Indian with purpose and meaning.

The freedom of the sacred is more than the freedom from the threat of bondage to the profane; it is the freedom of the sacred itself. This freedom rests in the power represented

by the ground on which the sacred ultimately depends. It is the power of the creation and the maintenance of the sacred, and one who is within the sacred partakes of the power as well as the order inherent in it. The freedom of the sacred, being dependent on its ultimate ground, represents a power beyond the human sphere. As a result it is interpreted within religious traditions in a variety of extraordinary ways. As examples we might cite the shaman of archaic traditions, reputed capable of achieving the power of flight, or in the Christian tradition where the pious man of faith is considered to be a man of extraordinary virtue, or in early Confucianism where the well-being of the entire realm depended upon the moral virtue (Te) of the sage-king.

The religious man aware of the dialectic of the sacred and the profane seeks to live within the sacred cosmos. On one level he does this through cultus and ritual or through the accepted modes and patterns of the particular religious traditions of which he is a part. Even in a secularized society such as our own, there are certain moments in an individual's personal history or particular rites of passage performed when even the profane man looks to the rhythms and patterns of the sacred. On a higher level, however, there are those individuals who seek to reach the source or the ground of the sacred itself. These are not just the mystics or the "god-intoxicated" persons, however, but those who experience

a "total response" of their "whole being" to the ultimately real.¹ The emphasis on the total nature of this experience is of central importance, for what is involved in the experiencing of the source of the sacred is the attainment of a new level of reality. In the terminology of evangelical Christianity, it is a con-version, a complete transformation which involves a new way of perceiving and acting in the world, indeed, a "new being".

This particular conception of the profane rooted in the chaotic multiplicity of the empirically perceived world and of the sacred grounded in an ultimate reality upon which depends cosmic, natural and moral order as well as the freedom of a transcendental reality, comes not only through the study of particular religious traditions but with the help of certain phenomenologists and historians of religion. In particular this conception of the sacred has been informed by such scholars as Rudolf Otto, Paul Tillich, G. vander Leeuw and Joachim Wach. Without attempting to elaborate their positions, it will be illuminating nevertheless to point to aspects of their thought particularly appropriate to the typology we have presented.

Rudolf Otto and Paul Tillich offer two interesting options for our understanding of the paradigm of the sacred.

¹Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 33.

In his classical work, The Idea of the Holy,¹ Otto maintains that the "other" to which the religious man relates in the sacred and in terms of which his life takes on meaning and purpose is experienced as a "ganz andere", a "wholly other" surrounded by a "mysterium tremendum".² This paradigm which ultimately defines the sacred should not be confused with any other object to which man might relate. The relationship between man and the object of his religious quest cannot even be described in terms of "infinite dependence" because these terms are analogous to other types of finite dependencies.³ The "holy other" is so completely outside man's accustomed awarenesses that he responds to it not merely in terms of dependence but with an awe-ful and fear-ful "creature feeling". Otto's understanding of the ultimate reality sought by the religious man dramatically underlines its radical "otherness". Man can experience and, hence, know this reality, but it must necessarily be a knowledge other than the knowledge a person has of perceptible objects.

The radical distinction between the individual and the paradigm of the sacred is moderated by Paul Tillich. He describes the ultimate reality as the "ground of being". This

¹Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).

²Ibid., p. 125.

³Otto was arguing his position against Frederick Schleiermacher.

literal or non-symbolic description of the ultimate is meant to convey the idea that ultimate reality (in Tillich's case, God) is not "a being" but "being itself". That is, God transcends every individual being as well as the totality of all beings. Every individual being, therefore, depends upon the ultimate ground of being as that reality underlying the whole process of human becoming. As Tillich says, "'God' is the answer to the question implied in man's finitude; he is the name for that which concerns man ultimately."¹ For Tillich, therefore, the religious man is not characterized by Otto's "creature feeling" but rather by an "ultimate concern".

If we were to accept Otto's basic premise that the nature of the paradigm of the sacred is to be conceived as "holy other", then we might conclude with van der Leeuw that as an "other" the object of religious experience is set aside from the usual and familiar in consequence of the Power it generated.² For van der Leeuw, the primary characteristic of the ultimately real, regardless of the particular form it assumes within a given religious tradition, is simply power. Because the "...idea of Power often forms the basis of religion,"³ Vander Leeuw understands the various categories of

¹Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I (Chicago: University Press, 1951), 211.

²Vanderleeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, I, 23.

³Ibid., 27.

religious phenomena with which he deals primarily in terms of this key concept. As the ^{English} title of his famous monograph indicates, he conceives of power as the "essence" of the nature of religion.

The question of the religious man, "What can I do to be saved?", still remains largely unanswered, however. We have examined the nature of the religious man's dilemma suspended between two ontological realities, the sacred and the profane, but we have yet to discuss how the power of the profane is neutralized and the power of the sacred attained.

In general it appears that if the ultimate reality or the paradigm of the sacred in relationship to which man finds meaning and reality is characterized by power, then it will inevitably be the case that man will attempt to assure himself of access to that power in a wide variety of ways. Through magic rites, prayer, sacrificial ritual and so on,¹ the religious man will seek to attain to, propitiate or in some other way insure himself that the power of the reality which in-forms the sacred will not be lost. That is, religious acts, whatever their nature, are conceived basically as a means to appropriate the power of the ultimately real.

Another aspect of the same general problem of the way in which the religious man relates to the paradigm of the sacred,

¹At this point it is not particularly germane to make the traditional distinction between magic as techniques to control sacred power and religion as submission to ultimate reality.

is brought out by Joachim Wach's discussion of religious experience. Wach defines religious experience as the total response of one's total being to what is experienced as ultimate reality.¹ If we accept Tillich's description of the paradigm of the sacred as the "ground of being," it logically follows that the experience of that reality can be none other than a "total" experience. Such an experience would seem to demand a kind of primordial conscious awareness of a condition prior to the interposition of all empirically determined states. Ordinary consciousness being forever bound by the qualifications of subject and object or knower and known is incapable of experiencing ultimate reality as the ground of being. The power that the religious man seeks, therefore, is the power to experience the paradigm of the sacred which necessarily involves the power to overcome the obstructions imposed by the "profane".

In the history of religions there appears to have been two basic types or forms by which the power of the profane has been overcome and the power of the sacred attained. One way in which this "salvation" occurs has been through the mediation of the ground of the sacred, usually in the form of a savior.² The other has relied exclusively on the strength, determination, will and knowledge of the individual. Nathan

¹Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions, p. 33.

²Vanderleeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, I, chapter 12.

Soderblom in discussing the first means by which the religious man attempts to reach the sacred poses the problem in this way:

Inasmuch as religion is not merely psychology and self-saving, but embraces likewise faith in a supernatural world, the assurance thereof is of essential importance to the pious man. How can he be assured of the divinity, and not only of the divinity, but also, which is equally important, of the grace and power of the divinity, of the will of the divinity to help him...He needs to know that the divinity has really saved him from his distress, from sin, and the world.¹

To this particular problem Soderblom maintains that there have been "...three classical examples of piety seeking support for its assurance in history, in an objective something beyond the range of man..."--Judaism, Christianity and Mahāyāna Buddhism.² All three traditions, he contends, answer the question of salvation by means of a "salvation-fact," a Heilstatsache.³

There is, however, another general form or type of answer to the basic soteriological question. It is the answer found in atheistic Sāṃkhya-yoga, classical Theravāda Buddhism or other traditions which reject the savior model. Here the insistence is that man himself must design the path to his own salvation. He alone can control the threatening

¹Nathan Soderblom, The Living God: Basal Forms of Personal Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 58.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 159.

power of the profane and reach the power of the ground of the sacred. There have been many ways devised to bring about this end. Ascetic practices, physical and psychological disciplines of various kind, means to control the mind and the senses--all with the purpose of eventually reaching the ultimate reality, to experience directly the source of all order and freedom.

One particularly important means by which the ultimate is reached by oneself has been knowledge. Through knowledge the religious man attempts to achieve the power of the sacred. As Vanderleeuw states it, "Power, always requires knowledge...Whoever desires to exercise power must know something about both the sources of his potency and the object to be controlled."¹ It could be said, therefore, that knowledge is directed toward two objects, the phenomenal or profane and the noumenal or sacred. All religions seem to agree that saving knowledge is not mere sensory knowledge. Not only is sensory-perception generally regarded as being inadequate to reach the ultimate, it is taken as a hindrance to its attainment. Knowledge of the profane, therefore, means knowledge of the principles of the phenomenal world, or knowledge of the true nature of the profane. Such knowledge we shall classify as rational, analytical or discursive knowledge. It is not simply empirical-descriptive knowledge,

¹Vanderleeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, II, 479.

but rather the kind of knowledge derived from calculated induction and rational analysis (and synthesis) of what has been observed. It is a type of knowledge which, by its very nature, demands an objective distance, a detachment from the world of the senses.

A rational-analytical knowledge, while useful in gaining a certain degree of power over the phenomenal world, is unable to attain a knowledge of the ultimate reality. Such knowledge must be supra-rational, intuitive or mystical, knowledge which in theistic traditions would be classified as "revealed". Knowledge of the ground of the sacred is necessarily "other" than knowledge derived from the senses and sense objects. Ultimate reality is a supra-sensuous reality and, therefore, cannot be known by ordinary modes of perception or inference. Since the goal of the religious man is to attain the power of the sacred by knowing it directly, a new mode of consciousness must be reached appropriate to the new level of reality. That is, before ultimate reality can be known, a decisive transformation must take place--the "new being" mentioned earlier. We cannot say, however, that the way of knowing appropriate to the sacred is totally divorced from prior forms of knowledge. On the contrary, understanding the true nature of the phenomenal world is an important stage in the acquisition of the knowledge of the ground of the sacred, but once this higher knowledge is reached, the paradigm of the sacred

becomes the sole perspective for the knowledge of the phenomenal world, and finally it alone becomes totally absorbing and empowering.

If we were to sketch a brief outline of the levels of knowledge which appear in relationship to the soteriological question, we might arrive at four categories: (1) pure sensory knowledge considered as a condition of complete bondage to the phenomenal world, (2) a rational-analytical knowledge of the nature of the phenomenal world rendering partial control over the profane, (3) supra-rational or intuitive knowledge which provides, on the one hand, a new orientation toward the profane, and (4) on the other hand, a direct access to the power of the ground of the sacred. Such categorization is, of course, an artificial construction and at least somewhat arbitrary. It is not meant to be an exclusive interpretation as an examination of a variety of religious traditions would prove. Ch'an Buddhism, for example, would object to the notion of a progressive development to the enlightenment experience giving knowledge of the ultimately real. Despite exceptions, however, the above described levels of understanding in relationship to the salvation-question are valid in a number of cases, the most important of which, we believe, being early Buddhism.

From an historical perspective it is the thesis of this study that in early Buddhism the rational-analytical and the supra-rational/intuitive levels of knowledge were equally

important aspects of the path to the attainment of the ground of the sacred, but that as the tradition matured, the Abhidhamma scholastics of Theravāda orthodoxy took the former type of knowledge to a logical extreme, whereas the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna Buddhism became overly preoccupied with the latter mode of knowledge. The other major philosophical school of early Mahāyāna, the Yogācārins, appear to represent a synthesis of the two traditions, rejecting neither the importance of analytical categorization nor the final role of intuitive or mystical realization.

CHAPTER II

THE BUDDHIST ANALYSIS OF MAN AND HIS SALVATION

A type of phenomenological framework has now been worked out for our examination of Buddhism. Before turning to a detailed analysis of the particular problem to which this study is addressed, however, two tasks confront us: first, to arrive at a general understanding of the teachings of Buddhism as presented by the Theravāda¹ tradition; second, to study the problem of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in non-Buddhist sources of a time roughly contemporaneous with the rise of Buddhism in India. This chapter addresses itself to the first task.

If one were to ask a Buddhist bhikkhu (monk) the question, "What is Buddhism," he might respond with a number of "formal answers" that play an important role in the teachings of the Theravāda as well as the Mahāyāna tradition. For instance, he

¹Unless otherwise specified, the use of the term, Theravāda, will apply to the major form of Buddhism practiced in Ceylon and Southeast Asia today which can conveniently be distinguished as that form of Buddhism whose sacred scriptures are in Pāli.

might answer that Buddhism could be explained in terms of the three refuges (tisarāṇa) or the three gems (tiratana), namely, the Buddha, the dhamma and the sangha. In elaborating this formula he would point to the figure of the Buddha as the source of the inspiration of the religion, as the "pathfinder" who pointed the way to ultimate truth and reality. This truth and the path to it, he would continue, are set forth in the dhamma or the teachings of the Buddha and his early disciples. These teachings are nurtured and perpetuated in the sangha or the community of monks who have dedicated their lives to the same search for Truth that Siddhattha Gotama set out on over 2500 years ago.

If this answer proved to be unsatisfactory one might provoke the bhikkhu to a further elaboration of the dhamma. In describing the doctrine of Theravāda Buddhism the monk might go on to summarize it in terms of the "Four Noble Truths" (cattāri ariyasaccāni)--suffering (dukkha), the arising of suffering (samudaya), the cessation of suffering (nirodha) and the path to the cessation of suffering (magga). These Four Noble Truths, according to the tradition, were preached in the Deer Park at Benaras at the occasion of the Buddha's first sermon after his enlightenment. If the bhikkhu happens to be a learned man he might even quote this section of the Buddha's sermon in a manner such as the following:

Now this, monks, is the noble truth of pain: (dukkha): birth is painful, old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation, de-

jection and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful, not getting what one wishes is painful. In short the five groups of grasping (*khandhas*) are painful.

Now this, monks, is the noble truth of the cause of pain: the craving, which tends to rebirth, combined with pleasure and lust, finding pleasure here and there; namely, the craving for passion, the craving for existence, the craving for non-existence.

Now this, monks, is the noble truth of the cessation of pain, the cessation without a remainder of craving, the abandonment, forsaking, release, non-attachment.

Now this, monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to the cessation of pain: this is the noble-Eight-fold Way; namely, right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.¹

Another formula which the monk might recite to explain Buddhism is that known as the *tilakkhaṇa* or the three marks of sentient existence, namely, *dukkha* (suffering), *anicca* (impermanence) and *anatta* (non-Self). These three marks apply to the first of the four noble truths which typify sentient existence while the last two truths apply to *nibbāna* or ultimate reality and the path to it. This division between the realms of sentient existence and ultimate reality or the phenomenal and the noumenal, if you will, provides us with two foci in terms of which to understand Theravāda Buddhism.

THE NATURE OF SENTIENT EXISTENCE

As has already been indicated, Theravāda Buddhism's understanding of sentient existence is that it is characterized

¹Mahavagga 6:19-22. from The Book of Discipline (Vinaya-Piṭaka) IV, trans. I. B. Horner ("Sacred Books of the Buddhists," Vol. XIV; London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1962), 16.

fundamentally by suffering, pain, ill, all of which are terms used to render the Pāli word, dukkha. In the Theravāda tradition the significance of dukkha is popularly described in the famous Jātaka tale called the "Four Sights." It will be recalled that according to the Pāli tradition the Buddha was born in the 6th century B.C. as Siddhattha Gotama, the son of the ruler of the Sākya tribe in Northeastern India in what today is Nepal. Since it was predicted at Siddhattha's birth that he would be either a great religious leader or a world ruler, his father took every precaution to direct his son toward the latter role. The Jātaka legends tell us that Siddhattha was surrounded by every kind of luxury possible and that until the age of twenty-nine he had never been exposed to suffering in any form. Then, as a result of a decision made by the gods, Siddhattha was confronted with three forms of suffering--sickness, old age and death--which "shocked" him into the recognition of the true nature of sentient existence and forced him to search for a higher reality. The Jātaka story describes this incident as follows:

'The time for the enlightenment of prince Siddhattha draweth nigh,' thought the gods; 'we must show him a sign;' and they changed one of their number into a decrepit old man, broken-toothed, gray-haired, crooked and bent of body, leaning on a staff, and trembling, and showed him to the Future Buddha...

Then said the Future Buddha to the charioteer ... 'Friend, pray, who is this man? Even his hair is not like that of other men.' And when he heard the answer, he said, 'Shame on birth, since to every one that is born old age must come.' And agitated in heart, he thereupon returned and ascended his palace...

Again, on a certain day, as the Future Buddha was going to the park, he saw a diseased man whom

the gods had fashioned; and having again made inquiry, he returned, agitated in heart, and ascended his palace...

And again on a certain day, as the Future Buddha was going to the park he saw a dead man whom the gods fashioned; and having again made inquiry, he returned, agitated in heart, and ascended his palace...

And again on a certain day, as the Future Buddha was going to the park, he saw a monk, carefully and decently clad,...and he asked his charioteer, 'Pray, who is this man?'...

...'Sire, this is one who has retired from the world;' and he thereupon proceeded to sound the praises of retirement from the world. The thought of retiring from the world was a pleasing one to the Future Buddha...¹

This legend provides a means through which the ordinary, pious Buddhist can understand life as dukkha or suffering, but it also points to an important ontological truth held by the Theravāda tradition: sentient existence is above all else marked by change and impermanence and is inevitably subject to casual forces which drive it toward death. This assessment of sentient existence has been formulated in various ways in the Theravāda tradition which will serve as guidelines for our investigations. The formulations we shall examine are: kamma and saṃsāra, paṭicca-samuppāda, anatta and dhamma.

KAMMA AND SAṂSĀRA

Kamma literally means, action, or deed and is derived from the Sanskrit root, kṛ, meaning simply to act or do. The word is used, however, to refer not merely to a single act, but to the influence of one act upon another or a pattern of

¹Jātaka 1:58-59. from H. C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations (New York, Atheneum, 1963), pp. 56-57.

activity. As explained by Nyanatiloka, all of the circumstances and conditions constituting the destiny of an individual come into existence only because of a previous cause and the presence of a number of necessary conditions.¹ In other words, the "law" of kamma is a law of moral determinism which "...not only accepts the operation of an infinite law of the conservation of moral energy in the world, but, in the form that it has had in Indian thought, it states that a man's ancestry, his station in life, his sorrow and happiness and even his death are determined by his actions".²

The orthodox Theravāda tradition emphasizes that kamma is not to be thought of simply as the result of action (kamma-vipāka), but rather that it is a process (kamma-bhava). As such it is sometimes likened to an "energy-factor" or a "life-stream."³ It is well described by the simile of the wave that appears to move across the surface of a pond, which in reality is nothing but a continuous rising and falling of ever new masses of water, each time evoked by the transmission of kamma.⁴

To call kamma a "law of moral determinism" has been chal-

¹Nyanatiloka, Fundamentals of Buddhism (Colombo: Bauddha Sahitya Sabha, 1949), p. 17.

²V. P. Varma, "The Origins and Sociology of the Early Buddhist Philosophy of Moral Determinism," Philosophy East and West, XIII (April, 1963), 26.

³Nyanatiloka, Fundamentals of Buddhism, p. 20. See also Winston L. King, In the Hope of Nibbana (Lasalle: Open Court, 1964), p. 40f.

⁴Nyanatiloka, Fundamentals of Buddhism, p. 19.

lenged by some scholars. Karl Potter for instance, wants to eliminate the term, "law" precisely because it implies a determinism, and use the word, "principle."¹ The kamma principle, in his opinion, is not a determinism, but a formulation of a program for moral inquiry.² The kamma principle is the attempt to seek for an explanation for "moral" occurrences. The purpose of this "moral inquiry" is similar to that of a study of natural causes, for "just as man's predicament dictates an investigation of the sources of physical power with an eye to adjusting or even to mastering such power, so the very same predicament necessitates an investigation into the sources of moral strength with intent to master such sources of self-control as can be discovered."³

Potter's thesis has a particular relevance to our study of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition. The principle of kamma, to follow his line of reasoning, is above all else one of the means by which the Buddhist attempts to understand the realm of sentient existence. It illustrates not only that an individual is caught or bound by his own actions, but that he can understand the reasons for certain actions and thereby control or redirect them. Since in early Buddhism, kamma is closely connected with upādāna or craving, by understanding the

¹Karl Potter, "The Naturalistic Principle of Karma," Philosophy East and West, XIV (April, 1964), 40.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 41.

motives of one's acts and the consequences that follow from them, one not only stops the "energy force" of kamma, but neutralizes the psychological clinging (upādāna) of action.¹

Integral to the principle of kamma is the notion of saṃsāra. Literally saṃsāra means to flow (sṛ) together (sam), but it is generally translated as "rebirth." In relationship to kamma, the notion of saṃsāra adds the dimension of prior and future existences. As it is often stated, the deeds one performs in a prior existence influence or determine the acts one does in the present existence, and the deeds one does in the present correspondingly influence a future existence. Saṃsāra coupled with kamma may lead to a serious fatalism and pessimism;² however, Potter's interpretation is once again most cogent to our study and serves to mitigate against this problem. He calls saṃsāra the "principle of beginninglessness."³ What the notion of saṃsāra provides in relationship to kamma is a trans-present time dimension to search for causes of present action. "Hence we may look for causes to explain events in any and all space-time regions prior to the behavior in question."⁴

¹Varma, Philosophy East and West, XIII, 43.

²A. R. Wadia, "Philosophical Implications of the Doctrine of Karma," Philosophy East and West, XV (April, 1965), 149.

³Potter, Philosophy East and West, XIV, 47.

⁴Ibid., p. 48.

Taken as "principles," kamma and saṃsāra stress the causal relatedness and interdependence of activity in the phenomenal world, the importance of actions or ethics in the world of everyday experience, the cyclical-continuous and, hence, non-permanent nature of sentient existence, and most significantly the opportunity to understand and thereby control human action in a world defined by kamma and saṃsāra.¹

PAṬICCA-SAMUPPĀDA

"Dependent Origination" or paṭicca-samuppāda refers to one of the most widely used formulas in the Pāli canon to describe the nature of sentient existence. It occurs in several forms, but that which the Theravāda tradition regards most highly contains twelve stages as follows:

¹The question of the origin of the ideas of kamma and saṃsāra is one of great interest. They apparently first occur in the form we have discussed in the Upaniṣads (e.g., Kaṭha Upaniṣad). Some scholars have tried to defend their origination in the Vedic tradition. In particular they have pointed to the affinities between ṛta (cosmic order) and kamma (moral order). More recently, mainly as a result of archeological discoveries at Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro, it has been speculated that both notions may have stemmed from the pre-Vedic or Indus Valley Civilization. From this point of view, kamma would not be a concretion of ṛta but rather an extension of empathetic magic. The possible origin of the saṃsāra doctrine in the Indus Valley Civilization has been strengthened by recent discoveries which would appear to indicate that the earth-fertility oriented religion of that pre-Aryan civilization was also dominated by a fear of periodic inundations. Hence, the importance of the cycles of nature which figure so prominently in most earth-fertility religions would have been coupled with an inherent pessimism resulting from the fear of the natural disasters brought about by floods. These factors may well have been the necessary ingredients to bring the idea of saṃsāra into being.

Avijjā-paccayā Sankhārā. Dependent on ignorance (avijjā) arise volitional formations (sankhārā).
 Sankhāra-paccayā Viññānaṃ. Dependent on volitional formations (sankhārā) arises consciousness (viññāna).
 Viññāna-paccayā Nāma-rūpaṃ. Dependent on consciousness (viññāna) arises name and form (nāma-rūpaṃ).
 Nāma-rūpa paccayā Saḷāyatanaṃ. Dependent on name and form (nāma-rūpa) arise the six sensory bases (saḷāyatanaṃ).
 Saḷāyatana-paccayā Phasso. Dependent on the six sensory bases arises contact (phassa).
 Phassa-paccayā Vedanā. Dependent on contact arises feeling (vedanā).
 Vedanā-paccayā Tanhā. Dependent on feeling arises craving (tanhā).
 Tanhā-paccayā Upādānaṃ. Dependent on craving arises clinging (upādāna).
 Upādāna-paccayā Bhavo. Dependent on clinging arises becoming (bhavo).
 Bhavo-paccayā Jāti. Dependent on becoming arises birth (jāti).
 Jāti-paccayā Jarā-maraṇaṃ Soka-parideva-dukkha-domannassupayasa sambhavanti. Evam etassa kevalassa dukkha-khandhassa samudayo hoti. Dependent on birth arise ageing and death (jarā-maraṇa) and sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. Thus there is the arising of the whole mass of suffering.¹

To hallow this formula the Theravāda texts make it a part of the Buddha's enlightenment experience. According to the Udāna² in the first watch of the night after the Buddha had emerged from seven days of samādhi (i.e., trance or concentrated thought), the Buddha (the "enlightened one") thought over the

¹Samyutta-Nikāya II:1. The Book of Kindred Sayings (Samyutta-Nikāya) II, trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids ("Pali Text Society," Vol. X; London: Oxford University Press, 1922), p. 2. For an analysis by a contemporary Theravāda Buddhist, see Piyadassi Thera, Dependent Origination ("The Wheel," Vol. I; Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1959).

²The Udāna forms part of the Khuddaka Nikāya usually considered to be part of the Sutta Piṭaka. It contains many legends about the life of the Buddha.

cycle of dependent origination in direct order as it is listed above. Then in the middle watch of the night he thought it over in reverse order, and finally in the last watch of the night he thought over the formula in both direct and reverse order. This legend which locates the paṭicca-samuppāda formula in the enlightenment experience of the Buddha, clearly relates it to the second and third of the four noble truths--the cause of suffering and its cessation. Avijjā or ignorance is made the cause of the entire conditioned sequence of sentient existence; however, knowledge of the causal sequence implies power over it and is, therefore, of great importance as part of the path to the attainment of ultimate reality.

Without going into a detailed analysis of the possible meaning of the various stages (nidāna) of the formula, it will be helpful to point to some of the ways in which it has been interpreted. As E. J. Thomas observes the various interpretations turn on two major questions, namely, whether the formula describes the different stages of an individual involved in suffering, or whether it has a cosmological significance regarding the origin and passing away of the universe.¹ In particular some of the European scholars of an earlier generation have seen the formula as: the evolution of a concrete entity from the state of non-existence (Burnouf); a Sāṃkhya-type empirical analysis of sentient existence (Jacobi and Pischel);

¹E. J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought (2d ed.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951), p. 60f.

an explanation not of sentient existence but of suffering (Olttramare); a cosmogonic solar myth describing the creation and destruction of the world (Kern).¹ The majority of scholars seem to agree that the sequence of stages does not have primarily a logical significance and that the main purpose of the formula is to indicate the conditioned nature of sentient existence. As G. C. Pande observes, the emphasis of the paṭicca-samuppāda is not on origination but on conditions and relations and hence is to be understood primarily as an, "... abstract law of contingency applied to things. It asserts that given anything there is also given something else which is its necessary and sufficient condition."²

Modern scholars in the West and the East have not been the only ones to try to interpret the meaning of the paṭicca-samuppāda. The Theravāda scholastics bent the formula to apply most particularly to the process of kamma and saṃsāra. It was said, for example, that the first three nidānas referred to a past existence, the fourth through the tenth stages referred to a present life, and that the eleventh and the twelfth applied to the future. Another way in which the Theravādins attempted to structure the twelve stages logically was to attribute the first two to the production of kamma; three

¹A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon (4th ed.; Varnasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963, p. 106.

²G. C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism (Allahabad: University of Allahabad, 1957), p. 412.

through seven to the process of rebirth; eight through ten to kamma and the last two stages once again to the rebirth process.¹

Undoubtably one of the reasons for the inconsistency in the logic of the formula which has been responsible for so much controversy regarding its meaning is the fact that in the Pāli canonical writings it occurs in different forms and contexts. In all probability the rudimentary form of the formula is pre-Buddhistic and within the corpus of the Pāli canon it shows different degrees of development. One scholar has summarized this evolution as follows:² (1) the formula as a statement about the origin of dukkha in terms of taṇhā (thirst) or upādāna (grasping); (2) a variety of forms illustrating in particular a competition between the primary significance of "clinging" and "craving" resulting from "contact" and "feeling" or the entanglement of viññāna in nāma-rūpa as a result of ignorance; (3) its final evolution into the classical twelve-stage formula.² In its classical formulation, as has been pointed out, avijjā takes precedence over taṇhā or upādāna since the proper apprehension of the four noble truths would presuppose that one has overcome sensual desires.

For the purposes of this study it is especially important to note that the paṭicca-samuppāda formula neither denies the

¹Nyanatiloka, Fundamentals of Buddhism, p. 37f.

²Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, p. 433f.

total unreality of the phenomenal world nor affirms its Reality. It functions as a means of avoiding the metaphysical extremes of "being" and "non-being" by affirming that the world of sensory experience is in a constant process of conditioned becoming. The paṭicca-samuppāda is not a formula intended to convince the ignorant of the impermanent nature of sentient existence; rather, it is an abstracted and formalized analysis of its impermanence. As such it has an important role in Buddhist meditation as a means by which to control consciousness and thereby reach toward a knowledge of ultimate reality.

ANATTA

The world of sentient existence is a world of kamma/sam-sāra and of paṭicca-samuppāda, but it is also a world of "non-self" (an-atta). Perhaps no other doctrine of Buddhism has been such a source of controversy and misunderstanding both within the Buddhist tradition as well as from outside it. Its importance is well illustrated by the fact that it is the first controversy taken up in the Kathā-Vatthu (Points of Controversy), a text reputed to be a record of the points of disagreement at the so-called "third council" convened by King Asoka in the third century B.C. Those Buddhist groups (sects) which varied from the orthodox Theravādins on this point were called "puggalavādins" or those who taught a doctrine of "person" (puggala). No doubt, one of the major reasons for the use of the word, puggala, instead of atta/ātman was to dis-

tinguish a Buddhist position from either a proto-Vedāntic ātman or a proto-Sāṃkhya puruṣa. Exactly what the puggala-vādins intended by their position is difficult to summarize. It is, however, perhaps most accurate to claim that they thought of the "person" or self as a kind of "structural unity."¹ By way of analogy they spoke of the relationship of the "person" to the psycho-physical elements of an individual as that of fire to fuel. Fire is real, has a nature of its own, exists by itself and yet is never apart from the fuel which it consumes. In a like manner, they asserted, does the self exist in relationship to the elements of our own life.² As a "structural unity," the puggala served to answer such knotty questions as: what is the bearer of kamma; what is it that attains to nibbāna; what is that remembers; and, what is it that acts in the phenomenal world.

The problem posed by the Buddhist teaching of anatta in the early years of the sangha as well as today, is the problem of misunderstanding it as an annihilationist position rather than as a middle course between either an annihilationist or an eternalist view. It is clear from the texts that the Theravāda tradition was concerned to deny the existence of a kind of homunculus (or "ghost in the machine")³

¹Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought In India (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 128.

²Ibid.

³The phrase, "ghost in the machine," is taken from

which dwelt within a human body.' Early Buddhism strongly rejected either an animistic notion of a "soul" or an understanding of a soul or self as an "essence" of an individual, an ātman or permanent, everlasting and absolute entity. One of the most effective illustrations of the Theravāda position is the famous chariot simile found in the Milindapañño (The Questions of King Milinda).¹ Milinda (King Menander, ruler of the Bactrian kingdom in Northwestern India in the first century B.C.) and the Buddhist sage, Nāgasena, are having a conversation regarding the nature of the self. Nāgasena asks the King to tell him what the chariot is and through a series of questions proves that the chariot cannot be identified as an entity that exists, but rather is simply a term denoting a sum of particular parts:

'Bhante, Nāgasena, I speak no lie: the word, 'chariot' is but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation, and name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, and banner-staff.'

'Thoroughly well, your majesty, do you understand a chariot. In exactly the same way, your majesty, in respect of me, Nāgasena, is but a way

Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962). There are some interesting parallels between the radical behavioristically oriented position of Ryle in regard to the question of the self and the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. Of course, the context of the two positions is entirely different.

¹The Milindapañño is an extra-canonical work written about the first century A.D. either in Sanskrit or a North Indian Prakrit. At an early date it was translated into Pāli and has become one of the most important and popular texts of the Theravāda tradition. See The Questions of King Milinda (Milindapañño) I, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids ("Sacred Books of the East"; New York: Dover Press, 1963), xif.

of counting term, appellation, convenient designation, mere name for the hair of my head, hair of my body...brain of the head, form, sensation, perception, the predispositions and consciousness. But in the absolute sense there is no Ego to be found.¹

The Theravāda position, as illustrated by the chariot simile, is not to deny the existence of a psycho-physical organism. In another of its classical formulae, it describes an individual person as being composed of five aggregates or collections (khandhas). They are: (1) rūpa (body, the four great elements, the five material sense organs and their corresponding objects in the material world; (2) vedanā (feelings and sensations); (3) saññā (perceptions); (4) saṅkhārā (mental formations, kamma formations such as volitional activity); (5) viññāṇa (consciousness).² None of these aggregates, however, can be classified as a "self," nor does their sum produce or result in something that stands as a self in addition to the khandhas. Hence, if none of the khandhas is a self, and if there is nothing that stands over and above the khandhas, there is no entity that can be said to be a self. The self is, as the chariot simile indicates, merely a term or appellation used to designate the psycho-physical organism. To realize this fact is to recognize also that human existence is impermanent (anicca) and suffering (dukkha). Hence, the teaching of anatta in early Buddhism, was not to make a univer-

¹Milindapañha 2:1.1. quoted from Warren, Buddhism in Translations, pp. 132-133.

²These categories will be discussed at greater length in the following section.

sal, theoretical, proposition, but rather to provide insight into the true nature of the sensory world, particularly as it was focused in the awareness of the individual.

It was the refusal to recognize the nature of the anatta teaching that led Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, one of the founders of the Pāli Text Society, to make her most "infamous" proposition: that in the "original" teachings of the Buddha there was a self doctrine and that the teaching of non-self was the result of "monkish" Buddhism.

"...in its outlook as a world religion, the non-existence in theory of the very man has been a serious hindrance. In practice, the very man has ever been for Buddhism as he is for every true teaching. But even for the man of today, there can be no healthy giving himself to the welfare of others, unless he sees in each that self as wayfarer, but himself he knows to be one. And as such, as valuer, as becoming, "man" is not transient, not 'ill,' is very real."¹

In Mrs. Rhys Davids opinion, as the above quotation illustrates, the teaching of anatta by the Theravādins has had seriously detrimental consequences for its standing as a world religion worthy to compete with Christianity, Islam and Hinduism. By and large, scholars of Theravāda Buddhism have rejected Mrs. Rhys Davids' argument for an atta doctrine in early Buddhism. Her defense appears to be based largely on her sympathetic but inevitably Western intuition which led her to interpret various passages in the Pāli texts as supporting the

¹C. A. F. Rhys Davids, A Manual of Buddhism (London: The Sheldon Press, 1932), p. 158.

notion of a self.¹

Even though scholars consider Mrs. Rhys Davids judgments on this problem as unreliable, there is no specific agreement among them as to the position actually exposed by the Buddha and his early disciples. La Vallée Poussin believes that while they rejected any notion of a soul as a metaphysical entity, nevertheless, they recognized a "self" or "soul" as a "...continuous fluid complex both bodily and mental, a person which, in fact, possess nearly all the characteristics of a soul as we understand the word..."² A. B. Keith sees the problem of anatta within the context of the Buddha's concern to overcome misery and suffering. Says Keith "... (the Buddha) recognized that for man to aim directly at the welfare of his self is the surest means of defeating the end of attaining that absence of desire which means, in the Buddhist view, happiness."³ One of the most balanced opinions is that of E. J. Thomas who points out that it is simply impossible to prove that the Buddha taught the doctrine of non-self, although "...it can be deduced, as the Buddhists themselves deduced it, from the doctrines of the khandhas and the other formulae in which the individual is

¹For example, one might turn to her discussion of Bhāvanīyo in the introduction to The Book of Gradual Sayings (Anguttara-Nikaya) III, trans. E. M. Hare ("Pali Text Society," Vol. XXV; London: Oxford University Press, 1934), xli.

²Louis de La Vallée Poussin, The Way to Nirvana (Cambridge: The University Press, 1917), p. 55.

³Keith, Buddhist Philosophy...Ceylon, p. 75.

analyzed into his elements."¹

The doctrine of anatta specifically denies that there is a focal point of meaning or value which can be called a "knower" or a "valuer." Along with the doctrines of kamma/samsāra and paṭicca-samuppāda it affirms that sentient existence is fundamentally an impersonal collection of factors constantly subject to cause and condition. It does not deny the reality of individual existents and hence acts (kamma) are effective; however, they are not effective as a means by which to transcend the cycle of rebirth or the cycle of dependent arising, the end toward which the Theravāda tradition aims. The knowledge of the truth of anatta, however, is an essential part of the path to ultimate reality. It is important not only as a means by which to eliminate the ego and hence the basis of desire, but, as we shall see in the following section, it is a positive means by which the consciousness can be controlled and one's destiny determined.

DHAMMA

The word, dhamma, is one of the most important terms for the Pāli tradition of Buddhism.² Its significance is indicated at least in part by the variety of meanings it assumes. In his commentary on the Dhammapada, for instance, Buddhaghosa,

¹Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, p. 99.

²The most complete study of the term, Dhamma, is still Magdalene and Wilhelm Geiger, Pāli Dhamma ("Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft," Vol. XXXI; Munchen, 1920).

the fifth century Theravāda commentator, lists the following four meanings for dhamma: good conduct, moral instruction, canonical writings and cosmic law.¹ He amends this list slightly in his commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇi² as follows: causal antecedent, moral quality or action formulated doctrine, and the "phenomenal" as opposed to the "noumenal."³ From these overlapping meanings T. W. Rhys Davids concludes that the basic meanings of dhamma for the Theravāda tradition are: doctrine, righteousness, conditionality and phenomenality.⁴

It is these last two categories that apply particularly to our study of sentient existence in the Theravāda tradition. Dhamma as that which is conditioned as well as that which conditions is illustrated by the paṭicca-samuppāda formula already examined. Dhamma as phenomena refers to the constituent elements of existence in both "subjective" and "objective" dimensions or both the constitutive elements of cognition as well as to their bases in ideas and objects.

¹T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (eds.), The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1959), p. 335.

²The Dhammasaṅgaṇi (a handbook of Dhamma) is one of the most important parts of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka of the Pāli canon. It deals with what might be called "psychological ethics" and will be treated at greater length in the fifth chapter.

³Rhys Davids and Stede (eds.), The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 335.

⁴Ibid., p. 336.

Above all, dhamma as phenomena does not signify primarily matter as such or material objects as they are perceived by the senses, but rather minute elements of existence which arise from sensory and perceptual awareness.¹ In other words, the dhammic scheme of dividing the sentient world into elements or particles is an analytical structure imposed on "observed" reality. In this regard it is not unlike any other structural model (e.g., molecular) which arises from observation of certain data.

The "scientific" or empirical implications of the dhammic scheme of Theravāda Buddhism should not be pushed too far, however.² The imposed analysis is not simply a result of inductive reasoning. Rather, the dhammic analysis rests on the supposition that sentient existence is suffering (dukkha) and impermanent (anicca). By analyzing sentient existence into minute elements the Theravādins were able to avoid the conclusion that the world of experience is illusory and hence unreal. The suffering of the world of experience, according to the Theravādins, does not arise as a result of the illusion that it is real, but from the illusion that it is permanent. By affirming that the sensory world is in reality composed of

¹Geiger, Pāli Dhamma, p. 80f.

²The scientific approach of Buddhism is emphasized by certain contemporary Buddhist apologists such as Dr. Luang Suriyabongs who in the foreward to An Introduction to Buddhism (Colombo: Metro, 1957), states, "Buddhism is a scientific religion with a scientific outlook and a scientific method."

tiny particles in a constant state of flux, the Theravādins were able to radicalize the notion of impermanence (anicca). Impermanence does not mean simply the inevitable change that accompanies the life process; rather, it asserts that at every moment sentient life is dying and being reborn. The dhammic structure of the Theravāda tradition, in effect, multiplies the impact of kamma/saṁsāra, paticca-samuppāda and anatta a hundred-fold. It leads, as A. B. Keith points out, to the awareness that "...we live in an existence of constant change which continually brings with it misery, and the one path of liberation is to obtain freedom from any part or share in this existence of unrestful change."¹

The "realistic" dhammic analysis of sentient existence may have had roots in a type of proto-Sāṁkhya thought. Furthermore, there was a definite evolution of this type of analytical thinking within the Theravāda tradition itself which in turn led to various sectarian developments.² That this type of philosophical analysis was not simply the machination of the Theravāda scholastic philosophers of Ceylon and South India hundreds of years after the Buddha's death is perhaps illustrated by an episode in the Mahāvagga where the venerable Assaji tells Sāriputta that the Buddha had discovered

¹Keith, Buddhist Philosophy...Ceylon, p. 60. See also Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism (2d ed.; Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1956), p. 41.

²These developments will be referred to in chapter five. See Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 134 and p. 178f.

the elements (dhamma) of existence, their cause and how to suppress them.¹ Although the dhammic classification was developed most profusely (if not profoundly!) by the Abhidhamma and Sarvāstivāda traditions to be studied in chapter five we must mention four of the important "psychological" categories of dhammic analysis. They are: the five khandhas, the twelve āyatanas, the eighteen dhātus and the twenty-two indriyas.²

The five khandhas (rūpa, vedanā, saññā, viññāṇa and saṅkhārā) have already been mentioned. They represent, as Stcherbatsky points out, the simplest classification of all the elements of existence.³ The categories become increasingly complex. The twelve āyatanas⁴ or "bases" of cognition refer to the six cognitive faculties (including mano or intellect) and their corresponding objects (e.g., color, sound); the eighteen dhātus⁵ or "components of the stream of elements"⁶ add six kinds of consciousness to the list of the āyatanas; and, the twenty-two indriyas include a variety of miscella-

¹The Book of Discipline, IV, trans. Horner, 52. See also Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 2.

²They are discussed in Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, chapters 2-4. See also Nalinaksha Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism (Calcutta: Oriental Book Agency, 1960), chapter 9.

³Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 5.

⁴Ayatana is from ā / yam, to reach, compass, place, region.

⁵From the Sanskrit dhātr. It is similar in meaning to Pāli, dhamma.

⁶Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 8.

neous mental factors such as happiness, sadness, and indifference. These categories, tedious as they become, nevertheless point out that human existence is fundamentally a series of multiple, momentary and mutually conditioned conscious events.¹ It illustrates that there is no such thing as "pure consciousness" or "pure objects" but only "dynamic events" in which the perceiver and the perceived are in a condition of constant flux. One scholar analyzes the dhammic classification of the Theravādins as demanding, on the one hand, differentiation, and on the other, depersonalization.² Because the dhammic scheme differentiates and depersonalizes the "illusion" of sentient existence as being composed of static entities is undermined. It means, for example, that declarative statements such as "I am happy" would be analyzed into a sequence somewhat like the following:

(1) there are changes in features and bearing which express, as well as physiological changes which accompany, the state of happiness; (2) there are mentally pleasant feelings; (3) there are perceptions of those objects which are held responsible for the happiness...; (4) there are greed, zest, excitedness and many other 'impulses'; (5) there are acts of consciousness which accompany the feelings, perceptions and impulses...³

Observers may scoff at such excessive analysis and categorization, and, no doubt, most Theravāda Buddhists would

¹Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 98.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

agree that the analysis is not an end in itself but merely a means to a higher end. In our study of the previous topics of sentient existence in the Theravāda tradition it was necessary to point out consistently that the knowledge of the causal sequence of kamma/saṃsāra, the conditioned nature of life as depicted by the paṭicca-samuppāda formula, and the emptiness or "soulessness" (anatta) of all empirical entities was a means by which one could control his life and thereby progress along the path to a more ultimate reality. The same claim must be made in an even stronger fashion for the Theravāda preoccupation with dhammic analysis. Through it the Buddhist hopes to destroy the sensuous desire and passionate ambitiousness which characterize the false hopes of most men. Nolan Jacobson puts it in this way, "Buddhism differs from all other religions in seeking...to conquer all of life's ills by removing and destroying man's passion for them through analysis..."¹ He goes on to compare the Theravāda penchant for analysis with the analytical philosophy of Wittgenstein observing that the cumulative impact of the analysis in both cases leads to the possibility of a higher wisdom instead of "running out on all sides in fragments of discursive thought."²

We have tried to indicate in some detail Theravāda Bud-

¹Nolan Pliny Jacobson, Buddhism: The Religion of Analysis (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 98.

²Ibid., p. 99.

dhism's understanding of sentient existence. Some of the most significant categories of Theravāda Buddhist thought have been employed. Although distinct, each topic has been consistently linked to the question of knowledge. That is, to be able to search for moral causes, to understand the twelve stages of conditioned existence and to analyze the constituent parts of the selflessness of sentient existence all serve to give one power over that which threatens one's life with suffering and misery. These, then, are important steps toward a higher reality. It is to a consideration of this reality we now turn.

THE NATURE OF ULTIMATE REALITY AND ITS ATTAINMENT

NIBBĀNA

We have seen that for the Theravāda Buddhist sentient existence is characterized by three marks--suffering (dukkha), impermanence (anicca) and soulessness (anatta). In sharp contrast to this worldly life of suffering in the phenomenal world (the profane) there is a higher reality, however. As was established in chapter one, it in-forms and gives meaning to the life of the religious man. This higher reality (nibbāna/nirvāṇa) stands as the summum bonum of every Buddhist, monk and layman alike no matter how inaccessible a goal it may appear to be.¹

¹The problem of the distinction between lay and monastic Buddhism is an extremely important one but beyond the scope of this study. Authorities seem to agree, however, that even though for the layman proximate religious goals are de-

The Pāli word, nibbāna, is derived from the Sanskrit, nirvāṇa which means literally* to be extinguished or blown-out (nir - vāna from vā, to blow). There is considerable confusion, however, as to the meaning of nibbāna in the Pāli tradition. This confusion results, as we would expect, from seeming contradictions in the texts themselves which in turn may stem from ambiguities in the minds of the early followers of the Buddha. According to La Vallée Poussin "...we know what nirvāṇa is as well as the Buddhists themselves did..."¹ hence, our own confusion on the subject of nibbāna is not simply of our own scholarly making. Some of the interpretations of nibbāna that may be derived from the texts are the following: (1) a condition of annihilation or eternal death, (2) an inconceivable and inexpressible state, (3) a reality which was left undefined by the Buddha, and, (4) an eternal, pure and infinite consciousness.²

Nibbāna as a condition of annihilation has been strongly defended by Stcherbatsky in his book, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. Arguing from the philosophical position that man's

defined in terms of kamma and merit making, nibbāna still functions as an ideal which inspires ethical and religious acts. See M. Ames, "Magical-Animism and Buddhism: A Structural Analysis of the Sinhalese Religious System," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII (June, 1964), 40. See also King, In the Hope of Nibbāna, chapter 3.

¹Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Nirvāṇa," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James A. Hastings, IX (1917), 376.

²Ibid., pp. 376-379. See also Nalinaksha Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relation to Hīnayāna (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1930), p. 45.

absolute end is always conceived either as eternal death or eternal life, he contends that the early Buddhists, namely the Sarvāstivādins in North India and the Vaibhāṣikas in South India and Ceylon, held nibbāna to be a state of utter annihilation.¹ Since, Stcherbatsky maintains, early Buddhism (i.e., Sarvāstivāda) held to a view of two types of dhammas--those which are everlasting (svabhāva) and those which are momentary (dhamma-lakkhana), it is to be assumed that nibbāna stands for a cessation of the momentary, changing dhammas and, hence, a reversion back to the everlasting dhammas or the dhammas in their lifeless condition. This state of "eternal death," contends Stcherbatsky, is very much like the notion of matter (prakṛti) in the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. The problem with this view, as Nalinaksha Dutt so well points out, is that Stcherbatsky, in effect, makes the Buddha into a materialist and an annihilationist, two views which the Pāli canon explicitly rejects.³

¹Stcherbatsky's position is constructed on the premise that the "realistic pluralism" of the Sarvāstivādins is the philosophical framework of early Buddhism. He rejects all attempts to search for an "original" Buddhism distinct from the Sarvāstivāda and Vaibhāṣika traditions. In particular he directs his attack against La Vallée Poussin whom he contends operates on the unhistorical assumption that the "Ur" religious notion includes belief in a soul and immortality. Stcherbatsky must be criticized for his nearly exclusive reliance upon the Abhidharmakośa for his treatment of early Buddhism. See Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism.

²Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), p. 27.

³Dutt, N., Aspects of Mahāyāna...Hīnayāna, p. 156.

There is without a doubt a basis in the Pāli texts for the position that nibbāna is to be interpreted as the annihilation of life. One of the texts most widely-used to support this view is taken from the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (Book of the Great Decease) of the Dīgha Nikāya where the Buddha is recorded as saying:

.....
 When the great sage finished his span of life

 All resolute and with unshaken mind
 He calmly triumphed o'er the pain of death.
 E'en as a bright flame dies away, so was
 The last emancipation of his heart.¹

Even though the simile of the flame dying out would suggest the snuffing out of life or a state of eternal death, in order to interpret this passage correctly it must be related to one immediately preceeding it which reads:

They're transient all, each being's parts and powers
 Growth is their very nature & decay.
 They are produced, they are dissolved again:
 To bring them all into subjection--that is bliss.²

The Pāli text of the first two verses reads, "anicoṃ vata saṅkhārā uppāda-vaya-dhammino." The image of the dying away of the flame, by relating it to this text, clearly refers to the control of those aggregates of sentient existence (saṅkhārā dhammino) which are characterized by flux and imperma-

¹Dīgha Nikāya II, eds. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin ("Pali Text Society;" London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1947), 157. Dialogues of the Buddha (Dīgha Nikāya) II, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (4th ed., "Sacred Books of the Buddhists," Vol. III; London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1959), 176.

²Ibid.

nence (aniccā) and, hence, suffering (dukkha). Such control is the equivalent of the "emancipation of the heart" (vimokṣo cetaso). It is inferential to interpret such a passage as referring to nibbāna as a state of eternal death. Nalinaksha Dutt is especially critical of Stcherbatsky's interpretation of the phrase, cetaso vimokṣo, as the destruction of consciousness and, hence, equivalent to death.¹ He cites Buddhaghosa's interpretation of vimokṣa not as "destruction" but as "the removal of the screens hindering vision."² In other words, to say that nibbāna involves the emancipation or even the destruction of the mind or heart (cetas) is another way of saying the nibbāna is not a product of the mind (a-cetas or a-cetasika). It stands on its own as an asamskr̥ta dhamma, a reality unlike the dhammas which characterize the sentient world of impermanence (anicca). Rather than standing simply for the absence of life, nibbāna is a reality beyond empirical determination (i.e., not a product of the cetas).

As La Vallée Poussin points out, those places in the Pāli canon which do refer to nibbāna as annihilation are most frequently associated with the an-atta teaching in some way or another, or with the teaching that the Buddhist saint is one who has annihilated the power of causation which marks sentient existence.³ It would appear to be the case then, that nibbāna

¹Dutt, N., Aspects of Mahāyāna...Hīnayāna, p. 162.

²Ibid.

³Poussin, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, IX, 377.

is indeed an annihilation of the characteristics of sentient existence (*saṅkhārā dhammino*), but that consciousness is not eliminated thereby suggesting the possibility that *nibbāna*, rather than being a lifeless state, is a state of existence transcending ordinary ways of knowing. From a phenomenological perspective, therefore, the death of the *saṅkhārās* is a necessary prelude to the "rebirth" of a new state of awareness or consciousness.

In contrast to a view of *nibbāna* as eternal death we have the position that it is a state or condition of eternal life. This view has been advanced by La Vallée Poussin.¹ Once again there are canonical passages supporting this view such as the following:

There is, O Disciples, something which is not born, not created, not produced, not compounded. Were there not, O disciples, this something not born... there would be no possible exit from what is born.²

In addition to passages which imply the existence of an eternal "something," Poussin defends his point of view by calling our attention to the fact that *nibbāna* is referred to in the Pāli canon as *amatapadam* or the "abode of immortality." Also from a historical perspective he considers this notion of *nibbāna* to be very early and related to both the layman's conception of ultimate reality as a paradise as well as the more

¹Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Bouddhisme: Opinions sur L'Histoire de La Dogmatique (3rd ed.; Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1925), II, 89f.

²Poussin, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, IX, 377.

"negative" monkish nibbānic ideal. The fact that those texts which admit of nibbāna as a state of existence of a saint after death are not infrequently associated with the idea of a person (puggala) and, therefore, in contrast with the predominant Theravāda teaching of anatta, does not rule out either the significance or the antiquity of the conception of nibbāna as an abode of immortality¹. In short, Poussin believes that in its most authoritative form nibbāna is not annihilation but an "unqualified deliverance" from transience and suffering to some kind of a state of sanctity.²

If we take the position that nibbāna is not a condition of annihilation, but a state of existence what kind of claims can be made about it? There are, on the one hand, passages in the Pāli canon which describe nibbāna positively employing such terms as--the unconstituted, true, undecaying, firm, signless, calm, quiet and excellent. As Oldenberg and others point out, however, at those places in the Pāli canon where discussion of the nibbānic question arises (e.g., the conversation between Yamaka and Sāriputta on the nature of the Tathāgatha) it is consistently maintained that such questions are beyond comprehension.³ In other words, even though the Pāli texts do occasionally use abstract nominatives to de-

¹Poussin, The Way to Nirvana, p. 131.

²Ibid.

³H. Oldenberg, Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order, trans. William Honey (London: Williams & Norgate, 1882), p. 282.

scribe ultimate reality, in essence nibbāna is beyond rational comprehension and description. A contemporary scholar of Buddhism has the following to say about the inconceivableness and inexpressableness of nibbāna: "Nirvāna is 'unthinkable' or 'inconceivable if only because there is nothing general about it, and everyone must experience it personally for himself; because there is nothing in the world even remotely like it, and because reasoning (tarka) cannot get anywhere near it. All conceptions of Nirvāna are misconceptions."¹

This brief treatment of the nature of nibbāna in the Theravāda tradition has not dealt with many facets of the problem. It has made no attempt to treat historically the varying interpretation of nibbāna among Buddhist sects nor has it touched on some of the fundamental possibilities within the Pāli canon itself (i.e., the agnostic interpretation; nibbāna as pure consciousness).² We have, nevertheless, exposed two important ways in which nibbāna has been presented in the texts and discussed by modern scholars. Taken together these negative and positive approaches to the ultimate reality of the Theravāda tradition are not contradictory or perhaps even paradoxical,³ for the negative understanding of nibbāna has been

¹Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 57. Conze's interpretations, however, are not infrequently overly colored by his studies in Prajñāpāramitā Buddhist literature.

²Dutt, N., Aspects of Mahāyāna...Hīnayāna, p. 45.

³R. L. Slater, Paradox and Nirvana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), chapter 4.

seen to apply to categories of the phenomenal world, and the positive understanding to a reality which can be experienced but not described.

This same synthesis of a positive and negative understanding of nibbāna can be found in Theravāda Buddhism in Southeast Asia today. Writing from the perspective of contemporary Buddhism in Burma Winston King claims that nibbāna as the ultimate goal is considered to be utterly transcendent, utterly real and utterly desirable.¹ He suggests, furthermore, that nibbāna as that which is utterly different from anything perceived in ordinary sense experience might be described as an "absolutely infinite infinitude," or as an "ideal limit," that point to which a certain development or experience or thought process would come if carried to its logical conclusion or theoretical perfection.²

If the ultimate reality of Theravāda Buddhism is, indeed, the "absolutely infinite infinitude" beyond ordinary modes or perceiving and knowing, then how is it known? How is it experienced? Is it the mere annihilation of our customary ways of living and experiencing, or is it also the acquisition of a higher level of being and, hence, new modes of perception and knowing? Questions such as these force us to examine the way in which nibbāna, the ultimate reality of Buddhism, is

¹Winston L. King, Buddhism and Christianity: Some Bridges of Understanding (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), p. 45f.

²Ibid.

attained.

THE PATH TO NIBBĀNA¹

The bhikkhu whom we had queried about the nature of Theravāda Buddhism had described a path or magga to the attainment of ultimate reality (see page 19). This "Noble Eightfold Path" as it is called consists of right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. These eight steps are classified by the Theravādins into three categories--sīla (morality), samādhi (concentration)² and paññā (wisdom).³ Even though Buddhist scholars may contend that the eight aspects of the path are to be thought of as overlapping concentric circles rather than successive stages or steps,⁴ there is clearly a progression from the category of sīla to samādhi to paññā. The moral restraints of sīla include right speech or sammā-vāca (refraining from lying, malicious, angry and frivolous talk), right action or sammā-kammanta (refraining from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct), right livelihood or sammā-ājīva (rejection of

¹This section will be necessarily foreshortened since chapter four deals basically with knowledge as a means to nibbāna.

²This category is also typified as citta or mind.

³Dutt, N., Early Monastic Buddhism, p. 142.

⁴G. P. Malalasakera, The Buddha and His Teachings (Colombo: Buddhist Council of Ceylon, 1957), p. 41.

soothsaying, magical practices, etc.).¹ Buddhism is not alone in beginning the path to ultimate reality with "physical restraints." Religious disciplines of various traditions generally begin at this stage.²

Discipline of physical activity, important as it may be, never enables the religious man to progress very far along the path to the attainment of ultimate reality. It must be accompanied by a discipline of the mind and consciousness. In the Theravāda tradition mental discipline includes three steps of the eightfold path--right effort or *sammā-vāyāma* (to remove existing evil thoughts and to assure the preservation of wholesome thoughts), right mindfulness or *sammā-sāti* (awareness of both mental and physical events, the examination of things of the world and the suppression of desire), and right concentration or *sammā-samādhi* (a path to attain to complete control of citta or the mind).³ The mental discipline of the Buddhist path, as well as the physical discipline, is not merely an attempt to control mind and body.

¹Dutt, N., Early Monastic Buddhism, p. 143. Contemporary Buddhists interpret the steps in the Eightfold Path in terms more relevant to the modern world. For instance, right livelihood might be used to criticize the manufacture and sale of arms. See Malalasekera, The Buddha..., p. 43.

²For example, the first chapter of Thomas à Kempis' Of the Imitation of Christ, discusses such topics as avoiding vain pride and unnecessary talking, the uses of adversity and ways to resist temptation. As students of mysticism point out, the mystical way begins with purification and purgation. See Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (New York: Meridian, 1955), p. 198f.

³Dutt, N., Early Monastic Buddhism, p. 143.

Both, rather, are aimed toward the attainment of a certain goal (i.e., ultimate reality) which is understood in a particular way; hence, the path of the religious person toward the realization of ultimate reality is inevitably accompanied by wisdom or knowledge. In Pāli this wisdom is known as *pañña* and is described in the eightfold path as right intention or *sammā-samkappa* (the resolve to renounce the world) and right views *sammā-diṭṭhi* (the four noble truths).¹

As numerous scholars point out the course of moral and mental training explicated in the eightfold path is undoubtedly pre-Buddhistic.² It may well be, as E. J. Thomas indicates, that Buddhism developed the *śīlas* or moral disciplines in a unique and "truly ethical" manner applying to layman and ascetic alike,³ but the most uniquely Buddhist aspect of the path is the ontology or world-view implied by the four noble truths. In essence, any religious discipline is an effort "to experience" or "to make concretely real" what has been handed down by the tradition as a description of reality. The Buddhist emphasis on physical and mental discipline is an acknowledgement of the fact that religious truths as propositions are never simply self-evident. They must be experienced or inwardly appropriated before they become meaningful.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 146. See Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, p. 43. See also Pande, Studies in the Origin of Buddhism, p. 512f.

³Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, p. 44.

To borrow a term from our contemporary scientific-electronic world, the way of meditation as described by the noble eight-fold path is a means by which "to program" reality. Through the program of physical and mental discipline the religious person is enabled to know, order and, hence, control himself and his environment as a means to the attainment of a higher reality. There is no better illustration of this outcome than the continuous emphasis in the Pāli texts on the overcoming of those feelings and desires which stand in the way of progress along the spiritual path. The Buddhist saint, the one who has reached the final stages of the religious path, is one who has attained to various superhuman capacities not the least of which is an "other-worldly" like detachment. In this state of detachment, from a phenomenological perspective, the profane world is left completely behind and one lives totally within the sacred (i.e., ultimate reality).

Although various aspects of the path to ultimate reality will be examined in detail in the fourth chapter of this study, it is necessary at this point to say a few more words about it from the perspective of the Buddhist saint. Just as there is a progression from sīla or physical restraints to the discipline of the mind (samādhi) to ultimate enlightenment (paññā), there is also a progression in the degrees of attainment of the ultimate.¹ These degrees have been formal-

¹Dutt, N., Early Monastic Buddhism, p. 252f.

ized in the Pāli tradition into four stages: sotāpanna (stream-enterer), sakadāgāmi (once-returner), anāgami (non-returner), and arahat (worthy one). Each stage has many characteristics which are described at great length in the Abhidhamma texts and the classical commentaries; however, in brief they outline a progressive elimination of those qualities of conscious life associated with existence in the phenomenal world (e.g., feeling, sensation, perception) and the attainment of a totally new mode of being. Philosophically speaking, the ontological and epistemological categories of the Theravāda arahat are radically distinct from the person who has not yet arrived at such a high stage of spiritual development. In the fourth chapter it will be our task to study in detail the path of the arahat as he arrives at ceto-vimutti (emancipation of mind) and paññā-vimutti (emancipation of knowledge).

CHAPTER III

THE SOTERIOLOGICAL NATURE AND FUNCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN NON-BUDDHIST SOURCES

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature and function of knowledge as part of the quest for ultimate reality as found in non-Buddhist sources roughly contemporaneous with the rise of early Buddhism. These sources include the "orthodox" Hindu schools of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta but also the heterodox movement of the Jains. Although texts much later than the time of early Buddhism will be referred to, the primary source for the orthodox schools will be selected Upaniṣads,¹ in which elements of "proto" Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta anticipate their later evolution as systems.

In general it can be said that the Upaniṣads represent

¹Without raising questions of critical and historical textual analysis, I am accepting the judgment of various scholars that the Upaniṣads and early Buddhism trace a development roughly parallel in time. "Le Bouddhisme et l' Upaniṣad se sont développés parallèlement pendant une longue suite de siècles. Marquer les étapes de leur développement est une tâche urgente qui contribuera sans doute à faire mieux connaître ces deux grands courants de la pensée religieuse et philosophique dans l'Inde." Jean Przyluski, "Bouddhisme et Upaniṣad," Bulletin de l'école Française D'extreme-Orient, XXXII (1932), p. 141.

the bringing together of important but divergent strands of thought which later served as the basis for the development of some of the most significant schools of Indian thought. Since the Upaniṣads themselves do not present a systematically formulated philosophy, particular epistemological or ontological positions are not elaborated in a logical and carefully constructed manner as is true of the later schools. Hence, what we shall characterize as "discriminating or analytical" knowledge is only hinted at in the Upaniṣads but becomes systematized in Sāṃkhya and is carried to an extreme in the Vaiśeṣika. On the other hand, "mystical or intuitive" knowledge, while clearly more pronounced in the Upaniṣads than the previously mentioned type of knowledge, lacks the rigorous development that it receives at the hands of such Advaita Vedāntists as Śaṅkara..

The general development of more consistent and logically constructed religious-philosophical systems from less rigorously formulated religious texts is, of course, not a phenomenon that is unique to Hinduism. A similar evolution is found in the religious traditions of the West and it is certainly true in Buddhism as we shall discover in the following chapters.

THE ORTHODOX TRADITION: THE UPANIṢADS

The Upaniṣads are an extensive body of texts numbering well over two hundred although there are only ten to fifteen

that are considered to be of major importance.¹ Generically the Upaniṣads are Āraṇyakas or "forest books" denoting their esoteric or secret nature. That the Upaniṣads were to be taught in a secret manner is well illustrated by the word itself--Upa / ni / ṣad--which literally means "to sit down around" indicating that Upaniṣadic teachings were conveyed by a teacher (guru) to a pupil or group of pupils sitting near him in the seclusion of a forest retreat.

Technically the Upaniṣads are classified as Vedānta or the "end of the Veda" and are related, at least in terms of authority, to earlier Brāhmaṇas and Samhitās. Hence, the BṛhadĀraṇyaka Upaniṣad forms the conclusion to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad belongs to the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa of the Yajur Veda. These classifications are a means of illustrating the fact that the Upaniṣads represent differing commentarial opinion among priestly schools and varying redactions of philosophical argumentation.² As such they obviously do not come from a single hand, nor do they represent a revolt by a group of learned kṣatriyas against the power of brāhmaṇin priests as earlier scholars such as Deussen and Garbe had contended.³ In brief, the Upaniṣads were

¹g. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953), pp. 20-21.

²A. B. Keith, The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads (Harvard Oriental Series; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), II, 498.

³Ibid., p. 494.

written by different groups of priests reacting to the religious, intellectual and socio-cultural forces of their time. It is evident that in some quarters there was a growing uncertainty regarding the place of Vedic sacrifice. It is also clear that the Upaniṣads reflect some of the most important philosophical ideas and religious practices that are in turn developed in different ways in Buddhism, Jainism, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vedānta as well as other orthodox and heterodox schools.

The Upaniṣads are classified and dated in various ways but the rise of Buddhism frequently figures prominently in this effort. For example Radhakrishnan states that the ancient prose Upaniṣads, Aitareya, Kauṣītaki, Chāndogya, Kena, Taittirīya, Brhadāraṇyaka, together with the metrical Īśa and Kaṭha belong to the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. and hence are pre-Buddhistic.¹ Hume simply observes that the date usually assigned to the Upaniṣads is around 600 B.C. just prior to the rise of Buddhism.² In our study three Upaniṣads in particular will figure prominently, the Kaṭha, Kena and Maitrī. The Kena is generally considered to be pre-Buddhistic; the Kaṭha frequently associated with the earliest beginnings of Buddhism;³ and Maitrī may possibly reflect a rising Buddhist movement.⁴

¹Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 22.

²Robert E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (2d ed. rev.; London: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 6.

³Oldenberg, Buddha, p. 531.

⁴K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 65.

The main conclusion to be drawn is that our study of these Upaniṣads may well reflect ideas more or less prominent in early Buddhism. Let us now turn to a general consideration of the nature of knowledge in the Upaniṣads.

Acknowledging the eclectic nature of the Upaniṣads as well as the time lapse over which they developed it would be logical to expect that different ideas would be discovered regarding the nature of "saving knowledge." For example in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka four means of correct knowledge are enumerated: scripture (smṛti), perception (pratyakṣa), tradition (aitihya) and reasoning or inference (anumāna).¹ In the Early Upaniṣads the ways of knowing seem to include various forms of perception (e.g., Chāṇd. 7.24.1, paśyati or seeing, śṛṇoti or hearing, revealed scriptures, mental conceiving (e.g., Brh. 2.4.5, mantavyaḥ) and rational understanding (e.g., Brh. 2.4.5, nididhyāsitavyaḥ, Chāṇd. 6.13, vijñātam).² In regard to the latter two Jayatilleke observes, "the verbal forms used cover the rational reflective sources of knowledge, which the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka appears to indicate by the word anumāna. The thinking process is sometimes described by the single word vijñāti but at other times a distinction appears to be drawn between the two cognitive processes of mental conceiving and rational understanding."³

¹Keith, The Religion...Upanishads, p. 482.

²Jayatilleke, Early...Knowledge, p. 58f.

³Ibid., p. 59.

At least by the time of the Late Upaniṣads, however, there appears to be another and higher means of knowing which negates or transcends the traditional ways. It is a "seeing"¹ but as an extrasensory form of perception. It is a new way of knowing unrecognized in the earlier tradition and acquired by means of meditation (dhyāna/jhāna).² Jayatilleke concludes that by the time of the Late Upaniṣads there were three major schools of thought in the Vedic tradition regarding the problem of knowledge and salvation: (1) orthodox brahmins who held the Vedas to be the supreme source of knowledge; (2) the metaphysicians who held the highest knowledge to be rational argumentation and speculation; (3) the contemplatives who believed the highest knowledge to be personal and intuitionist.³ Having noted in very broad terms the possible development of valid forms of knowledge (pramāṇas)⁴ in the Upaniṣads, we move

¹From the Sanskrit root, dṛs.

²Jayatilleke, Early...Knowledge, p. 61.

³Ibid., p. 63.

⁴Pramāṇa (pra / māṇa) literally means measure, scale, or standard. Traditionally Vedānta admits six pramāṇas: (1) pratyakṣa or perception, (2) anumāna or inference, (3) upamāna or analogy, (4) śabda or verbal authority, (5) abhāva-pratyakṣa or non-perception or negative proof, (6) arthāpatti or inference from circumstances. Other orthodox schools vary in their acceptance of the six pramāṇas. Nyāya allows the first four. Sāṃkhya affirms pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda. Other schools increase the number. See Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (London: The Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 637. Were this study to deal with the traditional forms of knowledge in Indian philosophy, it would necessarily have to treat these categories; however, it is our purpose

to an examination of the two major classes of knowledge which are regarded as typifying Upaniṣadic thought.

There seems to be wide agreement among modern scholars that the main stream of Upaniṣadic thought came to presuppose two major divisions of knowledge classified simply as higher (parā) and lower (aparā).¹ The lower knowledge "...consists of all the empirical sciences and arts as also of such sacred knowledge as relates to things and enjoyments that perish," whereas the higher knowledge is described as "...that knowledge whereby what has not been heard becomes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been understood becomes understood."² The lower form of knowledge deals with the phenomenal or actual world described in terms

rather to isolate two forms of knowledge as they relate to the salvation quest. In general these two forms fit into the two divisions of higher and lower knowledge found in the Upaniṣads. Of the types of "lower" knowledge, this study focuses on what is termed "analytical" knowledge which is to be taken as a broad category of empirically based knowledge including such traditional types of knowledge as perception and inference. "Analytical" as it is used in this study supposes "synthetic" knowledge as well, that is rational constructs based on one's study or analysis of the empirical world.

¹It is generally considered that Deussen's interpretation of the Upaniṣads in terms of a "Yajñavalkya idealism," that is an epistemological idealism leading to an absolute unit (Ātman-Brahman), grossly overlooks both the epistemological as well as the ontological development within the Upaniṣads. There seems to be wide agreement with Hume's opinion that the Upaniṣads represent a development from a "realistic monism" to an "epistemological idealism." Hume, The Thirteen...Upanishads, p. 42.

²S. Radhakrishnan (ed.), History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), I, 58.

of name and form (nāma/rūpa).¹ It includes such hallowed types of knowledge as the Vedas, ritual, grammar and astrology.² The higher form of knowledge is essentially beyond description and, hence, is most appropriately described by the uniquely Upaniṣadic via negativa, neti, neti (not this, not this).

In the Upaniṣads this dual epistemology, if it may be so characterized, corresponds to a dual ontology, namely, the division of reality (Brahman) into higher and lower forms. The lower Brahman is, in effect, the phenomenal world of subject-object distinctions. The higher Brahman is the essence of the historical process in which all individual entities lose their distinctiveness. It is perhaps most popularly known through the famous similes in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which form part of the dialogue between Śvetaketu and his father, Uddālaka:³

'Place this salt in the water. In the morning come unto me.'

Then he did so.

Then he said to him: 'That salt you placed in the water last evening--please bring it hither.'

Then he grasped for it, but did not find it, as it was completely dissolved.

'Please take a sip of it from this end,' said he.

'How is it?'

'Salt.'

'Take a sip from that end,' said he, 'How is it?'

'Salt.'

'Set it aside. Then come unto me.'

He did so, saying, 'It is always the same.'

¹Brhadāraṇyaka 1.6.3.

²Mundaka 1.1.4. & 5.

³For an exposition of the philosophical position of Uddālaka, see, B. A. Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1921), chapter 8.

Then he said to him: 'Verily, indeed, my dear, you do not perceive Being here. Verily, indeed, it is here.

That which is the finest essence--this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (Soul). That art thou, Svetaketu.'¹

Granting the fact that in general there are two degrees or levels of knowledge in the Upaniṣads parallel to the ontological distinction between the "hidden" Brahman and the manifest Brahman, is there any relationship between aparā and parā vidyā or must the lower form of knowledge simply be consigned to avidyā or ignorance?² We have already referred to a passage in the Muṇḍaka which seems to indicate that even knowledge of the Vedas is antithetical to the higher knowledge of the imperishable (akṣaram). This position is reinforced by the episode of Nārada and Sanathkumāra in the Chāndogya in which the latter characterizes the Vedic knowledge acquired by the former as "mere name" (nāma eva).³ On the other hand, Kena 4.8 definitely indicates that knowledge of the Vedas as well as the practice of austerities and self-control are essential to the secret knowledge relating to the highest Brahman. Furthermore, Kena 2.4, a section following paradoxical notions about the knowledge of Brahman, seems to indicate that the ultimate must be known through all the states of cognition as the ground

¹Chāndogya 6.13.1-3. from Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 248.

²Chāndogya 6.1.

³The corresponding ontological question would be whether the phenomenal world is considered as un-reality.

of the self. There are numerous other examples which could be cited to support the conclusion that lower forms of knowledge such as perception, inference or śruti texts can not consistently be ruled out as being without positive relationship to higher knowledge.

What does, in fact, seem to be the case is that if any empirically based knowledge or even preoccupation with the Vedic texts becomes an end in itself, then it is avidyā or ignorance and is a hindrance or veil to knowledge of the ground of all reality. Śvetaketu's father, therefore, has to warn him against the conceit of his Vedic learning, pointing out that the particulars of wisdom may blind one to the knowledge of ultimate reality.¹ Or as the Bṛhadāraṇyaka expresses it, the Ātman may not be seen because of the veil of name and form. "Him they see not for (as seen) he is incomplete, when breathing he is called vital force, when speaking voice, when seeing the eye, when hearing the ear, when thinking the mind."²

Indeed, it may be that in the Upaniṣads there is ultimately no valid ground of knowledge other than a kind of mystical intuition. As Dasgupta puts it, "The fact that ultimate reality cannot be attained by reason or by the senses, and that it may yet be grasped or realized in some other ways, reduces this conception of Brahman into...a sort of mystical

¹Chāndogya 6.1.4.

²Bṛhadāraṇyaka 1.4.7. from Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 82.

idealistic absolutism."¹ Certainly there are many examples in the Upaniṣads which could be cited to lend support to this opinion. We see this point of view in the answer Yajñavalkya gives to his wife Maitreyi in being asked about how one arrives at knowledge of the self:

For where there is duality as it were, there one smells another, there one sees another, there one hears another, there one speaks to another, there one thinks of another, there one understands another. Where, verily everything has become the Self, then by what and whom should one smell, then by what and whom should one see, (etc.)...²

Ultimate reality (Ātman-Brahman) appears to be "unknowable" because it is the basis of knowledge itself. It is the ground, the knower of the knowing, the seer of the seeing, the hearer of the hearing.³ Empirical knowledge, words and deeds may be indicators or sign posts of ultimate truth, but they cannot be vehicles taking man to that end.⁴ While granting that there is a predominant temper of "epistemological idealism" or "mystical idealistic absolutism" in the Upaniṣads we capitulate too easily to an "Advaitic" interpretation of the nature and function of knowledge, however, if we do not search out and study other types of knowledge in relationship to the salvation-

¹S. N. Dasgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge: The University Press, 1962), pp. 30-31.

²Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4.5.15. from Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 147.

³Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3.4.2.

⁴Radhakrishnan, History...Western, p. 59.

quest. We shall attempt this search in terms of the categories of "Sāṅkhya-Yoga" and "Vedānta" after making some further comments about the function of knowledge in the Upaniṣads.

Franklin Edgerton in discussing the soteriological function of knowledge in the Upaniṣads states that the quest for ultimate reality "...underlies the whole intellectual fabric of the Upaniṣads and furnishes the motive force behind their speculation."¹ This claim echoes the opinion of the majority of scholars who have written on the epistemology of the Upaniṣads; however, Edgerton's interpretation of the nature of this "salvation-knowledge" is particularly interesting and has a special relevance to this study. In his opinion, not only are the Upaniṣads preoccupied with the attainment of mokṣa by the means of knowledge, but this knowledge can be further defined as an effort to attain the power of the highest reality in order to control one's destiny. Such knowledge might be classified as "magico-mystical." Edgerton typifies it as the kind of epistemology which is part of the "Atharvanic intellectual sphere."² He contends that in the Atharva Veda knowledge had an immediate power and that to know the end to be gained was the primary

¹Franklin Edgerton, "The Upaniṣads: What Do They Seek and Why?," Journal of the American Oriental Society, XLIX (June, 1929), p. 97.

²Ibid., p. 98. See also K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 31.

means of attaining it.¹ Similarly in the ritualistic texts of the Brāhmaṇas, Edgerton finds that knowledge of procedure, is magically connected with the procedure itself with the consequence that to know a sacrificial ritual is just as effective as performing it. In Edgerton's judgment, therefore, in both the Atharva Veda and the Brāhmaṇas, knowledge has a magical quality about it since it can be demonstrated that it is aimed toward the acquisition of immediate power. It is this same type of "magico-mystical" knowledge that he discovers in the Upaniṣads.

In order to support his thesis that the "salvation-knowledge" of the Upaniṣads is essentially the same type as that found in the Atharva Veda and Brāhmaṇas Edgerton makes the following observations:² (1) Vidya in classical Sanskrit has the meaning of "magic" as well as "knowledge," (2) in the Upaniṣads as well as the early Atharva Veda and Brāhmaṇas practical and worldly benefits accrue from superior knowledge, (3) the immediate aim of knowledge is illustrated by the fact that the phrase, "ya evam veda" ("he who knows this") followed by a promise of a practical reward occurs frequently in all three forms of Vedic literature; (4) brahman ("holy knowledge") becomes the half-personified controller of the universe thereby pointing up the necessary relationship between knowledge and power.

¹ Ibid.

² The following points are summarized from Edgerton's article.

In brief, Edgerton finds a strand of continuity in the nature and role of knowledge among the Atharva Veda, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. He states this continuity as follows: "If there is any general difference in spirit between the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads it lies in just this, that the Upaniṣads carry out fully, to the logical extreme, the Atharvan-Brāhmaṇa doctrine that esoteric knowledge is the only thing that counts in the last analysis."¹ This "logical extreme" is to move beyond the control of the particular to the control of the universal. In other words, to know everything (i.e., Ātman/Brahman) is to get everything. The driving force behind the quest to discover the essence of the universe in the Ātman is to be able to control it and thereby to tap its power. Then, "Not only do I control the principle of the universe through knowledge which is power but I am the principle of the universe through mystic identification."²

Edgerton's position that knowledge in the Upaniṣads is power, while interesting and deserving of attention, is at least in part inadequate. The point at issue is to what degree the concepts of power and control can be applied to knowledge in its ultimate sense. That is, if knowledge ultimately is knowledge of Brahman then would it not be the case that knowledge as power would necessarily imply that knowledge of Brahman

¹Ibid., p. 108.

²Ibid., p. 111.

is power over Brahman. Such is not the case, not only in the Upaniṣads but in the relationship between knowledge and the ultimately real in other religious traditions as well. It is one thing to say that to know Brahman is to be Brahman, but it is quite another to claim that to know Brahman is to have power over it.

What then, is the accuracy of the claim that knowledge is power in the Upaniṣads? It appears to be true that generally in the Upaniṣads knowledge as controlling power is understood primarily in terms of man's relationship to himself and to the world in which he lives. That is, knowledge as controlling power is, on the one hand, a crucial stage on the way to knowledge of ultimate reality, and, on the other hand, knowledge of Brahman necessarily entails that a person have control over himself and the world in which he lives. The highest degree of knowledge, however, simply assumes that one has power over himself and his environment. It is a necessary accompaniment to a state of being and knowing which is so radically "other" than the ordinary and usual way of life as to be beyond the categories of power and control themselves. The problem of knowledge and salvation, therefore, would seem to involve the two fundamental types of knowledge discussed in chapter one. Our task is to determine more exactly the nature of these modes of knowing in the Upaniṣads.

ANALYSIS AND CONTROL: SĀṆKHYA-YOGA

It is beyond dispute that Sāṅkhya and Yoga in "primitive"

or "proto" forms existed at the time of the development of the Upaniṣads.¹ According to E. H. Johnston Sāṃkhya is rooted in the speculations of the Brāhmaṇas and the oldest Upaniṣads about the constitution of the individual and its formulations probably took place sometime between the interval separating the oldest group of Upaniṣads from the middle group.² It is not clear exactly how Sāṃkhya and Yoga became related. As classical systems it appears that Yoga is later; however in Hiriyanna's opinion "...it is probable that...(the) starting point should be sought in a primitive Sāṃkhya-Yoga with belief in a supreme God to whom individual selfs and prakṛti, the source of the physical universe, though distinct are yet subordinate; for such a doctrine is nearer to the teaching of the Upaniṣads than the atheistic Sāṃkhya or the theistic but dualistic Yoga of classical times."³

As far as the classical systems are concerned Sāṃkhya traces itself back to a figure named Kapila who is reputed to have lived about one hundred years before the Buddha and to have authored the Sāṃkhyapravacana Sūtra and the Tattvasamāsa.

¹M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), p. 267.

²A. B. Keith in The Sāṃkhya System (Calcutta: The Association Press, 1924), p. 7, does not quite agree. In his opinion there are elements of Sāṃkhya in the Upaniṣads which later became part of the Sāṃkhya system, but he thinks that "...it is impossible to see in these fragmentary hints any indication that the Sāṃkhya philosophy was then in the process of formulation."

³Hiriyanna, Outlines...Philosophy, p. 268.

Although Radhakrishnan believes Kapila to have been an historical person¹, such a view is rejected by Keith², Hiriyanna³ and other reputable scholars. The earliest and still the most popular textbook of the school is the Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa which may be dated about the fifth century A.D.⁴ Important commentaries on this work were written by Guṇapāda in the eighth century and Vācaspatimiśra in the ninth century.⁵ Regarding the Yoga system, Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras are generally regarded as the text book. Tradition has assigned the date of the Yoga Sūtras to the second century A.D. since its reputed author was identified with the grammarian Patañjali of that time. Professor Wood, however, challenges this date on the grounds of the content of the Sūtras and would place them between the fourth and the seventh centuries A.D.⁶ Important commentaries on the text include the Yogabhāṣya probably written in the eighth century and Vācaspatimiśra's Tattvavaiśaraḍī written about 850 A.D.⁷

¹S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (rev. ed.; London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1929), I, 254.

²Keith, The Sāṃkhya System, p. 13.

³Hiriyanna, Outlines...Philosophy, p. 269.

⁴Ibid., p. 269.

⁵Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, I, p. 254.

⁶J. H. Woods, The Yoga System of Patañjali ("Harvard Oriental Series"; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914), p. xviif.

⁷Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.

Although it is not our purpose in this section to try to prove a relationship between early Buddhism and Sāṃkhya or Yoga at least a few words should be said about this important problem. Many scholars have pointed out affinities among them. For example, Richard Garbe claims, "...die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie als eine Hauptquelle für den theoretischen Teil des Buddhismus gedient hat"; and, "...der Buddhismus nicht allein von dem theoretischen Sāṃkhya, sondern auch von der praktischen Yoga-Lehre ausgegangen ist..."¹ Other authorities such as Oldenberg and Keith, however, have been much more cautious about claims regarding origins or dependence. Keith, for instance, believes that classical Sāṃkhya was definitely not a source for Buddhism but allows either for the option of influence by a type of Sāṃkhya thought similar to that found in the Mahābhārata or the possibility that both might have stemmed from a common source.² Although he points to obvious parallels between Yogic meditation and Buddhist practices he states, "It is, however, an error to exaggerate the situation or to treat Buddhism as a branch of Yoga."³ Having somewhat summarily mentioned the development of Sāṃkhya and Yoga and their possible relationship with Buddhism the principal task remains, namely, to examine the soteriologi-

¹Richard Garbe, Sāṃkhya and Yoga (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1896), pp. 1 and 35.

²Keith, The Sāṃkhya System, p. 31.

³A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon (4th ed.; Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963), p. 144.

cal nature and function of knowledge in the forms of these two systems as they are reflected particularly in the Upaniṣads.

The very word, Sāṃkhya, points the way to an understanding of the nature of this system. From the Sanskrit root, khyā, the word's fundamental meaning is "relating to number or calculation, reckoning up, enumerating, discriminating."¹ Sāṃkhya then is an enumeration of elemental factors describing man and the universe. They are the result of a cosmic process set into motion by two principles--puruṣa² (spirit, conscious awareness, etc.) and prakṛti³ (matter, substance, etc.). According to Sāṃkhya cosmology the original condition (pralaya) of things is a duality in which puruṣa and prakṛti exist separately. Once puruṣa turns his attention to prakṛti, prakṛti's components (called guṇas or "strands") are shaken from their primordial equilibrium and through a process of gradual differentiation and integration of the three guṇas⁴ the various objects of the world originate (the so-called

¹Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 1103.

²The word, puruṣa, has an ancient heritage in Indian thought, being found in the Ṛg Veda, the so-called "Hymn to Man" (Puruṣa-Sukta, R.V., X:90).

³Prakṛti literally means "that which is prior to being made" (pra / kṛti) and refers to that "ur-stuff" from which the created world is formed.

⁴The three guṇas are sattva, rajas and tamas and account for the qualities of difference (e.g., goodness, light, desire, activity, sloth, etc.) among entities in the created world.

"sarga" condition in contrast to the "pralaya" condition).¹

According to the classical description this origination begins with buddhi (intellect) or mahat (the great or great one) and proceeds to ahaṁkāra (the "I-maker," ego, sense of individuality) and manas (mind), the organs of perception (jñāna-indriyas) and action (karma-indriyas), the tanmātras (subtle-elements) including sound, touch, taste, etc., and the mahābhūtas (gross elements) of earth, water, fire, air and ether.² Including puruṣa and prakṛti there are a total of twenty-five elements or principles (tattvas).

This description has rightly been called a "rationalistic theory of reality and life."³ The most important consideration for our purposes, however, is how this rationalistic scheme functions in relationship to Sāṁkhya soteriology. According to the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā the manifest or empirical world is defined by various forms of duḥkha or suffering (ādhyātmika, ādhibhautika, and ādhidaivika). The text begins by stating that the suffering which characterizes the "profane" world cannot be eliminated by either perception⁴ or by scriptural means

¹S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (3rd ed.; Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1948), p. 308. See also George P. Conger, "A Naturalistic Approach to Sāṁkhya-Yoga," Philosophy East and West, III (October, 1953), 237.

²See Appendix A.

³J. N. Mukerji, Sāṁkhya or the Theory of Reality (Calcutta: S. N. Mukerji, 1930), p. 77.

⁴The Sanskrit word in this instance is dr̥ṣṭi, referring to that which has been seen or "obviously" known through the agency of the senses.

(ānuśravikāḥ) but rather by "discriminating knowledge of the evolved, the unevolved and the knower" (vyaktāvyakta-jñavi-jñāna).¹ J. N. Mukerji's discussion of these terms is singularly helpful. Contending that the fundamental concept of Sāṃkhya is order, he postulates that jñā functions as this central principle and always implies both avyakta or the primordial unmanifest element and vyakta or the "society of personal-objective orders."² The vyakta is likened to the "linga puruṣa" which is divided into two orders, one containing logical or objectifying functions (the jñāna or buddhi-indriyas) and social or moral functions (the karma-indriyas).³ This scheme in Mukerji's opinion is a dynamic balance, an eternal dialectic in which the prime duty of the individual is jījñāsa or puruṣārtha jñāna, to cultivate the knowledge necessary to maintain the cosmic and moral order of the universe.⁴

If the end of man is to cultivate a knowledge of the structure of the universe as described in the Sāṃkhya scheme of things, can it be assumed that discriminating knowledge has the power to attain salvation? According to the classical de-

¹Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, 2:2. For the Sanskrit text of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā I have used that found at the beginning of Mukerji, Sāṃkhya...Reality. For the translation I have gone to A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Radhakrishnan and Moore (eds.), which, for the most part, is that of S. S. Sastri.

²Mukerji, Sāṃkhya...Reality, p. 7.

³Ibid., p. 7.

⁴Ibid., p. 8.

scription the suffering in the world results from a "delusion of grandeur" on the part of buddhi. That is, buddhi tries to identify with puruṣa but cannot do so due to the baggage it is compelled to drag along from its prakṛti side. Only when buddhi is able to bring about a recognition of the given structure of reality does suffering and misery cease; hence, through the power of discriminating knowledge the seven forms of evolution (virtue, vice, error, dispassion, passion, power and weakness) due to erroneous knowledge are turned back.¹

Or, as we read in Kārikā twenty-three, "Intellect (buddhi) is determinative. Virtue, wisdom and non-attachment and the possession of lordly powers constitute its highest."² It appears to be the case, then, that discriminating knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the Sāṃkhya analysis of reality) is, indeed, the cause of that state of equilibrium in which puruṣa thinks, "She (prakṛti) had been seen by me" and prakṛti thinks, "I have been seen" and then ceases to act; "hence, though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further evolution."³ It may be concluded, therefore, that at least from a psychological or an epistemological perspective, an analytical form of knowledge has the power⁴ to control reality and

¹Sāṃkhya-Kārikā 65. from A Source...Philosophy, Radhakrishnan and Moore (eds.), p. 445.

²Sāṃkhya-Kārikā 23. Ibid., p. 434.

³Sāṃkhya-Kārikā 66. Ibid., p. 445.

⁴See the discussion of buddhi as power in A Source...Philosophy, Radhakrishnan and Moore (eds.), p. 434.

to bring about the primordial equilibrium between the two principles of reality.

If we assume, as Dasgupta does,¹ that Sāṃkhya and Yoga evolved from the same source, we would expect them to have much in common philosophically. In fact, it is frequently claimed that Yoga essentially accepts the Sāṃkhya analysis of reality but believes in God (Īśvara), and adopts a body of practices for the attainment of ultimate reality.² It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the philosophy of Yoga and its comparisons with Sāṃkhya;³ however, it is germane to make a few preliminary remarks about Yoga as a method for the attainment of the ultimately real.

Yoga has an ancient heritage in Indian civilization. On the basis of archaeological data derived from the Indus-Valley culture, most Indologists agree that Yoga in some form may have been practiced in India as early as the fourth millenium B.C.⁴

¹S. N. Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930), p. 2.

²Ibid., p. 1.

³See Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy and S. N. Dasgupta, Yoga as Philosophy and Religion (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1924).

⁴A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 22. See also Sir Mortimer Wheeler, The Indus Civilization (Cambridge: The University Press, 1960), p. 89. This position has been challenged, although unconvincingly, in an article by Herbert Sullivan, "A Re-Examination of the Religion of the Indus Civilization," History of Religions, IV (Summer, 1964), 115-125.

If Yoga has Dravidian roots, it was, nevertheless, appropriated into the Aryan religious system where it became associated with tapas (heat), one of the cosmogonic principles in the late Rig Veda. Hence, as the cosmos might have arisen from chaos through the agency of tapas,¹ the yogin passes from the "profane" to the "sacred" or realizes mokṣa through austerities (tapas).

The term, yoga, is derived from the Sanskrit verbal root, "yuj" which means "to yoke." The purpose of yoga as a method to attain ultimate reality, therefore, is to control the senses so that ultimate reality might be truly known or--perhaps more aptly stated--experienced. As Alain Danielou puts it, "Basically, all physical and mental knowledge is, of necessity, an experience. A conception uncorroborated by experience remains a speculation and we can never be certain of its reality."² Yoga, then, aims to "corroborate" through experience a "speculation" about reality. The means by which it accomplishes this end is seemingly paradoxical. That is, by the control of the senses the aim is to release the perceptual apparatus to a higher or supra-rational mode of awareness and knowledge.³ Thus the Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali begin with concentration (samādhi) and end when the "energy of the intellect

¹See Rig Veda 10:129.

²Alain Danielou, Yoga, The Method of Re-Integration (New York: University Books, 1949), p. 4.

³Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom (New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1958), p. 36-37.

is grounded in itself," that is to say, a state of absolute freedom.¹ As Dasgupta points out this state of absolute freedom is, in fact, prajñā, a knowledge of the structure of reality (i.e., puruṣa and prakṛti) which is more than simply a rational understanding.²

Having looked briefly at Sāṃkhya and Yoga let us now turn to their "proto" forms in the Upaniṣads. In the third vallī of the Kāṭha we find:

Know (viddhi) the soul (ātmanam) as Lord of the chariot.

The body (śarīram) as the chariot (ratham);
Know thou the intellect (buddhiṃ) as the charioteer
And the mind (manas) as the reins (pragrahān).

The senses (indriyāni), they say are the horses:

The objects of sense (viśayāṃs) refer to their
"pasture land" (teṣu gocarān)
The self yoked to the senses and mind (ātmendriya-
mano-yuktaṃ)

Wise men (manīṣinas) call the enjoyer (bhoktā).

That one who has no understanding (avijñānavān)

Always with unyoked mind (ayuktena manasā sadā)
His senses are uncontrolled (avasyāni)
Like the wicked horses (duṣṭāsvā) of the charioteer.

But the one who has understanding (vijñānavān)

Always with yoked mind (yuktena manasā sadā)
His senses are restrained (avaśyāni)
As the good horses of the charioteer.³

In these passages the soul is depicted as the Lord of the body. The driver is buddhi or vijñāna. Manas is used by buddhi

¹Woods, The Yoga-System of Patañjali, p. 347.

²Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, p. 332.

³Kāṭha 3:3-6. See Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads, pp. 351-352, and Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 623f.

in the control of the senses (indriyāṇi). Here manas does not have the wider meaning of the seat of thought, feeling and will, but is more specifically the central organ of the conscious life which shapes into perceptions the impressions of the senses and translates them into conative acts expressed through the organs of action.¹ These acts are then yoked or supervised by buddhi. Understanding (vijñāna) is above both the senses and the mind; however, all three "activities" are coordinated with one another. The man who has no understanding also has an unyoked or undisciplined manas as well as uncontrolled passions. Vijñāna or discriminating understanding, then, is necessarily connected with the yoga of the mind (manas) and the senses (indriyāṇi).

The consequences of this knowledge and control is spelled out in the tenth and eleventh stanzas of the third vallī of the Kāṭha:

Beyond the senses are the objects of the sense (arthā)
 And beyond the objects of sense is the mind (manas).
 Beyond the mind is the reason (buddhiḥ),
 And beyond the reason is the great self (ātma mahān).
 Beyond the Great (mahatas) is the unmanifest (avyaktam),
 Beyond the unmanifest is the Person (puruṣas);
 Beyond the person there is nothing;
 That is the goal (kāṣṭhā); that is the highest
 course (parāgatis)²

The result of vijñāna and yoga is clearly a progression from

¹J. N. Rawson, The Kāṭha Upaniṣad (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 135.

²Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 352.
 Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 645.

the senses and sense objects to the ultimate principles of avyakta (or prakṛti in the Sāṃkhya scheme of things) and puruṣa. For our purposes it is not really important to decide whether or not this passage points to the cosmological duality of classical Sāṃkhya. What is important, however, is that the third vallī of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad clearly indicates that the ultimate goal is attained through the means of an analytical type of knowledge (vijñāna) and a yoking of the mind and the senses. Indeed, it appears as though one presupposes the other.

A similar conjunction of Sāṃkhya-type categories of existence with the method of yoga control is found in the sixth vallī of the Kaṭha. The analysis of existence into indriyāṇi, manas, buddhi and avyakta reveals that there is something beyond these entities, a true being (sattva), puruṣa, who cannot be known by the senses ("cakṣusā paśyati").¹ Hence, the senses must be controlled by yoga so that ultimate reality can be comprehended by a radically "other" type of knowledge --a knowledge simply characterized by the assertion, "he is" (asti).²

When cease the five
(Sense-)knowledges, together with the mind (manas),
And the intellect (buddhi) stirs not--
That, they say, is the highest course.

¹Kaṭha 6:6-9.

²Kaṭha 6:12.

This they consider as Yoga--
 The firm holding back of the senses.
 Then one becomes undistracted.
 Yoga, truly, is the origin and the end.

Not by speech, not by mind,
 Not by sight, can He be apprehended.
 How can He be comprehended
 Otherwise than by one's saying 'He is'?¹

In the Śvetāśvatara, one of the later Upaniṣads, further references to a proto-Sāṃkhya-Yoga are found within a more theistic context, a mode characteristic of the Epics. The second adhyāya begins with prayers to Savitṛi, one of the Vedic sun-gods, a prayer whose main theme is the control of the mind:

With mind having controlled the powers (devān)
 That unto bright heaven through thought do go,
 May Savitṛi inspire them,
 That they may make a mighty light.²

This prayer is then followed by a rather elaborate description of the mechanics of the practice of yoga ending with the assertion that the successful practitioner of yoga comes to know (jñā) the nature of ultimate reality and is thus released from all fetters or attachments to the world.³ In the sixth adhyāya it is stated that one may come to know ultimate reality, the one god ("eko devas") all pervading ("sarva-vyāpī") and inner soul of all things ("sarva-bhūtāntar-ātmā") by discrimination

¹Kaṭha 6:10-12. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, pp. 359-360.

²Śvetāśvatara 2:3. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 397.

³Śvetāśvatara 2:3-15. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 399.

(sāṃkhya) and discipline (yoga) and thereby become released from all fetters.¹

All of the above passages seem to indicate that there existed at the time of the rise and early development of Buddhism elements of Sāṃkhya-type analytical knowledge coupled with a method of yogic control both of which were integrated with the aim of the attainment of ultimate reality.

ENLIGHTENMENT AND FREEDOM: VEDĀNTA

It would, of course, be greatly misleading to assume from the above discussion that the predominant epistemological mode of the Upaniṣads is rational and analytical. On the contrary, it is supra-rational and intuitive for knowledge of the ultimate (i.e., Brahman) is, in the last analysis, a knowledge which transcends not only sensory perception, but rational constructs and analytical structures as well. From a phenomenological perspective the knowledge of that reality which is the object of the religious man's quest is a new kind of knowledge because of an entirely new set of ontological suppositions. In essence Brahman can neither be known as tables and chairs are known nor can it be the product of a rational philosophy. Brahman is beyond the distinction between knower and known. In the final analysis epistemology and ontology are identified. To know Brahman is to be Brahman. Whether or not this kind of knowledge can be called "magical"

¹Śvetāśvatara 6:13.

as Franklin Edgerton suggests is highly debatable.¹ Mystical knowledge in the sense of being "supra-rational" or "supra-logical" it certainly is. It is also true that knowledge of Brahman involves "power," a power over oneself and the phenomenal world. But it is not a power whose essential quality is to use or manipulate. Rather it is a power to be, to be a Self (Ātman). That this kind of ontological power carries with it other concomitant powers of a more magical nature is at best of secondary importance.

It has been previously pointed out that in the later Upaniṣads there had developed a two-fold epistemology and ontology, a duality between the phenomenal or the relatively real (hence the profane) and the noumenal or the absolutely real (hence the sacred). The absolutely real or the essence of all existent reality (param Ātman-Brahman) could not be known through ordinary channels of understanding. Nothing (neti, neti) was adequate to describe it:

By whom impelled soars forth the mind (manas) projected?

By whom enjoined goes forth the earliest breathing (prāṇaḥ)?

By whom impelled this speech (vācam) do people utter?
The eye, the ear--what god, pray, them enjoineth.

That which is the hearing of the ear (śrotasya śrotam),
the thought of the mind (manaso mano),

The voice of the speech (vāco vācam), as also the
breathing of the breath (prāṇasya prāṇaḥ),

And the sight of the eye (cakṣuṣas cakṣur)!

Past these escaping (atimucya) the wise (dhīraḥ)

On departing from this world, become immortal (amṛtā
bhavanti)

¹That is to say, if magical is understood as a means to gain an immediate end or control over a particular entity.

There the eye goes not;
Speech goes not, nor the mind.
We know not, we understand not
How would one teach it.

Other, indeed, is it than the known (viditād)
And moreover above the unknown (aviditād).
.....

That which is unexpressed with speech, (vāc)
That with which speech is expressed--
.....

That which one thinks not with thought (manas)
That with which they say thought (manas) is thought--
.....

That which one sees not with sight (cakṣus)
That with which one sees sights--
.....

That which one hears not with hearing (śrota),
That with which hearing here is heard--
.....

That which one breathes not with breathing (prāṇa)
That with which breathing is conducted
That indeed know as Brahman,
Not this that people worship as this.¹

The position represented by the above quotation from the Kena finds strong support elsewhere in the Upaniṣads. The Īśa, for example, clearly condemns a delight in any form of knowledge dependent on sensory perceptions as being even worse than ignorance.²

What then is the nature of this knowledge of the ultimate and how is it to be attained if it transcends the sensory apparatus including the mind (manas)? The Kaṭha gives us a clue

¹Kena 1:1-9. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads, pp. 335-336.

²Īśa 9:11.

by stating that knowledge of ultimate reality can be attained by turning the eye inward.¹ This position, merely alluded to in the earlier Upaniṣads, is more fully developed in the later texts. That is, if true knowledge is by definition knowledge of Brahman and if Brahman as the essence of the cosmos is identical with the essence of the self (Ātman) then by arriving at true knowledge of the self one necessarily attains knowledge of the essence of the cosmos (i.e., Brahman). It is, however by no means an easy task to achieve true knowledge of the self. In ordinary waking states of consciousness a man's vision is inevitably bound to be obscured by attachment to objects of the phenomenal world; hence, the Upaniṣads are led to postulate higher cognitive states appropriate to higher degrees of reality.²

Over and above the waking consciousness is a dreaming state ("svapna-sthāna") which is inwardly cognitive ("antaḥ-prajñā").³ This state of consciousness cognizes "mental states dependent on the predispositions left by the waking experiences. In this state the ātman fashions its own world in the imagining of dreams."⁴ Yet even in the dreaming state of consciousness

¹Kaṭha 4:1, 6:12.

²For a discription of these states as found in the Upaniṣads, see Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, trans. A. S. Geden (London: T. & T. Clark, 1906), p. 296f.

³Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad 4.

⁴Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 696.

the condition of perceiving and knowing is in terms of a duality between the perceiver and the perceived. A higher state of consciousness is necessary to perceive the ultimate unity of all things (i.e., ~~Atman-Brahman~~).

A third level of consciousness is called the state of deep-sleep ("suṣupta-sthāna").¹ It is described as a unified ("ekī-bhuta") cognitive mass ("prajñāna-ghana").² In this state consciousness enjoys an absolute peace and happiness (ānanda) and has a perception of neither external nor internal objects. In the older Upaniṣads this third state of consciousness was sufficient to point to the mode of cognitive awareness necessary to know Brahman. It was a condition of prajñā, implying a knowledge ab origine, a knowledge (jñā) prior (pra) to the origination of any created thing and, hence, a knowledge of the ultimate reality from which all things are brought forth and to which everything will return. Prajñā, therefore, might be well understood as a state or condition of primordial or subliminal-consciousness in which all beings participate and which the object of the religious quest is to realize.. It is toward such a realization that the Upaniṣads point, namely an awareness (cit) of the Real (sat) which is by definition also bliss (ānanda), the characteristic of the original state of reality in contrast to which any other condition represents some sort of "fall."

¹Māṇḍūkya 5.

²Ibid.

In the later Upaniṣads a fourth state of consciousness came to be added. Perhaps due to the influence of yoga¹ but apparently with the purpose of overcoming the transiency implied by making the preceeding level of consciousness analogous to a state of sleep. The fourth state of consciousness is described as:

Not inwardly cognitive (antaḥ-prajña) not outwardly cognitive (bahiḥ-prajña), not bothwise cognitive (ubhayataḥ-prajña), not a cognition mass (prajñāna-ghana), not cognitive (prajña), not non-cognitive aprajña), unseen (adrṣṭa)... ungraspable (agrāhya) having no distinctive mark (alakṣana), non-thinkable (acintya)...²

It is a level of consciousness frequently likened to a condition of death or deathlessness. It is permanent and, as the above quotation illustrates, beyond any distinction, even the appellation, prajñā. In his commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, Gauḍapāda states that the fourth or highest state of consciousness is "an eternal changless knowledge; not distinct from that which is known/Brahman is ever known/by the eternal is the eternal known."³ We are led, in short, to the ultimate identity of the knower and the known, a state of consciousness which, in fact, is a state of being. It is this "epistemological idealism" of the Upaniṣads rather than their "realistic monism"⁴ that serves as the foundation of the school of Advaita

¹Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 309.

²Māṇḍūkya 7.

³Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 309.

⁴Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 51.

(non-dual) Vedānta. This system of Indian philosophy owes its early development primarily to Śaṅkara, the eighth century Indian philosopher who in turn was especially indebted to Gauḍapāda, his reputed teacher.¹ Śaṅkara's most important writings were commentaries on the Brahma Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa², the Brhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads and the Bhagavad Gītā.³

The main theme of Śaṅkara's school of Advaita Vedānta is, "that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as many..."⁴ Since Śaṅkara believes that the world has no reality apart from the individual's consciousness⁵ the world appears as many only because of ignorance (avidyā, ajñāna). It logically follows, therefore, that only through knowledge (jñāna) can salvation, that is the absolute freedom (mukti) of the ultimately real, be reached.⁶

The critical question is how one attains to this knowledge. As Śaṅkara makes clear in his exposition of the first phrase of the Brahma Sūtra⁷ there are several antecedent con-

¹Dasgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 149

²It is believed to have been written in the second century B.C. according to S. Radhakrishnan, trans. in The Brahma Sūtra (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 22.

³Hiriyanna, Outlines...Philosophy, p. 340.

⁴S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge: The University Press, 1922-1949), I, 439.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Hiriyanna, Outlines...Philosophy, p. 340.

⁷"A-thāto brahma-jijñāsa" ("Now therefore the desire to know Brahman.") The Brahma Sūtra, trans. Radhakrishnan, p. 227.

ditions that must be fulfilled before knowledge of ultimate reality is attained. There must be an awareness of the impermanence of the world of māyā, non-attachment to worldly desires and rewards, the development of the qualities of calmness and equanimity and a desire for release from the phenomenal world.¹ Perhaps most importantly the desire for knowledge of Brahman arises from the individual's profound awareness of himself, namely, that he has an "essence" or "soul" (ātman) which is distinct from anything visible to the senses. In Śaṅkara's view, to know the essence of the self is to know Brahman (ayam ātmā brahma).²

Although as a school of philosophy Advaita Vedānta recognizes the six traditional pramāṇas (means of knowledge) of the Mīmāṃsā³ they are by no means all sufficient to gain knowledge of Brahman or ultimate reality. The first pramāṇa of perception is unable to provide knowledge of Brahman since ultimate reality cannot be an object of sensory perception. This claim is justified on several grounds. For example, Brahman is without those qualities of color and form which provide the basis of perceptual knowledge.⁴ Furthermore, though the world is

¹Bādarāyaṇa, Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 231.

³Perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, presumption and non-apprehension. See Hiriyanna, Outlines... Philosophy, p. 318.

⁴K. S. Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 121.

caused by Brahman, Śaṅkara denies that the cause in this case can be inferred from the effect.¹ It is true that sense perception is empirically valid, but the absolute reality of the non-duality of Brahman defies sensory knowledge.

Inferential knowledge in the Advaita school is derived from the relationship (vyāpti) between the things to be inferred (sādhya) and the ground from which it is inferred (hetu).² Brahman, however, cannot be reached by inferential knowledge because it is without differentiating mark (liṅga) nor has it a ground (hetu) with which it could have a relationship.³ In effect the Advaita position regarding inferential knowledge represents a criticism of what might be called "rational theology." All of the criticisms that can be levelled against Brahman as a causal inference from the world as an effect simply cannot be met. Since a rational theology must be able to answer every argument, it necessarily follows that one cannot reach a knowledge of Brahman by way of a rational or logical explanation. Of course, a rational logic (tarka) has its role. It is needed to investigate the meaning of scripture, remove doubts and contrary beliefs and convince one of the probability of the existence of Brahman.⁴ Beyond that, however, it cannot go.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 140.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 150.

If ultimate reality cannot be known either through sensory perception or inference and conceptual knowledge to what does the Advaitan appeal? The Brahma Sūtra provides an answer: "śāstra-yonitvāt" ("From Scripture being the source of its knowledge").¹ This passage could be interpreted to mean that the scriptural texts² are the only source for knowledge of Brahman; however, Śaṅkara clearly indicates that it is not the written text itself that is the source of knowledge of ultimate reality but rather ultimate reality revealing itself. It is as though the Scriptures reveal ultimate reality through the lives of the seers who themselves have experienced it. The texts allow the man of faith to respond as whole men to their teachings of the unity of all things in the cosmic Self. Such an act of faith is an act of "pure apprehension where our whole being is welded into one, an act of impassioned intuition which excludes all conceptual activities."³ The man of faith then, is not merely the seer represented in the Śāstra, but the believer as well. Both are men of power who have assimilated the truth and made it into a creative principle.⁴

¹Bādarāyana, The Brahma Sutra, trans. Radhakrishnan, p. 240.

²Scriptural texts or Śāstra for Śaṅkara includes the four Vedas, the Epics, the Purāṇas and other branches of learning. Bādarāyana, The Brahma Sūtra, trans. Radhakrishnan, p. 242.

³Ibid., p. 244.

⁴Ibid., p. 245.

The man of faith for Śaṅkara is much different than the yogin who claims to gain a supra-sensuous knowledge of ultimate reality through meditation and concentration. Śaṅkara is critical of yogic intuition as a means by which to know Brahman unless it functions only as a supplement to the Śāstra. Yogic practices might, indeed, instil extraordinary powers, but they cannot lead to the total apprehension of the oneness of the Self.¹ Once one truly "knows" Brahman by means of the scriptures, immediate liberation follows making yogic practices unnecessary. It must be borne in mind, however, that Śaṅkara's understanding of enlightenment and freedom or release, while discussed in terms of the scriptures, in fact denoted a revelation entailing a direct awareness. In Murty's view such revelation is the experience of absolute truth, "The primal awareness of a real presence ~~that~~ confronts man as holy and good."² This truth is not "provable" for a provable truth is external to man and he cannot relate himself to it absolutely. Rather it is a truth which enables man to relive it in such a manner as to enter into "communion with the historical consciousness to which it was disclosed."³

SYNTHESIS IN THE GĪTĀ

While espousing no particular philosophical system and

¹Murty, Revelation...Vedānta, p. 136.

²Ibid., p. 284.

³Ibid., p. 285.

being highly eclectic in nature, the Upaniṣads emphasized the incomprehensibility of ultimate reality (brahman). The role of analytical knowledge as represented in particular by a proto-Sāṃkhya position, therefore, played a relatively minor role. Brahman could only be known through some means of supra-rational knowledge. It was just such a state of consciousness the yogin tried to attain. Thus the yogic control of mental states culminated in a type of "deep-sleep" consciousness which was analogous to the oneness of ultimate reality or Brahman. It was, however, the ontological dimension of this awareness, namely the essential oneness of Brahman, that became the overriding concern of Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta several hundred years later. The knowledge or the awareness of this reality, rather than being described in terms of yogic intuition, became a question of revelation and faith; nevertheless, the knowledge of Brahman was still a matter of a total experience defying rational comprehension and description.

The Bhagavad Gītā incorporates many of the strands found in the Upaniṣads emphasizing the elements of Sāṃkhya analysis and the hints of theism found in the later Upaniṣads. The Gītā even more so than the Upaniṣads is remarkable for its eclectic nature due, at least in part, to its development over a period of centuries critical in the history of Indian thought.¹ The

¹Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that the roots of the Bhagavad Gītā are in the fifth century B.C. although as a document it was not formulated until the second century and was written in its present form about the second century A.D. The

Gītā, therefore, serves as a synthesis of diverse materials, including the two types of knowledge, the analytical-rational and the intuitive-mystical, relating to the attainment of ultimate reality. In the Gītā, however, the former type of knowledge which we have associated with Sāṃkhya thought plays an even more prominent role. In fact, Garbe claims that the Gītā was originally a Sāṃkhya-yoga treatise which was confused with a Kṛṣṇa-Vasudeva cult and then expanded by a Vedantist.¹

The soteriological nature and function of knowledge in the Gītā is bound up with its three major yogas or margas (bhakti or devotion, karma or action and jñāna or knowledge); hence, it is difficult if not impossible to consider the problem of knowledge in the Gītā apart from devotion (bhakti) and action (karma). Acknowledging ~~this~~ fact, let us turn to the second chapter of the Gītā to discover what may be considered one of its themes regarding the relationship between knowledge and salvation. In Gītā 2:39 we read, "buddhyā yukto yayā pārtha/karmabandham prahāsyasi." That is, by an intellect (buddhi) which is disciplined (yuktas) one will eliminate (prahāsyasi) the bondage (bandhas) of karma. The key to 2:39 is found later in the chapter where it is made clear that discipline (yoga) is evenness of mind or equanimity (samatvam).² Furthermore,

Bhagavad Gītā, trans. Radhakrishnan (2d ed.; London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1949), p. 14.

¹The Bhagavad Gītā, trans. & interpreted Franklin Edgerton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p.x.

²Bhagavad Gītā 2:48.

one of the most important verses in the entire Gītā, 2:47, elucidates this quality of equanimity or evenness of mind by claiming that one's attention must not be on the fruits of action or on inaction but on action itself, i.e., dispassionate action. The intellect that is disciplined (buddhiyoga), therefore, is one not interested in the fruits of action. It leaves behind both good and evil deeds ("ubhe sukṛtaduṣkṛte").¹ As it is stated in 2:51: "karmajam buddhi yuktā hi/phalam tyaktvā manīṣiṇas (For the wise, trained in intellect, abandon(ing) the fruit born of action)."²

Chapter two further describes the man of a detached buddhi as one of stabilized understanding (sthītaprajñā)³ who abandons desires of the mind (prajahāti kāmān...manogatān) who finds contentment by the self in the self alone (atmany evā'tmanā tuṣṭas),⁴ who has lost desire for joys (sukhesu vigatasprhas)⁵ who withdraws sense from objects of sense (samharate...indriyānī indriyārthebhyas).⁶ It is evident on the basis of chapter two of the Gītā that the disciplined intellect (buddhiyoga) is one which is withdrawn and not attached to the objects of sense, is tranquil and unconcerned with the fruits of action

¹The Bhagavad Gītā, trans. Radhakrishnan, 2:51.

²Ibid..

³Ibid., 2:54.

⁴Ibid., 2:55.

⁵Ibid., 2:56.

⁶Ibid., 2:57.

(karmaphalam).

Chapter four of the Gītā dealing with the theme of jñāna-yoga or the discipline of knowledge presents a similar understanding of the function of knowledge. We read that the discipline of knowledge is abandoning attachment to the fruits of action (tyaktvā karmaphalāsaṅgam).¹ This position is reinforced by 4:37, "the fire of knowledge reduces all action to ashes." On the basis of the evidence discussed thus far it appears to be the case that knowledge has an important control function in that it entails the withdrawal of the perceptive and discriminative mental apparatus into the self so that the attachments of the senses to the phenomenal world may be overcome. Given the fact that the objects of the senses are no longer worthy of attachment, what are considered valid objects of knowledge in the Gītā?

There are basically three answers to this question: (1) the unmanifest (avyakta) taken as the highest Brahman (param brahma), (2) Kṛṣṇa as the savior or the incarnation of the ultimate principle, and (3) the kṣetra or field. The former two alternatives can be dispensed with in relatively short order, the first being developed by the Vedāntic viewpoint and the second by the bhakti interpreters. The third, however, represents the Sāṃkhya perspective of the Gītā and serves to illustrate the role of analytical knowledge as part of the salvation quest. The "field" represents the constituency of

¹Ibid., 4:20.

human existence as defined by epic Sāṃkhya. Gītā 13:5 categorizes it into the gross elements (mahābutāni), the I-faculty (ahamkāra), intellect (buddhi), the ten indriyas and manas. The importance of this description of the self is that knowledge of the "field" produces an aversion to the objects of sense, an absence of the I-faculty, sorrow regarding birth, death, old age and disease, absence of great affection for sons, wife and house and a constant indifference of mind.¹ Knowledge of the "field," therefore, parallels the results of buddhi and jñāna yoga. All three produce an indifference to the objects of the senses and an evenness of the mind. The Sāṃkhya-type description of sentient existence along with the yoking of mind and body is, therefore, an important means by which control and power over one's self and one's world is gained, an important stage in the realization of salvation.

Despite the explicitly Sāṃkhya elements in the Gītā accompanied by the yogic control of the mind and actions, the Gītā's attitude is predominantly mystical.² That is to say, the Gītā synthesizes the analytical and rational approaches of Sāṃkhya and the control of sense perception with the more intuitive or supra-rational form of enlightenment characteristic of the Vedāntic wing of Upaniṣadic thought. This latter knowledge results either from meditation on ultimate reality

¹The Bhagavad Gītā 13:8 and 9.

²The Bhagavad Gītā, trans. Edgerton, p. 109.

in its unmanifested form¹ or from faith in Kṛṣṇa as the manifestation of Viṣṇu. Knowledge achieved simply by concentrating on Brahman is very difficult to attain,² hence the Gītā highly exalts a mystical enlightenment achieved through faith. The focal point of the Gītā, therefore, is the eleventh chapter in which Kṛṣṇa reveals himself as the ultimately real to Arjuna.

But thou canst not see Me
 With this same eye of thine own;
 I give thee a supernatural eye:
 Behold My mystic power as God!³

By Me showing grace towards thee, Arjuna, this
 Supreme form has been manifested by My own mysterious power;
 (This form) made up of splendor, universal, infinite,
 primal,
 Of Mine, which has never been seen before by any
 other than thee.⁴

In the last analysis the knowledge of ultimate reality prized most highly results from the total faith-experience of the individual; however, the Gītā does not rule out the intuitive insight of the solitary individual and in all cases the realization of the ultimate is to be preceded by discipline. In this regard Sāṃkhya and Yoga go together⁵ as preparatory to the intuitive enlightenment of the mystical experience.

¹The Bhagavad Gītā 12:4.

²Ibid., 12:5.

³The Bhagavad Gītā, trans. Edgerton, 11:8, p. 57.

⁴Ibid., 11:47, p. 60.

⁵The Bhagavad Gītā 5:4.

THE HETERODOX TRADITION: JAINISM

In concluding this chapter on the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in non-Buddhist sources roughly contemporaneous with early Buddhism at least a brief examination must be made of Jainism, the most important heterodox movement outside of Buddhism.

It is generally agreed that both Buddhism and Jainism arose from a similar cultural milieu in North-central India in an area assimilating an over-extended Vedism. In this area the important religious leader was not the brahmin but rather the śramaṇa, the ascetic wanderer searching for the answer to the problems of life's suffering and impermanence.¹ Sharing in this search both Jainism and Buddhism were characterized by certain forms of asceticism although the former was much more extreme in its ascetic practices than Buddhism.² Besides a more or less rigorous attitude toward life these two religions share certain other ideas and practices in common. Hiriyanna notes that both uphold a pessimistic attitude toward the empirical world and reject any notion of a supreme being,³ and Hermann Jacobi observes that Buddhism and Jainism share with each other and with Sāṃkhya-yoga the conviction that the pos-

¹See the discussion of the paribbajakas in T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India (8th ed.; Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1959), p. lllf.

²Sukumar Dutt, Early Buddhist Monachism (rev. ed.; Calcutta: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 36f.

³Hiriyanna, Outlines...Philosophy, p. 155.

session of right knowledge frees one from bondage to the phenomenal world of saṃsāra and karma and the concomitant attainment of ultimate reality.¹

Scholars are of the opinion that Jainism developed somewhat earlier than Buddhism and independent from it although the two religions share in the common religious and intellectual background of the sixth century B.C. which proved to be one of the most formative periods in India's history.² The founder, Mahāvīra, born in the first half of the sixth century, was thought to have been the last in a line of great prophets beginning as early as the eighth century. Written sources were probably handed down from as early as the third century B.C. but the Jain canon itself (Siddhānta) was compiled in the sixth century A.D.³ The principal primary sources for this section are one of the so-called Mūlasūtras, the Uttarādhyanana and one of the oldest and most important systematic expositions of Jain thought, the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra by Umāsvāti.⁴

The Jain world view can be characterized as a moral dualism. There is a spiritual principle or jīva whose intrinsic nature is one of perfection and a material principle or ajīva

¹Hermann Jacobi, "Jainism," The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings, VII (1915), p. 467.

²Hiriyanna, Outlines...Philosophy, p. 155.

³Hiriyanna, Outlines...Philosophy, p. 156.

⁴Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, p. 171.

which is evil in that it prevents the jīva from realizing its perfection. The object of life for the Jain, therefore, is for the jīva to shake off the malignant influence of a jīva and thereby "...to reveal all its inherent excellence in its fulness."¹ The role of knowledge in this realization is of central importance. Thus the first chapter of the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra begins:

1. Right belief, right knowledge, right conduct-- these together constitute the path to liberation.
2. Belief in things ascertained as they are is right belief.
3. This is attained by intuition or understanding.
4. The categories (tattvas) are souls (jīva), non-souls, inflow (āsrava) of karmic matter into the self, bondage (bandha) of self by karmic matter, stoppage (saṁvara) of inflow of karmic matter into the self, shedding (nirjarā) of karmic matter by the self, and liberation (mokṣa) of the self from matter.
5. By name, representation privation, present condition (bhāva) their aspects are known.
6.
7. Understanding is attained by (considering a thing with reference to its) description, inherence, cause, place, duration, and classification.
8. Also by existence, number, place, extent, time, interval of time, quality, and quantity.²

This passage clearly indicates the importance of "reasoned knowledge" as part of the salvation-quest in Jainism.³ Belief which is necessary for liberation is understanding things as they

¹Hiriyanna, Outlines...Philosophy, p. 159.

²Umāsvāti, "Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra," trans. J. L. Jaini, A Source...Philosophy, (eds.) Radhakrishnan and Moore, p. 252.

³Ibid. The translator of the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra notes that right belief means "reasoned knowledge" rather than "faith."

are, i.e., in terms of the categories of the Jain analysis of existence. That these categories are known by a rational analysis of things is illustrated by the fifth, seventh and eighth paragraphs of the chapter quoted above. The same kind of analysis is apparent in the twenty-eighth chapter of the Uttarādhyayana. Here we find that those who are truly wise understand substance, the qualities inherent therein and their development; the problem of motion and rest in terms of dharma and adharma; that time is characterized by duration; that the soul (jīva) is characterized by knowledge, faith and happiness whereas matter (ajīva) is distinguished by sound, color, taste, smell and touch.¹ In other words, an important aspect of the Jains search for the ultimate is understanding the phenomenal world in terms of categories created by their own analysis. These categories are more real than mere sense perception and serve to give form to the sensory world thereby acting to control it.

The control exercised by the knowledge of things as they really are, i.e., the tattvas, is part of Jain yoga. "This yoga consists of jñāna (knowledge of reality as it is), śraddhā (faith in the teachings of the Jains), and cārita (cessation from doing all that is evil)."² The purpose of this yoga is the attainment of perfect knowledge which is the restoration

¹Jaina Sūtras, trans. Hermann Jacobi ("Sacred Books of the East"; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1895), p. 155.

²Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, p. 199.

of the true nature of the jīva. This restoration takes place when the four kaṣāyas (passions) of anger (krodha), pride (māna) delusion (māyā), and greed (lobha) have been overcome by controlling the senses. With the senses controlled the mind is purified (manah śuddhi) and unattached to the phenomenal world. In this condition the self is then enabled to directly perceive or know through "transcendental intuition" (kevala jñāna) the ultimately real.¹ This intuitive or mystical knowledge results in the attainment of certain powers. Among them are clairvoyance and telepathy but most important of all omniscience. Omniscience is not only the logical end of a progression of knowledge, however; it represents a return to the original state of the soul (jīva) and, hence, the attainment of ultimate reality.

The emphasis in the Jain system is on a rational-analytical knowing in contrast to an intuitive-mystical type. Coupled with its scheme of analytical categories or tattvas is a rigorous physical and mental yoga.² Through control, therefore, the Jain hopes to purify himself from materialistic karma and attachment to the profane world in order to obtain the release (mokṣa) of "saving knowledge." This highest form of knowledge (kevala jñāna) is supra-rational and leads to omniscience.

¹Mohan L. Mehta, Outlines of Jaina Philosophy (Bangalore: Jain Mission Society, 1954), p. 94f. See chapter four for a discussion of the Jain theory of knowledge.

²See the discussion of tapas and dhyana in R. Williams, Jaina Yoga (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 238f.

In itself it is ultimate reality for the state of omniscience it represents is the original state of the soul.

In this chapter we have briefly examined various forms of Indian religious thought originating from a time roughly contemporaneous with the rise of Buddhism. It has been seen that in the orthodox schools stemming from the Upaniṣads the acquisition of knowledge played an important role in the salvation-quest. Although various forms of knowledge are considered as valid both within the Upaniṣads and more particularly within the various philosophical systems, by the time of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads it became apparent that there were two ~~major~~ divisions of knowledge. The former included knowledge derived from sense perception, logic, the scriptures, etc.; whereas the latter can be best indicated by such terms as "supra-rational" or "mystical."

It is within this broad distinction, therefore, that any understanding of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge within the Indian religious tradition must take place. There is a "lower" knowledge and a "higher" knowledge. In some cases the lower knowledge, particularly as it is represented by the analytical structures imposed upon perceived realities occupies a very significant role within the religious tradition. We have seen how this type of knowledge is especially important in the Sāṃkhya tradition and also within Jainism, the one heterodox tradition mentioned. In both of these cases such knowledge is part of a tradition in

which yoga, both physical and mental, is important. In the case of Sāṃkhya we found that references to its "proto" forms in the Upaniṣads and the Gītā were generally found in conjunction with references to yoga. Jainism, from its very outset, has emphasized a rigorous yogic discipline.

We have seen, however, that even in Sāṃkhya-yoga and Jainism the culminating form of knowledge is not rational and analytical but rather supra-rational and intuitive. It is this "higher" form of knowledge found in the Upaniṣads that was to be the particular concern of the Vedāntic tradition. Within the Advaita system, however, it was pointed out that this supra-rational aspect was discussed less in terms of the intuition of the yogin and more within the terminology of revelation (śruti) and faith. The same observation applies to the Gītā as well. As is true for many aspects of Indian thought and practice, the Gītā represents, a beautiful synthesis of both the rational-analytical and the intuitive-mystical forms of knowledge as part of the salvation-quest.

We are now prepared for the principal task of this study, namely, an analysis of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in early Buddhism.

CHAPTER IV

KNOWLEDGE, CONTROL OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND SALVATION IN THE NIKĀYAS

We have pointed out in chapter two that early Buddhism understood the nature of man and the world as a two-fold reality--a *samskr̥ta* or phenomenal realm and an *asamskr̥ta* or noumenal realm. The *samskr̥ta* realm was understood to be a state of "conditioned particulars" and, hence, without permanence or essential value (*anatta*). By way of contrast ultimate reality was conceived as a state of absolute and universal peace (*ānanda*) and quiescence (*nibbāna*) to which the individual was drawn as a release (*vimutti*) from the causal conditionedness of his life in the phenomenal world.

The most important religious question, of course, was how the ultimate reality of *nibbāna* could be attained. We saw in chapter three that at a time roughly contemporaneous with the rise of Buddhism this soteriological question became closely associated with the problem of knowledge. That is, at a time in the history of Indian religious thought when the traditional objects which governed the sacred (i.e., the Vedic gods) and the customary ways of establishing a relationship with them

(i.e., sacrifice) were called into question, the religious man was forced to establish the reality of the sacred for himself. The question, "How can I know the Real," therefore, came to be of utmost importance. At least for some the proof for the existence of any reality beyond the empirical rested with the individual himself.

TWO TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

Within this context the quest for salvation or the attainment of the ultimately real seemed to call for two general types of knowledge--one of a more rational-analytical nature which was closely associated with the "yoking" of the mind or control of the consciousness, and another more intuitive and supra-rational type. The former played a particularly important role as preparation for the latter, although in the last analysis the nature of ultimate reality could not be known rationally or analytically. At a later date these two types of knowledge became assimilated into philosophical systems, thereby diminishing to some degree their primary soteriological reference. Also their earlier complementary functions, both subordinated to the attainment of the ultimate, came to be more and more separated from each other.

In a real sense the relationship between knowledge and the salvation-quest in early Buddhism as well as in the Indian religious tradition from at least the Middle Upaniṣads onwards, is fundamentally a problem of the nature and function of vijñāna/viññāṇa and prajñā/paññā and the relationship between the

two.¹ Herbert Guenther notes that the primary purpose of Buddhism is "...to lead man from his unregenerate state of naive common-sense to enlightenment or reality knowledge."² He goes on to say, "In more familiar terms this means that a complete change of attitude is aimed at, which is certainly not too incorrect to define more precisely as a shift from a discursive thought situation to an intuitive cognitive situation."³ In Guenther's opinion the intuitive knowledge aimed at approaches "pure sensation" which is not conceived so much as a unity of subject and object, but rather a non-propositional, immediate mode of knowing.⁴ Pure intuition, says Guenther, is then a knowing and understanding the things one apprehends before they are modified by our beliefs and conceptualizations.⁵

A similar juxtaposition of *viññāna* as discursive thought and *paññā* as intuitive knowledge is made by several other scholars. For example, D. T. Suzuki in an address at an East-West philosophers conference at the University of Hawaii said that *viññāna* and *prajñā* are always contrasted in Buddhist

¹On this point, see Alex Wayman, "Notes on the Sanskrit term, *Jñāna*," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXV (December, 1955), 255.

²Herbert V. Guenther, "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXVIII, (December, 1958), p. 19.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., 26.

⁵Ibid., 25.

thought.¹ Vijñāna is used as the mode of knowledge appropriate to the world of the senses and the intellect characterized by the duality between the seer and the seen.² Prajñā by way of contrast is, "...the fundamental noetic principle whereby a synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible." In Suzuki's opinion vijñāna and prajñā stand diametrically opposed to each other methodologically. Vijñāna is the principle of analysis and conceptualization whereas prajñā always aims at synthesis and unity.³ Despite their distinctive functions, however, Suzuki believes that they are not totally separated from each other; rather, vijñāna needs prajñā behind it in order to function properly.⁴ This point is also affirmed by P. T. Raju writing on intuition as a philosophical method in Indian thought. He contends that except at the lowest and highest levels of cognition, thought (vijñāna) demands intuition (prajñā). He says, "thought cannot work without intuitions and intuitions cannot be understood without thought, and...the distinctions between thought and intuition cannot be clear-cut."⁵

¹D. T. Suzuki, "Reason (vijñāna) and Intuition (prajñā) in Buddhist Philosophy," Essays in East-West Philosophy, ed. C. A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951), p. 17.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 23.

⁴Ibid., p. 17.

⁵P. T. Raju, "Intuition As a Philosophical Method in India," Philosophy East and West, II (October, 1952), 205.

As we turn to an examination of *vijñāna* and *paññā* in early Buddhism we are faced with two basic tasks. The first is to reach an understanding of the terms themselves keeping in mind that as far as the question of knowledge and salvation is concerned early Buddhism points to a "...transposition of consciousness from normal faculty to a condition of identity with the principle on which the faculty depends, a coming to see 'things' not as they are or seem to be in themselves, but sub specie aeternitatis."¹ The second task is to study the relationship between the two terms as ways or modes of knowing. Are they so radically different as to be inapplicable to each other, or are they essentially related as part of the Buddhist salvation-quest? Both of the above mentioned "tasks" are basic to a consideration of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in early Buddhism. Before continuing, however, a few comments must be made in regard to what is meant by early Buddhism.

Early Buddhism is defined for the purposes of the dissertation as that record provided primarily by the first two Nikāyas of the Pāli canon, the Dīgha and the Majjhima.² There

¹A. K. Coomaraswamy, "Paravṛtti-Transformation, Regeneration, Anagogy," Festschrift Moriz Winternitz, eds. O. Stein and W. Gampert (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1933), p. 235.

²The Pāli canon, known as the Tipiṭaka (the three baskets), is divided into three major sections: the Vinaya-Piṭaka (the section on monastic rules and discipline), the Sutta-Piṭaka (the section on the "threads" or discourses and dialogues of the Buddha) and the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka (the section on the "higher doctrine" or philosophical and psycho-

are several authorities who support such a designation. T. W. Rhys Davids, the translator of the *Dīgha Nikaya* and the founder of the Pāli Text Society, and Robert Chalmers, the translator of the *Majjhima* and other Pāli texts, agree that the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima* together "...present the essentials of early Buddhism in their oldest extant form."¹ B. C. Law, while placing the second and third volumes of the *Dīgha Nikaya* chronologically later than the first, agrees that the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima* provide us with early material.² Maurice Winternitz essentially supports this view as well, although he observes that the third volume of the *Dīgha* on the whole contains later material than either volume one or two.³

It would be possible, of course, to attempt a much more carefully delineated analysis of the Pāli canon in our search for the content of early Buddhism. Pāli scholars have already made rather rough chronological outlines of the canonical

logical writings). The *Sutta-Piṭaka*, parts of which form the basis of this chapter, is divided into five *Nikāyas* or collections, viz., (1) *Dīgha*, (2) *Majjhima*, (3) *Saṃyutta*, (4) *Anguttara*, and (5) *Khuddaka*. According to tradition, the *Tipiṭaka* in some form emerged at the time of the first council held in *Rājagaha* shortly after the death of the Buddha. See S. C. Banerji, An Introduction to Pali Literature (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1964), p. 21f.

¹The Further Dialogues of the Buddha (*Majjhima Nikaya*) I, trans. Robert Chalmers ("Sacred Books of the Buddhists"; London: Oxford University Press, 1926), vii.

²B. C. Law, A History of Pali Literature (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1933), I, 42.

³Maurice Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1933), II, 35.

materials.¹ To attempt to isolate particular strata of material such as, "the simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books,"² however, would be an onerous task beyond the scope of this study. On the basis of the judgment of such prominent scholars of Indian Buddhism as T. W. Rhys Davids, B. C. Law and Maurice Winternitz, therefore, it appears to be justified to focus our investigations on the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas of the Pāli canon, utilizing other texts³ where and when they supplement or support views presented in the first two Nikāyas.

BEING AND KNOWING: VINNANA

In studying the category of discriminating or analytical

¹T. W. Rhys Davids provides the following chronological table of Buddhist literature from the Buddha's time to the time of Aśoka:

- "1. The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.
2. Episodes found, in identical works, in two or more of the existing books.
3. The Silas, the Paryāna, the Octades, the Patimokkha.
4. The Dīgha, Majjhima, Anguttara and Samyutta Nikāyas.
5. The Sutta Nipāta, the Thera- and Therī-Gāthas, the Udanas and Khuddaka Pāṭha.
6. The Sutta Vibhanga and the Khandakas.
7. The Jātakas and the Dhammapadas.
8. The Niddesa, the Itivuttakas, and the Patisambhida.
9. The Peta- and Vimāna-Vatthus, the Apadanas, the Cariya Pitaka, and the Buddha Vamsa.
10. The Abhidhamma books..." See Rhys Davids, T. W., Buddhist India, p. 84.

²Rhys Davids, T. W., Buddhist India, p. 84.

³The most important texts besides the Dīgha and Majjhima will be the Samyutta and Anguttara Nikāyas.

knowledge several terms will be discussed but none is more significant than vijñāna/viññāna. The word is based on the Sanskrit, vi-jñā, meaning to distinguish, discern, observe, investigate or know,¹ and is found frequently in both the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavad Gītā. As has been pointed out by Franklin Edgerton, there is no clear definition of the meaning of vijñāna in the Gītā and other writings in classical Sanskrit.² In the Upaniṣads it sometimes appears that vijñāna is the form of knowledge necessary to attain to the highest reality. Thus in Kaṭha 4:15 the knowledge or understanding of the essential identity of all things in ātman is vijñāna:

As pure water poured forth into pure
Becomes the very same,
So becomes the soul (ātman), oh Gautama,
Of the seer (muni) who has understanding (vijñāna).³

The same confidence in vijñāna is expressed in Chāndogya 8.7.1 where it is said that the ātman which is "free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hungerless, thirstless..." should be understood (vijñāna) and that one who understands ("vijñānāti") the ātman obtains all desires and all worlds.⁴ There are other passages in the Upaniṣads, however, which are not

¹Monier-Williams (ed.), A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 961.

²Franklin Edgerton, "Jñāna and Vijñāna," Festschrift Moriz Winternitz, eds. O. Stein and W. Gampert (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1933), p. 217.

³Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 355.

⁴Ibid., p. 268. "Sa sarvāṃś ca lokān āpnoti sarvāṃś ca kāmān...yas tam ātmānam anuvidya vijñānāti." Radhkrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 501.

so optimistic about vijñāna. Kena 1.3, for example, clearly states that the ultimately real transcends vijñāna--"Na tatra cakṣur gacchati na vāg gacchati na manah/na vidmo na vijñānīmo yathaitad anuśiṣyāt" ("There the eye goes not, speech goes not, we understand not how one can teach this.").¹ Brhadāraṇyaka 1.5.3. supports this passage by affirming that discerning knowledge is dependent upon the mind ("manasā vijñānāti"), one of the sense organs in the perspective of Upaniṣadic psychology. Even Chāndogya 7.5.1 which enumerates a wide variety of subjects known by vijñāna ranging from snake charming to the Rig Veda points to elements higher than vijñāna.

Turning to the Bhagavad Gītā, perhaps one of the most interesting uses of vijñāna is its frequent conjunction with jñāna. It appears to be the case that in most instances the coupling of these two terms is associated with the views of Sāṅkhya and Yoga. For instance Gītā 3:41 refers to the relationship between controlling the senses and both types of knowledge (i.e., vijñāna and jñāna) and 6:8 likens the man immovable through yogic concentration (samādhi) to one satiated with jñāna and vijñāna. Writing on the two terms, jñāna and vijñāna, in classical Sanskrit literature, Franklin Edgerton translates them as "theoretical" and "practical" knowledge respectively.² He claims to have come across the insight

¹Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 582.

²Edgerton, "Jñāna and Vijñāna," Festschrift Moriz Winternitz, p. 218.

that vijñāna means practical or applied knowledge through a study of one of the stories in the Vetālapañcaviṃśati, and that this position is supported by Śaṅkara's commentary on Gītā 3:41 which states that vijñāna is the experiencing of jñāna in specific instances and his commentary on Gītā 6:8 which points out that vijñāna is the making of things known from science part of one's experience.¹

Edgerton does not present a particularly convincing argument for his interpretation of vijñāna as practical or applied knowledge. In the first place yoga in the Bhagavad Gītā is not conceived as a "practical" activity or an activity which applies theoretical insights to one's life in the world but rather as an important means to the realization of the ultimately real. If, indeed, vijñāna is to be associated with yoga it would appear to be more appropriate to understand it in terms of its soteriological purpose rather than any other function. Therefore, in Gītā 2.46 it is the brahman who truly understands (vijñāna) that has transcended the knowledge of the Vedas; and in Gītā 11.31 Arjuna's desire is to understand (vijñāna) Kṛṣṇa, the manifestation of ultimate reality or Viṣṇu. In other words, vijñāna in the Gītā is not conceived as putting into practice what one has come to understand, but rather is a particular way of knowing associated with man's quest for salvation. In fact, it would appear on the basis of internal evidence from the Gītā itself, that there is more

¹Ibid., p. 219.

justification for associating vijñāna with the kind of knowledge that results from the Sāṅkhya analysis of reality than with Yoga. For example, in Gītā 13.18, vijñāna is clearly associated with the categories of Sāṅkhya thought.

In sum it is possible to conclude that in the Upaniṣads and the Gītā vijñāna may be understood at least in one of its uses as a type of knowing directed toward the attainment of the ultimately real; that its power to attain this end is uncertain; and that at least in the Gītā vijñāna may be a category or mode of knowledge applied specifically to the analytical schematization of Sāṅkhya.

Turning to the Pāli canon, viññāṇa, is found to have several different meanings. According to the Pāli Text Society Dictionary it stands for "a mental quality as a constituent of individuality, the bearer of (individual) life, life force ..., general consciousness...(and)...may be characterized as the sensory and perceptive activity commonly expressed by 'mind'".¹ Dr. O. H. de A. Wijesekera of the University of Ceylon writing on the concept of viññāṇa in Theravāda Buddhism contends that there are four basic ways in which viññāṇa is used in the Pāli canon: 1) in the sense of cognitive or perceptive consciousness, 2) the surviving factor in the individual as denoted in particular by the term, saṃvattanika viññāṇa (the viññāṇa that evolves), 3) the medium in which

¹Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 618.

jhānic or spiritual progress takes place as implied by the expression *viññāpaṭṭhiti* (the stations of *viññāpa*), and 4) the basis of all consciousness and unconscious psychological manifestations pertaining to individuals within *samsāric* or empirical existence.¹ Each of these usages clearly applies to the life of the individual within the phenomenal world; nevertheless, as the basis of cognition and perceptive consciousness and as part of the means by which spiritual progress is gained *viññāpa* is an important mode of knowledge relating to the Theravādin's quest for salvation.

Dr. Wijesekera presents a careful and detailed analysis of *viññāpa*; however, for the purposes of this study we can focus on two fundamental uses of *viññāpa* in the Pāli Nikāyas. The first is *viññāpa* as consciousness or mind; the second is *viññāpa* as a mode of knowing. The fact that *viññāpa* is found to represent both a condition of consciousness as well as a type of knowledge will prove to be of the utmost significance.

Viññāpa as consciousness or mind is nearly synonymous with two other important terms in the Pāli canon, *citta* and *mano*. *Citta*² means the center of man's emotional and intellectual nature. The Pāli Text Society Dictionary states that such English expressions as "heart and soul" best capture the

¹O. H. de A. Wijesekera, "The Concept of *Viññāpa* in Theravāda Buddhism," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXXIV (July-September, 1964), 259.

²*Citta* is the past passive participle of the Pāli *cinteti* meaning think, perceive, know. Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 266.

meaning of citta and that it refers especially to the conative and emotional side of thought.¹ As Mrs. Rhys Davids writes, "In citta we...usually have man as affective and affected, as experiencing."² Mano³, on the other hand, is said to represent the intellectual function of consciousness, especially as it is expressed in valuing, measuring, purposing and intending.⁴ Viññāna complements citta and mano by referring to perceptive and sensory activity.⁵ Despite these distinctions, however, in what may be a very old sutta, viññāna, citta and mano are equated ("cittam itī pi mano itī pi viññānam") and stand in opposition to kāya or body.⁶ Let us assume, then without further elaboration, that in early Buddhism the terms citta, mano and viññāna were used either synonymously or as aspects of the same "empirical consciousness."

There are two important characteristics of the empirical consciousness in early Buddhism that need to be investigated. The first is its impermanent nature, and the second may be

¹Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 266.

²C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism (London: Luzac & Co., 1936), p. 266.

³Mano is a nominative form from the verb, *maññati*, meaning think, imagine. Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 520.

⁴Rhys Davids, C. A. F., The Birth of Indian..., p. 237.

⁵Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 618.

⁶Ibid.

characterized as the surviving factor in the individual within samsāric or empirical existence. The impermanent nature of consciousness is well brought out by the following passage in the Samyutta Nikāya:

But this, brethren, that we call thought, that we call mind, that we call consciousness, that arises as one thing, ceases as another, whether by night or by day. Just as a monkey, brethren, faring through the woods, through the great forest catches hold of a bough, letting it go seizes another, even so that which we call thought, mind, consciousness, that arises as one thing, ceases as another, both by night and by day.¹

Elsewhere in the Nikāyas it is made abundantly clear that the impermanence of the empirical consciousness is a result of its connection with the senses. That is, empirical consciousness appears to be dependent upon conditions to which the senses are subject. As Majjhima I.259 puts it, "aññatra paccayā nātthi viññāṇassa sambhavo" ("apart from condition there is no origination of consciousness").² The same sutta goes on to say that visual consciousness (cakkhuvīññāṇa) arises because of eye and material shapes; auditory consciousness (sotavīññāṇa) arises because of ear and sounds; olfactory consciousness (ghānavīññāṇa) arises because of nose and smells; gustatory consciousness (jivhāvīññāṇa) arises because of tongue

¹The Book of Kindred Sayings, II, 66. "Yam ca kho etaṃ bhikkhave vuccati cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam iti pi, taṃ rattiyā ca divasassa ca aññad eva uppajjati aññaṃ nirujjhati. Seyyathā pi bhikkhave makkaṭṭo araññe pāyane caramāno sākham gaṇhāti, taṃ muccitvā aññaṃ gaṇhāti..." (Samyutta Nikāya, II, 94.)

²The Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikāya), trans. I. B. Horner.

and tastes; tactile consciousness (*kāyaviññāṇa*) arises because of body and touches; mental consciousness (*manoviññāṇa*) arises because of mind and mental objects.¹ The consequences of the fact that *viññāṇa* arises as a result of contact between the sense organs and sense objects are significant. One important question which arises is whether cognitive consciousness originates de novo from an empirical situation or simply begins to function when there is contact between the organ and the object of sense. Wijesakera supports the latter interpretation insisting that the former would equate Buddhism with materialism in its theory of perception.² For our purposes, however, the most important point appears to be that *viññāṇa* is necessarily rooted in the objects of sense thereby creating the possibility of consciousness being in bondage to the empirical or phenomenal world.

The dimensions of this attachment or bondage to the empirical world are illustrated by the following passage from the *Madhupindika-sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*:

Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement (*phassa*); feelings (*vedanā*) are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one perceives (*sañjānāti*); what one perceives one reasons about (*vitakketi*); what one reasons about obsesses (*apañceti*) one; what obsesses one is the origin of the number of perceptions and obsessions

¹The *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, eds. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, and C. A. F. Rhys Davids ("Pali Text Society"; London: Luzac & Co., 1948), 295.

²Wijesakera, Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXXIV, 255.

which assail a man in regard to material shapes cognisable by the eye, past, future, present.¹

Here we find a direct connection between *viññāṇa* and *papañca*, or consciousness and the obsession, illusion, obstacle, impediment² resulting from the perceptions (*sañña*) which are rooted in the contact (*phassa*) between sense organ and object.

The empirical world presupposed by these texts might well be described as a world of fields of consciousness, an arena of sensory presentations in which external objects are dependent upon a cognizing consciousness and *visa versa*. The empirical world of things and objects has no independent reality, but neither does consciousness itself. It is impossible to talk about one without the other. Mrs. Rhys Davids emphasizes this point in regard to the mind or consciousness when she says that early Buddhism was not concerned with the "mind" but with "minding,"³ that is, with mind in relationship to sense objects. The same conception of the phenomenal world as fields of consciousness is illustrated by the development of the classification of the eighteen *dhātus* in later Pāli literature. The *dhātus* or fundamental bases of existence in-

¹"Cakkhuñ c'āvuso paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-viññāṇam, tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti, yaṃ papañceti tato nidānaṃ purisaṃ papañcasāṅkhā samudācaranti atītānāgata-paccuppannesu cakku-viññeyyesu rūpesu." Majjhima Nikāya, I, 111-112.

²Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 412.

³Rhys Davids, C. A. F., The Birth of Indian..., p. 231f.

cluded the six sense organs, their objects of contact, and the six forms of resultant consciousness (viññāṇa).

Given the fact that empirical realities are, in effect, fields of consciousness it necessarily follows that the empirical or phenomenal world will be characterized primarily by impermanence. Since objects and consciousness are in a condition of constant interdependence it is impossible to discover any degree of permanence within the world of the senses. As Dr. Sarachchandra writes: "We perceive forms with our eyes, hear sounds with our ears and get attached to them. But the things we get thus attached to are constantly changing...(and) the world of constant change has no permanent reality. Its existence is purely relative,...dependent on the activity of the senses."¹ The "obsessed" (papāṇa) consciousness, therefore, is one which is bound to objects of sensory perception mistaking empirical objects as permanent entities when, in fact, they are only objects of consciousness changing at every moment as our perceptions change.

If the phenomenal world is viewed as spheres or fields of consciousness, in one sense consciousness functions as the medium in which empirical existence take place. In this capacity viññāṇa has the power to effect the origination or cessation of the world.² Another result is that viññāṇa be-

¹E. R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception (Colombo: The University of Ceylon Press, 1958), p. 11.

²Ibid.

comes the sine qua non for the birth, growth and development of conscious existence within the phenomenal world.¹ In a dialogue, for example, between ~~Isanda~~ and the Buddha in the Mahā-nidāna-suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya, the Buddha states that viññāṇa is the cause of name and form (~~nāma~~/rūpa) and that if consciousness (viññāṇa) were not to descend into the mother's womb there would be no birth and that without consciousness, furthermore, there would be no further evolution of life.² This nearly "quasi-substantive" conception of viññāṇa is, in the opinion of Dr. Wijesekera, also expressed in the terms, samvattanika-viññāṇa (rebirth-consciousness), and viññāṇa-sota (stream of consciousness) or bhava-sota (stream of becoming).³

Viññāṇa as mind or consciousness, in brief, is an expression of an ontological reality, a reality characterized by diversity and impermanence. In this sense viññāṇa does not mean full cognition but is "...a sort of anoetic sentience that occurs before the object is completely apprehended."⁴ At this level, viññāṇa represents no ~~formal~~ power or control in and of itself, but rather the formless, weakness and pain of disordered chaos. It is presentative consciousness, coming

¹Wijesekera, Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXXIV, 255.

²Dīgha Nikāya, II, 62.

³Wijesekera, Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXXIV, pp. 255-256.

⁴Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p. 4.

into being when sense objects stimulate sense organs. Perhaps it could be said that at this stage *viññāṇa* is merely "reactive" consciousness or awareness. It is, therefore, a condition of un-freedom, of absolute bondage to phenomenal diversity even though the objects to which it is bound come into being as objects of consciousness.

The ontological condition of bondage to plurality and impermanence is, indeed, the profane in its most radical connotation. The Theravādins quest for salvation is to escape from this condition, to negate its threat of confusion and disorder. But where are the possibilities for creating a sacred cosmos from this chaos? Do they lie within man's own consciousness or is the source only to be found in some outside force? These questions bring us to a second basic use of *viññāṇa* in the Pāli Nikāyas, namely, *viññāṇa* as a mode of knowledge.

Clues as to the nature of this knowledge are found throughout the Nikāyas. For example in the *Dhātu-vibhaṅga-sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, *viññāṇa* as the sixth *dhātu* beyond the five bases or elements of earth, water, fire, air and space is characterized as a knowledge which is able to distinguish between pleasure and pain, one of the fundamental dualities of the phenomenal world--"Athāparam *viññāṇam* yeva avasissati¹ parisuddham pariyodātam, tena *viññāṇena* kiñci jñāti; sukham ti pi vijñāti; dukkham ti pi vijñāti; adukkhamasukhan ti pi vijñāti."¹ To be able to make this distinction is character-

¹*Majjhima Nikāya*, III, 242.

ized as "knowing anything" (*kiñci jānāti*). It would appear to be the case, therefore, that *sukhā* and *dukkha* refer not simply to pleasure and pain as concomitants to existence in the sensory world, but to the characteristics of the nature of reality. *Vīññāna*, therefore, as knowledge of the distinction between pleasure and pain or happiness and suffering appears to be a discriminating knowledge in regard to the true nature of reality. An identical use of *vīññāna* is found in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* where it is said that by *vīññāna* one discriminates the pleasurable from the painful and the neutral--"*kiñ ca vijānāti: sukhā ti pi...dukkhā ti pi...adukkhamasukhā ti pi...*"¹ In the same *sutta* the text goes on to say that *vīññāna* is called knowledge because one discriminates by means of it--"*vijānāti ti...tasme vīññānan ti vāccati.*"² Furthermore we find that in the *Vimāṇsaka-sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* it is said that 'the Tathāgata should be examined in order to know (*vīññāpāya*) whether he is perfectly enlightened or not--"*...Tathāgate samānesanā kātabbā, sammāsambuddho vā no vā iti vīññāpāya ti.*"³ *Vīññāna* in these instances is clearly a mode of knowledge or cognitive state which by its power of discrimination has within itself the possibility of becoming more than mere

¹Ibid., I, 292. See Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 434f.

²Majjhima Nikāya, I, 292.

³Ibid., 317.

sensory awareness. It has, in other words, at least some power of self-transcendence.

Viññāṇa in the Pāli Nikāyas, in brief, presents two different possibilities of interpretation regarding man in relationship to his quest for the ultimately real. It can mean, on the one hand, empirical consciousness, sensory "fields" in which man's consciousness is bound to the objects of sense. This level may be considered as the profane, when that which is most essential to human reality (i.e., viññāṇa) is completely un-free, bound by its attachment to objects of the senses and totally without any control over itself. On the other hand, viññāṇa, as a mode of knowledge implies that it has the power to transcend its total involvement in the sensory; thus, in the Kevaddha-sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya it is asked:

'Where do earth, water, fire and wind,
And long and short, and fine and coarse,
Pure and impure, no footing find?
Where is it that both name and form (nāma/rūpa)
Die out, leaving no trace behind?'
On that the answer is:
'The intellect (viññāṇa) of Arahatsip...'¹

It rests within viññāṇa itself to progress toward the ultimate. This progress is a result of knowledge attained through *an inductive understanding of the impermanent nature of the phenomenal world.*

This progression is marked in particular by a scheme of spiritual training or meditation known as jhāna or samāpatti

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 283.

to be examined at some length later. At this point, however, it should be noted that the acquisition of spiritual states is a refinement of the consciousness (viññāṇa). Such a progressive "refinement" is indicated by the so-called seven stations of consciousness (viññāṇa). These describe the movement of viññāṇa from consciousness of matter, to the dying out of the consciousness of sense-reaction, to the turning away from consciousness of the manifold, to the consciousness of infinite space, to the consciousness of infinite consciousness.¹ Here is a freeing of viññāṇa from attachment to empirical objects to a more universal awareness of the nature of itself and of reality. Such a freeing is denoted even more forcefully by other terms in the Pāli Nikāyas which must be at least briefly mentioned.

That the way in which viññāṇa rises from its bondage to the phenomenal world is through the power of objectifying and analyzing reason and knowledge is illustrated by a number of words denoting reflective cogitation, contemplative observation and rational discrimination. Among them would be included such terms as, vīmaṃsā, anupassanā, paṭisaṅkhātī, paṭisancikkhati, paccavekkhati.²

Vīmaṃsā denotes consideration, examination and investi-

¹Dīgha Nikāya, III, 253; II, 68.

²Important terms omitted from this list are vicāra and vitakka. Both will be discussed later in the chapter in conjunction with jhāna.

gation.¹ In its use in the Nikāyas it is frequently associated with the attainment of higher powers, praiseworthy concentration and even insight into the nature of ultimate reality itself. Thus in Dīgha Nikāya III, 222, vīmaṃsā-samādhi is one of the four stages to iddhi or supra-natural powers; in the Anguttara Nikāya vīmaṃsā is described in "The Book of the Tens" as one of the conditions of the higher life of the Buddhist saint;² and in Anguttara I, 297, insight into the nature of the ultimate appears to be contingent on a detached examination (vīmaṃsā) of "...resentment, infatuation, wrath, enmity, hypocrisy, delusion, treachery, stubbornness, impetuosity, pride...(etc.)"³

Anupassanā, denoting contemplation, observation, looking at⁴ is clearly essential to the development of true wisdom. For example, through anupassanā the bhikkhu analyzes his body into such components as feelings and mind and understands their impermanent nature.⁵ Furthermore, it is said to lead to a "...vision of things not taught before..." to knowledge, insight, wisdom and light.⁶ A related term, samanupassanā, is

¹Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 644.

²The Book of Gradual Sayings, V, 65.

³Ibid., I, 276.

⁴Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 39.

⁵The Book of Kindred Sayings, V, 261.

⁶Ibid., 157.

seen to be integral to the means by which the hindrances (nīvāraṇa) which blind the individual to higher realities are overcome.¹

An important stage in the development of viññāṇa beyond bare sensory consciousness is the simple act of being rationally aware of particular human acts and particular activities, especially those conducive to the pleasure of the senses. Thus the Majjhima Nikāya admonishes the monk to reflect carefully (paṭisaṅkhā) while eating, and to think over (paṭisaṅcikkhati) the householder life.³ Reflective thought is like a mirror which catches the image of every act and thought of the person; hence, the Buddha admonishes Rāhula to reflect (paccavekkhati) again and again in doing every act, speaking every word and thinking every thought: "Evam eva kho Rāhula paccavekkhitvā paccavekkhitvā kāyena kammaṃ kattabbaṃ, paccavekkhitvā paccavekkhitvā vācaya kammaṃ kattabbaṃ, paccavekkhitvā paccavekkhitvā manasā kammaṃ kattabbaṃ."⁴

The consequences of analytical and reflective thought on the one hand are ethical. By the power of discrimination (bāla-paṭi-saṅkhāna) one abandons "...immorality of deed in body, speech and thought...and conducts himself in utter pur-

¹Dīgha Nikāya, I, 73.

²Majjhima Nikāya, I, 273.

³Ibid., 267.

⁴Ibid., 415.

ity."¹ Paṭisaṅkhāna, however, also leads to bhāvanā, "cultivation," "making-become," which is conducive to yet higher goals of mindfulness and detachment.² Analytical or discriminative knowledge, therefore, represents not only self-conscious awareness or even rational understanding but is the power by which the individual becomes "other" than he is. In rational, analytical thought which is inherent in consciousness (viññāṇa) itself there rests the power of changing the very structure of reality. Through the attainment of knowledge, the individual comes to control his environment rather than be controlled by it. Vi-ññāṇa comes to mean not merely a sensory consciousness dispersed among the multifarious and impermanent object-realities of the empirical world, but a consciousness which has analyzed and understood that world to the point of controlling and, hence, transcending it.

BEING AND KNOWING: PĀṆNA

We have seen how viññāṇa characterizes the profane in two ways--as the ground of existent entities and as the means by which the individual can gain power over them by rational-

¹The Book of Gradual Sayings, I, 47.

²Ibid., 48. Mrs. Rhys Davids has discussed the word, bhāvanā, in several of her writings. See her Sakya or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931), p. 93f. Although she has been justly criticized for interpreting this and similar terms to mean becoming more of a "self," the notion of bhāvanā as "making-become" or "becoming other than what one presently is," represents a helpful interpretation. That is, early Buddhism clearly implies that right knowledge brings about ontological change.

analytical knowing. As a mode of knowledge, *viññāṇa* functions soteriologically as a means to a higher reality. This reality, on one level of discourse, can be identified as *nibbāna*.¹ As a polar term to *viññāṇa*, however, it may also be discussed as *paññā*. In this case *paññā* would represent a form parallel to that of *viññāṇa* but applicable specifically to the sacred rather than the profane. We would contend that *paññā* represents both the nature of consciousness in the sacred as well as the mode of knowing the ultimate or the ground of the sacred. *Viññāṇa* and *paññā* are, therefore, parallel in their representative natures as consciousness although different in cognitive function. The function of *viññāṇa* as a mode of knowledge is primarily to help control the consciousness through analytical and discriminating understanding of the empirical world. This control function is not an end in itself, but rather points beyond itself to a higher end or goal. *Paññā*, on the other hand, does not function as a control but rather as a release, a freeing of the consciousness to a knowledge of the ultimate itself, a knowledge defying the categories of rational discrimination. In this sense *paññā* may be classified as a supra-rational, intuitive or perhaps mystical type of knowledge in contrast to *viññāṇa* as a rational and analytical type.

The word, *paññā*, is derived from the Sanskrit, *prajñā*,

¹See chapter two.

meaning to know, understand, discern, distinguish.¹ It is found in both the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavad Gītā, although it is not used extensively.² In the first vallī of the Kaṭha it refers on one occasion to knowledge of the sacrifice by which one can gain the "boundless world" (anantalokāpti), and on another to a knowledge of the ephemeral nature of the delights and pleasures of the phenomenal world.³ In the Brhadāranyaka the nature of brahman is likened to prajñā,⁴ a usage similar to that of Kauṣītaki 3.2 where under the guise of Indra the ultimate is said to be the intelligent self (prajñātman). In the same Upaniṣad prajñā is said to be necessary for all types of intelligible experience--speaking, breathing, hearing, seeing, acting and thinking (e.g., "...na hi prajñāpetā dhīḥ kācana sidhyen na prajñātavyam prajñāyeta");⁵ prajñā serves to control all of these activities as well as make them intelligible;⁶ in essence, all beings are one with prajñā ("...prajñāyai sarvāṇi bhūtāny ekam bhavanti...").⁷ In the

¹Monier-Williams (ed.), A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 659.

²G. A. Jacob, A Concordance to the Principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavad-Gita (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963), p. 582.

³Kaṭha 1:14 and 1:28.

⁴Brhadāranyaka 4.1.2.

⁵Kauṣītaki 3.7. The Principal Upaniṣads, trans. Radhakrishnan.

⁶Kauṣītaki 3.6.

⁷Kauṣītaki 3.4.

Upaniṣads, therefore, prajñā may represent an ontological principle pointing to the essence of all things (i.e., the ultimate form of reality) as well as a mode of comprehension encompassing a knowledge of the nature of things.

In the Gītā, prajñā, as a stage of cognition, shares much in common with vijñāna. It must be stabilized and detached from desires;¹ and, appears to be used nearly synonymously with vijñāna in Gita 11.31 where Arjuna, addressing himself to Kṛṣṇa says:

Tell me, who art thou, of awful form?
Homage be to Thee: Best of Gods, be merciful!
I desire to understand thee (vijñātum icchām)...
For I do not comprehend (na prajānām) what
thou hast set out to do.²

The similarity of usage between prajñā and vijñāna in ^{the} Gītā is a phenomenon duplicated in certain passages in the Nikāyas. These occurrences point to the fact that one should not expect to find a consistent and systematic presentation of particular ideas in religious texts that have evolved over a period of hundreds of years and have been written by many hands. More importantly, however, even though these two terms come to achieve distinct roles in early Buddhism, they continue to maintain an important relationship to each other. The nature of this relationship will be a matter of attention at the conclusion of this section.

It has been demonstrated that in the Nikāyas the condi-

¹The Bhagavad Gītā, trans. Edgerton, p. 15.

²Ibid., p. 58.

tion of existence in the profane or the phenomenal world is one of un-freedom because consciousness (viññāṇa) is bound to empirical objects by sensory perceptions (saññā). It has been shown, furthermore, that viññāṇa has the power within itself to rise above mere sensation to higher cognitive states. By means of inductive analysis viññāṇa perceives the implicit dualities and conflicts which characterize the empirical world. It thereby progresses to higher and higher levels of understanding, however, always qualified by its inevitable attachment to the senses. The important point is that progress can take place eventuating in a break with the senses so that both a new way of knowing and a new kind of reality result. The *Āpañja-sappāya-sutta* of the *Majjhima* discusses this progression and change in a form typical of the *Nikāyas*. It points out that perceptions (saññā) related to sense desires (kāma) are ruled by Māra resulting in an evil and immoral consciousness ("pāpakā akusalā manasā").¹ The only way in which this condition can be changed is for consciousness (citta) to be developed so that a condition of true permanence (āpañja) which is the highest attainment of wisdom ("paññāya adhimuccati") can be reached.² As another passage in the *Majjhima* puts it, perfect knowledge (aññā)³ comes only through gradual

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, 262.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Aññā* generally refers to perfect knowledge, the knowledge of arahantship, saving knowledge. Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, *The...Pali-English Dictionary*, p. 14. The use

training, attainment and progress.¹ Perhaps the most obvious illustration of the fact that paññā comes as the result of an extended period of discipline and gradual understanding is the division of the eight-fold path into the categories of sīla, samādhi and paññā. In this case, wisdom or true knowledge, is reached at the end or the conclusion of a prior progression.

The goal achieved by this progressive realization is above all a goal characterized by freedom (vimutti). Again and again the Nikāyas point to the fact that one who enters the way (magga) to salvation has entered on the freedom of the consciousness (cittovimutti), freedom through "intuitive wisdom" (paññāvimutti).² Such freedom is likened to abhiññā, a supra-rational knowledge, which is perfect (aññā).³ The model of the religieux par excellence is one who is endowed with intuitive wisdom (paññā) and freedom (vimutti) or a "knowledge-vision of freedom" (vimuttiñāṇadassana).⁴

Freedom by itself is, of course, merely an abstraction and the Pāli Nikāyas are quite concrete about what it is that the individual of intuitive wisdom is freed from. In brief,

of paññā I am developing in this section is identical with the meaning of aññā.

¹ Majjhima Nikāya, I, 479. "...anupubbasikkhā anupubbakiriya anupubbapaṭipada aññāradhanā hoti."

² Majjhima Nikāya, I, 77.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

the man of *citto-paṇṇā-vimutti* is freed from those attachments to the objects of the phenomenal world which control his consciousness, which blind him from an awareness of the nature of himself and the world in which he lives, and which prescribes his ability to transcend himself and his environment. The word used in the Pāli texts for this binding attachment to the phenomenal world is *āsava* which literally means an "out-pouring."¹ Through ignorance (*avijjā*), sensuous desire (*kāma*), and the wish for becoming (*bhāva*) an individual is literally "poured out" into the material world. He is defined by all of the objects and immediate goals of the world of sensory reality making a condition of freedom absolutely impossible.

Freedom in any religious tradition, of course, is more than merely freedom from. It is a freedom to as well. Early Buddhism is no exception to this rule. In this case it is a freedom to *pañṇā*, a new insight (*vipassanā*) and vision (*nāṇa-dassana*). The individual who has attained to *pañṇā* having overcome the impediments of the senses is enabled to know in a new way. It is a knowing no longer tied to the fields of sense, to sense objects and organs in the manner of empirical consciousness (*viññāṇa*). *Pañṇā*, then, represents the new consciousness of "rebirth" or transformation (*parāvatti*).² It is the "noumenal" consciousness empowered to know the es-

¹This term will be discussed at greater length in the section on the control of consciousness.

²Coomaraswamy, "Paravṛtti=Transformation, Regeneration, Anagogy," Festschrift Moriz Winternitz, p. 232f.

sence of things prior (pra) to their dissemination (vi) as part of the world of sensory reality. Because it represents a mode of consciousness like *viññāṇa*, *paññā* is able to perceive ultimate reality directly just as *viññāṇa* is able to perceive the phenomenal world directly. *Paññā*, therefore, has been called an extrasensory "seeing" (*dassana*) or perception.¹ It is a form of perception in that it knows directly but it is extra-sensory in that it is not dependent upon the senses or the objects of sense.

Paññā as insight (*vipassanā*)² is the knowledge of the nature of things, or the knowledge and insight of things as they are ("*yathā-bhūta-ñānadassana*"). If you will, it is the acknowledgement of the impermanence (*anicca*) of the phenomenal world and its inherent suffering (*dukkha*) but from the perspective of the knowledge of the essence of things (*paññā*) rather than from the perspective of the knowledge nature of the phenomenal world (*viññāṇa*). It is possible for the empirical consciousness to arrive at a cognizance of the impermanence of the phenomenal world by inductive methods, but until that knowledge is realized from the perspective of ultimate reality its consequences are limited. The knowledge of the nature of things is that aspect of *paññā* described in the

¹Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 432.

²For a presentation of *vipassanā* by a modern Buddhist, see Ledi Sayadaw, The Manual of Insight (Vipassanā Dīpanī) ("The Wheel," Vol. II; Kandy: The Buddhist Publication Society, 1961).

two stages of the eight fold path as right-views and right-intentions. Within the Theravāda tradition it is basically the four noble truths but also the layers of elaboration added to it which attempt to describe the nature of things from the perspective of the ultimate.

Knowledge of the nature of things is not sufficient, however. It must be supplemented by "salvation-knowledge," the knowledge-and-vision of things that is absolute freedom (vimutti-ñāṇadassana). It is the knowledge attained by the Buddha at his enlightenment when he is reported to have said 'there arose in me the knowledge and insight that my salvation is unshakable, that this is the last birth and that there is no further birth' ('ñāṇaṃ ca pana me dassanaṃ udayādi; akuppā me vimutti, ayam antima jāti natthi dāni punabbhave').¹

"Freedom-knowledge" complements "nature-of-things knowledge" in that the latter is the knowledge of things as they are empirically seen from the perspective of what they might become, whereas the former is simply the acknowledgement of what the highest reality is. The insight aspect of paññā, therefore, may speak in descriptive terms of impermanence, conditionality, and so on, but the "vision" aspect of paññā is limited to the such simple assertions as emptiness (suñña) and signless (anmitta).

As Edward Conze points out, the term, suñña, is not used

¹Majjhima Nikāya, I, 167.

in the Theravāda tradition as extensively as anicca or impermanence;¹ nevertheless, its limited use serves as an important means by which to indicate the vision aspect of paññā. References occur in the Anguttara Nikāya where the Buddha is made to say that his discourses are "...deep and deep in meaning, transcendental, dealing with the Void (suññatā)..."²; the Cula-suññatā-sutta describes a method for the development of a true, changeless and pure emptiness ("yathābuccā avipallatthā parisuddhā suññatā..."³; and the Akkaṅkheyya-sutta refers to the monk who is calmed (samatha) and who has transcended every perceptual form as a "cultivator of empty places."⁴ As the last reference indicates, suñña takes us back again to the notion of paññā as freedom of the mind or consciousness (ceto-vimutti). This freedom may be best delineated in the Nikāyas in the sequence of appamāṇā (immeasurable), ākiñcañña (nothingness), suññatā (emptiness) and animittā (signless).⁵ Suññatā-cetovimutti or "freedom of the mind that is emptiness" refers to the fact that essential reality abides beyond the particulars of the phenomenal world. The above limited references appear to indicate that salvation-knowledge as suñña denotes not only the negation of form associated with the phenomenal

¹Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 59.

²The Book of Gradual Sayings, I, 68.

³Majjhima Nikāya, III, 104.

⁴Ibid., I, 33. The Middle Length Sayings, I, 41.

⁵Majjhima Nikāya, I, 358.

world but also a reality beyond form. Paññā perceives this reality as suññatā, not mere emptiness, but that ultimate reality from which the world of multiplicity derives.

Along with suñña or suññatā the term, animitta (signless) is an important descriptive indicator of the "freed mind" or consciousness (cetovimutti).¹ It denotes more than the inadequacy of the human intelligence to grasp ultimate reality. It implies, rather, that human consciousness operating on a higher level (i.e., paññā) can, indeed, know the ultimate and that both the ultimate itself as well as the consciousness one has of it represent that primordial reality from which all distinct entities derive. It is that universal and absolute ground of being which by definition must transcend the limits of finite knowledge. Theravāda Buddhism then goes on to make the optimistic claim that a man can know this ultimate reality by his own efforts. To truly know this reality is to know it directly and to know directly assumes that one participates in that level of reality. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that salvation-knowledge or paññā is described as a "seeing-knowing" (jñāna-dassana). Since what is "seen" is radically other than what is seen in the empirical world, the vision aspect of paññā must also be radically other than the modes of knowledge appropriate to the phenomenal world. If this claim is accurate, that is, if paññā as jñāna-

¹Ibid., 296.

dassana is radically other than empirical consciousness or viññāṇa then the nature of the relationship between these two forms of knowing becomes a crucial question. Do they in some way complement each other or are they so radically different in nature and function that there is effectively no relationship between the two?

Writing in Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques La Vallée

Poussin uses a dialogue among the monks, Savit̥ṭha, Musīla and Nārada in the Samyutta Nikāya as a typology to represent two different approaches to nibbāna, the rational and the mystical. In the dialogue Savit̥ṭha asks Musīla and Nārada whether, "apart from belief, apart from inclination, apart from hearsay, apart from argument as to method, apart from reflection on and approval of an opinion" did they have a knowledge of the conditioned nature of the phenomenal world and that the ceasing of it was nibbāna.¹ Musīla replied that he knew (jānāti) and saw (passati); hence, for him the hindrances (āsavas) to the ultimately real had been stripped away and he had attained to arahatship. Nārada for his part, stated that he had the right insight that the "ceasing of becoming" was nibbāna but that he was not an arahant for whom the intoxicants had perished.² La Vallée Poussin comments:

Musīla et Nārada...représentent assez bien le 'rationalisme' et la 'mystique.' Musīla possède la sainteté parce qu'il n'a pas touché le Nirvāṇa avec son corps. On peut, sans imprudence, dis-

¹The Book of Kindred Sayings, II, 81-82.

²Ibid.

cerner dans les sources bouddhiques, anciennes ou scholastiques, deux théories opposées, ... la théorie qui fait du salut une oeuvre purement ou surtout intellectuelle; la théorie qui met le salut au bout des disciplines ascétiques et extatiques."¹

La Vallée Poussin's position, that the "intellectual" and the "ecstatic" or "rational" and "mystical" are two necessarily opposing means to the ultimately real in early Buddhism must, in our opinion, be challenged.

One of the most important suttas in the Nikāyas illustrating the relationship between what La Vallée Poussin has termed the rational and mystical approaches to nibbāna and what we have discussed in terms of viññāṇa and paññā is the Mahavedalla-sutta in the Majjhima Nikāya. There, in a dialogue between the venerable Sāriputta and Koṭṭhita the Great, the meaning of the relationship between "intuitive wisdom" (paññā) and "discriminating consciousness" (viññāṇa) is discussed. A person is said to be "intuitively wise" when he comprehends (pajānāti) dukkha, dukkha-samudaya, dukkhanirodha and dukkhanirodhagāminī, or, in other words, the four noble truths.² Discriminating consciousness is so called because it discriminates (vijānāti) pleasure and pain (sukha..dukkha) and what is not pleasure and pain (asukha..adukkha).³ Having so described the natures of paññā and viññāṇa, Koṭṭhita asks

¹Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Musīla Et Nārada: Le Chemin Du Nirvāṇa," Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques V (Juillet, 1937), 189-190.

²Majjhima Nikāya, I, 292.

³Ibid.

Sāriputta if the two are associated or dissociated, a question to which Sāriputta replies, "That which is intuitive wisdom, your reverence, and that which is discriminative consciousness, these states are associated, not dissociated ("saṃsaṭṭha no visamsaṭṭha"), and it is not possible to lay down a difference between these states having analyzed them again and again ("vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā").¹ "Whatever one comprehends... that one discriminates; whatever one discriminates that one comprehends..." ("yaṃ... pajānāti taṃ vijānāti, yaṃ vijānāti taṃ pajānāti").² Accepting the proposition that viññāṇa and paññā are associated Koṭṭhita then asks in what way they differ. To this question Sāriputta replies that paññā is to be developed (bhāvetabba) whereas viññāṇa is "for apprehending" (pariññeyya).³ Perhaps this reply is another way of saying what Professor Jayatilleke points out, namely, that viññāṇa seems to apply to "cognition" in general whereas paññā applies more specifically to the understanding and development of "spiritual truths."⁴

This dialogue serves to illustrate the important relationship between viññāṇa and paññā. Let us summarize what has appeared to be at least a recognizable position on this question in the Nikāyas. Both viññāṇa and paññā can be understood as consciousness, the former the consciousness apropos the

¹Ibid. The Middle Length Sayings, I, 351.

²Majjhima Nikāya, I, 292.

³Ibid., 293.

⁴Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 435.

phenomenal and the latter apropos the noumenal. Viññāṇa as empirical consciousness has an innate tendency to become attached to "things" and, hence, to lose its freedom. In fact, viññāṇa cannot be conceived except in terms of sensory spheres, i.e., consciousness, sense organs and sense objects. Within itself, however, viññāṇa has the power to rise above mere sensation or sensory perception. By inductive means it can recognize the impermanence and essencelessness of the phenomenal world. A higher reality, however, can only be inferred. Viññāṇa cannot know the ultimate reality itself precisely because this reality transcends the senses to which viññāṇa is bound. It is at this point that paññā enters, for, whereas viññāṇa might recognize the dualities of phenomenal reality (e.g., pleasure and pain), it can neither know the implications of these dualities from the perspective of the ultimate nor can it know the ultimate reality directly. Paññā, as we have suggested, fulfills both of these functions. That is, paññā as the noumenal consciousness has both a transcendental insight (vipassanā) into the nature of the phenomenal world, as well as a direct vision (dassana) of ultimate reality. Paññā, therefore, represents above all else the freeing of the mind or consciousness (citto-mano-viññāṇa-vimutti) to an unlimited realization, the undesigned totality (suffāṭā) which the "ground of being" represents in all religious traditions.

Having developed such a seemingly definitive position, we must quickly make an important qualification. The Pāli Nikāyas

do not present a consistent view of either *viññāṇa* or *paññā*. We have, within the limitations of our analysis, imposed a schematization on the *Nikāyas* that they, themselves, do not present. To some degree, therefore, the focus of this study has undoubtedly distorted the "raw content" of these early Buddhist texts. In defense of this analysis, however, two points must be made: (1) there is support for the general position taken both within the *Nikāyas* as well as by scholars of Buddhism, and (2) our primary purpose has not been to exposit the content of early Buddhist texts, but to arrive at a certain typology or categorization to help us understand the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in early Buddhism.

THE CONTROL OF CONSCIOUSNESS


Having used *viññāṇa* and *paññā* as types to discuss the nature and function of knowledge in early Buddhism, it is now imperative to examine the context in which the soteriological aspects of knowledge become most important. This context is the act of meditation and the control of consciousness. Meditation in the broadest sense of mental training is of central importance to the entire Indian religious tradition. Anesaki and Takakusu, for example, state that meditation is "...the universal method of mental culture of all Indian religious schools."¹ In Buddhism in particular meditation has always played an important role. Thus Edward Conze writes that "...meditational practices constitute the very core of the Buddhist approach to life...On the way to Nirvāṇa they serve to promote spiritual development, to diminish the impact of suffering, to calm the mind and to reveal the true facts of existence."² Because of the centrality of meditation in the Buddhist tradition it is possible to state that not only is knowledge essentially meaningful only in terms of the highest goal, nibbāna, but only when it is part of the more immediate end of the control of the conscious mind as well. Almost in one and the same breath therefore, to attain to nibbāna is to be in control of all con-

¹M. Anesaki and J. Takakusu, "Dhyana," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James A. Hastings, IV (1912), 702.

²Edward Conze, Buddhist Meditation (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), p. 11.

scious states as well as to have achieved the knowledge of the ultimately real.

The process of meditation in early Buddhism may be schematized as follows:



This chart points up the parallel development of the attainment of higher levels of knowledge and greater control of the conscious mind through meditation until finally there is a realization of the identity of the "objectless inwardness" of the consciousness and the "unsubstantial emptiness" of the ultimately real. We have already discussed the right-hand side of the chart in our study of knowledge in early Buddhism. The left-hand side remains to be examined. Our study will be organized around the terms cited in descending order--sati, samādhi, jhāna, upekkhā and finally sambodha or ultimate enlightenment which represents the synthesis of the two sides of the chart.

¹Adapted from Conze, Buddhist Meditation, p. 16.

SATI AND MINDFULNESS

The process of meditation and the control of consciousness begins with sati and sampajañña, two practically inseparable terms in the Pāli canon.¹ They are widely discussed in the Piṭakas and later commentaries, and according to a recent observer one of the suttas devoted entirely to an exposition of sati and sampajañña is among the most highly respected and frequently memorized Buddhist texts in Ceylon.² The Pāli word, sati, is derivative from the Sanskrit, smṛti, meaning remembered or recollected. In Hinduism the word has come to stand for a body of "remembered" literature (e.g., the Epics, Sūtras, Purāṇas) in contrast to "revealed" or śruti texts (e.g., Samhitas, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads). The term in Pāli has taken on not only the connotation of something called to mind or remembered but mindfulness, intentness of mind, or wakefulness.³ Nyanaponika interprets sati as "bare attention" and sampajañña as "clear comprehension."⁴ Sati as bare atten-

¹The meaning of sati and sampajañña came to be nearly synonymous. Sampajañña is formed from the verb pa-jānāti / sam meaning to come to know altogether, hence, to discriminate and comprehend.

²The Foundations of Mindfulness (Satipatthana Sutta) trans. Nyanasatta Thera ("The Wheel," Vol. II; Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1960), 3.

³Rhys Davids and Stede (eds.), The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 672.

⁴Thera Nyanaponika, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation (London: Rider & Co., 1962), p. 30.

tion has a threefold value of helping the mind to know, shape and liberate itself, Nyanaponika writes.¹ Its knowing function is to analyze the objects of existence through dissection and discrimination and realize the conditioned and conditioning nature of all phenomenal entities. Sati shapes individual's lives by causing reflective action rather than immediate responses. Thus the mind gains a new power and a new freedom from control by habitual action-response. As Nyanaponika expresses it, "Right Mindfulness recovers for man the lost pearl of his freedom snatching it from the jaws of the ~~dragon~~ Time."² The third value of sati is the freeing of the mind. Paradoxically the control of attention and reflection rather than confining the mind liberates it, for it is sati that produces the insight (vipassanā) into the true nature of things. This realization leads to detachment from ordinary bondage to the objects and goals of the phenomenal world.

Sati or bare attention is a discipline of the consciousness more apropos the act of meditation itself. Sampajañña can be understood as the integration of sati with right knowledge (ñāṇa) or wisdom (paññā). By way of a summary overview the the Buddhist commentaries on the Piṭakas distinguish four kinds of sampajañña: (1) clear comprehension of purpose (sāttthaka-sampajañña, (2) clear comprehension of suitability (sāppaya-sampajañña), (3) clear comprehension of the domain of medita-

¹Ibid., p. 34.

²Ibid., p. 41.

tion (gocara-sampajañña), (4) clear comprehension of reality or non-delusion (asammoha-sampajañña).¹ The first two types of sampajañña have a particular application to intentionality and action. One's intention or purpose is concentrated under the leadership of mind, and action is adapted both to external circumstances as well as to the nature of the given individual. The third sampajañña refers to the fact that the fruits of meditation are to be borne in the activities of daily life. Thus the purpose of meditation is to affect not merely a circumscribed spectrum of life, but rather life in its totality. The last mode of sampajañña is the continual acknowledgement that at no time is there an abiding personality or ego behind one's thoughts or actions. This fundamental realization about the nature of being is not limited to a serene moment of detached and quiet meditation but affects every act and every thought of the individual.

Within the Nikāyas there are three suttas devoted entirely to a discussion of sati and sampajañña: the Mahā-satipaṭṭhāna-suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya, the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya and the forty-seventh chapter of the Samyutta Nikāya ("Kindred Sayings on the Arisings of Mindfulness"). The first sutta in particular will serve as our guide for a more detailed exposition of sati.

The Mahā-satipaṭṭhāna-suttanta is nearly identical with the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya with the exception of

¹Ibid., p. 46f.

an exposition of the four noble truths at its conclusion. We are told at the beginning of this dialogue that the only path (magga) leading to the purification of beings ("sattanam visuddhiya"), of passing beyond grief and lamentation ("sahapariḍdevanam"), of the dying out of suffering and misery ("dukkha-somanasanam") and the realization of nibbāna is the fourfold setting up of mindfulness ("cattaro satipaṭṭhana").¹ In order to come to grips with the full dimension of sati these four stages of mindfulness must be analyzed.

In the first place mindfulness demands a control of the body (kāya) which overcomes the desire and misery ("abhiḍjha-domanassam") typical of the world (loka).² This end is accomplished by practices of meditation and concentration. The bhikkhu is to isolate himself, assume a posture of meditation and practice breathing exercises with a total consciousness of every act so that the bodily organism will be tranquillized ("kāya-saṁkara passambhayaṁ").³

Mindfulness of the body begins, then, with breathing exercises described as follows:

Mindful let him inhale, mindful let him exhale. Whether he inhale a long breath, let him be conscious thereof; or whether he exhale a long breath, let him be conscious thereof. Whether he inhale a short breath, or exhale a short breath, let him be conscious thereof. Let him practise with the thought 'Conscious of my whole body I will inhale';

¹Dīgha Nikāya, II, 290.

²Dīgha Nikāya, II, 291.

³Ibid.

let him practise with the thought 'Conscious of my whole body will I exhale.' Let him practise with the thought 'I will inhale tranquillizing my bodily organism'; let him practise with the thought 'I will exhale tranquillizing my bodily organism.'¹

The Buddhist concern with breath represents a continuity with earlier Indian thought. In the late Rig Veda and the Brāhmaṇas breath was one of the objects of cosmogonic speculation, the life force through which it was thought the world might have come into being.² Breathing exercises (prāṇayāma) also played an important role in Hindu haṭha yoga. There the practice was eventually to arrest (viccheda) the movement of inhalation and exhalation. The purpose of breath control in yoga, however, was not merely to gain power over respiratory functions but access to higher states of consciousness. Thus Bhoja's commentary on the Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali reads: 'All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of respiration --there being always a connection between respiration and consciousness in their respective functions--respiration, when all the functions of the organs are suspended, realizes concentration of consciousness on a single object.'³

Breathing exercises as the initiation of sati seem to have a dual function not unlike that in the practice of haṭha

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 328.

²For example, see Rig Veda 10:129.

³Quoted in Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 55.

yoga, namely, to engender control over the body but also to produce an awareness of the real nature of the body. As Nyanaponika puts it the mindfulness of breathing is both a subject for "tranquillity-meditation" (*samatha-bhāvanā*) as well as an act used for the development of insight (*vipassanā-bhāvanā*).¹

Following the initiation of mindfulness through breathing exercises the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhana-suttanta* moves to contemplation of various aspects of the body and its functions. They are in brief: 1) mindfulness of bodily postures, 2) contemplation of the parts of the body, 3) reflection on the constituent elements of the body, and 4) the so-called "cemetery contemplations." Turning first to the mindfulness of bodily postures the bhikkhu is enjoined to contemplate (*anupassanā*) the body (*kāya*) internally (*ajjhata*) and externally (*bahiddhā*) as something that comes into being (*samudaya*) and passes away again (*vaya*).² Furthermore, such contemplation should accompany every act so that "...when (the bhikkhu) is walking (he) is aware of it thus:--'I walk'; or when he is standing, or sitting, or lying down, he is aware of it."³ The purpose of the mindfulness of the bodily postures is to gain the knowledge (*ñāṇa*) that he dwells independent (*anissito viharati*)

¹Nyanaponika, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, p. 65.

²Dīgha Nikāya, II, 292.

³The Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 329.

grasping after nothing in the world ("kicci loke upādiyati").¹ The sati of bodily postures, therefore, should produce a total self-awareness in the adept such that--"In going, standing, sitting, sleeping, watching, talking or keeping silence he knows (sampajāna) what he is doing."² This total self-knowledge is directed toward two ends: 1) an acknowledgement of the impermanence of the body (its arising and decay), and, 2) an independence (anissito) from any attachment to the phenomenal world.

The contemplation of the parts of the body is ~~an~~ extension of mindfulness regarding the body and its functions. It begins with an enumeration of various physical organs and bodily products ranging from hair to the heart to urine. This description of the body and its parts is likened to a bag filled with various kinds of grain which can be separated out and identified."...And a keen-eyed man ... reflects as he pour(s) them out:--'that's rice, that's paddy, those are beans,' and so forth. Even so, bhikkhus, does a brother reflect on the body from the soles of the feet below upward to the crown of the head, as something enclosed in skin and full of divers impurities (asucine)."³

Reflection on the parts of the body becomes even more

¹Dīgha Nikāya, II, 292.

²"Gate thite nisinne sutte jāgarite bhāsīte tuṇhi-bhāve sampajāna-kārī hoti." Dīgha Nikāya II, 292.

³The Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 330.

analytical, however. From physical parts, the bhikkhu moves his attention to the fundamental bases (dhātu) or constituent parts from which the body is composed. In the Theravāda scheme of things these basic elements are four--earth (paṭhavi), water (āpo), heat (tejo) and air (vāyo). Mindfulness of the fact that the body is composed of these elements is likened to the butcher who when he has slain an ox displays the carcass piece by piece.¹ There appears to be a two-fold purpose behind the development of mindfulness regarding the various parts and constituent elements of the body: 1) the knowledge that there is no abiding ego in the body but only those parts that can be observed and inferred from this observation; and, 2) the essentially "vile" and impermanent nature of the body.

This second purpose is even carried to greater extremes in the fourth aspect of the mindfulness of the body, the cemetery contemplations. Here the bhikkhu is enjoined to contemplate his own body as though it were undergoing ever increasing degrees of decomposition after death. Thus initially he contemplates a body abandoned in a grave yard which is swollen and turning black and blue; then a body which has been partially eaten by wild animals; and finally a body which has been reduced to a mere heap of bones.² All of these contemplations serve as not overly gentle reminders that the body is something

¹Ibid., p. 331.

²Dīgha Nikāya, II, 294-97.

that comes into being but passes away again.¹

The second stage of mindfulness is to arrive at the same degree of awareness of the true nature of the feelings (vedanā) as was developed of the body. The bhikkhu must be able to distinguish among feelings that are pleasurable (sukha), painful (dukkha) or neutral (adukkha-sukha) as well as feelings concerning either spiritual (sāmisa) or material (nirāmisa) things.² All of these types of vedanā are subject to arising and dying away just as is the body; hence, they are transient, ephemeral. The mindfulness of the feelings just as mindfulness regarding the body produces a detachment, an independence from the things of this world.

After subjecting the body (kāya) and the feelings (vedanā) to the kind of objective scrutiny that leads to an understanding of their true nature, the bhikkhu developing sati turns his attention to citta "...the ever-changing, ever-active continu-

¹The preoccupation of early Buddhism with death offers some very interesting possibilities of interpretation other than the rather obvious one given in the text. It might, for instance, be an outgrowth of archaic shamanistic practices, for the shaman is one who above all else is qualified by a knowledge of death. On this point see Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), p. 509f. On the other hand, in the dialectic between the sacred and the profane, death plays a very important role. For example, as Van Gennep and others point out, rites of initiation marking a passage from a "profane" state to a "sacred" state are not infrequently signaled by a symbolic recreation of death on the part of the initiate. Arnold Van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 75f.

²Dīgha Nikāya, II, 298.

ance of consciousness, or re-acting intelligence"¹ and also to dhamma, the ideas, cognizable objects or presentations beyond the stage of mere sensory re-action.² Regarding the citta or conscious thinking process the bhikkhu must become aware of its various modes whether it is lustful, dull, intelligent, attentive, or distraught. That this awareness or knowledge of the states of the mind is for the purpose of control is well illustrated by the following passage from the Vitakkasanthāna-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya:

...if while the monk is attending to the ~~thought~~ function and form of those thoughts, there still arise evil unskilled thoughts associated with desire and associated with aversion and associated with confusion...that monk, his teeth clenched, his tongue pressed against his palate, should by his mind subdue, restrain and dominate his mind (citta).³

Through sati directed toward the mind, therefore, the bhikkhu is enabled to both understand and subdue or control the mind or consciousness (citta). It is recognized that citta as well as kāya and vedanā comes into being but then passes away.⁴

Regarding the dhamma, the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-suttanta specifically mentions five groups: (1) the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa), (2) the five groups (khandha), (3) the five spheres

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 325.

²Ibid.

³The Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikāya) I, trans. I. B. Horner ("Pali Text Society," Vol. XXIX; London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1954), 155.

⁴Dīgha Nikāya, II, 299.

of sense (āyatana), (4) the seven factors of enlightenment (sattasu bojjhangesu); and, (5) the four ariyan truths (catusu ariya-saccesu). All of these groups of dhamma are to be reflected upon with the same scrutiny as kāya vedanā and citta with the intent purpose of leading the bhikkhu to an independence where he grasps after nothing in the world. For example, regarding the nīvaraṇa of sensuous desire (kāma) the bhikkhu reflects:

'I have within me sensuous desire' (kāma). Or again, when within him is no sensuous desire, he is aware of this. And he knows of the uprising of such desire unfelt before, knows too of his putting aside that uprisen sensuous desire, knows too of the non-arising in future of that banished sensuous desire.¹

He is similarly mindful of the arising (uppādo) and the falling away (anuppādo) of the four other nīvaraṇa of malevolence (vyapada), stolidity and slothfulness (thīna-middha), excitement and misdeeds (uddhacca-kukkucca) and wavering or doubt (vicikicchā).²

Directing his attention toward the five khandhas, the bhikkhu considers individually their arising and passing away until in a state of non-grasping he attains to mindfulness. Contemplating the six āyatanas or the internal and external spheres of sense, the bhikkhu is made aware that any fetters (bandhana) that bind him to the world are a result of the coming together of the organs of sense and the objects of sense.

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, II. 334.

²For an exposition of the nīvaraṇas, see page 179.

By his analysis he becomes aware of the arising and the putting aside of all fetters. Of the seven factors of enlightenment¹ the bhikkhu must grow aware "...if they are subjectively present, or absent, and he is aware of how there comes an uprising of any factor not hitherto arisen and of how there comes a full development of such factors when it has arisen."² Finally the Mahāsatipatṭhana-suttanta expounds the four ariyan truths which must also be considered in terms of the same pattern of their arising and passing away.

What in brief is the purpose of sati-sampajañña? In general terms it can be said that mindfulness produces a profound self-awareness. More specifically, however, it is intended to produce a detachment from the world of sense (i.e., the profane) through the realization of its fundamental impermanence. As expressed by Nyanaponika, the purpose of sati is a theoretical and practical means for the "...realization of that liberating truth of anattā, having the two aspects of egolessness and voidness of substance."³ The Mahāsatipatṭhāna provides a "visible demonstration" and "immediate visualization" of sati which "...imparts life transforming and life-transcending power."⁴

¹For an exposition of the seven factors of enlightenment, see page 201.

²The Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 336.

³Nyanaponika, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, p. 75.

⁴Ibid.

SAMĀDHI AND ONEPOINTEDNESS

Samādhi represents a greater degree of control over the mind or consciousness (citta, viññāṇa) than sati. As the word itself (sam / a / dhā) denotes samādhi is a bringing together, a concentration of the mind in contrast to the more general practice of mindfulness (sati). As was pointed out in chapter two samādhi in the Theravāda tradition is taken to be one of the major divisions of the Buddhist path to salvation along with sīla and paññā. Before examining samādhi in the tradition of the Nikāyas, however, we shall note its use in the Upaniṣads and the Gītā.

The word, samādhi, occurs in thirteen passages in the Upaniṣads but only two of these occurrences are in one of the principal Upaniṣads.¹ Both of these are found in the sixth chapter of the Maitrī, a chapter clearly influenced by yogic thought. Samādhi appears in 6:18 as the last in the list of six-fold yoga: control of breath (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of senses (pratyāhāra), meditation (dhyāna), concentration (dhāraṇa), inquiry (tarka), and concentration (samādhi). The sage who practices this yogic discipline culminating in samādhi transcends the distinction between good and evil (puṇya-pāpa) and attains oneness with the ultimate or Brahman. Furthermore,

¹G. A. Jacob, A Concordance to the Principal Upanishads and Bhagavad-Gita (Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass, 1963), p. 974. In his introduction to the Subha-sutta, T. W. Rhys Davids notes in The Dialogues of the Buddha, p. 265, that Samādhi has not been found in any Indian book older than the Pāli Piṭakas, and that samādhi as the concentration of the mind must be distinguished from jhāna, the older pre-Buddhist term which points to a state of self-induced ecstasy.

one who has attained to this ultimate is a knower (vidvān) who has restrained (niyāma) his mind (manas) and is void of mental constructions or conceptions (niḥsaṃkalpa).¹ In Maitrī 6:34 samādhi has the causative force of cleansing the ceto or mind of the impurity of desire (kāma) and, hence, leads to happiness (sukha), knowledge (jñāna) and liberation (mokṣa).

In the Gītā two occurrences of samādhi and one of samādhista are found.² All three are located in the second chapter called the discipline of reason (sāṃkhya-yoga). Samādhi is said to be antithetical to one who has the nature of desire (kāma), who aims at the goals of pleasure (bhoga) and the attaining of power (īśvara-gati). The person who is fixed in concentration (samādhista) is one who has abandoned desires ("prajahāti kāmān"), his mind is unperturbed by sorrows ("duḥkheṣv anudvignamanāḥ"); he has no desire for joy ("sukheṣu vigatasprhaḥ"); he is no longer subject to longing, fear or anger ("vītarāgabhaya-krodhaḥ"); his senses are withdrawn from the objects of sense ("indriyāṇi samharate indriyārthebhyas"); and his knowledge is stabilized (sthitaprajña).³

On the basis of these references in the Upaniṣads and Gītā we may conclude that samādhi reflects the influence of the proto forms of sāṃkhya and yoga; that it is antithetical

¹Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 831.

²Jacob, A Concordance...., p. 974.

³The Bhagavad-Gītā 2:53-58. The Bhagavad Gītā, trans. S. Radhakrishnan, pp. 122-124.

to those desires (kāma) conducive of attachment to the world of phenomena; that it is essential to the withdrawal of the senses from the objects of sense; that it is necessary to the control of the mind (manas); and that it cleanses the blemishes from the processes of consciousness. Particularly on the basis of Maitrī 6:19 it is suggested that samādhi is not only essential to the control of the senses and therefore the management of sensory knowledge (e.g., perception), but that it is necessary to the in-forming of the conceptual process (samkalpa) as well.

Turning to early Buddhism the important relationship between samādhi as the process whereby one concentrates his thoughts and controls his consciousness and sīla or the ethical and moral behavior of the religious man has already been indicated in the second chapter. The purpose of the present consideration of samādhi is to study its specific implications for the higher goals of the salvation-quest.

In the Subha-sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya the young brahmin, Subha, asks Ananda to expound the doctrine regarding samādhi. The resulting answer includes elements which overlap with other categories of this chapter, but several points are made which will serve as a basis for our understanding of samādhi.

In the first place the sutta affirms that one practices samādhi by guarding the doors of the senses ("indriyesu gutta-dvāro").¹ This particular practice is described as follows:

¹Dīgha-Nikāya, I, 207, also 70.

when the bhikkhu sees an object ("rūpan") with his eye ("cakkhunā") he is not grasped ("gāhī") either by its general appearance ("nimitta") or by its details ("anuvañjana"); he restrains whatever factor might cause the arising of evil elemental reactions ("akusalā dhammā"); so restraining his sense of sight ("cakkhundriyam") he attains mastery over his sense of sight ("cakkhundriye samvaram apajjati").² In a similar fashion he controls his other sense organs: "...when he hears a sound with his ear, or smells an odor with his nose or tastes a flavor with his tongue or feels a touch with his body, or cognizes ("viññāya") a phenomenon ("dhammam") with his mind ("manasa") he is not grasped either by the general appearance or the details of it."³ By so restraining all of his senses, including the manas or conscious mind, he experiences an unblemished happiness (avyaseka sukha). Having so restrained and guarded all the sense organs so that no element (dhamma) of the phenomenal world may claim him, the bhikkhu is now mindful (sati) and with clear comprehension (sampajañña). As described in the Subha-sutta, therefore, samādhi begins when the senses are no longer subject to the rule of the objects of sense.

In the Cūḷa-vedalla-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the layman Visakha asks the nun, Dhammadinnā, "Katamo pan'ayye samādhi, katame samādhinimittā

¹Gāhī is the imperative present ganhati.

²Dīgha-Nikāya I, 207, also 70.

³Ibid.

katame samādhiparikkhārā, katamā samādhibhāvanā"¹--"What is concentration, what are the distinguishing marks of concentration, what are the requisites for concentration, what is the development of concentration?"² To this question the wise nun replies that samādhi is one pointedness of mind (cittassa ekaggatā), its marks the four objects of mindfulness ("cat-tāro satipaṭṭhānā"), its requisites the four right efforts ("cattaro sammappadhānā") and that whatever leads to the increase of these is, in effect, the development of concentration.³ This passage illustrates the close relationship between sati and samādhi. That is, samādhi appears to presuppose the four objects of mindfulness. Samādhi, however, goes beyond the awareness of impermanence and sensory detachment produced by sati. It is refinement of the control of the consciousness, a concentration of the mind to a single point thereby eliminating all extraneous thoughts. Buddhaghosa in applying the definition, "cittassa ekaggatā" to samādhi goes on to elaborate it as follows: "(samādhi) is the centering (ādhāra) of the consciousness and consciousness-concomitants evenly (samaṁ) and rightly (samma) on a single object."⁴ The man of concen-

¹Majjhima Nikāya I, eds. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, C. A. F. Rhys Davids ("Pali Text Society;" London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1948), 301.

²The Middle Length Sayings, I, 363.

³Majjhima Nikāya, I, 301.

⁴Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli (Colombo: R. Semage, 1956), p. 85.

trated (samādhi) and one-pointed (ekaggata) mind, therefore, stands in stark contrast to the "profane" man who is "empty-headed, frivolous and loose in talk."¹

The Cūḷa-vedalla-sutta's exposition of samādhi also says that the requisites of concentration are the four right efforts. The four right efforts are described in various parts of the Nikāyas as follows: checking the rise of evil and wrong states of consciousness not yet arisen; shedding evil and wrong states which have already arisen; encouraging the rise of right states not yet arisen; ensuring that right states which are already there shall be multiplied and developed.² The four right efforts frequently mentioned as one of the "formula truths" reported to have been perceived by the Buddha and passed on to his disciples.³ While this formula does indeed point to a relationship between samādhi and the production and retention of right constituent states of conscious being, it raises the broader issue of the place of samādhi in a variety of conceptual structures illustrative of an enlightened state of mind. For instance all of the five iddhipādas, the paths to the attainment of supra-normal powers,

¹The Book of Gradual Sayings, I, 66.

²Majjhima Nikāya, II, 11. "Anuppannānaṃ, pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ anuppādaya; uppannānaṃ phāṇāya; anuppannānaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ uppādaya; uppannānaṃ thitīya"

³For example, see Dīgha Nikāya, II, 120.

are dependent on samādhi.¹ The five forces (indriyāni) or "organs of spiritual sense" include samādhi which is described by one Buddhist scholar as "the dominant faculty, which brings about concentration of thoughts and makes the adept rise higher and higher in meditations."² Samādhi is also the sixth of the seven factors leading to enlightenment,³ and it has already been pointed out that samādhi is one of the three major divisions of the noble eightfold path. On the basis of the crucial role played by samādhi in the formulae cited, it appears to be the case that the concentration of mind is a necessary step to the attainment of a higher truth and the concomitant powers accompanying it. The Buddhist adept, therefore, who begins his religious quest with a general awareness of the nature of the self and reality must move beyond the state of objective detachment produced by this mindfulness. He must progress to a unity of concentration which eliminates the flow of sensory material into his conscious mind. Only by such a concentrated effort will he be able to rise to higher forms of apperception, to a mystic intuition of a reality

¹The five iddhipāda are resolution (chanda), effort (viriya), consciousness (citta), and investigation (vimamsa). Dīgha Nikāya, III, 77.

²Dutt, N., Early Monastic Buddhism, p. 248.

³The seven factors or limbs of enlightenment (sambojjhaṅga) are: sati, dhammavicaya, viriya, pīti, passaddhi, samādhi and upekkhā.

veiled to ordinary perception.¹

JHĀNA, STAGES TO THE ULTIMATE

Buddhist meditation progresses from samādhi to jhāna, or from concentration and one-pointedness to the gradual expansion and freeing of the consciousness from its attachment to sensory realities. Jhāna is the Pāli equivalent of the Sanskrit term, dhyāna, from the verb dhyāyati meaning to think of, imagine, contemplate, call to mind, meditate on.² The word occurs in over thirty passages in the Upaniṣads in both earlier and later texts.³ A passage of great interest in one of the early prose Upaniṣads is Chāndogya 7:6 in which the earth ("pṛthivī"), atmosphere ("antarikṣam"), sky ("dyauh"), waters ("āpaḥ"), mountains ("parvatāḥ"), gods and men ("deva-manuṣyāḥ") all are said to meditate ("dhyāyanti"). Those among men who would attain greatness practice meditation ("tasmād ya iha manuṣyanam mahattvam prāpnuvanti dhyānāpādāmsā ivaiva te bhavanti"); and, in typical Upaniṣadic fashion dhyāna is equated with Brahman, ultimate reality and goal of the salvation quest in Upaniṣadic thought.⁴ So important is dhyāna in this early Upaniṣad that

¹The process of mental training became greatly elaborated in the scholastic or abhidhamma period of Theravāda Buddhism. Nalinaksha Dutt provides an excellent discussion of the various forms of samādhi as represented in particular by the Visuddhimagga in chapter 7 of Early Monastic Buddhism.

²Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 521.

³Jacob, A Concordance..., pp. 472-473.

⁴Chāndogya 7:6.

it is to be meditated upon (upāssveti) as an ontological principle leading one to the universal soul.¹

In the later Maitrī Upaniṣad dhyāna is mentioned as part of the six-fold yoga: restraint of the breath (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of the senses (pratyāhāra), meditation (dhyāna), concentration (dhāraṇā), contemplation (tarka) and absorption (samādhi).² In this instance dhyāna is seen specifically as part of the means whereby one attains to knowledge of the unity of all things in the "Supreme Imperishable" or Brahman. In the examples from both the Chāndogya and the Maitrī, dhyāna is a stage on the way to ultimate reality (brahman) although it functions in the first case ontologically and in the second as a psycho-physical means to the attainment of a heightened consciousness of the unity of all things in Brahman.

In the Gītā dhyāna also appears as a step or stage of the path to a higher goal. In Gītā 12:12, for example, dhyāna is said to be superior to merely discipline (abhyāsas) of knowledge (jñāna); however, beyond dhyāna is abandonment of the fruits of action ("dhyānat karmaphala-tyāgas").³ In 13:24 dhyāna appears to be one of the means whereby one attains insight into the self ("dhyānenā tamani paśyanti"). Other means, however, are the discipline of reason ("sāṅkhyena yogena") and

¹Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 250.

²Maitrī 6:8.

³The Bhagavad Gītā, trans. S. Radhakrishnan, p. 296.

the discipline of action ("karmayoga").¹

On the basis of the evidence cited as illustrative of the milieu in which Buddhism developed it appears to be the case that dhyāna was considered essential to the path to salvation and that it was thought of in at least three ways: as an ontological principle pointing to the unity of all things in Brahman (e.g., the entire cosmos meditates); a stage on the path to the realization of ultimate reality; and finally, one of several paths one might choose to attain the ultimate. It is the second notion of dhyāna which was to be of particular importance in early Buddhism.

As scholars of early Buddhism point out the term, jhāna, is frequently found in the Theravāda suttas as a fourfold formula called, 'first, second, third and fourth jhāna.'² By carefully analyzing this formula and the contexts in which it occurs the significance of jhāna in relationship to the control of consciousness and saving-knowledge will become clear.

In the Brahmajāla-sutta a discussion of the four jhānas occurs within the context of the question, "How may the self or soul (atta) attain to the highest nibbāna in this visible world?"³ It is in answer to this question that an explication

¹ Ibid., p. 310. According to Jacob these are the only two occurrences of dhyāna in the Gītā, A Concordance..., p. 473.

² For example, see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1936), p. 332f.

³ The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 50.

of the four jhānas is set forth.

In this sutta it is accepted as an apriori condition of phenomenal existence that the atta or self is subject to kāma or sensuous desires.¹ It is also the case that kāma or sensuous desires are characterized by impermanence (anicca). Phenomenal existence, therefore, necessarily involves suffering since sensory pleasures are constantly subject to change. The only way one can hope to achieve happiness and joy (pīti-sukha) is by cutting off kāma. In the first jhāna (paṭhamajjhāna) this state is accomplished by detachment (viveka)² accompanied by reflection and investigation (vitaka-vicāra). In order to understand this jhāna these three terms must be studied in some detail.

The term, viveka, has a three-fold significance: a physical separation from the world in the sense of 'seclusion'; an intellectual separation in the sense of 'discrimination'; and an ethical separation in the sense of the mind (citta) 'being separate from the world.'³ For instance, in the Mahā-saṃnāṭa-sutta the Buddha tells Ānanda that a bhikkhu who delights in fellowship cannot enjoy well-being or emancipation of mind (cetovimutti) but that such happiness (sukha) demands renunciation (nekkhamma), solitude (paviveka), and enlightenment (sam-

¹In contrast to the nature of the self (ātman) in the Upaniṣads.

²From the root, vic / vi.

³The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 84, (see footnote).

bodha).¹ The Buddha claims that as a Tathāgatha he has reached such a state of isolation (viveka) by dismissing thoughts of all attendant phenomena (sabbanimitta) and by developing and dwelling in a state of emptiness (suññatā).² The Sutta goes on to say that a bhikkhu who likewise desires to develop and dwell in inward emptiness ("ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ upasampajja vihareyyan") should calm, tranquillize, focus and concentrate his mind inwardly ("...ajjhattaṃ...cittam saṅṭhapetabbaṃ sannisādetabbaṃ ekodikātabbaṃ samādahātabbaṃ").³ This sutta clearly indicates that viveka implies both a physical separation from the delights of ordinary worldly intercourse as well as an isolation of the mind (citta). It is interesting to note that the resultant separation is described as a condition of inward emptiness (suññatā) since in the later Mādhyamika tradition the perspective on this important term will shift from a psycho-physical emphasis to an ontological one.

In the Naḷakapāna-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya viveka is described more in terms of separation from sensuous desires (kāma) and from the evil constituents of being (akusala dhamma). This separation is said to result in the attainment of joy and happiness (pīṭisukha). The Tathāgata who has reached such a state has overcome those attachments to the profane

¹ Majjhima Nikāya, III, 110.

² "Ayam kho pan'...vihāro Tathāgatena abhisambuddho, yadidaṃ sabbanimittānaṃ amanasikārā ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ upasampajja viharitum." Majjhima Nikāya, III, 111.

³ Majjhima Nikāya, III, 111.

world known as the āsavas which produce the suffering (dukkha) of "birth, old age and death" (jātijarāmarāṇa).¹ Viveka, then, means a detachment from the world of sense with its accompanying desires and kammic resultants of rebirth.

The terms vitakka² and vicāra should be taken together. In fact T. W. Rhys Davids contends that by examining the use of these two words in earlier and later works one concludes that they once had synonymous meanings.³ They came to have slightly different intentions, however, with vitakka referring in particular to initial thought or observation and vicāra denoting continuing or sustained investigation and reflection. Together they are used to indicate "...the whole of the mental process of thinking."⁴

In the Upakkilesa-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya both vitakka and vicāra are related to concentration (samādhi). The Buddha is recorded as saying that by developing samādhi in several modes beginning with vitakka and vicāra he gained the knowledge (ñāṇa) and the vision (dassana) that his final liberation (vimutti) was assured. Vitakka and vicāra, therefore,

¹Ibid., I. 464.

²The term, vi-takka, is especially interesting in that it is derived from the Sanskrit, tarka, meaning conjecture, reasoning, speculation, etc., and came to be applied to any philosophical system or doctrine founded on speculation or reasoning. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 439.

³Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede (eds.), The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 620.

⁴Ibid.

are important to the concentration (samādhi) of one's thoughts and act as one of the first steps toward the attainment of the apperception (dassana) of ultimate reality. They share with viveka the characteristics of directing the individual away from mere sensory reality. Thus in the Dasuttara-suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya the eight thoughts (vitakka) of the "great-man" (mahāpurisa) include the limitation of desires, detachment, and mental concentration.¹ As we shall see, however, vitakka can become dangerous. As the Sakka-pañha-suttanta of the Dīgha points out vitakka, rather than a means by which attachment is overcome, can become a mental preoccupation which causes desire (chanda)² the root of the profane or the world of "things."³

In sum the first jhāna is primarily a condition of detachment. It involves a physical, intellectual and ethical separation from the phenomenal world. An important phase of the development of the concentration necessary to acquire the first jhāna is careful thought and analysis of one's self and the surrounding world.

The second jhāna is achieved when observation and investigation (vitakka and vicāra) are suppressed. In this stage these two mental functions are said to be olārika or "gross,"

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, III, 261.

²In this particular case, chanda or excitement is nearly identical in meaning with taphā, thirst or craving.

³Dīgha Nikāya, II, 277. The Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 311.

implying that they are necessarily involved in the empirical world. The second jhāna is characterized by joy and happiness (pīti-sukha), but rather than being born of viveka or detachment, it is the result of samādhi ("samādhijam"), translated by Rhys Davids in this passage as "serenity."¹ This state is further characterized by a tranquil inner nature ("ajjhataṃ sampasādanam") and a concentrated mind or heart ("cetaso ekodibhavam").²

Just as the first jhāna was labeled 'gross' (olārika) since it involved vitakka and vicāra, the second acquires the same rubric because it is characterized by joy (pīti) and an exhilaration of the heart ("cetaso ubbillāvitattam").³ The qualities which are found in one who attains to the third jhāna are equanimity (upekkhā) and mindfulness (sati), 'self-possession' (sampajāna), dispassion (virāga) and an abiding happiness (sukha-vihārī). Finally in the fourth jhāna the attention of the heart on happiness ("sukham cetaso ābhogo") is transcended as is a concern with its opposite, dukkha or suffering.⁴ Similarly the polarity of somanassa and domanassa⁵ or mental distress is overcome. The last jhāna is, therefore, composed of

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, I. 50.

²Dīgha Nikāya, I, 37.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., I, 37-38.

⁵Somanassa is from manas / su; domanassa from manas / du.

pure equanimity and mindfulness ("upekhā-sati-pārisuddhim").¹

"Thus do some maintain the complete happiness in the visible world of a living being."²

The four-fold jhāna formula appears again in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta, the discourse on the fruits of the life of a sāmañña or recluse. In this sutta the discussion of the jhānas is preceded by an overcoming of the five hindrances or nīvaranas and is followed by the acquisition of supra-normal powers or iddhi³ and abhiñña (supra-normal knowledge) as well as the overcoming of the āsavas. In order to understand more fully the role of jhāna within the scope of Buddhist soteriology we shall examine in some detail the most important of the concepts in this sutta, namely, the nīvaranas, iddhi, abhiñña and the āsavas.

The classical formula of the five nīvaranas⁴ as found in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta and elsewhere in the Nikāyas (e.g., Dīgha III, 49) is described as follows: (1) coveting the world ("abhiñjham loke"); (2) malevolence and the desire to injure ("vyāpāda-padosaṃ"); (3) stolidity and slothfulness ("thīna-

¹Dīgha Nikāya, I, 38.

²The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 51.

³Iddhi literally means well-being, prosperity.

⁴Nīrvāraṇa is from the Sanskrit niś / varana literally meaning not choosing or unable to choose and hence an obstacle or hindrance. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 376.

middham"); (4) excitement and misdeeds ("uddhacca-kukkuccaṃ")¹; and, (5) wavering or doubt ("vicikicchā").² One must overcome these hindrances so that in each case the mind may be purified ("cittam parisodheti").³ Separated from sensuous desires and evil elemental impulses ("kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi") the *sāmañña* is enabled to enter into the sequence of the four *jhānas* previously described.⁴ With the exception of the fifth *nīvaraṇa* the concern of this formula is clearly with those emotions which tend toward unreflective involvement in the phenomenal world. As *Samyutta Nikāya* 5:83 puts it, the *nīvaraṇas* are conducive "...to the still more becoming and growth thereof."⁵ Concomitant with this involvement in the becoming of the phenomenal world is the lack of insight or ignorance which can be described in terms of blindness and loss of sight. One who has not overcome the *nīvaraṇas* obviously is unable to acquire any degree of knowledge beyond that granted through the agency of the senses in dependence on the empirical

¹I have used here the root meaning of *kud-kicca*, gerundive of *karoti*, rather than the second meaning, "worry," used by T. W. Rhys Davids in his translation of this sutta. I have done so in order to preserve the parallel between the explicit coupling of the hindrances to mind and body that appears to exist in the two preceeding pairs of words.

²Dīgha Nikāya, I, 71.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., I, 73.

⁵The Book of Kindred Sayings, V, 70.

⁶Ibid., pp. 80-81.

world.

The *Sāmañña-phala* -sutta makes clear, however, that one who passes through the jhānas transcends an ordinary involvement in the phenomenal world as implied by the nīvaraṇas. As a result of the attainment of the four jhānas the consciousness or mind (citta) is made pure (parisuddha), freed from blemish (aṇaṅga), devoid of evil (kilesa)¹, stable (thita) and immovable (ānebhha).² The citta is thereby freed to direct itself toward the "insight that comes from knowledge."³ This insight is simply that this body (kāya) has a form (rūpa) composed of the four great elements ("cātum-mahā-bhūṭiko"), that it is a result of a human birth ("mātā-pettika-sambhavo"); that it is perpetuated by partaking of foods ("odana-kummās-upaccayo"); that it is impermanent and subject to dissolution and disintegration ("anicca-ucchādana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhaṇsana-dhammo"); and that consciousness itself (viññāna) depends on (sita) the body and is bound up with it (patibandha).⁴ With

¹The word, kilesa, along with other terms such as the nīvaraṇas, taṇhā, the āsavas, etc., all have reference to unthinking involvement in the phenomenal or profane world. Kilesa literally means stain, soil, impurity and comes to stand for sensuous desires, passions, etc. "Its occurrence in the Piṭakas is rare; in later works, very frequent, where it is approx. tantamount to our terms lower or unregenerate nature..." Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede (eds.), The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 216.

²Dīgha Nikāya, I. 76.

³The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 86. "ñāna-dassanāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti." Dīgha Nikāya, I, 76.

⁴Dīgha Nikāya, I, 76. We find here a standard description of the body. Consciousness (viññāna) in this in-

the citta purified (parisuddha) and collected (samhita), the sāmāñña has such powers of mind (manas) that he is able to create (maya) with it another body (aññaṃ kāyam) than the body subject to the frailties described above. As the text describes this process it is "...as if a man were to pull out a reed from its sheath. He would know: 'this is the reed, this the sheath. The reed is one thing, the sheath another. It is, from the sheath that the reed has been drawn forth.' And he similarly were/to take a snake out of its slough, or draw a sword from its scabbard."¹

The notion of manomaya has significant possibilities for this study; however, on the basis of the Pāli texts it is difficult to arrive at a specific interpretation. As The Pali English Dictionary states, in general the term denotes being made or formed by the mind, particularly as though magically made.² For example the Brahma-jāla-sutta refers to the evolution (samvatta) of the world system to the point where most beings have been reborn in the "World of Radiance" (loko ābhassara) and "there they dwell made of mind (manomaya), feeding on joy, radiating light from themselves, traversing

stance indicates the five senses or the entire emotional and intellectual process. See The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 87, notes 1 and 2.

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 88.

²Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede (eds.), The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 521.

the air (and) continuing in glory..."¹ A similar association of manomaya with a heavenly realm is found in the Apanṇaka-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya. There it is stated that the corporeal gods ("deva rūpino") are a product of manomaya.² The two passages cited above clearly refer to the magical power of manas by relating manomaya to the mythological realms and beings of Buddhism. Indeed, manomaya's earliest meaning may have been predominantly magically oriented in that the power of the manas was thought to be responsible for the attainment of heavenly rewards of some form or another; however, we find that the notion comes to assume both ethical and ontological connotations.

For an example of this development we turn to the Dhammapada, a text which holds a place of veneration in Buddhism roughly equivalent to that of the Bhagavad Gītā in Hinduism. It too represents a synthesis of the popular and the sophisticated and contains within its limited length a rich store of information.³ The Dhammapada opens with the following two verses:

manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā,
manasā ce paduṭṭhena bhāsati vā karoti vā
tato naṃ dukkham anveti cakkam va vahato padam

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 30. "Te tattha honti manomayā pīti-bhakkhā savam pabhā antalikkha-carā subhaṭṭhā-yino..." Dīgha Nikāya, I, 17.

²Majjhima Nikāya, I. 410.

³The Dhammapada is a compilation from various sources--both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Mrs. Rhys Davids, however, believes that it may have been written as a unitary work simply reflecting popular religious phraseology. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Minor Anthologies (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. x.

manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā,
 manasā ce pasannena bhāsati vā karoti vā
 tato naṃ sukham anveti chāyā va anapāyini¹

The first line of both verses asserts that all dhammā or constituents of being are "mind-preceded, mind-rooted and mind-made." Because of the power of the mind to make the self the first verse states, "If with a corrupt (paḍuṭṭha) mind one speaks or acts/ Thereupon suffering (dukkha) follows him as a wheel (follows) the foot of (the one who) pulls it." If, however, "with a pure (pasanna)² mind one speaks or acts/ Thereupon happiness (sukha) follows him as a shadow never leaving (him)."

In this passage the ethical and the ontological are definitely related in terms of manas. That is, the mind appears as the center point. It has the power to create the "self" as it were. The ethical dimension stems from this fact. If the mind is ignorant and impure one will suffer; if, on the other hand, the mind is enlightened and pure one will attain happiness.

Having passed through the five nīvarana and attained the four jhānas and the power of manomaya, the sāmāñña now acquires the iddhis, or supra-normal powers, and the abhiññas or supra-

¹The Dhammapada, trans. S. Radhakrishnan (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 58-59.

²Passana is a past passive participle of paṣīdati meaning to be clear, bright, light, etc. Although the term in this passage obviously has ethical overtones, might it not also refer to intellectual "enlightenment?" Thus, one who is pure also knows the truth.

normal knowledge. The term, iddhi, is of pre-Buddhistic origin.¹ In different contexts it may be used in the Pāli texts to describe the potency of a king, a rich noble, a hunter, etc.² In the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta*, eight modes of iddhi are mentioned: (1) the power of becoming one or many; (2) the ability to become invisible; (3) passing through objects such as walls and hills; (4) penetrating through solid ground; (5) the power to walk on water; (6) traveling cross-legged in the sky; (7) touching the moon and the sun; (8) reaching Brahma heaven.³

The above listed iddhis acquired by the Buddhist adept have striking similarities with the archaic phenomenon of shamanism.⁴ The coincidence of characteristics between these two religious practitioners has been studied by Mircea Eliade in his monograph, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy.⁵ In particular he points to the "identity in expression" between the superhuman experiences of the Buddhist yogin and the

¹Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede (eds.), The...Pali-English Dictionary, p. 120.

²Ibid.

³The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 83-89.

⁴Eliade notes that the word, shaman, is derived through the Russian from the Tungusic, "saman." Some scholars, however, have derived the term from Pali. See Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), p. 495.

⁵In particular, see chapter 11, "Shamanic Ideologies and Techniques Among the Indo-Europeans," in Eliade, Shamanism:....

archaic symbolism of ascent and flight found so frequently in shamanism.¹ Symbols of ascent and flight are especially important since they point to the ecstatic experience at which shamanism aims. The shaman through the medium of this experience obtains, as it were, a superhuman state of being which grants to him such powers as flight, especially for the purpose of reaching other-worldly realms such as the Brahma heaven. The magical aspect of this power is well illustrated by our particular text which specifically indicated that prior to the acquisition of the iddhi, the *sāmañña* has exercised the power of *manomaya*, the "magic" of his mind, in order to create "another body." It would appear to be the case that the iddhi which follow are powers of that "other body" created as a result of passing through the four *jhāna*.

The shamanistic and, hence, magically oriented origin of the iddhi is further brought out by what appears to be a growing suspicion on the part of early Buddhism toward the public display of para-normal or superhuman psychic powers. In the *Kevaddha-sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* the Buddha is represented as warning against the use of mystic wonders because they might be confused with the use of magical charms practiced in Gandhāra.² He is made to say, "It is because I perceive danger in the practice of mystic wonders, that I loath, and abhor,

¹Eliade, *Shamanism:...*, p. 409.

²*The Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, 213.

and am ashamed thereof."¹ In the Vinaya Piṭaka it is stated that a bhikkhu should not display psychic powers before the laity beyond the powers of ordinary men.² The Sampasādanīya-sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya makes clear that there are indeed two types of iddhi, one which is termed ignoble (an-ariyan) and the other noble or ariyan.³ The ignoble are those powers discussed above in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta and elsewhere in the Nikāyas.⁴ In the Sampasādanīya-sutta the justification for labeling these iddhi as ignoble is that they are concomitant with the mental intoxicants and with worldly aims ("sāsava sa-upadhikā").⁵ In other words, it is possible to employ the fruits of the four jhāna or the iddhi in such a manner that the profane world, rather than being transcended, becomes even more attractive and deepens one's involvement within it. Iddhi produced through manomaya may become the occasion of a descent into the phenomenal world rather than ascent into the noumenal or sacred.

By way of contrast to the ignoble powers (iddhi) all of which involve some superhuman power, the Sampasādanīya-sutta describes the ariyan iddhi as follows:

When a bhikkhu can, if he so desire, remain uncon-

¹ Ibid.

² The Book of Discipline, II, p. 112.

³ Dīgha Nikāya, III, 112.

⁴ See the Kevaddha-suttanta.

⁵ Dīgha Nikāya, III, 112.

scious (asaññī) of the disgust (paṭikkūla) amid what is disgusting; or conscious of disgust amid what is not disgusting; or unconscious of disgust amid what is both disgusting and the opposite; or, avoiding both that which is disgusting and the opposite, should remain indifferent to them as such, mindful and understanding.¹

As should be expected by the ariyan iddhi one overcomes the "mental intoxicants" (āsavas) and the worldly aims (upadhika) rather than being further embroiled in them.² Rather than representing superhuman or magical powers the ariyan iddhi stand for a control of saññā or perceptions which leads to an indifference (upekhako) toward the disgusting and the non-disgusting, those polarities which qualify our perception of the phenomenal world.

The transformation of iddhi from an archaic shamanistic meaning is further illustrated by the Jana-vasabha-suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya describing the four ways in which iddhi is developed. They are: concentration and effort with desire ("chanda-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgatam"); concentration and effort with energy ("viriya-samādhi..."); concentration and effort with a "dominant idea" ("citta-samādhi..."); concentration and effort with investigation ("vīmaṃsā-

¹The Dialogues of the Buddha, III, 107. In Pāli the last clause reads, "Paṭikkūlaṃ ca appaṭikkūlaṃ ca tad ubhayam abhinivajjetvā upekhako vihareyyam sato sampajāno..."

²Upadhika literally means "having a substratum" (from dhā / upa) but it comes to stand for an attachment to the phenomenal world of rebirth. Āsava (from sru / ā) literally means an "outflowing" and comes to stand for certain ideas which prevent the mind from being freed from the phenomenal world.

samādhi...)). Here we find a progression not to a state of ecstasy leading to powers of invisibility and flight, but rather a progression from desire (chanda) to investigation (vīmaṃsā) or from motivation and effort to a more refined and sophisticated use of the reasoning processes. It appears to be the case that iddhi as the fruit of jhāna becomes, rather than supernatural powers acquired in shamanistic trance, an analytical understanding (vīmaṃsā) of the phenomenal world which engenders a detached objectivity (upekhako) in the face of the polarities of impure/pure, loathsome/non-loathsome, / disgusting/non-disgusting which typify the phenomenal or the profane world.

In addition to the iddhi, the Sāmañña-phala-sutta indicates that other powers are acquired by the sāmañña who has overcome the nīvaraṇas and acquired the jhānas. These powers are said to be the heavenly or divine ear ("dibbāya sota-dhātuyā"); discernment of various types of minds or citta; knowledge of previous existences ("pubbe-nivāsānussati-ñāṇāya"); the heavenly or divine eye ("dibba cakkhu") with which the adept "...sees beings as they pass away from one form of existence and take shape in another..."² These supernatural powers eventually developed into a stereotyped list of six abhiññas ("higher knowledges"). They appear in the Dasut-tara-suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya as follows: (1) the iddhi

¹Dīgha Nikāya, II, 213.

²Ibid., I, 79f.

in their various modes described above; (2) "deva-hearing" by which the adept "hears sounds both heavenly and human, far and near; (3) a mind that "...understands the minds of other beings, other persons..."; (4) an ability to recall to mind "...the various temporary states as he lived in days gone by..."; (5) "deva-sight" by which "he discerns the ~~present~~ of beings faring according to their deeds"; (6) the realization and knowledge of the extinction of the "intoxicants" (āsavas) and the attainment of freedom.¹

We can discern in this list an amalgam of two different types of abhiññā. In the first instance there is the type illustrated by the occurrence of the supra-normal powers in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta. There the abhiññās just as the iddhis are acquired as the result of the jhānas and through the power of manomaya. In particular the abhiññās, however, seem to express a psychic or mental power in contrast to the extraordinary physical power of the iddhis. For example, the heavenly ear and the divine eye of the abhiññās would appear above all else to indicate a heightened mode of perception enabling the adept to arrive at a supra-natural knowledge bordering on omniscience. Thus the iddhi and the abhiññās seem to complement each other, the one pointing to physical power, the other to mental power. It is just such a mutually supporting role, for example, that iddhi and abhiññā play in the Akāṅkheyya-

¹Ibid., III, 281. Also The Dialogues of the Buddha, III, 257f.

sutta of the *Majjhima Nikāya*.¹ By the end of the *Nikāya* period, however, the aspect of the *abhiññā*s denoting a psychological power of magical import practically came to be equated with the magical physical powers of *iddhi*.

There is, on the other hand, another type of *abhiññā* in the *Dasuttara-suttanta* list, a "higher-knowledge" of the destruction of all attachments to the profane and to the realization of ultimate reality or *nibbāna*. This aspect of the *abhiññā*s is found in the *Samyutta Nikāya* where the *abhiññā*s are preceded by the "middle path" and is followed by enlightenment and *nibbāna*.² Or, again in the *Anguttara Nikāya* where it is said that *abhiññā* leads to full emancipation³ and the *Dīgha* where we find that *abhiññā* is contrary to priestly superstitions and vain (sophistical) speculations.⁴ In other words, *abhiññā* at this level is insight into the truth claims of Buddhism regarding the nature of reality. It may be that these two types of *abhiññā* represent a combination of a more popular and "primitive," magically oriented tradition with the more sophisticated, doctrinally oriented tradition of the priests. It is very difficult to assert, as the *Pāli Text Society Dictionary* does, that the more magically oriented understanding of *abhiññā* is later.⁵ Perhaps all that can be

¹Majjhima Nikāya, I, 33.

²The Book of Kindred Sayings, V, 357.

³The Book of Gradual Sayings, IV, 179,

⁴Dīgha Nikāya, III, 131.

⁵Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede (eds.), The...Pāli-

safely said is that in the Nikāyas the two traditions came to be amalgamated. That is to say, it was expected that as a person gained detachment from the phenomenal world he not only gained a "saving knowledge" (abhi-jñā), but supra-normal powers (iddhi) as well.

Having destroyed the nīvaraṇas, attained the jhānas, the iddhis and abhiññās, the Sāmañña-phala-sutta goes on to say that the sāmañña is then able to destroy the āsavas, the "deadly floods" or "intoxicants" that are part of the attachment of the profane man to the phenomenal world.¹ In this sutta the āsavas are enumerated as kāma (sensual desire), bhāva (becoming or desire for future life) and avijjā (ignorance of the four noble truths).² One of the most famous passages in which reference to the āsavas is contained is a formula repeated throughout the Nikāyas and in particular the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta of the Dīgha. It illustrates the interrelationship of conduct (sīla), concentration (samādhi) and understanding (paññā) in regard to the āsavas. After affirming that concentration must be accompanied (paribhāvita) by right conduct and understanding by concentration, the passage concludes: "...paññā-paribhāvatam cittaṃ sammad eva āsavehi vimuccati, seyyathīdam kamāsaṃ bhāvāssaṃ diṭṭhāsaṃ avijjāsaṃ."³ The mind (citta)

English Dictionary, p. 64.

¹See footnote on page 188.

²Dīgha Nikāya, I, 83.

³Ibid., II, 81.

of the individual that is surrounded by a profound understanding (paññā) of the nature of reality will be freed (vimuccati) from being "poured out" (āsava) into the profane world through sensual desires, the wish for a life of continual becoming, false views and ignorance of his true state of being.

The āsavas, as the nīvaranas, serve to clarify from what the jhānas free a man. From a phenomenological perspective it is the profane as we have on occasion indicated. The profane specifically is the world of sensuous desire, becoming, anger, worry, dullness, stupidity, or, in other words, the profane is an ignorant, unthinking involvement in and attachment to the empirical world. The jhānas represent stages by which an individual attains a power of mind (manomaya) which represents a new order of reality (the sacred), "another body" (aññam kāyam) as the text stated it. This new order is graphically illustrated by certain powers which the texts describe partially in the terms of the ancient tradition of shamanistic magic and partially in terms of the higher knowledge (abhi-
jñā) represented by the Buddhist analysis of existence. The coincidence of these two elements is highly significant, not only from an historical point of view but from a phenomenological perspective as well. That is, our study of the jhānas might well lead to the conclusion that we have preserved here two modes of knowledge in relationship to the salvation-quest: ecstasy and a mode of knowledge characterized by vīmaṃsā, vitakka and vicāra or more rational and analytical forms of

thinking. Knowledge as power, then, comes to take on a rather particular meaning. It is power in the sense of power over the world of becoming and change but it is also power described in a supra-human manner. It is supra-human power because it is the power of a new reality (the sacred), hence, it is not merely control over the phenomenal world although that remains.

UPEKKHĀ AND THE UNLIMITEDS

We have seen in our discussion of jhāna that upekkhā appeared in the third stage and that in the fourth there remained only sati and upekkhā. Having discussed the former term, we now turn to an examination of upekkhā. The word, upekkhā, is derived from the Sanskrit root *īkṣ* meaning to gaze or look at plus the prefix *upa*; hence, the word literally means ~~to~~ overlook or neglect.¹ Its meaning is extended, however, to denote patience, equanimity or indifference. The Pāli Text Society dictionary defines upekkhā as, "hedonic neutrality or indifference, the zero point between joy and sorrow."² A. B. Keith notes that upekkhā as a quality of the third and fourth jhāna does not actually connote a hedonistic sense of indifference but rather an intellectual neutrality. Thus, upekkhā, at least in its jhānic context is an impartial tolerance in regard

¹Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 215.

²Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede (eds.), The Pāli-English Dictionary, p. 150.

to all mental states.¹

A broad survey of the uses of upekkhā in the Theravāda tradition is given by Edward Conze as follows: 1) neutral feelings which are neither pleasant nor unpleasant (adukkham-asukha-vedanā), 2) an attitude of "serene unconcern" or sameness of thought (cittasamatā) arising from the practice of concentration or jhāna, 3) the final stage of worldly wisdom just prior to reaching the Path when evenmindedness toward all conditioned beings is achieved, 4) the equanimity of the arhat who retains a natural state of purity, 5) the equanimity of the arhats as contrasted with the dull, indifference of ignorant men, and 6) an attitude of impartiality providing an antidote to ill-will and sensuous greed.²

Turning to the Nikāyas themselves we discover that one of the most frequent uses of upekkhā is in the formula of the four brahma vihāras or the abodes of brahma. The brahma vihāras are four "states of mind" which result, after death, in a rebirth in the heavenly worlds of brahma.³ There is disagreement among Buddhist scholars as to the origin of the brahma vihāras. T. W. Rhys Davids contends that they were almost certainly exclusively Buddhist⁴, whereas E. J. Thomas

¹Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, p. 126.

²Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 89-90.

³The four brahma vihāras are love (mettā), compassion (karuṇā), sympathetic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā).

⁴The Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 299.

believes that they show a direct connection with Brahmanical practices since they occur in the Yoga Sūtras.¹ Regardless of origin, however, the brahma vihāras are important in that they represent modes of higher consciousness, although they are not in themselves the highest enlightenment or nibbāna.²

Another term used in the Nikāyas to define the brahma vihāras is appamaññā or "infinite feelings."³ This term is applied to these states of mind or categories of consciousness since all of them in effect deal with the expansion of the mind. Thus the Mahā-sudassana-suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya reports the following attainments of the mythological figure, "the Great King of Glory" (rājā mahā-sudassano) after reaching the fourth jhāna:

And he let his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of love; and so the second quarter and so the third and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world, to pervade with heart of love, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure, free from the least trace of anger or ill-will.⁴

And in a similar fashion he pervaded the whole world with a consciousness (cetas) of compassion, sympathetic joy and

¹Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, p. 50.

²Ibid.

³Appamaññā is derived from the Sanskrit pramāṇya / the prefix, a, literally meaning "without measure."

⁴The Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 219. "...mettā-sahagatena cetasa ekam desaṃ phavitvā vihāsi, tathā dutiyam, tathā tatiyam, tathā catuttham. Iti uddham adho tiriyaṃ sabbadhi sabbattatāya sabbāvantam lokam mettā-sahagatena cetasā vipulena mahaggatena appamāṇena averena avyāpajjhena pharitvā vihāsi."

equanimity. The brahma vihāras in general and upekkhā in particular represent, if you will, universal states of consciousness. They are one of the somewhat paradoxical outcomes of the process of meditation and the control of the mind which has been described in the Nikāyas, a process that is even more refined in a later period. This outcome of Buddhist meditation is seemingly paradoxical in that the progression from sati, to samādhi and even into the jhānas was primarily a narrowing down of the consciousness. But the narrowing of the consciousness was for the purpose of its ultimate liberation. The "refinement" of the mind was important primarily for the elimination of attachment to the objects of sense and concomitantly to develop such mental control that the mind, as it were, had the power to construct its own reality (manomaya). That is to say, the purpose of meditation in the Nikāyas is to free the mind from dependence on sensory objects so that it can be "expanded" to realities which defy empirical qualification. Upekkhā, therefore, becomes the last element in the seven factors of enlightenment and is a characteristic shared by both arahats and buddhas.

Perhaps the significance of the difference in consciousness implied by upekkhā and ordinary states of consciousness can be best demonstrated by referring to two Nikāya texts. In the Saḷāyatama-vibhanga-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya/six in-^{there are} differences. A worldly indifference is "...the indifference on seeing a thing which appertains to the ignorant and foolish

average man...such indifference...fails to transcend the thing seen..."¹ By way of contrast the indifference of renunciation arises when "...on discerning the transitory nature of things seen and their mutability, instability and annihilation, indifference arises from causal understanding."² Upekkhā denotes, therefore, a transcendence of empirically oriented knowledge.

But if meditation frees the mind from dependence on the phenomenal world, to what is it freed? The answer must of necessity be in abstract terms, and the person who is looking for a concrete definition of the knowledge of ultimates is bound to be disappointed; however, one answer given by the Nikāyas is found in the Mahāvedalla-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya. There, in a conversation between Sāriputta and Koṭṭhita the Great, Sāriputta discusses four freedoms of the mind (cetovimutti): appamāṇā (immeasurable), ākiñcañña (nothingness), suññatā (emptiness), animittā (signless).³ All four of these characteristics of the cetovimutti are identical in that they connote a state or condition of non-attachment. They also point beyond themselves to a reality beyond definition, a reality that can be known but not in the way that people ordinarily know. The whole thrust of Buddhist meditation, therefore, is to produce a condition of consciousness in which

¹The Further Dialogues of the Buddha (Majjhima Nikāya) II, trans. Robert Chalmers ("Sacred Books of the Buddhists," Vol. VI; London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 280.

²Ibid.

³Majjhima Nikāya, I, 297.

ultimate reality can be known directly, just as objects are perceived directly in the phenomenal world. The Buddhist way of coming to know ultimate reality is to produce a condition of being in which the ground of the sacred can be perceived directly. It is because the reality to be known is "other" than that which is ordinarily known that the process of meditation--sati, samādhi, jhāna and upekkhā--must be undergone. The knowing apparatus must be transformed since, indeed, to reach nibbāna involves a total transformation of being.

SAMBODHA

The Buddhist's quest for ultimate reality ends with the attainment of complete wisdom or ultimate enlightenment (sambodha). The paradigm for this total knowledge is, of course, the Buddha. From the legends of his life contained in the Jātakas we know that after his decision to renounce the householder life and search for ultimate reality he first sought religious instruction from two teachers and then practiced austerities for six years.¹ Finding these traditional teachings and practices unsatisfactory, however, the young Sākyan prince set out on his own path (magga) and was able to achieve his goal, hence, becoming known as the enlightened one (the Buddha).

In the brief recital of his enlightenment in the Bhaya-

¹E. J. Thomas, The Life of the Buddha as Legend and History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949), Ch. 6.

bherava-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya it is recounted that being detached from sense pleasures (kāma) and immoral conditions (akusala dhamma) he passed through the four jhānas previously described and then "...with the mind composed, quite purified, quite clarified, without blemish, without defilement..."¹ he attained to the three supra-rational knowledges (abhiññā)--the knowledge of his former births, the arising and passing away of all beings, and the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas.² These attainments led to a condition of absolute freedom described as follows: "Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam itī nāṇaṃ ahoṣi; khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāpāram itthattāyati..." ("In freedom the knowledge came that I am freed; birth is destroyed; ended is the period of apprenticeship; what has been done is completed; there is no further development..."). The text goes on to speak of this freedom in the following manner, "avijjā vihatā vijjā uppanā, tamo vihato āloko uppano..." ("ignorance was dispelled, knowledge arose, darkness was dispelled, light arose...").³ In other words, the condition achieved by the Buddha was an "en-lightenment" experience, a conversion from darkness to light, from the ignorance of profane existence to the knowledge of sacred existence, from involvement in the relatively

¹Majjhima Nikāya, I, 21-23. The Middle Length Sayings, I, 27-29.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

real to participation in the ultimately real.

Without breaching the important problem of the relationship between arahatship and buddhahood, the term, sambodha, comes to be applied in particular to the last three stages of sanctification discussed at the conclusion of chapter two. Turning to the last of these stages, the arahat, we find this Buddhist saint described frequently by the following formula, "Idha bhikkhu āsavānaṃ khayā anāsaram cetovimuttiṃ paññā-vimuttiṃ ditthe va dhamme sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati" ("Here a monk, after destroying his impurities, himself realizes, in this life, through his higher attainments, emancipation of both mind and knowledge").¹ Sambodha represents, therefore, the culmination of the process of consciousness expansion (ceto-vimutti) and acquisition of knowledge (paññā-vimutti). The factors which went into creating this condition of total awareness have been the subject of this chapter. There are at least two more formulae in the Nikāyas, however, which should be mentioned.

The first and the least important for the purposes of this study is the so-called "seven constituents of enlightenment (sambojjhanga). They include the following: sati (mindfulness), dhammavicaya (investigation of things), vīriya (energy), pīti (joy), passaddhi (tranquility), samādhi (concentration) and upekkhā (equanimity).² Several of these terms have been pre-

¹N. Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism, p. 271.

²Dīgha Nikāya, II, 79; III, 106. For a brief discussion

viously discussed; but, the list taken as a whole serves to point up the fact that sambodha is a "synthetic" realization. That is, even though in the final analysis ultimate enlightenment in Theravāda Buddhism may be beyond rational categorization, nevertheless, it represents a gradual training of the mind and the attainment of deeper and more profound insights into the nature of existent entities.

More germane to our study, sambodha may be understood in the light of the "eight stages of deliverance" (*aṭṭha vimokkhā*). In the *Mahā-nidāna-suttanta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* they follow a description of the bhikkhu who is characterized by "*paññā-vimutto*." The eight stages are described as follows: (1) having form or body (*rūpa*) one sees (*passati*) forms (*rūpāni*); (2) not perceiving one's own form ("*arūpa-saññī*") one sees external forms ("*bahiddhā rūpāni*"), (3) thinking the pleasant (*subha*) one becomes concentrated (*adhimutto*), (4) passing beyond the perception of forms (*rūpa-saññā*), perceptions of sense-reactions dying away ("*paṭigha-saññānam atthagamā*"), mindless of perceptions of the manifold ("*nānatta-saññānam amanaskārā*"), conscious of infinite space ("*ananto ākāso*"), (5) passing beyond the sphere of infinite consciousness (*viññāṇaścāyatana*), (6) passing beyond the sphere of infinite consciousness and entering the sphere of nothingness (*ākāsaññāyatana*), (7) surpassing the sphere of nothingness and entering the sphere of

of the sambojjhanga see Piyadassi, The Seven Factors of Enlightenment ("The Wheel," Vol. I; Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1960).

neither perception nor non-perception ("na evasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ"), (8) transcending the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception and entering a state where perceptions and consciousness cease ("samatikkamma saññā-vedayita-nirodhaṃ").¹

The atṭha-vimokha illustrates the fundamental significance of Buddhist enlightenment, namely, that it is a knowledge transcending empirical consciousness. It necessarily represents, therefore, a "new" consciousness appropriate to a radically "other" form of knowledge, the knowledge of the ultimately real. Along the way to this realization the Buddhist adept controls the empirical consciousness in order to gain power over ordinary sensory realities. This process of gaining control of the empirical consciousness and, therefore, over the phenomenal world, involves arriving at an inductive understanding of the impermanent nature of sensory realities. But, important as such knowledge is, it, too, must be transcended by the Buddhist adept because such knowledge is rooted in viññāṇa. He must be freed from bondage to the sense-consciousness, to the phenomenal. His consciousness must be "expanded" so that the knowledge of that ultimate ground of being, the alpha and the omega of all creation may be known and, hence, realized.

The ultimate realization or enlightenment of the Theravāda tradition does, indeed, represent power, but not conceived

¹Dīgha Nikāya, II, 70-71. The Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 69. Stages four through seven came to be known as the four arūpa jhānas.

in terms of "controlling power." Physical and psychological control are crucial aspects of the Buddhist's journey from the profane to the sacred, but with the realization of the ultimate, the emphasis shifts from controlling power to absolute freedom. Freedom, then, becomes the prime characteristic of the enlightened state. It characterizes consciousness because it is freed from the senses; it is described as saving-knowledge (*pañña*) because it is the knowledge of the original state of ultimate perfection and purity.

CHAPTER V

THE SOTERIOLOGICAL NATURE AND FUNCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE POST-NIKĀYA BUDDHIST TRADITION

It has been demonstrated by a study of the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas that in early Buddhism the path to nibbāna called for two fundamental types of knowledge--a discriminating or analytical knowledge and an intuitive or mystical knowledge. Neither of the two types was developed to the exclusion of the other for although nibbāna could not be won without the latter type of knowledge, the former was nevertheless a necessary stage along the way. Both types of knowledge are maintained by every school of thought throughout the history of Buddhism even though there are shifting emphases and differing interpretations as to their function and nature. In general, however, the Theravāda tradition, particularly from the perspective of Abhidhamma developments, evidences a preoccupation with categories of analytical thought, whereas the Mahāyāna tradition, particularly in its Mādhyamika form, appears to point almost exclusively to a type of intuitive or mystical knowledge. It is the task of the present chapter to investigate these claims.

THE ABHIDHAMMIKAS¹

In its technical sense the word, Abhidhamma, means the third section (piṭaka) of the Pāli canon. While containing a wide variety of materials, it is known primarily as a philosophical and psychological elaboration on the truths contained in the Sutta Piṭaka.² Those Abhidhamma books which are particularly important for an understanding of the analytical aspects of Pāli scholasticism are the Dhammasaṅgani,³ the Vibhaṅga,⁴ and the Paṭṭhāna.⁵ The study of these texts has

¹The word, Abhidhammika, is meant to cover both the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda traditions; however, since this particular section concentrates on the Pāli scholastic tradition (the Theravāda Abhidhamma), I have chosen the Pāli rather than the more common Sanskrit (Abhidharmika) form of the word. In general usage, Abhidhamma or Abhidharma can indicate scholastic preoccupation with analytical categorization and systematization as represented by the Theravādins, Sarvāstivādins and Yogācārins. See Conze, Buddhist Thought In India, p. 178.

²The Abhidhamma Piṭaka comprises seven works: (1) Dhammasaṅgani, (2) Vibhaṅga, (3) Kathāvatthu, (4) Puggalapapañatti, (5) Dhātukathā, (6) Yamaka, and (7) Paṭṭhāna. In comparing the Abhidhamma with the Sutta Piṭaka, B. C. Law states, "It (the Abhidhamma) treats of the same subject as the Sutta Piṭaka and differs from that collection only in being more scholastic." Law, A History of Pali Literature, I, 303-304.

³The Dhammasaṅgani literally means something like "the co-enumeration of dhammas" (although Mrs. Rhys Davids renders it "A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics" in her translation of the Pali text). It discusses various kinds of consciousness and types of material forms.

⁴The Vibhaṅga or Exposition has as its object "to formulate the theories and practical mechanism of intellectual and moral progress scattered throughout the Sutta Piṭaka..." Law, A History of Pali Literature, I, 316.

⁵The Paṭṭhāna or the Book of Causes deals with twenty-four paccayas or modes of relations between things.

been the backbone of the Theravāda scholastic tradition. This tradition is perhaps best represented by Buddhaghosa, the famous South Indian commentator and translator whose principal work was carried on in Ceylon in the fifth century A.D.¹

Historically two major schools² of Buddhism carried out the development of Abhidhamma thought: the Vibhajjavādins ("those who make distinctions")--who were the forerunners of the Theravādins of Ceylon and Southeast Asia and the Sarvāstivādins ("those who teach that everything exists") who in turn were the forerunners of the Sautrāntikas.³ Fundamentally both the Sarvāstivādins and the Vibhajjavādins upheld a realistic and pluralistic ontology conceived in terms of various structural categories of dhammas or elements of existence. Correspondingly their epistemology was also realistic in that knowledge or truth was the product of the interaction of various types of objects with various forms of consciousness.⁴

Philosophically speaking it is undoubtably the case that the Abhidhammika preoccupation with elaborations of dhammas reflected their desire to explain all phenomena as existing without substance, essence or soul (anatta). Religiously, however, as well as from the phenomenological perspective of this study, this interpretation does not do justice to the signifi-

¹For a brief account of Buddhaghosa's life and thought see B. C. Law, Buddhaghosa, (Bombay, 1946).

²Omitted in this instance would be the Yogācāra.

³Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 119.

⁴See Conze, Buddhist Thought In India, p. 108.

cance of the analytical schemes of the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda elders. As is well-evidenced by Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* and Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* the various methods by which the forms of sentient existence are analyzed and classified are to be understood as integrally related to the process of meditation and control of consciousness. The conclusion to be drawn from the juxtaposition of the seemingly absurd and endless lists of dhammas with the rigorous procedures of meditation and concentration characteristic of the Theravāda tradition is that the intention of the analysis was not primarily to prove the non-existence of a soul, but rather to enable the religious man to control his conscious states.

This brief study of the Abhidhamma tradition is based primarily on two texts, the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa and the *Abhidhammatthasangaha* attributed to Anuruddha.¹ Even though the *Abhidhammatthasangaha* was probably written in the twelfth century and therefore shows a considerable development over the *Dhammasaṅgani* and other Abhidhamma texts,² it is considered by the Theravāda Buddhists in Ceylon and Southeast Asia to be the best introduction to Abhidhamma thought. As such it is an invaluable synthesis of the three Abhidhamma books

¹ For a brief discussion of Anuruddha see Anuruddha, *Compendium of Philosophy* (*Abhidhammattha-Sangaha*), trans. Shwe Zan Aung (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1963), p. viif.

² Of particular importance in this development is the classification of perceptible time into 17 moments of consciousness.

cited as being the most important Theravāda scholasticism.

The Visuddhimagga is not only the most important work written by a seminal figure in the history of the Theravāda tradition, but it remains today the meditation manual par excellence of Southeast Asian Buddhism. There are, of course, many other texts which could have been utilized. In addition to relevant Abhidhamma books, of particular importance is Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Dhammasaṅgani (the Atthasālinī) as well as the studies of such later commentators as Dhammapala.¹ Since, however, our purpose is not to undertake an extensive study of the Abhidhamma tradition, but rather to offer a pattern or model of understanding the nature and function of knowledge in relationship to the quest for salvation our limited selection will suffice.

THE CATEGORIES OF THE ABHIDHAMMIKAS: ABHIDHAMMATTHASANGAHA

It has been previously stated that for the Theravāda tradition the fundamental element of existence is the dhamma and that the dhammas are analyzed or structured into particular categories such as the five khandhas, the twelve āyatanas, the eighteen dhātus and the twenty-two indriyas.² These

¹ See P. V. Bapat (ed.), 2500 Years of Buddhism (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1956), pp. 217-218. Also important but repetitive of much found in the Visuddhimagga is Upatissa, The Path of Freedom (Vimuttimaggā) (Colombo: M.D. Gunasena & Co., 1961).

² For a careful elaboration of these categories see Nalinaksha Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism (Calcutta: Oriental Book Agency, 1960), chap. IX or Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism (2d ed.; Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1956).

analytical¹ schemes which function as a reality higher than a purely descriptive account based on sensory impressions are not important simply as a philosophical explication of the doctrine of anatta, but as a means of disciplining and thereby controlling the mind or consciousness. In this sense the dhammic structures are significantly related to the meditation process thereby forming an important link in the passage from the phenomenal (samskr̥ta) to the noumenal (asamskr̥ta) realms.

These categories are even taken to greater extremes (in the Abhidhamma texts.) They must, however, be understood as integrated into the process of meditation and concentration or otherwise these extensive elaborations and enumerations will appear to be merely the sterile ruminations of monkish scholastics who had nothing better to do with their time than proliferate the ways in which the phenomenal world might be comprehended.² Initially it is necessary to examine in some detail the manner and significance of the scheme of Abhidhamma classification. Then we shall study the relationship between these categories and the act of meditation and concentration.

¹ Nyanaponika points out that the Abhidhamma is most properly divided into "analysis" (Dhammasaṅgani) and "synthesis" (Paṭṭhāna and Vibhāṅga), however, I am primarily concerned to demonstrate that the structures of Abhidhamma are analytical in the sense that they are rational constructions based upon analyses of perceived realities. See Thera Nyanaponika, Abhidhamma Studies (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1956), p. 3f.

² C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism (London: Luzac & Co., 1936), p. 355.

It should be noted that the Abhidhammika categories can be understood as elaborations of the pre-Buddhist classification of sentient existence into the two divisions of *nāma* and *rūpa* (name and form). For instance of the five *khandhas* four (*saññā*, *vedanā*, *viññāna* and *sankhāra*) are classified as *nāma*. An elaboration of this dual division is the tri-partite classification of elements of matter (*rūpa*), elements of mind (*citta* and *cetana*) and forces (*sankhāra*).¹ In either case, it might be claimed that the Abhidhamma provides us mainly with variations on the theme of "mentality" and "materiality"² encompassing within their analytical structures metaphysical considerations (e.g. the four 'spheres of *kāma*, *rūpa*, *arūpa* and *lokuttara*) as well as ethical concerns (i.e. the four classifications of consciousness--*kusala*, *akusala*, *vipaka* and *kriya*).

Turning to the Abhidhammatthasangaha to illustrate the way in which the Theravāda scholastics proliferated the dhammic analysis of sentient existence we find initially an investigation of various states of consciousness (*citta*). There are eighty-nine (or one hundred twenty-one) types of consciousness divided among the four spheres or states of being--the sensuous (*kāma*vacara), form (*rūpa*vacara), formless (*arūpa*vacara)

¹ Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, chaps. 5-7.

² These terms are used in Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification (*Visuddhimagga*), trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli (Colombo: R. Semage, 1956).

and the supermundane (lokuttara magga) and the four classes of ethical attitudes--the moral (kusala), immoral (akusala), resultant from past deeds (vipaka) and the inoperative as to future results (kriya).¹ Although it would be far too tedious to explicate these classifications fully, it is necessary to make a few observations about them in order to comprehend their significance as categories of knowledge in relationship to the quest for the ultimately real.

The majority of the forms of consciousness² are located within the sphere of kāmavacāra. Forms of kusala citta within this sphere may or may not be accompanied by such characteristics as feelings of joy or indifference or knowledge. Akusala citta or immoral consciousness is characterized by varying degrees of hate, delusion and wrong views and is confined to the sphere of kāmāloka unlike kusala citta which is found throughout all spheres of being. Resultant or vipaka citta applies in particular to the five sense consciousnesses plus the mind element (manodhātu) whereas all but two of the kriya cittas apply to arahats and Buddhas only.

At first glance the above comments on the nature of citta

¹There are numerous charts of the various classifications and categories of the Abhidhammatthasangaha. For example, one of great brevity is found in C. B. Dharmasena, Aids to Abhidhamma Philosophy ("The Wheel," Vol. IV; Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1963). More elaborate outlines may be found in W. F. Jayasuriya, The Psychology and Philosophy of Buddhism (Colombo: YMBA Press, 1963). See appendix B.

²Fifty-four of the eighty-nine classifications.

as described in Abhidhamma literature may seem slightly confusing. Actually the analysis is very logical although highly elaborate and tedious. To illustrate further how complicated the classification of the eighty-nine forms of citta may become let us see how it is applied to a particular phenomenon such as smiling. In the Abhidhammatthasangaha there are thirteen classes of consciousness by which one may smile. These are divided among ordinary persons (puthujjana), those who are in the first three stages of sanctification,¹ arhats and pacceka-buddhas and finally sambuddhas. Furthermore the text recognizes six classes of laughter--i.e. a smile consisting in a slight movement of the lips just revealing the teeth, laughter giving out only a slight sound, laughter accompanied by the movement of the head and shoulders, laughter accompanied by the shedding of tears and an outburst of laughter accompanied by the forward and backward movement of the entire body from head to foot.²

Such minute exposure of the phenomenon of smiling cannot but impress the reader with the barrenness of such scholastic investigations. Superficially there is seemingly as little importance to the psychological preoccupations of the Abhidhamma fathers as to the theological concerns of the European

¹ These are the sotāpanna, the sakadāgāmi, and the anāgāmi.

² Anuruddha, A Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammatthasangaha), trans. & ed. Nārada Thera (2 vols.; Colombo: Vāḍḍirāmaṇa, 1956-57), pp. 28-29.

scholastics who debated such questions as the number of angels who could dance on the head of a pin. Indeed, the analyses in the Abhidhammāthasāṅgaha of the eighty-nine classes of citta, the fifty-two kinds of cetasika or mental states accompanying citta and the numerous classifications of rūpa or matter leave one not a little bemused at the seeming irrelevance of such an effort. There is, however, at least one way in which the psychological and philosophical "nit-picking" of the Abhidhammika fathers becomes acutely relevant. While the categories of citta, cetasika and rūpa are scholastic renderings of the doctrine of anatta, the minute analysis to which "mentality" and "materiality" is subjected is especially important as a means by which sentient existence can be controlled. Every act performed, every thought conceived, every feeling felt can be analyzed in terms of the categories of mind and matter proffered in the Abhidhamma. What is of real importance is not the act or the thought or the feeling, but the structure in terms of which they can be analyzed, the appropriate categories of dhammas in relationship to which they are to be understood. For the Theravādin what is real about the phenomenal world is not that which is merely perceived by the senses, but the schemes of dhammas superimposed upon it. The control value of this dhammic superstructure is obvious. The real is not subject to the whimsy of sensory impressions but in effect is "frozen" into minute dhammic particulars.

We have put forward the thesis that the dhammic classifications elaborated by the Theravāda scholastics in effect have a two-fold function. One is ontological. That is, these classifications represent a truer or a higher reality than mere sensory reality. As such they also point beyond themselves to an ultimate reality or nibbāna. The other function is psychological (and ethical) in that these structures serve as "guideposts" or "controls" for the conscious mind; hence, they are not only descriptive of an end but of a means to an end. What we have called "analytical" knowledge, therefore, not only gives form and thus meaning through definition but serves to control cognitive states. In sum, the analytical orientation of the Abhidhammikas is both ontologically as well as psychologically significant.¹

In order to illustrate further the centrality of analysis for the Theravāda scholastics we turn to the manner in which the Abhidhammatthasangaha treats the process of apperception or full cognition. The total sequence of the apper-

¹ This interpretation of the thrust of the Abhidhammikas is somewhat unusual. A more commonly accepted understanding of the task of the compilers of the Abhidhamma is presented by Mrs. Rhys Davids who saw them as the jealous guardians of the doctrines of the Suttas from errors arising through vagueness and ambiguity of language. "In abhidhamma the teacher, conversant with Dhamma, and teaching it in his turn, possessed, in the definitions of these seven supplementary books, a thesaurus of knowledge helping to clarify his knowledge and his expositions. He set himself, to eliminate from the doctrines...all that was contingent in narrative... The bare judgment, or predication, was thus registered, and its terms defined." Rhys Davids, The Birth... Buddhism, p. 375.

ception of an object (either mental or material) is divided into seventeen thought-moments.¹ It begins when a sense-object enters the "subconscious life-continuum" (bhavaṅga).² This entrance measured in three moments is followed by awareness or āvajjana.³ Awareness in turn leads to sensory consciousness such as eye or visual consciousness (cakkhu-viññāṇa) which in turn is followed by the reception of the sense-impression caused by the external stimulus (sampaṭicchana). The next thought-moment is called santīraṇa and involves examination and investigation of the sense impression.⁴ This measurement leads to further differentiation, limitation, discrimination and definition (voṭṭhappana).⁵ The point has been reached ~~when~~ full-cognition or apperception (javana) lasting for seven thought-moments occurs.⁶ The series or

¹Anuruddha, A Manual of Abhidhamma, p. 198f.

²Bhavaṅga from bhava / aṅga means "constituent of becoming," but it is interpreted as a functional state of subconsciousness. See the following: Rhys Davids and Stede, The Pali...Dictionary, p. 499. Anuruddha, Compendium..., p. 265f.

³From āvajjati which means turning to, paying attention, apprehending.

⁴Santīraṇa (san / tīraṇa) is from tīreti, causative of tarati, to measure, to judge. Santīraṇa is classified as one of the pariññās (pari-ññā) or "higher knowledges" which indicates the importance of "measuring" or discriminating knowledge.

⁵Voṭṭhappana is from voṭṭhāpeti = vavatthapēti, causative of vi / ava / stha, to establish by discrimination or analysis.

⁶Javana from javati means to run, hurry, hence "going" in the sense of intellectual movement. Considered to be one of the most important terms in the Abhidhamma psychology. See Anuruddha, Compendium..., p. 245.

process of seventeen moments is then completed with two thought-moments of identification and retention (*tadārammaṇa*).

This entire process is described by Shwe Zan Aung in the following simile:

A man, lost in the deepest sleep, is lying at the foot of a mango-tree with his head covered. A wind now stirs the branches, and a fruit falls beside the sleeping man. He is in consequence aroused from dreamless slumbers. He removes his head-covering in order to ascertain what has awakened him. He sees the newly fallen fruit, picks it up, and examines it. Apprehending it to be a fruit with certain constitutive attributes observed in the previous stage in investigation, he eats it, and then, replacing his head-covering, once more resigns himself to sleep.

The dreamless sleep corresponds to the unperturbed current of the stream of being (*bhavanga*). The striking of the wind against the tree is like the 'past' life-moment, during which the object enters the stream and passes down with it, without perturbing it. The swaying of the branches in that wind represents the vibration of the stream of being. The falling of the fruit corresponds to the arrest or interruption of being, the moment at which the stream is 'cut off' by thought; the waking of the man to the awakening of attention in the act of cognition on occasion of sense; the removal of the head-covering to the sense-reaction of sight. The picking up of the fruit is comparable to the operation of receiving; inspection of it recalls the examining function. The simple apprehension of the fruit as such, with certain constitutive attributes of its own corresponds to the discriminative or determining stage; the eating of the fruit resembles the act of apperception. Finally, the swallowing of the last morsels that are left in the mouth corresponds to the operation of retention...¹

Regardless of our judgment about the validity of the "psychology" of this analysis of cognition, at least two facts are apparent: the whole process of apperception is subjected to

¹Ibid., p. 30.

a rigorous analysis represented by seventeen "moments" or stages. Also within the process discriminating or analytical reasoning plays an important role.

The crucial question from the standpoint of this study, however, is the application that this so-called analytical knowledge has to the quest for ultimate reality. In the *Abhidhammatthasangaha* the analyses of consciousness and mental states, of thought processes and matter and the manner in which all of them are related or synthesized is concluded by a chapter on "religious exercise" or "mental culture" (*bhāvanā*). *Bhāvanā* serves to make concrete or applicable to the salvation-quest of the individual what has heretofore been primarily the object of philosophical attention. It becomes clear that the function of analysis is, at least in part, mind or consciousness control, enabling the individual to understand what inevitably must be "experienced." Hence, the control exercised by analytical knowledge eventually gives way to the "supra-rational" (*abhiññā*) knowledge and power acquired through trance. What is attained is a state of being which the phenomenologist is compelled to classify as the "sacred" for it represents a condition of absolute purity in which all of the dross of the "profane" realm has been nullified.

In sum even the Theravādin scholastics of the 12th century could not escape the inevitable paradox to which their exaggerated concern with analysis led--namely, a type of

knowledge which is absolutely without qualification or sign (nimitta), a knowledge which, indeed, relied on the insight (vipassanā) of analytical investigation, but which in the end can only be classified as mystical or intuitive, a product of jhāna.

ANALYSIS, MEDITATION AND UNDERSTANDING: THE VISUDDHIMAGGA

As has been previously mentioned, the Buddhist emphasis on the control of the senses and the consciousness as a necessary part of the way to salvation is not unique. The mystic way in various religious traditions may involve extensive prior preparations before ultimate knowledge or "mystical union" is attained. Theravāda scholasticism is outstanding, however, in the important role assigned to categories of understanding as a means of the purification of cognitive states. Nothing illustrates this tendency more forcefully than Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga or *Path of Purity*.¹ This principal work by the most influential scholar of the Theravāda tradition is divided into three major sections--right conduct or virtue (sīla), concentration (samādhi) and understanding or wisdom (paññā). Since our concern is with paññā it is this section

¹In addition to the Pāli Text Society's edition of the *Visuddhimagga*, Henry Clarke Warren's edition in the Harvard Oriental Series (Vol. XLI) is undoubtedly the most accurate as well as the most readily available. Of the two major English translations, that done for the Pāli Text Society by Pe Maung Tin and the more recent translation by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, I have preferred the latter. It is particularly helpful in that it follows the paragraphing used by Warren and Kosambi in the Harvard Oriental Series text.

of the Visuddhimagga which will occupy our attention.

Buddhaghosa defines true understanding (paññā) as follows: "Kusalacittasampayuttam vipassanāñānam paññā" or "paññā is insight (vipassanā)-knowledge (ñāna) together with (sampayutta) good or moral consciousness (kusala-citta)."¹ He goes on to point out the similarities and dissimilarities between paññā and other ways of knowing. Like perception (saññā) and cognitive awareness (viññāna), understanding (paññā) is a condition or a state of knowing (jānana-bhāva).² Saññā is the mere perception of an object as 'blue' or 'yellow' but it does not involve penetration into the characteristics (lakkhaṇa) of the object as impermanent (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and non-self (anatta).³ Viññāna, on the other hand, exposes these true characteristics of phenomenal entities but does not make manifest the (supramundane) Path (magga) to the ultimately real. As would be expected paññā occupies this role. It goes beyond the knowledge of the nature of objects to the magga which leads to salvation. Its proximate cause is concentration (samādhi) for one who is concentrated knows and sees cor-

¹Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, eds. H. C. Warren and D. Kosambi ("Harvard Oriental Series"; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 369. The following citations in this section will refer to the chapter and paragraph of the above edition of the Visuddhimagga. See also Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification, trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli p. 479 and Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purity, trans. Pe Maung Tin (3 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1923-31), p. 506.

²14:3

³Ibid.

rectly ("samāhito yathābhūtam jānāti passatī").¹ One who knows and sees correctly, therefore, proceeds to paññā which penetrates to the "individual essences" (sabhāva) of all dhammas.² True understanding or paññā, therefore, is essentially related to the discipline of concentration (samādhi) as well as the dhammic conceptualization of all reality.

Buddhaghosa offers the reader an even more graphic description of the relationship between paññā, samādhi and the dhammic schematization by means of a tree metaphor. In this image the various structures of dhammas (i.e. khandhas, āyatanas, dhātus, indriyas, the saccas and paṭiccasamuppāda) are likened to the SOIL out of which paññā is developed; the two preparatory purifications of conduct (sīla) and consciousness (citta) are likened to the ROOTS and the purification of view (diṭṭhi), the overcoming of all doubt (kaṅkha), the attainment of the knowledge (ñāṇa) and vision (dassana) of the path (magga) and the not-path (amagga), reaching the knowledge and vision of the (middle) path (paṭipāda) and the purification of knowledge and vision (ñāṇadassanavisuddhi) are all likened to the TRUNK.³ "Consequently," states Buddhaghosa, "one who is perfecting these should first fortify his knowledge and learning and questioning about those things that are

¹14:17

²Ibid.

³14:32

the SOIL after he has perfected the two purifications that are the ROOTS; then he can develop the five purifications that are the TRUNK."¹

In a more succinct but less graphic form it might simply be said that the Buddhist path to salvation is a physical and mental discipline (the roots) in the context of an elemental or dhammic analysis of reality (the soil) which leads to purified vision and knowledge (the trunk). In fact, it is this structure around which the Visuddhimagga is constructed. The first two sections deal effectively with the "roots" of sīla and samādhi while the third section treats the "soil" of the dhammic structures and the "trunk" or the five purifications of knowledge.

In order to understand more completely the relationship between "analytical" and "intuitive" knowledge in the Visuddhimagga we now turn to the twentieth chapter on the knowledge and vision (ñāṇadassana) of what is and what is not the path where Buddhaghosa discusses three types of knowledge or, more precisely, three types of "mundane further-knowledge" or "full-understanding" (lokiya-pariñña): ñāṭapariñña (full-understanding of the known); tīraṇapariñña (full-understanding of investigation); pahāṇapariñña (full-understanding of abandoning).²

¹14:32 Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification, trans. Bhikkhu Nānamoli, pp. 488-489. *Tasmā tesu bhūmibhūtesa dhammesu uggahaparipucchāvasena ñāṇaparicayam katvā mūlabhūtā dve visuddhiyo sampādetvā sarīrabhūtā pañca visuddhiyo sampādentena bhāvetabbā.*

These three types of full-understanding are further elaborated as follows: the wisdom or understanding (paññā) which is higher knowledge (abhiññā) is knowledge (ñāṇa) by being rooted in what is known (ñātaṭṭha); wisdom which is full-understanding (pariññā) is knowledge by being rooted in investigation (tīraṇaṭṭha); wisdom which is abandonment (pa-hāna) is knowledge by being rooted in abandonment (pariccāga).¹

Full-understanding of the known is the first step in reaching knowledge about the nature of the path (magga) to salvation. It is achieved by a methodological insight (naya-vipassanā) known as the thorough understanding of the groups (kalāpa-sammasana).² Or as the text succinctly states it: "vipassanāya ca kalāpasammanam ādi"--the comprehension of the groups is the beginning of insight.³ There are two ways in which the comprehension of the groups is to be understood. In a general sense it is simply the understanding arising from the comprehension of characteristics (lakkhaṇa) of particular dhammic groups, e.g. the "body-ness" (rūppana) of body (rūpa), "feelingness" of feeling, etc. Specifically, however, full-understanding of the known includes all of the principle categories of dhammas of the Theravāda scholastics ranging from nāma/rūpa to the paṭiccasamuppāda. A study of

¹Ibid. Abhiññā-paññā ñātaṭṭhena ñāṇam, pariññāpaññā tīraṇaṭṭhena ñāṇam pahānapaññā pariccāgaṭṭhena ñāṇam.

²20:2

³Ibid.

these categories leads to the penetration of the specific characteristics of the dhammas ("dhammānam paccatta-lakkhaṇa-paṭivedhassa").¹ This process of *nāṭapariññā* is preparatory to the direct vision (*dassana*) of the path (*magga*) which arises with *tīraṇapariññā*.

Full-understanding of investigation (*tīraṇa-pariññā*) consists of penetration into the general characteristic of the dhammas encountered in the previous level of knowledge. This characteristic is that all dhammic structures are impermanent (*anicca*). There are also particular aspects of *tīraṇa-pariññā* which involve a detailed analysis of the "material" and "immaterial" dhammas pointing to the three general characteristics of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta*. This elaborate and tedious analysis in the twentieth chapter of the *Visuddhimagga* culminates in the "eighteen principal insights" (*aṭṭhārasa mahāvipassanā*).² In brief these are: (1) contemplating impermanence (*anicca*) and abandoning the perception of permanence (*nicca-saññā*); (2) contemplating suffering (*dukkha*) and abandoning the perception of pleasure (*sukha-saññā*); (3) contemplating non-self (*anatta*) and abandoning the perception of self (*atta-saññā*); (4) contemplating non-involvement (*nibbidā*) and abandoning pleasure (*nandi*); (5) contemplating dispassion (*virāga*) and abandoning passion (*rāga*); (6) contemplating cessation (*nirodha*) and abandoning origination (*samudaya*);

¹20:4

²20:90

(7) contemplating relinquishment (paṭinissagga) and abandoning of grasping (ādāna); (8) contemplating destruction (khaya) and abandoning the perception of solid masses (ghana); (9) contemplating the fall (vaya) of the dhammic structures and abandoning the accumulation of kamma; (10) contemplating change (vipariṇāma) and abandoning the perception of everlastingness (dhuva-saññā); (11) contemplating the signless (animitta) and abandoning signs (nimitta); (12) contemplating the desireless (appaṇihita) and abandoning desire (paṇidhi); (13) contemplating voidness (suññatā) and abandoning "settling-in" (abhinivesa); (14) developing insight into the dhammas of higher understanding (adhipaṇṇā-dhamma-vipassanā) and abandoning the tendency toward the grasping of essence (sārādānābhinivesa); (15) developing true knowledge and vision (yathābhutañāṇa-dassana) and abandoning the tendency toward deluded infatuation (sammohābhinivesa); (16) contemplating danger (ādīnavā) and abandoning the tendency toward dependence (ālayābhinivesa); (17) contemplating reflexion (paṭisaṅkhā) and abandoning non-reflexion (appaṭisaṅkhā); (18) contemplating turning away (vivaṭṭā) and abandoning the tendency toward bondage (samyogābhinivesa).¹

Two observations need to be made about this list. First, Buddhaghosa notes that some of the eighteen insights are not within the scope of investigating knowledge and are only pene-

¹20:90 Nānamoli elaborates the significance of these insights in a long footnote. See Buddhaghosa, The Path..., trans. Bhikkhu Nānamoli, pp. 732-733.

trated when full-understanding as abandonment is reached. Second, the insights that have been reached are consequent from the process of meditation as is indicated by Buddhaghosa's claim, "having thus become familiar with the material and immaterial meditation subjects and so having penetrated here already a part of those eighteen principal insights which are later on to be attained in all their aspects by means of full-understanding as abandoning...he (the meditator) consequently abandons things opposed to what he has already penetrated."¹ The relationship between full-understanding as investigation and the meditation act is also brought out by the word, *anupassanā*,² or *contemplation*, a meaning extended from its root significance of "looking at." Hence, in meditation one looks at or contemplates particular objects (material or immaterial) in order to attain some of the insights described above.

Through a process of inductive insight and meditation the individual understands the dhammic nature of the phenomenal world and the true nature of the characteristics of these dhammas. He is now prepared to move to full-understanding as abandoning. At this level not only are such categories as *rūpa* and *vedanā* perceived as impermanent, but any notion of permanence whatsoever is abandoned. Buddhaghosa puts it in this way: "When he (the meditator) repeatedly observes in this

¹Ibid., p. 734.

²*Anupassanā* is an abstract noun from the verb, *anu* / *passati*. Its Sks. equivalent is *anudarśana*. Rhys Davids and Stede, The Pali...Dictionary, p. 39.

way, examines and investigates material and immaterial states to see that they are impermanent, painful and non-self, then if his knowledge works keenly, formations quickly become apparent. Once his knowledge works keenly and formations quickly become apparent, he no longer extends his mindfulness to their arising and presence or occurrence or sign but brings it to bear only on their cessation and destruction, fall and breakup."¹ As we have already seen the preoccupation with dissolution and abandonment is already reflected in the eighteen insights.

Buddhaghosa elaborated three kinds of abandoning (pahāna) --by suppression (vikkhambana), substitution of opposites (tadaṅga) and by cutting off (samuccheda).² Abandoning by suppression is most naturally a part of "mundane kinds of concentration" (lokiyasamādhi).³ For example the nīvaraṇa or hindrances are suppressed in one who develops the first jhāna just as water is pressed out of a water-weed by pressing a pot on it.⁴ The form of abandoning most germane to this study of the Abhidhammikas, however, is the second, the so-called substitution of opposites. In effect this type of understanding is the "abandoning of any given state that ought to be

¹21:10 Buddhaghosa, The Path..., trans. B. Ñānamoli, p. 748.

²22:110

³Ibid.

⁴22:111

abandoned through the means of a particular factor of knowledge..."¹ For instance it would be the giving up of the false view of ego through the substitution of *nāma/rūpa* or other dhammic correlates. This form of understanding is an excellent illustration not only of a means of abandonment-knowledge, but the role played by analytical thought as one proceeds from the profane or the phenomenal to the sacred or noumenal.

Finally when abandonment-knowledge is developed as "cutting-off" (*samuccheda*) the meditator moves entirely into the realm of the noumenal or the supramundane. Here is a kinship with the last of the eighteen insights--turning away. "...At that point (the meditator's) mind is said to retreat, retract and recoil from the whole field of formations, as a water drop does on a lotus leaf that slopes a little."² Having cut off the phenomenal world of sentient existence the meditator is in a position to realize (*sacchikiriyā*) *nibbāna* first through a vision (*dassana*) and then through development (*bhāvanā*). But this development of noumenal realization receives no treatment at the hands of Buddhaghosa and he moves immediately to a consideration of the benefits derived from understanding (*paññā*).

Among the benefits derived from the development of wisdom (*paññābhāvanā*) are the removal of all the defilements (*āśeṣas*)

¹22:112 Buddhaghosa, The Path..., trans. B. Nānamoli, p. 813.

²22:121 Ibid., p. 815.

of the profane and the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpattī). Buddhaghosa makes abundantly clear, however, that cessation does not mean a state of utter passivity. Rather, it is characterized by the attainment of power (bala), the power of the unification of the mind and non-distraction and the power of insight.¹ Hence, it must be concluded that wisdom leads to a nibbānic state which not only transcends verbal definition, but which implies the attainment of a power by which/^{one}controls one's world. This control means the elimination of the threat of the profane represented primarily by the unpredictable demands of the senses as well as the attainment of supra-normal knowledge and power.

MĀDHYAMIKA

Although students of Buddhism point out that the seeds of Mādhyamika are apparent even in the earliest period of Buddhist thought,² the founder of the Mādhyamika School (Middle Way) is generally taken to be Nāgārjuna, a South Indian brahmin who flourished in the middle of the second century A.D. We have little factual material about his life but there is no reason to believe that Nāgārjuna was not an historical person.³ It is generally considered that he based his under-

¹"Katamāni pan'ettha dve balāni ..pe..katamā vasi-bhāvata tī? Na ettha kiñci amhehi vattabbam atthi; sabbam idam etassa uddesassa niddese vuttam eva." 23:19.

²Harsh Narain, "Śūnyavāda: A Reinterpretation," Philosophy East and West, XIII (January, 1964), p. 313f.

³T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (2d ed.; London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 88.

standing of Buddhism on the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras¹ and propagated his views at the famous monastery-university center at Nālandā.² A brilliant dialectician and polemicist he has been acclaimed by one well-known Buddhist scholar as the most brilliant philosopher of India.³

The importance of the place of Mādhyamika thought in the history of Buddhism is well-illustrated by Professor T. V. R. Murti's recent work, The Central Conception of Buddhism. In his opinion it is the fulcrum on which the length and breadth of Buddhist thought balances. As Richard Gard puts it, the Mādhyamika served as the transition point between the earlier Hīnayāna and the later Mahāyāna epistemological, metaphysical and religious views.⁴ Beginning with Nāgārjuna the history of the formative development of the Mādhyamika covers a period from the mid-second century to the ninth century A.D. and is

¹It is thought that the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras belong to the earliest of the Mahāyāna texts and originated in South India. There are a number of these Sūtras varying in length from over 100,000 ślokas to terse magical formulas (dhāraṇīs). The Aṣṭasahasrikā (8,000 ślokas) is probably the earliest. See M. Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, II, 313f.

²Bapat, 2500 Years of Buddhism, p. 220.

³Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhistic Thought (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1912), p. 186. For a concise study of the life and work of Nāgārjuna, see K. V. Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Sastra (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1966), p. 25f.

⁴Richard A. Gard, "Madhyamika Buddhism" (Unpublished lectures delivered at Mahamakuta Buddhist University, Bangkok, Thailand, 1956), p. 1.

divided into four periods as follows: (1) the initial formulation by Nāgārjuna and Ārya Deva emphasizing a rigorous critique of the Abhidharmikas as well as the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika systems; (2) the beginning of a split in Mādhyamika thought between proponents of a critical dialectic exclusively (Buddhapālita, the Prāsangika School) and those who upheld the importance of a constructive position as well (Bhāvaviveka, the Svatantra School); (3) a period of orthodox systematization by Candrakīrti and Śānti Deva along the lines of the Prāsangika School; (4) the assimilation of Sautrantika and Vijñānavāda elements by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.¹ Our brief investigation of the Mādhyamika School will represent the orthodox position as derived in particular from the Prajñāparāmitā literature, Nāgārjuna, Ārya Deva and Candrakīrti.²

ŚŪNYATĀ AND THE CRITICISM OF ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES

Our study of the Pāli Nikāyas and particularly the Abhidhammika tradition revealed that knowledge based on analytical and discriminating reasoning played an important role in the passage from sentient existence (or the phenomenal world) to ultimate reality (nibbāna or the noumenal realm). The positive role assigned to the rational categorization of man's

¹Murti, The Central...Buddhism, pp. 87-103.

²Principal secondary sources will be works previously cited by Murti, Ramanan, Sogen, Stcherbatsky and Conze.

existence in the sensory world was predicated on a two-fold ontology, an atomic, evanescent "real" (samskr̥ta) and a "real" which so far transcended the former as to be beyond man's ordinary ways of knowing. Man's knowledge based on perception and inference enabled him not only to control the impermanent condition of his life in the world, but played an important role in pointing to the higher and radically "other" state of being. Despite this twofold function, however, the analytical categories evolved by the Abhidhammika tradition were necessarily confined to the realm of samskr̥ta dhammas.

The Mādhyamika tradition stands in radical opposition to both the ontology and the epistemology of the Abhidhammikas. Rather than a dualistic ontology composed of samskr̥ta and asamskr̥ta dhammas, the Mādhyamikas rejected the entire dhammic scheme as being illusory. In its place they substituted a "monistic" world-view described by Nāgārjuna in the following terms: "The self-nature of all things is regarded as like shadows; they are in substance pure, serene, non-dualistic and the same as suchness."¹ Or even more descriptively in his Mādhyamika Śāstra Nāgārjuna states:

There is no difference at all.
Between Nirvana and Samsara.
There is no difference at all
Between Samsara and nirvana

¹Nāgārjuna, "Mahayana Vimsaka" (3:4), trans. Susuma Yamaguchi, A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, eds. S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 338.

What makes the limit of Nirvana
Is also then the limit of samsara
Between the two we cannot find
The slightest shade of difference.¹

Reality then is non-dual, free from all empirical predicates and relationships. As such it is denoted most frequently by the Mādhyamikas as śūnyatā, devoid of every kind of determination.

The term, śūnya or śūnyatā² has become the hallmark of the Mādhyamika tradition. As was true of the word, anatta, authorities are divided between a positive and a negative interpretation. Earlier scholars in the field of Buddhist studies such as H. Kern, M. Walleser, H. Jacobi and A. B. Keith interpreted the doctrine of śūnya as a nihilism or negativism; however, later scholars including Th. Stcherbatsky and T. V. R. Murti have interpreted it as a way of asserting a philosophical absolute.³ It seems to be most just to the meaning of the word to point out that it has a dual significance. In terms of mundane truth (samvṛti satya) it means relativity and conditioned becoming and as ultimate truth

¹Nāgārjuna, "Mādhyamika Śāstra" (24:20-21) from Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1965), p. 77.

²Śūnya is derived from the Sanskrit root *śvi*, meaning to be empty, void, etc. See Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (London: The Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 1085.

³A thorough discussion and forceful presentation of śūnya as an absolute nihilism can be found in Narain, Philosophy East and West, XIII, pp. 311-338.

(paramārtha satya) it means the unconditioned, undivided being which is the ultimate nature of the conditioned and the contingent.¹ As one scholar of Indian idealism expresses the double meaning of śūnya, "It means the unreality of the determinations as well as the reality of indeterminateness."²

The samvṛti level of śūnyatā is perhaps best illustrated by the cycle of pratītya-samutpāda or "conditioned-coproduction." It will be recalled that the Theravādins utilized this formula to illustrate the causally conditioned nature of sentient existence. Nāgārjuna, however, takes the pratītya-samutpāda a step further to show that all empirical constructs such as the skandhas which are subject to causal conditions are illusory or unreal. In the first chapter of his Mādhyamikakārikās he attacks the pratītya-samutpāda formula as follows: things that have a cause must be either real or unreal; if they are real, they do not need a cause, because they already are; if they are unreal it is meaningless to speak of their cause.⁴ Take rūpaskandha for example. Is rūpa caused by something which is rūpa or by something which

¹Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy..., pp. 172-173. See also P. T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953), p. 251.

²Raju, Idealistic...India, p. 252.

³Ibid., p. 138. See also Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, p. 141.

⁴Raju, Idealistic...India, p. 244.

is not rūpa? If it is caused by the latter, then, as the effect is not found in the cause rūpa must be uncaused. But there is nothing in the world which is uncaused. If, on the other hand rūpa is caused by something which is rūpa then there is no need of the effect because it already exists. But it is impossible for anything to exist even before it is caused. Hence, the whole question of causation which is at the root of the pratītya-samutpāda formula is self-contradictory and illusory.¹

Nāgārjuna's logical argumentation which attempts to prove the relative nature or emptiness of all rational constructs such as the pratītya-samutpāda or the skandhas is also found in the Prajñāpāramita texts:

Iha Śāriputra rūpaṃ sūnyatā...evam eva vedanā-samjñā-samskāra-vijñānam. (Here, O Sariputra, form is emptiness...the same is true of feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness)²

In the same Sūtra we read: "Iha Śāriputra, sarva-dharmāḥ sūnyatā-lakṣaṇā...(Here, O Sariputra, all dharmas are marked with emptiness)."³ The text goes on to state that since the

¹ Ibid., p. 245.

² Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 81.

³ Ibid., p. 85. Throughout various Mādhyamika texts there are extended discussions related to the notion of sūnyatā. For example, the Abhisamayālaṅkāra discusses twenty kinds of emptiness including the emptiness of the subject, the object, the emptiness of emptiness, the emptiness of essential nature, etc. See The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, Part I., trans. Edward Conze (London: Luzac & Co., 1961), p. 129f. See also Aṣṭasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, trans. Edward Conze (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1958), p. 117f.

dharmas are empty the questions of causation as well as the temporal problem of the arising and the cessation of the dharmas are no longer relevant. In sum, all of the dharma-based categories so tediously constructed by the Theravādins do not actually exist. There are no skandhas, no indriyas, no dhātus, no birth and death, no four noble truths.¹ There is only *śūnyatā* or emptiness.

It is impossible to discuss in detail the development of the notion of *śūnyatā* in *Mādhyamika* and related literature. One of the best summaries of the different uses of the term in *Prajñāpāramitā* texts has been done by Edward Conze.² He distinguishes four levels of meaning and use for *śūnyatā*-- ontological, psychological, logical and religious. The ontological level would apply to such considerations as: the denial of the self-beingness (*svabhāva*) of all dharmas; dharmas being unable to have marks (*lakṣana*); dharmas being isolated (*vivikta*) and hence not being able to act on one another; and, dharmas not being able to come into existence because they are in isolation. Psychologically the fact that dharmas are non-existent necessarily means that they cannot be apprehended, nor can they be possessed or depended upon. The primary importance of *śūnyatā* for *Mādhyamika* logic is the denial of duality. Discrimination (*vikalpa*) becomes the

¹Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books, p. 89.

²Edward Conze, "On the Ontology of the *Prajñāpāramitā*," Philosophy East and West, III (July, 1953), 117-131.

core of ignorance. Religiously *śūnyatā* is essentially related to the bodhisattva's goal of *upekṣā* or evenmindedness.

The *Prajñāpāramitā* teaching had two important consequences for the thought of Nāgārjuna. First, his position becomes a broadside rebuttal of the so-called "modaī"¹ view of the *Abhidhammikas* as well as the views of such orthodox schools as the *Sāṃkhya* and *Vaiśeṣika*. Second, we find a radical reinterpretation of the meaning of ignorance (*avidyā*) and knowledge with the consequence that intuitive knowledge (*prajñā*) plays a more significant role in the *Mādhyamika* tradition than in the *Theravāda*. In order to develop the first point it is necessary to examine Nāgārjuna's critical dialectic and then his specific criticisms of the *Abhidhamma*, *Sāṃkhya* and *Vaiśeṣika* positions.²

The main function or purpose of Nāgārjuna's dialectic is "to cut at its root the tendency to cling to the specific as ultimate..."³ It is an attack on every and any position which

¹This term is applied to the *Abhidhammikas* in T. V. R. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.

²For an extended discussion of Nāgārjuna's use of logic see Richard H. Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System," Philosophy East and West, VI (January, 1957), 291-308. In criticizing those who would interpret Nāgārjuna's use of logic only negatively, Robinson says, "There is no evidence that Nāgārjuna 'uses logic to destroy logic.' He asserts that a certain set of propositions--the Buddhist doctrine--is true under a certain condition, that of emptiness, and false under another condition, that of own-beingness." (p. 307).

³Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy..., p. 171.

takes a particular conception of the ultimate as being the ultimate itself. Murti likens Nāgārjuna's attack on conceptual categories to Kant's suspicion of the ability of the categories of the understanding to comprehend an object beyond sensory perception.¹ The Mādhyamika dialectic, then, rather than being simply destructive or nihilistic is an attempt to prove that the ultimate cannot be adequately captured within the framework of the conceptual categories of existence and non-existence.

Those who cling to the existence view stand opposed to those who cling to the non-existence view. On account of this opposition there arise (contentions of) right and wrong; on account of such contentions there arise disputes. On account of disputes there arise the elements of bondage. On account of the elements of bondage there arise deeds (that bind creatures to stages of suffering). From such deeds ways of evil become open. In the true nature of things there are not these oppositions nor these (contentions of) right and wrong nor (the consequent) disputes.²

In its classical four-fold form the dialectic affirms that entities cannot be described in terms of: existence,

¹Murti, The Central...Buddhism, p. 126. Murti, Raju and others frequently make comparisons between Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophers such as Nāgārjuna or Vasubandhu and such classical philosophers in the West as Kant, Hegel and Bradley. R. H. Robinson in Philosophy East and West, VI, p. 308, dissents from this tradition contending that the most fruitful comparisons with the logic of Nāgārjuna are to be made with the Eleatics and Plato. To illustrate the diversity of opinion on this score, Agehananda Bharati in The Tantric Tradition (London: Rider & Co., 1965), p. 14, insists that scholars of Indian philosophy need to employ the "more sophisticated tools of multi-value-logic, logical empiricism, and linguistic analysis."

²Nāgārjuna, "Mādhyamika Śāstra" (331b) from Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy..., p. 175.

non-existence, both existence and non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence.¹ In regard to Nirvāṇa for example, the dialectic would unfold itself with the following logic:²

(1) Nirvāṇa cannot be an existent (bhava) because an existent entity like vijñāna (consciousness) must suffer decay and death which nirvāṇa cannot and therefore that which has no decay and death cannot have an existent form.

(2) It cannot be a non-existent (abhava) because non-existence implies a change undergone by an existent and since there can be no non-existence without a positive counterpart, nirvāṇa is not non-existence.

(3) It cannot be both existence and non-existence for then mokṣa or deliverance would be both existence and non-existence which would necessarily mean the presence of saṃskāras but as their presence would not represent a condition of deliverance, nirvāṇa cannot be both existence and non-existence.

(4) Finally, nirvāṇa cannot be neither bhava nor abhava since it is signless (animitta) and cannot be known by empirical consciousness (vijñāna) but only by an indefinable transcendental consciousness (prajñā). Hence, it cannot be clearly defined that nirvāṇa is not neither existence nor non-existence.

¹Ibid., p. 155f.

²These points are only a partial development of Nāgārjuna's argumentation. See Dutt, Early...Buddhism, pp. 189-192.

Having seen how Nāgārjuna applied the four-fold negation to the category of nirvāṇa, we must now examine some of his criticisms of the constructive categories of the Abhidhammikas.¹ It will be recalled that in the Abhidhammika ontology the saṃskṛta realm was composed of ultimate, durationless, atomic entities called dhammas constantly flashing into existence and then subsiding into non-existence. All saṃskṛta entities are subject to causal relations divided into causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaṃya). The Abhidhammikas held these dhammic entities and their causal conditions to be ultimately real. This position is denied by Nāgārjuna.

There absolutely are no things,
Nowhere and none, that arise (anew),
Neither out of themselves, nor out of non-self,
Nor out of both, nor at random.

Four can be the conditions
(Of every thing produced),
Its cause, its object, its foregoing moment,
Its most decisive factor.

In these conditions we can find
No self existence of the entities.
Where self-existence is deficient,
Relational existence also lacks.²

Candrakīrti's commentary on these passages brings out the orthodox Mādhyamika criticism of the Abhidhammika scheme of causally conditioned dhammas, namely, that production demands relationship (e.g., seed to sprout) and relationship means

¹Murti, The Central...Buddhism, p. 192. Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy..., p. 171.

²Nāgārjuna, "Mādhyamika Śāstra" (1:1-3) from Stcherbatsky, The Conception...Nirvana, p. 71.

preexistence but if entities preexist in their causes "...they would have been perceived and their (new) production would have been useless."¹

In more specific terms, the Mādhyamika Śāstra presents an elaborate criticism of the four causal conditions.² In regard to the first condition Nāgārjuna asks, what is produced? If an existent then the question of cause is irrelevant, but if it is non-existent it is senseless. So then if nothing (neither an existent nor a non-existent) is produced the question of "cause" is meaningless. But what about the "object" of cognition? If it is the condition of an existent cognition then it is not necessary as a condition, and if it is the condition of a non-existent cognition then it is inconceivable. The third condition of "foregoing moment" is the condition that there is a moment of extinction before the production of an entity; however, if there is a moment which indeed is an absolute extinction then how can it function as a condition of causation? Furthermore, if (as has already been shown) there is no origination of an existent or a non-existent, then how could there be an extinction? As far as the fourth or decisive condition is concerned, the Śāstra observes that if entities are devoid of self-nature then the position 'this being, that becomes' cannot be maintained; or

¹Candrakīrti, "Prasannapadā" (1:42) from Ibid., pp. 166-167.

²Nāgārjuna, "Mādhyamika Śāstra" (104b-105b; 296b-297b) from Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy..., pp. 180-182.

if the entities possess an absolute self-nature then it could not function as a condition of the other existent entities since they also would necessarily be absolute.

The realm of *samskr̥ta dhammas* was classified by the Abhidhammikas into various categories the most prevalent of which were *khandha*, *dhātu* and *āyatana*. These categories or "modes" are criticized by Nāgārjuna as being as reality-less as the "substantial" view the Abhidhammikas are concerned to reject. Both "modes" and "substance" are simply inadequate descriptions of reality and, hence, are *samvṛti satya* or mundane truth. As an example of Nāgārjuna's attack on these traditional categories we turn to his analysis of the *dhātus*.

The earliest *dhātu* classification is not the well-known eighteen element modification of the *āyatana* classification, but the six bases of earth, water, fire, air, ether (*ākāśa*) and consciousness.¹ In criticizing these basic elements of which phenomenal things are composed, Nāgārjuna raises the question of the relationship between the elements and their characteristics. Is there any distinction between the "qualified" and the "quality?" If not, they cannot be defined or distinguished from one another. If there is a distinction, however, which is the prior, the element or its defining characteristic? If the former then it can exist without its specific property and hence would be nondescript, but as a

¹Murti, The Central...Buddhism, p. 89.

non-descript entity is a non-entity such a thing could not be an object of experience. If the characteristic is prior, however, then it could exist by itself and there would be no need of the element. The entire scheme of dhātus must be meaningless because the elements and their characteristics can be taken neither as being together nor separate.¹

To prolong the examination of the Mādhyamika criticism of the Abhidhammikas or other philosophical systems would unduly extend the limits of our study. Suffice it to point out that the two non-Buddhist traditions to come under the strongest attack were the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika and in particular their teachings regarding causes and conditions which provided for the Mādhyamika "...eminent examples of the extremes of existence and non-existence, identity and difference, one and many."² The Mādhyamika, as we would expect, found the same fundamental problem with these schools as with the Abhidhammikas, namely, the attempt to conceptualize ultimate reality. To describe the specific nature of the ultimate ground of the world or the specific nature of the relationship between contingent entities to the ultimate is an anathema to the Mādhyamikas for the simple reason that these relative conceptions are taken as ultimate.

¹ Ibid., pp. 189-191. See also Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy...., pp. 207-208.

² Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy...., p. 179.

PRAJÑĀ AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE DIALECTIC

We have seen how the Mādhyamika employed a critical dialectic in order to undermine confidence in the ability of human reason to conceptualize ultimate reality. Seen from this perspective alone, the Mādhyamika position is, indeed, nihilistic; however, we are not left with only the negation of the categories of the constructive intellect. The function of the dialectic is to lead the religious man to a higher truth (paramārtha satya) acquired by prajñā or intuition. Morphologically, therefore, just as the analytical categories of the Abhidhammikas are necessary steps to higher insight so the critical dialectic of the Mādhyamika is essential to achieve the same end. If the function of the constructive intellect in the Theravāda-Abhidhamma tradition is to gain the power of the sacred by the control of consciousness and the concomitant transcendence of the world of sense, might it not be the case that the Mādhyamika use of negative logic, in fact, performs an identical function for the Mādhyamika? Thus, even though the epistemologies and ontologies of the Abhidhammika and the Mādhyamika traditions are radically different, as we have attempted to point out, the function of reason is very similar. In fact, we might put forward the claim that the Mādhyamikas have even more confidence in the use of analytical reason as one of the stages of the path toward salvation than do the Abhidhammikas; for, whereas the latter acknowledge the crucial importance of constructive

categories as "way stations" from the "common-sensory perceived" to the "non-describably perceived," the Mādhyamikas obviously believe that it is possible to achieve knowledge of the ultimate through the negation rather than the construction of rational categories. In this manner, the previously acknowledged importance of the ontological and the metaphysical ("objective") is minimized and the epistemological or "subjective" is maximized. As is evidenced in various forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism in China and Japan influenced by the Mādhyamika¹ enlightenment is attained only through the experience of the individual freed from the context of conceptualized philosophical schemes. In a more philosophical vein, "the essence of the Mādhyamika attitude, ...consists in not allowing oneself to be entangled in views and theories, but just to observe the nature of things without a standpoint (bhuta-pratyavekṣa)."²

Steadfastly refusing to be tied down to any particular "view" yet having great confidence in the ability of the reason to control and overcome the power of the empirical world the Mādhyamikas arrive at śūnyatā or the ultimate only in prajñāpāramitā or the perfection of intuitive wisdom.³ Prajñāpāramitā is not caused by the critical dialectic even though

¹In particular Ch'an or Zen.

²Murti, The Central...Buddhism, p. 209.

³Ibid., p. 213.

the dialectic is necessary to free the intellect from attachment to illusory conceptualizations. Perhaps it is clearest to say that the highest knowledge, while not unrelated to those positive aspects of knowledge in the sensory world which lead to the destruction of the defilements (kilesas) and the rooting out of the sense of "I" and "mine", nevertheless, stands alone as an integral principle that comprehends all aspects of cognition as well as emotion, truth as well as compassion.¹ Ultimately *prajñāpāramitā* is unthinkable, incomparable, immeasurable, incalculable and unequalled.² In the final analysis it cannot be separated from *śūnyatā*. It, itself, is the ultimately real.

How is this intuitive knowledge which transcends both empirical designations as well as dialectical logic reached? In part, as we have indicated, it is attained as a result of the rigorous exercise of logic and intellectual dialectic which in effect purifies the mind. On one level the relationship between logic and intuition might be thought of as a philosophical one; however, the fundamental point is religious. *Prajñāpāramitā* is the goal of the bodhisattva, the religious man par excellence of the Mahāyāna tradition. In relationship to the bodhisattva ideal *prajñā* is the last of the perfections (*pāramitās*) to be acquired. Yet the preceeding *pāramitās* (e.g. charity, moral-

¹Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy..., p. 118.

²Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā 13:1, p. 101.

ity, patience, strenuousness and meditation) not only culminate in *prajñā*, but are contingent for their effectiveness on it. As D. T. Suzuki graphically described it, "...*Prajñā* is like the earth which makes possible the growth of vegetation. All the other conditions may be there for a seed to grow, but without the earth it will never grow. So without *prajñā*, the other *pāramitās* will altogether lose their potentiality, there will be no life in them."¹ Without *prajñā* the bodhisattva is like a bird that cannot fly properly or a jar that has not been fully baked.²

The *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* describe five levels of *prajñā*. Basically these levels represent a clearing away of conceptual restrictions and the attainment of the highest truth (*śūnyatā*). These five levels are described as (1) *māmsacakṣus*, eye of flesh, (2) *divyacakṣus*, the deva eye or eye of the gods, (3) *prajñācakṣus*, the eye of wisdom, (4) *dharmacakṣus*, eye of dharma, and (5) *Buddhacakṣus*, the eye of the Buddha.³ The eye of flesh and the deva eye are limited to the realm of form. When *mām-sacakṣus* is purified through moral deeds, the bodhisattva becomes aware of the whole of visible *rūpa*, "a world-system consisting of 1,000,000,000 worlds."⁴ The *devacakṣus*,

¹D. T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (3rd series; London: Luzac & Co., 1934), p. 212.

²Ibid., pp. 212-213.

³The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, Part I, p. 43. See also Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy..., p. 355.

⁴The Large...Wisdom, Part I, p. 44.

purified through dhyāna and samādhi leads to a knowledge of birth and death and the causal factors behind them. At these levels of knowledge everything is still thought to have its own nature. The wisdom eye (prajñācakṣus) represents a level of knowledge in which the notion of separate dhammas is overcome. The eye of dharma produces all of the powers acquired by the arahat.¹ Furthermore, it is born from the bodhisattva's compassion to save all sentient beings. The buddha eye, however, is the highest. In it all the other levels of knowing merge.

It is the comprehension that is non-exclusive, neither exclusive of the mundane nor of the ultimate. It is the comprehension in which the true nature of things is clear as daylight; it is at the same time the bearing of limitless love and compassion toward all beings. It is the comprehension in which ignorance and passion have been concluded and which is aware that the true nature of ignorance is itself wisdom, that the true nature of passion is itself compassion. It is the true wisdom.²

It is true, as we have already pointed out, that the epistemology and the ontology of the Mādhyamikas is radically different from the philosophical position of the Abhidhammikas; nevertheless, in the end both the arahat and the bodhisattva gain a knowledge of the ultimately real by means of a mystical intuition which transcends ordinary ways of knowing. It is true that the Mādhyamikas' concern that the ultimate could

¹Ibid., p. 46.

²Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy..., p. 126.

not be captured by the human mind led them to a rejection of the analytical structures of the Abhidhammikas; however, they were just as convinced as their Theravādin brethren that the phenomenal world per se must be transcended. We have suggested in this chapter that, indeed, the logical method of a Nāgārjuna might well be construed as performing a function parallel to the positive conceptualization of the Abhidhammikas--namely, both disciplining the consciousness as well as pointing the way to a higher reality. The Mādhyamika approach is, of course, much more radical since it does not provide an analytical scheme which could function as an intermediary stage along the way to nirvāṇa. As we shall see in the following section the Yogācārins in many ways represent a synthesis of both of these approaches.

YOGĀCĀRA

In concluding this study of the nature and function of knowledge and its relationship to soteriology in the post-Nikāya tradition, it is necessary to look all too briefly at the Yogācārins. Metaphysically the Yogācāra tradition is generally classified as an "absolute idealism"¹; however, as a religious philosophy it can be taken as representing a synthesis of the more analytically inclined Abhidhammikas and the more mystically oriented Mādhyamikas. We have seen that for the Theravāda scholastics analytical categories functioned

¹Conze, Buddhist Thought In India, p. 251.

both as a description of an ontological reality as well as part of the discipline of the control of man's conscious states. Religiously both functions are significant aspects of the Theravādins quest for ultimate reality. In contrast it was shown that the Mādhyamikas' rejection of the rational constructs of the Abhidhammikas opened up the way for a greater emphasis on the sole role of intuitive or mystical knowledge of the ultimate; however, it was suggested that the rigorous negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna might, indeed, have served a similar function as the positive Abhidhammika constructs as a means to control man's consciousness. In other words, by the use of negative modes of reasoning the Mādhyamikas might not only have been reflecting the traditional mystical stance of the via negativa, but making a seemingly nihilistic dialectic a positive means for structuring the consciousness toward a radically new kind of conscious awareness appropriate for the attainment of the ultimately real or the sacred.

The Yogācārins were inheritors of both of these traditions. They were profoundly aware of the fact that the ultimately real is beyond normal human perception and even understanding; however, they were also convinced of the necessity of conceptual guidelines that would assure a greater degree of control for the human consciousness as it struggled to reach ultimate reality. It is, therefore, in the Yogācāra school that the paradox of the radical control of the human

consciousness and its equally radical freedom meet. In support of the former we can point to the fact that philosophically the Yogācārins extended the traditional seventy-five categories of the Sarvāstivādins to one hundred; in support of the latter it can simply be stated that for this Buddhist school alone ultimate reality becomes pure, undifferentiated consciousness--viśuddhavijñāna.¹ This same paradox is encapsuled in the dual titles for this school, the Yoga-cārins or practioners of yoga-control and the Vijñānavādins or those who teach the way of consciousness.

The foundations of Buddhist idealistic thought of which the Yogācārins are representatives is said to have had its roots in the philosophy of Aśvaghoṣa and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra.² As Aśvaghoṣa is considered to have been a contemporary of King Kanishka³ it can be said that Yogācāra thought began its development in the second century A.D., although it is generally agreed to have reached its apogee in the writings of the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu.⁴ Many important Buddhist thinkers were influenced by Asanga and Vasubandhu⁵ such as Sthiramati

¹Raju, Idealistic...India, p. 256.

²Dasgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 79.

³Bapat, 2500...Buddhism, p. 218. This position is based on Suzuki's studies and is strongly contested.

⁴Conze, Buddhist...India, p. 250.

⁵Philosophically their most important works are the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha by Asanga and the Vimśatīka and Triṃśīka by Vasubandhu. Conze, Buddhist...India, p. 251.

and the younger Dharmapāla, but the best-known were probably Dignāga, the pre-eminent figure in the history of Buddhist logic, and Dharmakīrti, the "Immanuel Kant of India."¹ Takakusu traces three lines of development after the death of Vasubandhu: (1) Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Śīlabhadra and Hsüan-tsang with the center being at the University of Nālandā; (2) Gunamati, Sthiramati and Paramārtha with the center of this school at the University of Valabhi; (3) a third line which soon died out represented by Nanda and Jayasena but which influenced the thought of Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang.² Our primary sources of information will be the earliest roots of Yogācāra in the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra and the writings of Asanga and Vasubandhu.

CATEGORIES AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Like the Sarvāstivādins the Yogācārins structured the universe into numerous categories of elements or dharmas. Like the "realistic" schools the dharmas were separated into two basic divisions--the saṃskṛta (constructed or phenomenal) and the asaṃskṛta (unconstructed or noumenal); however, their number was increased to one hundred and was classified as follows: (1) vijñāna or citta, eight; (2) caitta or caitasika, fifty-one; (3) rūpa, eleven; (4) citta-viprayukta or vīptayukta-

¹Bapat, 2500...Buddhism, p. 225.

²Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1956), pp. 83-84.

saṃskāra, twenty-four; (5) six asaṃskṛta dharmas.¹ It is unnecessary for the purposes of this study to analyze this structure in detail. The studies of such scholars as Sogen, Takakusu and Rosenberg serve as convenient references. The first category of vijñāna or citta does, however, deserve our special attention.²

It will be recalled that for the Theravādin scholastics there were six fundamental types of consciousness including five categories of sense consciousness (i.e., eye, ear, nose, tongue and body) and the mental or mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāna). The Yogācārinś accepted all of these but appended two more--manas or the "subconscious mind"³ and ālaya-vijñāna or "ideation-store" consciousness.⁴ Whether dealing with the

¹Sogen, Systems...Thought, p. 217. Takakusu, The Essentials...Philosophy, p. 94a. Otto Rosenberg, Die Probleme der Buddhistischen Philosophie ("Materialen zur Kunde des Buddhismus," Heft 7-8; Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1924), p. 127f.

²There is a great amount of confusion as to how the various Sanskrit terms indicating consciousness, cognitive awareness, mind, etc., should be translated in the Yogācāra tradition. Part of the confusion stems from the fact that in some sources different terms may be basically equated (e.g., citta and vijñāna in the Lankāvatāra) whereas in others either more exact distinctions will be made or different terms used. In most instances, I shall try to clarify my use of terms in translation either by reference to the Sanskrit word, or to the text in question. See the following: Sogen, Systems...Thought, p. 218. D. T. Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1930), p. 176.

³There are certain striking similarities between the psychological theories of C. G. Jung regarding the "collective unconscious" and the Yogācāra notion of ālaya-vijñāna.

⁴Suzuki, Studies...Sutra, p. 169f.

Lankāvatāra, the Triṃśika or other Yogācārin sources there is general agreement that the highest reality is pure undifferentiated consciousness, (e.g., cittamātratā, vijnāpatimātratā, etc.).¹ Just as there is no substantive distinction between the ocean and its waves, so all eight forms of consciousness are in substance identical and differ only in form.²

In the Triṃśika these forms of consciousness are said to undergo three "transformations":

These transformations are of three kinds.

They are the consciousness of "ripening in a different life,"

The consciousness of intellection, and the consciousness of the discrimination of the objective world. First of all the ālaya (ideation store) consciousness, which brings into fruition all seeds (or effects of good and evil deeds).

(In its state of pure consciousness), it is not conscious of its clings and impressions.

.....

The second transformation

Is called the mind-consciousness,

Which, while it depends on the ideation-store consciousness, in turn conditions it.

Its nature and characteristic consists of intellection.

.....

Next comes the third transformation,

Which consists of the last six categories of discrimination

Its nature and characteristic consists of the discrimination of objects.

.....

Based on the mind-consciousness

The five consciousnesses (of the senses) manifest

¹Raju, Idealistic...India, p. 269.

²The Lankāvatāra Sutra, trans. D. T. Suzuki (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1932), p. 42.

themselves in concomitance with the objective world.
 Sometimes the senses manifest themselves together,
 and sometimes not,
 Just as waves are dependent on the water.

Thus the various consciousnesses are but transformations.

That which discriminates and that which is discriminated

Are, because of this, both unreal.

For this reason, everything is mind only.¹

What does this doctrine of pure consciousness mean in terms of the data of human experience? For example are objects merely illusory? The answer is both yes and no.² Objects exist in that they are representations of consciousness stored in "seed" (bīja) form in the "collective unconsciousness" and are manifested or evolved through the mind and sensory consciousnesses; however, objects do not exist in the sense of having their own

¹Vasubandhu, "Trīṃśika", trans. Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book In Indian Philosophy, pp. 334-336. This process of transformation is discussed by Junjiro Takakusu in The Essentials... Philosophy, p. 82 as follows: "When all things are reflected on our mind, our discriminating or imagining power is already at work. This is called our consciousness (vijñāna). Since the consciousness coordinating all reflected elements stores them, it is called the store-consciousness or ideation-store.... The ideation-store itself is an existence of causal combination, and in it the pure and the tainted elements are causally combined or intermingled. When the ideation-store begins to move and descend to the everyday world, then we have the manifold existence that is only an imagined world. The ideation-store, which is the seed-consciousness, is the conscious center and the world manifested by ideation is its environment."

²Vasubandhu, Wei Shih Er Shih Lun (The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation Only), trans. Clarence H. Hamilton, XIII (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1938), p. 21f. Jiryo Masuda, Der Individualistische Idealismus der Yogacara-schule ("Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, Heft 10"; Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1926), p. 26f. Baju, Idealistic...India, p. 270.

self-nature (svabhāva). Objects take their nature only from the various forms of consciousness which in relationship to the process of cognition are classified into three categories (corresponding to the three transformations of consciousness): parikalpita, paratantra and pariniṣpanna.¹

Parikalpita means "imagined" or "contrived" and refers, in effect, to the world of common sense. Fundamentally this is the world of subject-object distinctions. Paratantra refers to the level of knowledge in which common-sense objects are understood to be the inter-dependent arising of dhammas. Finally, Pariniṣpanna or "perfected" knowledge recognizes that the empirical object does not exist in the manner in which it is imagined; it is free from all discrimination of signs, names, entities and marks and is pure "suchness" (tathatā) which is pure consciousness.

In all three "types" of post-Nikāya Buddhism we find a pattern of knowledge which is similar to that in the Nikāyas themselves. There is a general agreement that pure sense impressions are to be rejected. The path to salvation involves a control of the senses which demands a new kind of knowledge. Initially that knowledge represents a transition from the "profane" or mere sensory reality to the "sacred" or ultimate reality. In the Abhidhammikas and the Yogācārins that "transition" takes the form of dhammic categories which have both

¹Takakusu, The Essentials...Philosophy, p. 95.

ontological as well as psychological significance. Above all they function as an important means by which to control man's cosmos. The Mādhyamikas attempt to control states of cognitive awareness another way--through rigorous logical dialectic. In all three schools, however, "control" gives way to release or freedom in the form of mystical, intuitive, supra-rational "knowledge." The Yogācārins present us with the most clear-cut consequence of this position, namely, not only that all subject-object distinctions have evaporated or that the ultimate is śūnyatā or emptiness, but that ultimate reality is consciousness itself.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT: A CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS QUEST IN THE RETROSPECT OF EARLY BUDDHISM

Early Buddhism developed at a critical period in the history of India's religions. It was a time of scepticism and agnosticism regarding traditional religious ideas and practices. Consequently, the religious man was forced on a personal quest for the ultimately real. The sacred could no longer simply be accepted or assumed; it had to be proved in the sense of being perceived by oneself.

The contemporary religious scene in America, so obviously different from sixth century B. C. India, shares with it the characteristics of scepticism and agnosticism. The best sellers among theological tracts are works by the "secular theologians" and "God is dead" paperbacks. Articles are written which herald the present day as a "post-Christian era." Within this period of religious and ethical turmoil there are appearing not only those professional theologians and religious philosophers who are trying to reshape and reformulate the traditional views of the sacred and the ways of relating to it, but certain individuals who seem to be

saying, much as the religious innovators of ancient India did, that the ultimately real can be known only by individual, direct perception. They are the religious revolutionaries, the religieux nouveaux, who are saying that the old way of trying to know God has failed and that we must now turn to a new way, a radically personal and individualistic way, a way that will serve to re-establish the sacred.

These religieux nouveaux would include such individuals as Alan Watts, Aldous Huxley, Richard Alpert, Timothy Leary and a number of others representing a wide variety of views and interests. As a group, however, they have been attracted by Eastern thought in various forms, in particular Vedānta and more recently Zen. Some of them have also been the foremost spokesmen for the use of psychedelic drugs as a means to assist individuals in the perception of religious realities.

Most of these "avant garde" spokesmen are not taken seriously by traditional Christian and Jewish churchmen and theologians, much less by the average church-goer. They are so far on the fringes of orthodox thought that there seems to be little hope that they will make any noteworthy contribution to the mainstream of religious thought or practice in this country. Some of the group mentioned above are, of course, much more "respectable" than others. Alan Watts, while a popularizer, is highly enough regarded by the academic establishment to have been subsidized by the Bollingen Foundation for a two year period of study at Harvard, and

Aldous Huxley is well known as a man of some stature in literary circles. But such figures as Richard Alpert and Timothy Leary, however, are considered with much more suspicion than Watts or Huxley primarily for their advocacy of the use of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and other drugs as aids to "religious experience."

By and large these "religious revolutionaries" as a group have exploited Eastern religions as a justification for their views. Some, such as Alan Watts, have been writing books on Eastern religions since the 1930's. Others such as Leary and Alpert have used Eastern religions primarily as a means to interpret the drug experience.¹ They are sometimes led to make unfortunate and obvious distortions of Eastern religious traditions in order to justify their advocacy of drug use.

As a group there are wide variations among them, but they have a common concern for the experience of a "ground of being," and they are in general agreement that ultimate reality is a unity lying beyond all phenomenal diversity. The religious quest for these religieux nouveaux is the realization, experience or direct knowledge of this unity.

¹Alpert and Leary have found Tibetan Buddhism particularly useful as an aid to "program" the drug experience. For example, they have collaborated with Ralph Metzner in planning an LSD "trip" using the Tibetan Book of the Dead.

It is a transcendence of "self-conscious selfhood,"¹ an awareness of a "total reality in its immanent otherness,"² a direct perception of the truth of the enigmatic saying that the ultimate reality or Dharma-body is "the hedge at the bottom of the garden".³ According to the testimony of Alan Watts, "The feeling of self is no longer confined to the inside of the skin. Instead, my individual being seems to grow out of the rest of the universe...so that my center is also the center of the whole."⁴ The experience of the ground of the sacred, therefore, is the apprehension that individuals do not come into the world but out of it as leaves of a tree.⁵ In addition to their concern for the experience of a unitary ground of being immanent in the cosmos, the religieux nouveaux share certain other characteristics in common. Among them are the following: (1) a criticism of Western society as the agency alienating man from the natural unity of things, (2) a romantic attachment to nature as the expression of the natural harmony of the universe, (3) the importance of sensory awareness in the

¹Aldous Huxley, Through the Doors of Perception/Heaven and Hell (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), p. 67.

²Ibid., p. 78.

³Ibid., p. 19.

⁴Alan Watts, The Joyous Cosmology (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 65.

⁵Alan Watts, The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), p. 8.

experience of ultimate reality, (4) an "optimistic humanism" regarding the consequences of the individual's direct perception of the ultimate unity of all things.

One common characteristic of these religious revolutionaries is their deep suspicion of Western culture and society. As the Old Testament prophets who saw Israel being seduced by the practices of Canaanite and Babylonian cultures, these innovators envisage the hallowed forms of the establishment and the status quo as the primary forces alienating man from his true personhood. Aldous Huxley writing on the relationship between the individual and culture raises the question, "How can he (the individual) continue to enjoy the benefits of culture without at the same time, being stupefied or frenziedly intoxicated by its poisons?"¹ By pure receptivity and mental silence, says Huxley, the doors of perception can be cleansed of their acculturated habits and new forms of consciousness will emerge.² Richard Alpert and Timothy Leary speak of the expansion of consciousness with the use of LSD and other psychedelic drugs as a "fifth freedom," "...the freedom to expand one's consciousness beyond artifactual cultural knowledge. The freedom to move from constant preoccupation with the verbal games--the social games, the game of self--to the joyous unity of what exists

¹Aldous Huxley, "Culture and the Individual," LSD: The Consciousness-Expanding Drug, ed. David Solomon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964), p. 40.

²Ibid. \

beyond."¹

In his pretentiously titled volume, The Book, Alan Watts appends the subtitle, "On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are." Watts means by this subtitle that Western man has a badly distorted notion of what it means to be a person. He contends that Western culture has deluded man into thinking he is an independent, separate and isolated ego. In effect our society has produced a taboo against "knowing who you are." "The lowdown on life," says Watts, "is that our normal sensation of self is a hoax or, at best, a temporary role that we are playing, or have been conned into playing--with our own tacit consent..."² Watts is particularly critical of the activism of liberal Protestantism since it reflects "...the mythology of the world of objects, and of man as the separate ego."³ Instead of frantically doing numerous "good works" to compensate for the guilt arising from what society actually is and what we define the ideal society to be, we would be better off sensitizing our perceptions to the full potency of the claim that the individual and the universe are one. "As it is, we are merely bolting our lives--gulping down undigested experiences as fast as we can stuff them in--because awareness of our own existence

¹From the foreword to Watts, The Joyous Cosmology, p. x.

²Watts, The Book:...., p. 11.

³Ibid., p. 98.

is so superficial and so narrow that nothing seems to us more boring than simple being."¹

The critical stance toward social structures adopted by these innovators is complemented by a profoundly romantic appreciation for nature, particularly its natural harmony and unity. The opposites of the physical world, says Watts, are complementary and not in opposition. Thus, if we conceive of wave or particle vibrations effecting the sensations, there is never a crest without a trough or a particle without an interval. Sound is actually sound/silence and light is not pure light but light/darkness. Modern man, laments Watts, usually fails to recognize this pattern of "black-and-white" in the natural world and sees himself over-against his environment. The game of "black-and-white," then, becomes the game of "white must win," the battle of survival which ignores the interdependence of the two sides. The only way by which to overcome the fictions which form the traditional ways of thinking about the world is to accept the fact that "the world is your body," the recognition that "...I the individual organism, am a structure of such fabulous ingenuity that it calls the whole universe into being."² For Aldous Huxley under the influence of mescaline, a simple bouquet of flowers came to signify

¹Ibid., p. 128.

²Ibid., p. 95.

"...a transience that was yet eternal life, a perpetual perishing that was at the same time pure Being, a bundle of minute, unique particulars in which, by some unspeakable and yet self-evident paradox, was to be seen the divine source of all existence."¹

The knowledge of the essential unity of the self and the universe results from what is frequently called by the religieux nouveaux as an "expansion of consciousness," an exstasis, or in the jargon of the psychedelic advocates, "blowing the mind." In the rather jejune words of Timothy Leary, "...it becomes necessary for us to go out of our minds in order to use our heads."² It is at this point that the advocates of the use of psychedelic drugs such as mescaline, psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) play a particularly important role. These drugs produce an effect which Leary describes as a "...temporary suspension of imprinting..."³ That is, the psychedelic drugs produce a release of the fixed perceptual patterns returning the individual's nervous system to a "state of disorganized flux closely analogous to that of infancy."⁴ Under such changes of the nervous system the individual's consciousness is open in a unique way to

¹Huxley, Through the Doors of Perception/..., p. 18.

²Timothy Leary, "Introduction," LSD: The Consciousness-Expanding Drug, ed. David Solomon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964), p. 13.

³Ibid., p. 20.

⁴Ibid., p. 21.

"reimprinting," to the attainment of a new knowledge or awareness never before possible. In this condition two factors become extremely important--the "set" and the "setting." The set refers to all that the individual himself brings to the experience, his background, training and expectations of the experience. The setting refers to the environment or the milieu in which the experience takes place. The factors of set and setting along with the "guide" during the LSD "trip" play a determining role, since the heightened sensory awareness and vulnerability to internal and external stimuli produced by the drug result in a loss of cognitive and rational control.

It is clearly evident that the knowledge attained by the use of psychedelic drugs, while providing an awareness of a radically different dimension of human consciousness, nevertheless, is a knowledge derived through the senses. For the religieux nouveaux the senses play a crucial role in the realization of a higher state of conscious awareness. In this respect they represent a startling contrast to early Buddhism. The consequences of their position are also quite different. Their emphasis on the sensory leads them to embrace the physical and the material completely. On the one hand this emphasis has produced in some quarters an exaggerated hedonism; on the other, it has resulted in a kind of utopian "optimistic humanism." Man, the religieux nouveaux contend, as a part of nature is basically good and loving.

If he can but realize his original state of harmony and oneness with the physical world, there will be peace and happiness in the world. Richard Alpert echoed this position in addressing a conference on drugs at Oberlin College. When attacked for advocating a position of complete irresponsibility regarding the important social problems of our day, such as the racial crisis and the Vietnam war, he simply responded that if individuals would only "turn on," then such problems would easily solve themselves.

The religieux nouveaux have put before us a "religious model" which superficially bears some resemblances to the Indian religious tradition. In the retrospect of our study of early Buddhism and the categories used to describe the nature of religion, we must now seriously raise the question as to the adequacy of the model of these contemporary religious innovators.

For early Buddhism there was a clear distinction between the profane and the sacred. The profane was the empirical or phenomenal world, the sphere of sensory realities. Profane consciousness, therefore, was consciousness bound by the chaotic, multiplicity of individual objects. To break out of this condition of "un-freedom" the individual needed to arrive at a knowledge of the impermanent nature of all existent entities. Such knowledge was an essential step in breaking the power of the profane. It could be arrived at by inductive analysis of the phenomenal world coupled with

various methods to control the empirical consciousness; however, this process did not finally eventuate in the knowledge of the ground of the sacred. Such knowledge was achieved only through a "transformation" consciousness, a radically "other" consciousness appropriate to the nature of the reality known. In the Pāli texts, knowledge of the ultimate was a "knowing by seeing" and, hence, a direct knowledge like knowledge of sensory existents. However, it represented an apperception unlike that associated with the world of things. It was a knowledge of the "freed-mind," that mind or con-sciousness not dependent upon the senses.

The religieux nouveaux have a totally different attitude toward the phenomenal world than early Buddhism. Whereas they are critical of social structures, they find in the world of nature a model of harmony and unity in which man must realize his unique selfhood as part of the larger cosmic whole. Because of this basically affirmative view of the physical world including man's body, the way in which this "immanent-transcendent unity" is known is through the senses. The function of the psychedelic drug is primarily to expand the sensory system so that through it normal perceptual patterns might be broken. By way of contrast, the early Buddhist's suspicion of the material world, in particular the senses and objects of sense, led them to espouse a way of control of the empirical consciousness rather than its expansion. As part of this control analytical and rational forms

of perceptual knowledge had a part and were not simply rejected. This control, however, was not an end but a means to an end, namely, nibbāna. Nibbāna is, indeed, a release, but it is a release from the senses, not a release of the senses. What is attained is a new reality, a new level of consciousness and a new knowledge--all of which transcend the phenomenal world and the empirical consciousness. In its own unique way, early Buddhism preserved the "otherness" of the ultimate ground of the sacred. The religieux nouveaux, however, seem to reject the "otherness" of the sacred. The ground of the sacred is man himself, physical man. Rather than demanding that the empirical consciousness be controlled in order to be supplanted by a "transformation" consciousness, the religious innovators of the present day appear to affirm its ultimacy. Indeed, what would appear to be an even "radicalized profane" for the Theravādins, namely an exaggerated dependence upon the senses and sensory knowledge, becomes the sacred for the religieux nouveaux.

Alpert, Leary and even Alan Watts might well be attacked on the scholarly grounds that they misuse Eastern religions to justify or explain their own personal religious positions. However, in the light of our study we need to ask whether or not the religious model they set before us is at all adequate on the grounds of the religious tradition from which they claim to derive so much inspiration. The conclusion we must

draw is a negative one. Not only is the fundamental religious dialectic between the profane and the sacred misconceived, but the implications of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge from the time of the Middle Upaniṣads through the philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism is drastically changed. Knowledge is salvation from the bondage to the chaos of sensory realities including the empirical consciousness. For the religieux nouveaux, salvation is simply the expansion of this consciousness to an awareness of cosmic unity; however, it is not a "transformation" of the consciousness, i.e. a "new being." On the basis of our study we have to conclude that the religious innovators of our day, while justly groping for a ground on which to base a personal religious faith, have come up with the wrong answer. Early Buddhism may not be the right model for our times either, but at least there we find the pattern of a way of knowledge which can justify both the rational and the supra-rational within the primordial religious dialectic of the profane and the sacred so essential to the nature of religion.

APPENDIX A

UNIVERSE AND MAN ACCORDING TO SĀMĀKHYA

THE PRALAYA CONDITION

1. Puruṣas

2. Prakṛti

Sattva

Rajas

Tamas

THE SARGA CONDITION

3. Buddhi or Mahat

4. Ahankāra

5. Manas

6-10. Jñāna-Indriyas. The faculties of:

6. Hearing

9. Tasting

7. Touch

10. Smelling

8. Seeing

11-15. The Karma-Indriyas. The faculties of:

11. Moving

14. Procreating

12. Grasping

15. Speaking

13. Excreting

16-20. The Tanmātras. The subtle elements including:

16. Śabda (sound)

19. Rasa (taste)

17. Sparśa (touch)

20. Gandha (odor)

18. Rūpa (form)

(Tattvas 2-20 compose the subtle body which transmigrates)

21-25. The Mahābhūtas

21. Ākāśa (ether)

24. Āpas (water)


22. Vāyu (air)

25. Pṛthivī (earth)

23. Tejas (fire)

APPENDIX B

ABHIDHAMMA CLASSIFICATION OF CITTA¹



¹W. F. Jayasuriya, The Psychology and Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 32.

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KNOWLEDGE AS SALVATION: A STUDY IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Donald Keeney Swearer

Statement of the Problem

In early Buddhism ultimate reality was generally characterized by the term, nibbāna/nirvāṇa. As a condition or state other than the world of mere sensory realities, it transcended the three marks of: anicca (impermanence), anatta (without essence), and dukkha (suffering). The means of attaining nibbāna was classically described by the formula of the Noble Eight-fold Path, the last of the Four Noble Truths. Integral to this path to the ultimately real was knowledge, but what kind of knowledge? Was it essentially a knowledge derived from a rational or analytical study of the empirical world, or could it be characterized as a supra-rational, intuitive leap? That these two forms of knowledge had come to be contrasted with one another is revealed by a study of certain Upaniṣads antedating or contemporaneous with the rise of Buddhism. As Buddhism developed the Theravāda tradition, in particular the Abhidhamma scholastics, refined the categories of inductive analysis to an exhausting degree whereas certain of the Mahāyāna schools, in particular the Mādhyamika, reduced rational constructs to a logically absurdity. In the light of this historical development our problem is to try to determine the relationship between the rational or analytical and the supra-rational or intuitive modes of

knowledge in early Buddhism (i.e. represented by the Pāli Nikāyas) in relationship to the quest for nibbāna. In other words, we are concerned to delineate the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in early Buddhism.

Procedure

This study attempts to combine a phenomenological and historical approach to the problem. It begins by setting forth a phenomenological framework which rests on an interpretation of the categories, "sacred" and "profane." After a brief analysis of Theravāda Buddhism providing historical content to these categories the study moves to a consideration of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in non-Buddhist sources. The focus is on "proto" forms of Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Vedānta representing the two types of knowledge being investigated. Within this context the problem is then examined in the Nikāyas (viz. Dīgha, Majjhima) utilizing the terms, viññāṇa and paññā. The study is continued briefly into the Abhidhamma, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra traditions.

Results and Conclusion

It was discovered that early Buddhism synthesized the two modes of knowledge in relationship to the salvation-quest. Analytical knowledge was particularly important in conjunction with meditation and control of consciousness as a means to realize ultimate reality (i.e. nibbāna); however, in the end it had to be surpassed by a higher mode of knowledge

based not on inductive analysis of empirical realities but on a direct knowledge or "vision" of a transcendent reality. The two types of knowledge while distinct were nonetheless essentially related. *Vijñāna*, the consciousness apropos the empirical, was also understood as a mode of knowledge with the power to transcend involvement in the sensory world by understanding its true nature. In this capacity it could lead to *paññā*, knowledge from the perspective of ultimate reality itself.