

LINGUISTIC APPROACH TO BUDDHIST THOUGHT

GENJUN H.
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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras

First Published 1986

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007

Branches

Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004

6 Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras 600 004

© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

ISBN : 81-208-0038-9

PRINTED IN INDIA

BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45 NARAINA
INDUSTRIAL AREA, PHASE I, NEW DELHI 110 028 AND PUBLISHED BY
NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, DELHI 110 007.

PREFACE

The idea for this short treatise is drawn from several previous articles published in various journals, papers read at a number of international conferences and a collection of articles written especially for publication in this volume.

Owing to a vast amount of creditable works in the field of Buddhism, especially during the last half century, a remarkable contribution has been added to our knowledge of the parts as well as the whole. Yet further investigation remains to be done on the linguistic, epistemological, and doctrinal points of difference that have developed over the long span of centuries. The eighteen different schools of Abhidharma Buddhism, for example, cultivated a vocabulary and labyrinth of philosophical concepts found in much earlier teachings, though often clothing them with new and amended implications. Moreover, these implications were seldom worked out until after the conclusions arrived at were in general favor among scholastic contemporaries.

Through the use of linguistic and epistemological methods of research the author has sought to establish a connection with Sarvāstivāda on the one hand and the multitude of meanings provided by Mahāyāna texts on the other. Notwithstanding the author's intentions, however, much yet remains to be done. Indeed many problems connected with Buddhist thought, with the doctrines peculiar to the various Abhidharma schools, and with the multitude of technical terms still await further research.

In consummating the realization of this work a word of acknowledgement is in order. The late Professors I.B. Horner (The Pāli Text Society, London) and E. Conze (Lancaster University) were kind enough to encourage me with especial interest and care in carrying out my endeavors. Indeed without their gracious encouragement this present work might not have been realized. Also, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor P.V. Bapat (Poona, India), who offered his unfailing help and inspiration in pursuing a linguistic approach to the study of Buddhist thought.

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II. Indische Grundlage des japanischen Buddhismus 166

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- A. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, The Pāli Text Society (PTS), London
- A. Com. *Aṅguttaranikāya-Aṭṭhakathā*.
- AKBH. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna, 1975
- AK. Chinese tr. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, Taisho Edition
- AAV. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-loka*, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932-35
- Asl. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, ed. P.V. Bapat, The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1942
- AKV. *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932-34
- ASP. Chinese tr. *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā*, Taisho Edition
- BSOAS. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London University
- BHSD. F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, New Haven, 1953
- CPD. *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, Copenhagen, 1948-82
- Dhp. *Dhammapada*, PTS
- Dhp. Comm. *Dhammapada-Aṭṭhakathā*, PTS
- Dhs. *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, PTS
- Divy. *Divyāvadāna*, Cowell and Neill, Cambridge, 1886
- D. *Dīghanikāya*, PTS
- D. Com. *Dīghanikāya-Aṭṭhakathā*, PTS
- J. *Jātaka*, PTS
- JPTS. *Journal of the Pāli Text Society*, PTS
- Kvu. *Kathāvatthu*, PTS
- Kvu. Com. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, PTS
- Lañk. *Lañkāvatāra-sūtra*, ed. B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923
- M. *Majjhimanikāya*, PTS
- M. Com. *Majjhimanikāya-Aṭṭhakathā*, PTS
- MVP. *Mahāvīyutpatti*, ed. Sakaki, 2 vols., Kyoto, 1916-25
- Netti. *Nettipakaraṇa*, PTS
- Ny. Chinese tr. *Abhidharmanyāyānusāra-śāstra*, Taisho Edition
- P. *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. N. Dutt, London, 1934
- Pā. Pāli
- SN. *Suttanipāta*, PTS
- SN. Com. *Suttanipāta-Aṭṭhakathā*, PTS
- SED. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1899
- SWT. S(Sung Dynasty), W(Wei Dynasty), T(T'ang Dynasty)
- T. Taisho Edition (*Taisho-Shinshu-Daizo-Kyo*, ed. J. Takakusu and K. Matanabe), 55 vols., Tokyo, 1924-29
- Th. *Thera-Therīgāthā*, Pāli Text Society, PTS

- Th. Com. *Therigāthā Aṭṭhakathā*, Pāli Text Society, PTS
U. *Udāna*, Pāli Text Society, PTS
Vism. *Visuddhimagga*, 2 vols., Pāli Text Society, PTS
Vibh. *Vibhaṅga*, Pāli Text Society, PTS
Vibh. Com. *Vibhaṅga-Aṭṭhakathā*, Pāli Text Society, PTS

LINGUISTIC APPROACH TO
BUDDHIST THOUGHT

CHAPTER I

EARLY BUDDHIST CONCEPTS

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEGATION IN BUDDHISM *nekkhamma and naiṣkramya*

India had many schools of philosophy which developed their own systems of thought, based on the logic of negation. Buddhism was one of these schools of thought.

The purpose of Buddhist negation is not merely negation as such, but the positive goal of pointing towards the Absolute. In other words, the Absolute is approached through the logic of negation. Negation is simply an expression of the Absolute.

The how and why of the Absolute, which can not be expressed directly in words, can be expressed by the philosophy of negation. Generally, negation presupposes observation of the world with two perspectives: first, to deny the already known; and second, to give a positive expression by means of the opposite concept.

The first category, or the negation of the already known, can be found in Abhidharma philosophy in various words which reflect negation by the use of three prefixes, namely *a*, *na*, and *vi*. This negation refers to the negation of the experimental.

The second category means the positive expression of the super-experimental (the religious experience) by means of negation of the experimental (the mundane world). This positive expression of the opposite comes late in the development of Buddhism. At that time the positive expression was in the form of negation with the prefixes *nir*, *vi*, and *sama*.

The development from *a* to *nir* may be traced not merely in this Abhidharma school, but also in the historical development of Buddhist philosophy. This is clearly shown in the development of *nekkhamma* in Pāli and its evolution of meaning from Abhidharma to Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Evidence clearly indicates that the term *nekkhamma* and *akāma* are one and the same; only the implication is different. Both terms are derived from the common root *kam*, meaning "to desire," according to Pāli literature.

In Sanskrit Buddhist literature, *nekkhamma* is Sanskritized as *naiṣkramya*. For example:

*kāmeṣu bhayaṃ okāraṃ sankilesaṃ naiṣkramyānsisaṃsāvyava-
dānaṃ prakāsayati* (Mahāvastu III. 357).

*kāmānaṃ ādīnavaṃ kāraṃ sankilesaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ
pakāsesi* (D.I.110, Ambatthasutta. I.148. etc.).

Here *naiṣkramya* corresponds to *nekkhamma* in Pāli. Again in Mahāvastu:

*nāpi ye dharmāḥ grhāṣṛitās te naiṣkramyāṣṛitā iti deśayāmi;
nāpi ye dharmā naiṣkramyāṣṛitās te grhāṣṛitā iti deśayāmi* (MV.
I.173.13).

The Sanskrit compound *naiṣkramyāṣṛitās* again corresponds to the Pāli term *nekkhammasita*, meaning ‘based on (a holy life) free from desire,’ which is contradictory to the term *gehasita*, meaning ‘connected with a worldly life’ (S. IV.233).

Naiṣkramya is derived from *nis-kram*, meaning ‘not to approach’ or ‘not to go towards,’ whereas *nekkhamma*, is derived from *nis-kam*, meaning ‘not to desire’; hence, etymologically neither term can be used interchangeably.

As for the etymology of *nekkhamma*, Childers gives an unconvincing and hypothetical interpretation. He takes into consideration two different etymologies: *naiṣkāmya* and *niṣkram*.

According to Childers, if *nekkhamma* had been derived from *naiṣkāmya*, it would have been *nekkamma*, but not *nekkhamma*. Childers thus preferred *niṣkram* to *naiṣkāmya*. But it is just as possible that *nekkhamma* is derived from *naiṣkāmya*, as the syllable *k* is frequently transformed into *kh* in Pāli, e.g., *prakrānta* (Skt.)—*pakkanta* (Pā.) or *kānti*—*khanti* etc. There should be no doubt about the derivation from *naiṣkāmya* to *nekkhamma*. The above should suffice as examples showing the derivation of *nekkhamma*.

The Sanskritization of *naiṣkramya* for *nekkhamma* need not be a problem to us. It is only necessary to refer to the Pāli and Sanskrit Buddhist texts, where *naiṣkramya* is directly Sanskritized from *nekkhamma* (Pāli). Moreover, in the Pāli texts we have, in relation to *nekkhamma*, the word *nikkhamma*, meaning ‘going out of.’

Nikkhamma is obviously derived from *nis-kram*, which is common to the root of *naiṣkramya*.

Now, in what sense is *nikkhamma* employed in the Pāli canon? To answer that we need to understand the meaning of *nikkhamma* as expressed in the Pāli canon:

*nikkhamma gharā panujja kāme
kathaṃ bhikkhu sammā so loke paribbajeyya* (SN. 359).

‘How should bhikkhu, going out of the house, giving up desires, rightly wander about as a Buddhist mendicant in this world?’

Commenting on *nikkhamma* Buddhaghosa says: *vatthukāme panudita gharāvasā nikkhamma* (SN. Com. I. 362).

From the above we see that *nikkhamma* means ‘going out of,’ derived from *niṣ-kram*, which should more accurately be Sanskritized as *naiṣkramya*. Hence, *nikkhamma* is different from *nekkhamma*, derived from *nis-kam*, meaning ‘not to desire.’ But we can, nevertheless, often find *naiṣkramya* used as equivalent to *nekkhamma*:

*dānakathaṃ śīlakathaṃ svargakathaṃ...naiṣkramyānusamśavya-
vadānaṃ samprakāśayati* (MV, III. 375).

This Sanskrit passage is equivalent to that in the Ambattha-sutta (D.I.110. 148), in which the Pāli term for *naiṣkramya* is not *nikkhamma*, but *nekkhamma*.

In other passages the same Sanskritization occurs, e.g., ‘*naiṣkramyam anuvarṇayanti kāmeṣu doṣadarśinaḥ*’ (MV. I. 107), and also ‘*adya te sapphalaṃ janma lābhodya sumahams tava/yasya kāra-rasajñasya naiṣkramya astukaṃ manaḥ*’ (Saundarananda, XII.21).

According to Pāli Buddhist tradition there existed two terms differentiated from each other, *nekkhamma* and *nikkhamma*, which should rightly be Sanskritized as *naiṣkāmya* and *naiṣkramya*. In the Sanskrit Buddhist tradition, both terms are indistinguishably Sanskritized as *naiṣkramya*.

For the purpose of this article one needs to remember that *nekkhamma* retains its initial meaning derived from *nis-kam* (‘not to desire’), and not from *niṣkram* (‘to go out of’), according to the Pāli Buddhist tradition.

It should be pointed out that the confusion between *nekkhamma* and *nikkhamma* rests upon the problem of Sanskritization, and not upon the implications of these terms involved in the

Sanskrit *naiṣkramya*.¹ The following quotation from Abhidharma-kośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra should give evidence to the fact that *naiṣkramya* implies both senses, *nikkhamma* ('going out') and *nekkhamma* ('not desiring').

naiṣkramyaṃ s'āśravo'nāśravo mārگاḥ.

dhātoḥ saṃsārād vā niṣkrameṇaṃ vairāgyam ity apare (AKV. 96).

'Some say: *naiṣkramya* means the evil and non-evil paths. It means "going out of the transmigration of various realms of existence" and also "being free from lust." '

One can readily see how *naiṣkramya* may include both the meaning derived from *nis-kram* and the implication contained by *nekkhamma*, meaning 'being free from desire'. We can easily see that some Abhidharma scholars might take *naiṣkramya* to refer explicitly to the derivation from *nis-kram*, and implicitly to the involvement of *nis-kam*, meaning 'not to desire.'

Since our chief concern is with the development of the meaning of negation, we shall return to the distinction between *a* and *nir* in the Pāli literature.

Nekkhamma, as mentioned above, means the negation of *kam*, meaning 'to desire'. The connotation of *kāma* is felt in the connotation of *nir*. This is shown in various passages where a play of words exists between *nir* and *kāma* (cf. Rhys Davids, Pāli English Dictionary, 213), i.e., '*kāmānaṃ etaṃ nissaraṇaṃ yad idaṃ nekkhammaṃ*' (It. 61; Vin. I. 104; A. III. 245; M. I. 115). It means that *nekkhamma* denotes 'the giving up of desires'. A play of words with the prefix *nir* is also found expressed in Cullavagga, 340, SNA. 605, meaning 'without desire'.

Now, the meaning of negation in relation to *kāma* is also shown by words with the prefix *a*, *akāma* ('without desire').

It is said in the Jātaka:

akāmaṃ kāmehi icchasi (J.V. 295).

akāmaṃ sakāmaṃ naro labhate piyaṃ (J.V. 295).

These passages represent the negation of *kāma* used in the noun form with the prefix *a*, namely, *akāma*. It is also used in the adverbial form *akāmā*, meaning 'unwillingly':

akāmā kāratabbaṃ (Vin. III. 205)

akāmā vyākātabbo (D. I. 94)

It is clear from these quotations that words with the prefix *a* mean simply 'lacking', 'devoid of', and 'deficient'; in other words, there is nothing positively implied in the prefix. Words with the prefix *a* represent the negation of the opposite.

Nekkhamma, however, does not always negate the opposite, as is the case with *a-kāma*, but also implies something positive. *Nekkhamma*, used in the same sense as *a-kāma*, is found in the Suttanipāta, e.g., '*nekkhamma daṭṭhu khemato, uggahitaṃ nisattaṃ vā mā te vijjittha kiṃcanaṃ.*' (SN. 1093). In this passage *nekkhamma* represents the negation of the opposite, as *a-kāma* does.

Nekkhamma carries the negation further; the five elements of deliverance (*nissaraṇīya dhātuyo*) are enumerated (D.III.239-240; A.III.245; A.III.290). *Kāmānaṃ nissaraṇaṃ* in the five *nissaraṇaṃ* (deliverance) means 'to settle in the state of non-desire' (*nekkhamme cittaṇa pakkhanti*). Further elaboration also occurs in the Dīghanikāya:

nekkhammaṃ kho paṇ'assa manasikaroto nekkhamme cittaṃ pakkhanti pasidati santiṭṭhati vimuccati, tassa taṃ cittaṃ sugataṃ subhāvitaṃ suvuṭṭhitaṃ visamyuttaṃ kāmehi, ye ca kāma-paccayā uppajjanti āsavā vighatā pariḷāha, mutto so tehi, na so taṃ vadaṇaṃ vedeti, idaṃ akkhātaṃ kāmānaṃ nissaraṇaṃ (D. III.239-240).

The different qualities of deliverance are defined by *nekkhamma*, the spiritual situation of non-desire, without any substantial difference in meaning. Such qualities as *suvuṭṭhita*, *suvimutta*, *visamyutta*, for example, depict one and the same spiritual situation, that of non-desire, modified by the prefixes *su* and *vi*. *Nekkhamma* refers to the spiritual situation being well-balanced (*subhāvitaṃ*), arising out of (*suvuṭṭhitaṃ*) and being separated from (*visamyuttaṃ*) the desires (*kāmehi*). The positive element in the spiritual situation of non-desire (*nekkhamma*) is apparent from these synonyms modified by the prefixes *su* and *vi*. The spiritual situation of non-desire (*nekkhamma*) is differentiated from the five other *nissaraṇa* (deliverance) according to what is regarded as spiritual tranquility, and whether *nekkhamma* is considered to be solely negative. And finally, according to how *nekkhamma* is to be conceived positively.

Whatever else it means, *nekkhamma* is here thought of as the

spiritual end of Buddhist training and is thereby given a positive content.

The positive content of *nekkhamma* includes not merely the negation of *kāma* (*a-kāma*), but also the negation of all evils (*akusala*). The Dvedhāvitakkasutta, for example, reads:

kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ vodānapakkhaṃ (M.I.115).

The connotation of *nekkhamma* is implied in *kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ*, meaning 'meritorious qualities'; and means the deliverance from evils.² It is further stated in the Cariyāpiṭaka:

bhavaṃ disvāna bhayato nekkhammam abhinikkhammaṃ (Cariyāpiṭaka, 2.4.1.2).

'Having seen a being, being devoid of, and getting rid of (eliminating) fear...'

Here the connotation of *nekkhamma* is implied in *abhinikkhamma*, which is derived from *abhi-nir-kram*, meaning 'to go out of'.

Nikkhamma is often used in parallel to the phrase showing the negation of *kāma* (desire). For example, in the Suttanipāta:

nekkhamma gharā panujja kāme
kathaṃ bhikkhu sammā so loke paribbajeyya (SN. 359).

'Having gone out of the household, given up all desires, how should Bhikkhu rightly lead life as a mendicant in this world?'

Both *nikkhamma* and *nekkhamma* refer to the fact that one gets out of his household and gives up all desires in order to lead a life as mendicant. *Nekkhamma*, here, means to give up all desires (*kāme*) completely, and not merely a desire (*kāma*).

In the Pāli commentaries, *nekkhamma* is exemplified in a broad sense, involving not only a *kāma*, but also various *kāmas*, which means evil (*akusala*) in contrast to meritorious (*kusala*).

In a broad sense *nekkhamma* in the Pāli commentaries probably represents three kinds of modification:

1. Identification between *nekkhamma* and *kusala*. This can be found in the Majjhimanikāya commentary which explains the phrase *nekkhamma-vitakka*,³ saying *kāmehi nissataṃ sabbaṃ kusalaṃ* (M.Com.II.79), and also *kāmato nissataguṇakammato nissataguṇe ʾhiteṇa puggaleṇa* (Ibid. IV. 197⁴), etc. These passages represent explicitly the identity between *nekkhamma* and *kusala*, which is implicitly noticeable in the Dīghanikāya (D.III.239-240; Vibh. p. 86).

2. Modification of *nekkhamma*.

Here the meaning of *nekkhamma* acquires a positive content. The Dīghanikāya Commentary reads:

nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ pakāsesi pabbajjāya guṇaṃ pakāsesi ti attho (D.Com.I.473).

‘To expound advantages of a state of non-desire means to expound virtues of a Buddhist mendicant.’

The identity between *nekkhamma* and *pabbajja* is also revealed in the commentary on the Aṅguttaranikāya (cf. an explanation on *pabbajja* in the passage ‘*nekkhamme cittaṃ pakkhandatī ti pabbajjāya cittaṃ ārammaṇavasena pakkhandatī*’ (A.Com.IV.204).

Nekkhamma also represents *anāgāmin* (one who does not return), i.e., ‘*ettha nekkhamman ti anagāmimaggo adhippeto, so hi sabbaso kāmānaṃ nissaraṇaṃ*’. The identification with *anāgāmin* is found in the commentary on the Dhammapada 272, in which *nekkhamma* means *anāgāminsukha*.

Furthermore, *nekkhamma* is connected with *nibbāṇa*, meaning ‘liberation’, i.e., ‘*nibbāṇe khemabhāvaṃ disvā*’ (Vimānavatthu Cm., p. 348; A. Com.III.242), ‘*nibbāṇaṃ ca nibbāṇagāmiṃ ca paṭipadaṃ khemaṃ ti disvā*’ (Suttanipāṭa Com.II. on SN. 1098), and ‘*nekkhammanti kilesūpasamaṃ nibbāṇaratiṃ pana sandhāy’etaṃ vutaṃ*’ (Dhammapāḍa Com. 181), etc.

Sometimes a distinction is drawn between *pabbajja*, meaning ‘to lead a life as a mendicant,’ and *nibbāṇa*, meaning ‘liberation.’ In this case *nibbāṇa* represents *nekkhamma*. But it does not represent *pabbajja*, i.e., ‘*ettha pabbajja nekkhamman ti na gahetabbaṃ*’.

All of these interpretations quoted above refer to the positive content of *nekkhamma* given by Buddhaghosa, the brilliant commentator on Pāli canons.

According to another commentator Dhammapāla, *nekkhamma* includes three kinds of mental situation, viz, *nibbāṇa* (liberation), *samathavipassanā* (tranquility), and *pabbajja* (the leading of a life as a mendicant (Cariyāpīṭaka Com.2.4.1.2). Accordingly *nekkhamma* develops in Abhidharma literature a positive content, which is modified by such expressions as *anāgāmin*, *pabbajja* and *nibbāṇa*. We must not forget though that all of these positive elements are extended to *nekkhamma* (lit., *nis-kam*, meaning ‘not to desire’), but are not extended to *nikkhamma* (lit., *niṣ-kram*, mentioned before, is differentiated from *nikkhamma*).

It is important to note that the Tibetan translation employs *naiṣkramya*, incorrectly Sanskritized from *nekkhamma*. For example, *ñes par ḥbyuñ ba la brten pa* = *naiṣkramyāśrita*, MVP. No. 6755; *spags pa* = *naiṣkramya*, No. 644; *mñon par ḥbyuñ* = *naiṣkramya*, No. 7554. The Tibetan *ñes par ḥbyuñ ba*⁵ also stands for *niḥsaraṇa* ('coming forth') (cf. Prasannapadā nāma Mādhyamika-vṛtti, XIII. 8). *Ḥbyuñ* clearly stands for *kram* ('to come out') (Laṅkāvatāra, p. 307). An emphatic prefix *mñon par* stands here for *nir* (-kram), which means 'entirely' or 'clearly.' Thus *mñon par ḥbyuñ pa* stands for *naiṣkramya*. If one could reduce *mñon par ḥbyuñ pa* to the Pāli word, he would have modified *abhinikkhamma* with an emphatic prefix *abhi* (cf. J. I. 61; Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā' p. 19). Now it is clear that the Tibetan translation follows the Sanskrit *naiṣkramya* and not the Pāli *nekkhamma*.

As for the Chinese translation we find two different renderings:

1. Chinese renderings, which seemingly stand for the Sanskrit *naiṣkramya* (*nikkhamma* in Pāli), are as follows:

Ch'u yao meaning 'getting out of' (Dīrghanikāya, fasc. 13. T. I. 82), *ch'u li* meaning 'being separated from' (Ibid. fasc. 8. T. I. 51b).

2. Chinese renderings, which stand for the Sanskrit *naiṣkāmya* (*nekkhamma* in Pāli) are as follows:

Wu yu meaning 'non-desire' (Madhyamanikāya, fasc. 25. T. I. 589); *ch'u yü* meaning 'getting out of desire' (Mahādharmasaṃgraha, fasc. 2. T. I. 230b).

Nissaraṇa is translated into Chinese words such as *ch'u yao* (D fasc. 8. T. I. 51b; M. fasc. 26. T. I. 591b) *ch'u li* (Mahādharmasaṃgraha, fasc. 2. T. I. 230b) and also *yüan* meaning 'condition' (Ibid.). All of these Chinese words stand for *naiṣkramya*.

Nissaraṇa and *naiṣkramya* together mean 'getting out of'. It seems reasonable, therefore, to reduce such Chinese words as *ch'u yao*, *ch'u li* etc., to *naiṣkramya* ('getting out of'), and not *naiṣkāmya* ('non-desire').

The precise readings of the Daśabhūmika-sūtra⁶ and its Chinese translations suffice to show us the fact that such words as *ch'u yao*, *ch'uli*, *yüan li* stand for *naiṣkramya*. On the other hand, *naiṣkramya* is rendered as *ch'u chia* meaning 'getting out of the household' by Dharmarakṣa (West Chin Dynasty, A.D. 265-316), *neng ch'u li* meaning 'completely getting out of' by Śiladharmas (Tang Dynasty, A.D. 618-906), *ching ch'in hsiu hsing* meaning 'earnestly

to endeavor' by Buddhābhaddra (East Chin Dynasty, A.D. 317-417) and Bodhiruchi (Northern Wei Dynasty, A.D. 386-534), and *ch'in hsiu ch'u li* meaning 'to practice to get out of' by Śikṣānanda (A.D. 695-699).

Naiṣkramya, however modified, is translated into all of the above Chinese words. The Tibetan translation of *naiṣkramya* in the Daśabhūmikasūtra is *ḥdaḥ byuñ* meaning 'getting out of', and has the same meaning as in Chinese.

To judge from this enumeration of Chinese words, the Chinese tradition seems to have confused *naiṣkramya* with *naiṣkāmya* or *nekkhamma* with *nikkhamma*. Those scholars who correctly translate *naiṣkāmya* into the Chinese words such as *wu yū* or *ch'u yū* are Saṅghadeva (East Chin Dynasty, 317-420 A.D.) and Dānapāla (Northern Sung Dynasty, 960-1127 A.D.), for the Chinese words correspond to the original meaning of *nekkhamma* i.e., 'non-desire'. Both scholars, Saṅghadeva and Dānapāla, distinguish *nissaraṇa* or *naiṣkramya* and *naiṣkāmya*, giving different Chinese words to each of the Sanskrit terms. Saṅghadeva renders *nissaraṇa* into *ch'u yao* and *naiṣkāmya* into *wu yūan*, while Dānapāla renders *nissaraṇa* into *ch'u li* or *yūan* and *naiṣkāmya* into *wu yūan*.

Scholars who misinterpret *naiṣkāmya* as *naiṣkramya* are Buddhayaśa and Chu Fu Nien (later Chin Dynasty). The original Sanskrit, which they render into Chinese words like *ch'u yao*, *ch'u li* and *yūan li*, meaning 'getting out of', 'being separated from' and 'being secluded from', would be *naiṣkramya*, meaning 'getting out of'. The first of these three renderings, i.e., *ch'u yao*, is given to *nissaraṇa*, meaning 'getting out of' as well. *Nissaraṇa* is a synonym of *naiṣkramya*.

In the Chinese tradition *ch'u yao*, *ch'u li* and *yūan li* often refer to *naiṣkramya*, in the same sense, representing 'getting out of'. Yet the concept of *naiṣkramya* is quite different from that of *naiṣkāmya*, an equivalent to *nekkhamma*, meaning 'non-desire'.

An even better example of incorrect Sanskritization occurs in one passage of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (p. 307) and represents exactly the same passage as in the Pāli. The Pāli passage reads: 'nikkhamma gharā panujja kāma' (SN. 359). *Nikkhamma* in this passage means 'getting out of'. On the other hand, *naiṣkramya* in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra also means 'getting out of'. In this case, of course, *naiṣkramya* would be the correct Sanskritized word for the *nikkhamma*. Nevertheless, *naiṣkramya* is always misinter-

preted as the word corresponding to *nekkhamma*. The Chinese *ch'u chia*, meaning 'getting out of household' corresponds to *naiṣkramya*. It would be correct, if *naiṣkramya* always corresponded to *nikkhamma*. But in reality it corresponds to *nekkhamma*. Hence, the Chinese also would rightly be *li yü*, meaning 'getting out of desire'.

The Buddhist Sanskrit translators seem to disregard the importance of the Pāli original meanings of *nikkhamma* and *nekkhamma*. The primary concern is that *naiṣkramya* means the negation of all kinds of defilement or worldly things (cf. also a concept of *ch'u chia* in the Paramārtha's Chinese translation of Buddhagotra-śāstra, fasc. 4. T. 31.810c).

In other words, the Sanskritized word *naiṣkramya* in the passage corresponding to the Pāli is an incorrect translation of *nekkhamma*. However, it should be remembered that, philosophically speaking, the meaning of *naiṣkramya* refers not only to a verbal word but also to the connotation of the word in wide perspective, and extends to the negation of all things profane inclusive of *kāma* (desire). The single word *naiṣkramya* includes, in its connotation, both the words *nekkhamma* (a negation of *kāma*) and *nikkhamma* (a negation of all things profane). The reference to the connotation of *naiṣkramya* in wide perspective is given in the *Uttaratantra*⁷ and its Chinese and Tibetan translations as follows:

Skt. *jantaḥpuraratikṛdāṃ naiṣkramya duḥkhacārikām*

Tib. *btsum moḥi ḥkhar gyis dgyes rol dañ, des ḥbyun dhaḥ bspyod pa dañ.*

Chin. "Being born in the Palace, giving up all kinds of desire, Kumāra (Buddha) gets out of the household to lead an ascetic life."

There seems to be no doubt here that *naiṣkramya* corresponds to *ḥbyun* and *ch'u chia*, meaning 'getting out of household', and that 'giving up all kinds of desire' (*yen li chu yü hsiang*) finds its equivalent neither in Sanskrit nor in Tibetan translation.

It seems possible that the Chinese term *yen li chu yü hsiang* could be a compound intentionally added by the Chinese translator to modify the word *ch'ü chia*. If so, the reason will have a double aspect:

1. *Yen li chu yü hsiang* is simply a modification of *ch'u chia*, added by the translator from the aspect of the literal comparison of different translations.

2. *Yen li chu yü hsiang* is formed by an extension of the original meaning of *nekkhamma*, which means 'non-desire'.

In other words, it is only by an extension of the original meaning that *ch'u chia* meaning 'getting out of the household' can be modified by *yen li chu yü hsiang* meaning 'giving up all kinds of desire'.

In general, though *ch'u chia* ('getting out of the household') stands for various terms such as *pravrajyā*, *naiṣkramya*, *naiṣkāmya* and *āraṇya*, *āraṇya*⁸ which literally means 'forest.' Connotatively *āraṇya* represents 'getting out of the household' (*ch'u chia*). Another verse in the Uttaratantra reads:

Skt. *ratikṛḍāraṇyapравicarāṇa (mārapramathanam)*

Tib. *dgyas ral pa dañ dben par sbyod (dañ bdud bcon dañ)*

Chin. *hsi lo chi yü hsian ch'u chia hsian ku hsian.*

Here *ch'u chia* stands for *āraṇya* meaning 'forest', but it also stands for *naiṣkramya* meaning 'getting out of' in the same Chinese translation of the Uttaratantra (p. 88). Thus, *ch'u chia* actually corresponds to *āraṇya*, *pravrajyā* and *naiṣkāmya*, but not to *naiṣkramya*. But *yen li chu yü hsian* meaning 'getting out of all kinds of desire' also means to deny desire (*kāma*). In other words, it represents the original meaning of *nekkhamma* (non-desire), which also stands for *ch'u chia*.

It is evident from the above that *ch'u chia*, meaning 'getting out of the household', is modified by the compound *yen li chu hsiang* meaning 'getting out of all kinds of desire', and that this modification is an extension of the original meaning of *nekkhamma*, meaning 'non-desire'. The most extra-ordinary confusion has resulted from the incorrect Sanskritization of *nekkhamma* into *naiṣkramya*.

We may generalize from the above and say that if *nekkhamma* is Sanskritized into *naiṣkramya*, or rendered into *ch'u chia*, *nekkhamma* means the abolition of all things profane. In other words, the relative negation in later Buddhism transposes into the negation of the whole. Pāli Buddhism referred to the simple negation of the opposite, as expressed in the form and meaning of *nekkhamma* derived from *nis-kāma* (non-desire), while later Sanskrit Buddhism refers to the positive expression of experience as is expressed in *naiṣkramya*, which represents not only 'getting out of',

but also 'getting out of the household', 'getting out of all kinds of desire', and even *nirvāṇa* meaning 'liberation'.

This change in the process from the logical or relative negation (in Pāli Buddhism) to the positive expression of experience (in Sanskrit Buddhism)⁹ is significant. The metaphysical basis of Sanskrit Buddhism (Mahāyāna Buddhism) is thoroughly experimental. This may be seen in the dissatisfaction of Mahāyāna Buddhism with only the original meaning of words. The Sanskrit Buddhist tries to push further back, to explain the religious experience implied in the words.

To clarify the point let us note a few examples. The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (trl. by Kumārajīva) reads:

Vimalakīrti said: "Then, you will give rise to the highest Enlightenment. It is nothing but 'getting out of the household (*ch'u chia*).'" (Śrīvimalakīrti-nirdeśa. fasc. 2.T.14. 541c).

Moreover the commentary on *Daśabhūmi-sūtra* by Hui yūan reads:

"As for *ch'u yao* (*naiṣkramya*), *ch'u* means 'result', while *yao* means 'important path' [to the Enlightenment]." (fasc. 10. *Dainippon Zoku Zokyo*, 71.244b)

And the *Daśacakra-kṣitigarbha* (trl. by Hsüan Tsang) says:

"*Ch'u yao* (*naiṣkramya*) of the three vehicles means the truth, such as the fourfold noble path (*catursatyā*), and so on." (T. 13.752a).

It is not the purpose here to determine whether *ch'u yao* and *ch'u chia* correspond to *naiṣkramya* and *pravrajyā* or not. However, on the basis of Chinese tradition we can assume that *ch'u yao* stands for *naiṣkramya* while *ch'u chia* for *naiṣkramya* or *pravrajyā*.

Ch'u yao literally means 'getting out of', and metaphorically it suggests an important path to the result (the Enlightenment) in the positive sense. Another Chinese word *ch'u chia* literally means 'getting out of the household' and metaphorically it suggests 'to give rise to the highest Enlightenment', again in the positive sense.

The interpretation of the above in China differs entirely from the original meaning of *nekkhamma* in India. The Chinese interpretation does not even suggest a negative expression. It actually transforms the negative into the positive.

What is perhaps more important is that negation in Chinese

Buddhism, developed in the widest perspective, is the concept *nekkhamma* with a prefix *nir*, and not *a*. The two aspects of the negation of *kāma* (desire), as we have examined earlier, are *nekkhamma* and *akāma*, of which the latter simply means the relative negation, or the negation of opposites. Hence, the latter is not a concept to represent the Mahāyānist trend of thought, namely, the positive expression of experience.

In general, the prefix *nir* stands for an emphatic prefix inherited in the Buddhist tradition. The Abhidharmakośa reads:

Skt. *na te nirviśeṣā bhavanti* (AKV. p. 176. ed. by Wogihara)

Chin. *wu to ts'u pieh* (There are no various distinctions).

Nirviśeṣa in this passage is *viśeṣa* modified by *nir*, but not the negation of *viśeṣa*. Hsüan Chien endeavoured to render *nir* into *to* in Chinese, meaning 'various' as used in a positive expression.

We have so far seen that, in the Buddhist tradition, *nekkhamma*, meaning 'non-desire', whether Sanskritized as *naiṣkramya* or *naiṣkāmya*, has to express the positive content of experience. Therefore, it has been rendered into such words as *nieh p'an* meaning 'liberation', *ch'u chia* meaning 'getting out of (all things profane)'.

In the Buddhist tradition *naiṣkramya* represents two aspects of negation.

First, *naiṣkramya* represents the relative negation of the opposite, as is the case with *nekkhamma*, meaning 'non-desire'. *Wu yüan* meaning 'non-desire' corresponds exactly to *nekkhamma* as discussed above.

Second, *naiṣkramya* represents the positive content of the religious experience, as it is found exemplified in such words as 'liberation',¹⁰ 'getting out of all profane things' etc.

An adequate comprehension of such a tradition will suffice to show us that *nir* is not only the relative negation of the opposite—the negation of the experimental (*kāma*)—but also the positive expression of the religious experience beyond the realm of the experimental.

This is to say that the negation indicated by the prefix *nir* positively points out the absolute religious experience; and yet it is not abstract from the realm of the experimental.

This concept of negation, expressed by the prefix *nir* implicitly denotes the positive content, and explicitly retains the negative form. It is simply because one can finally get the positive content,

i.e., the realm of super-experimental of the religious experience by and through the negation of the experimental.¹¹

In other words, negation in the Buddhist sense represents two dimensions, the negation of the realm of the experimental and the expression of the realm of the super-experimental (*nirvāṇa*).

II. A LINGUISTIC APPROACH TO THE BEGINNINGLESS CIRCLE OF LIFE : *anamatagga* and *anādikālika*

A Survey of Etymological Analysis

We have a Pāli term *anamatagga*, meaning 'without beginning', which is very often used in compound with *saṃsāra* (the human life). We shall examine its etymological analysis and its distinction from *anādikāla*, a Mahāyānist expression translated into the English 'without beginning'. The same English stands for a Pāli '*anamatagge*'.

With regards to this term the Pāli Text Society's Pāli English Dictionary (PTSD) gives an etymology—*ana-mata-aggā* (pl.).

The prefix *ana* is here taken as a negative one. *Ana-mata* points to the denial of *mata*. However, there is no prefix like *ana* in Pāli.

Childers gives an interpretation. In his view, *anamatagga* indicates a Sanskrit term *a-amṛta-agra*. It means that [*saṃsāra*] does not end in *nirvāṇa* (*amṛta*). (*Childers, Dictionary of the Pāli Language*. p. 32.) Childers could be right when he quotes Rogers's translation of the Pāli phrase *anamatagge saṃsāra saṃsaranto*. This phrase is translated by him as follows: 'Revolving in a revolution of being in the countless existence that have no beginning'. (*Buddhaghosa's Parables*. 1870, London, p. 56.) Irrespective of Rogers's translation Childers takes *anamata* as *an-amata*. However, *anamata* could be a double negation of *mata*. It should mean 'non-unthinkable', i.e., 'thinkable'. If being so, *anamatagga* denotes the beginning thinkable. 'It will be rightly opposed to its original significance.

Another etymology is given by Pischel in his *Grammatik des Prākṛit-Sprachen* (Strassburg 1900, Section 251).

Pischel takes it as *a-amat-agga*. Further, he takes the root of *namat* as *nam*. This etymology, however, could be of no sense.

Further, A Critical Pāli Dictionary (CPD), the most exhaustive

Dictionary of Pāli, analyses it by *an-amat* 'agga (CPD, p. 156) just as it is the case with PTSD and DPL, giving thereby the meaning 'without top and bottom'. But, there is no word equivalent to 'top and bottom' in the compound *anamatagga* as such. Hence, this analysis indicates its implication, but not the etymological significance.

In relation to Ardhamāgadhi Edgerton reduces *anamatagga* in Pāli to *anavarāgra* (Buddhist Hybrid Dictionary), quoting ample of original sources such as Divy. 197.15 (*anavarāgro saṃsāro*) and Śikṣāsamuccaya 170.2 (*anavarāgre jātisaṃsāra*), etc.

According to Edgerton a Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit term *anavarāgra* is derived from *an-avara-agra*. It means a negation of *avara* (bottom) as well as *agra* (top). It is translated into English as 'without top and bottom', which is also adopted by CPD, as mentioned before.

A Tibetan translation of it is also the same as this English rendering. That is, *thog ma dan tha ma med pa* ('without top and bottom').

However, all these English translations and a BHSD *anavarāgra* literally do not correspond to *anamatagga* in Pāli.

All we can say here is that whatever *anavarāgra* in BHSD or the English translation it is merely a connotation or an implication of *anamatagga*, but not an etymological meaning.

Edgerton offers another etymology in terms of Ardhamāgadhi. The Ardhamāgadhi term *anavarāgra* is, he presumes, a Hyper-Sanskrit for *anavadagga* (BHSD. New Haven, 1953, p. 21). He is inclined to connect *anavarāgra* with *anavadagga* or *anavayagga* rather than with *anamatagga* in Pāli.

Another attempt would be conceivable. Pischel's Grammatik (Section 251) indicates a phonetic change: A syllable *m* followed by *n* turns into *n*. If so, *anamatagga* in Pāli could closely be related to *anavadagga* in Ardhamāgadhi.

But, this attempt seems not to be fair unless the relationship between *an* and *aṇ* will sufficiently be explained. Moreover, a particle *an(aṇ)* is wrongly taken as a negative particle as seen in all other etymological expositions.

Anamatagga and its Etymology in Pāli

At first it may be given as a conclusion that a Pāli term *anamatagga* is adequately derived from *anu-a-mata-agga*, but not

from *an-a-mata-agga*, and that a prefix *anu* indicates an emphatic particle, which means 'complete' or 'absolutely'.

The prefix *anu* followed by a vowel *a* (*amata*), in here *u* being deleted due to the vowel *sandhi*, has turned into *an*, ample examples of which will be found in compound with verbs.

They are: *anoloketi* ('precisely observes') is rightly derived from *anu-ava-loketi* (Cf. Sammohavinodanī, PTS, Ed. p. 355), which is wrongly Sanskritized by *avalokayati*. *Anu* ('complete') is replaced by *ava* ('above'). This Sanskrit term *avalokayati* is often intermixed with *apaloketi*.

It may here be remarked that the intermixed use of *apa* and *ava* is found in such examples as *apalokiteśvara*—*avalokiteśvara*, *apavāda*—*avavāda*, etc. The meaning of *ava* is probably not important.

Regarding *anu* and *an* we have another example: *anosīdati*, which means 'to settle down'. It comes from *anu-ava-sad* (Sammohavinodanī, p. 108).

For these reasons, a particle *an* in a term of *anamatagga* is not a negative particle.

A particle *anu* in Pāli has also an emphatic meaning. It will be proved by the following examples.

In general the prefix *anu* is fertile in Sanskrit compounds, most of which make the following meanings clear: 'after', 'along', 'in consequence', 'near to', 'behind', 'gradually', 'beneath', 'less than', and 'according to'.

In a complex of meanings, as enumerated above, is an emphatic meaning of *anu* missing. The emphatic meaning, however, plays an important role in terms of *anamatagga* in question.

We have ample examples of Pāli terms formed with *anu*, indicating the emphatic meaning. They are:

<i>anupakkhadati</i>	'(He) eats into'
<i>anupabbajati</i>	'(He) gives up the world'
<i>anupariyāti</i>	'(He) goes round and round'
<i>anuparidhāvati</i>	'(He) runs up and down'
<i>anusañcarati</i>	'(He) goes round about'
<i>anusañgīto</i>	'changed together'

Clearly does Buddhaghosa, great Pāli commentator, comment on *anu* as an emphatic particle, when he refers to *anusaya*, one of the most important Buddhist terms. In his *Aṭṭhasālinī*, the commentary on *Dhammasaṅgani* defines *anusaya* and says:

*Thāmagataṭṭhena anusetṭi anusayo.*¹

(Because of harping on [an idea] persistently it is termed the 'latent bias'.)

Other commentaries also read:

*Anusayo bhavuppattiyā mūlam.*²

(The latent bias is a basis to give rise to life)

*Anusayā akusalamūlāni.*³

(The latent bias is a basis of the unwholesome)

Thus, the prefix *anu* is to be taken as an emphatic particle meaning 'strongly', 'persistently' and 'completely'.

Further, it is also not fair to take *anu* as *ana*; Otherwise the original meaning will be negated, as for example, *anappameyya* and so on.

Anappameyya in turn comes from *anu-appameyya* ('complete unmeasurable'), but never from *ana-appameyya*, which means a negation (*ana*) of immeasurable (*appameyya*), i.e., 'the measurable' which negates its original implication.⁴

There is one example, which has a correct English rendering, but not an etymological basis. It is the term *anabhāva* translated into English as 'the utter cessation of becoming', which can hardly be traced back to its own etymological analysis, for this English translation has no Pāli word equivalent to 'utter'. 'Utter' in English could not be equivalent to *ana*.

Supposing a prefix *ana* being a negative, the meaning of *anabhāva* will become the reverse say, 'the not-cessation of becoming'.

Moreover, it is a problem to be solved in the future that *ana* could be in itself a negative prefix. That is beyond the present issue.

In a similar manner, *anu*, the prefix expressing completeness, plays certainly a prominent part in the analysis of *anavaya* which remained unexplained in PTSD, in which it has been given no etymological analysis.

In regard to *anavaya* Childers gives its derivation from *a-avaya*. However, *avaya* being a negation of *vaya*, *a-avaya* could be the doubled negation of *vaya*, namely, 'privatio', which is rightly opposed to its original meaning 'non-privatio' or 'completeness'.

Strange enough is the fact that, his English rendering, despite the wrong etymology, seems to be quite adequate. He rightly

renders it: 'perfectly acquainted with'. Probably he translated it in view of its implication.

Because of the vowel *sandhi*—*anu*+*a*=*an*—this term *anavaya* clearly can be taken as derived from *anu-a-vaya*, literally meaning 'complete non-want' or 'completely no-lacking'.

The same is the case with *anavajja* rendered into non-fault, the etymology of which also is found neither in PTSD nor in DPL at all. In this case also its etymology is not *an-a-vajja*, which indicates the doubled negation of *vajja* (fault), but *anu-a-vajja* rightly meaning 'complete', 'faultless'.⁵

So we must say that these interpretations are based on a misunderstanding of the prefix *anu*, as even in cases where the emphatic meaning of *anu* is clearly used in Pāli, the interpreters take it in the sense of *an* or *ana*.

But, fortunately there exists a passage, also, where the prefix *anu* is interpreted as 'complete' by Buddhaghosa. He gives his interpretation in his commentary on *Samyuttanikāya*. It runs:

anamataṅga'ti *anu-amataṅga*, *vassa-sataṃ vassa-sahassam ñāṇena augantvā pi amataṅga aviditaṅga*, *nāssa sakkā ito vā eto vā aggaṃ jānituṃ*, *aparicchinna-pubbāpara-koṭiko*'ti *attho*.⁶

(Complete cessation of beginning means 'complete unthinkable beginning'. Even if one thinks of it one hundred years or one thousand years long, its beginning is unthinkable and unknown. It is impossible to know the beginning here and there, its beginning and end cannot be determined.)

We clearly have here *anu-amata-agga* for *anamataṅga*, thus, leaving no doubt at all about the 'complete cessation of beginning'.

Anamataṅga and its implication in Pāli

The Pāli term *anamataṅga*, literally meaning 'the complete cessation of the beginning', acquires not only a negation of the beginning (*agga*), but also a special shade of implication from '*amata*' (*a-man*).

Amata in itself represents a negation of thinking (*amata* derived from *a-mata*). Beyond the range of thinking is the beginning (*agga*). *Agga* being not a sort of ultimate principle, its negation does not mean the mere denial of the process of inference. In other words, *agga* is not the object of inference. What is to be

denied, that is the way of 'thinking' *agga* as a real entity. It is 'thinking' (*man*, pp. *mata*) that counts.

Whether *agga* exists in reality or not is a problem far beyond the range of Buddhist inquiry. In contrast, important is whether 'thinking', the reasoning power, will succeed in finding an ultimate principle (*agga*) from which all things well commence.

According to the fundamental thesis of Buddhism any sort of thinking power is to be denied in its nature. This thesis is applied also to the Pāli compound *amatagga*, meaning 'the beginning unthinkable', being different from *an-agga* (a merely logical negation of *agga*). The Pāli conception of *amatagga*, we might say, corresponds in a sense to a Mahāyānist concept of a negation of *vikalpa*, which is also the discriminative thinking or the discriminative knowledge.

Thus, *amata* being used in compound with *samsāra* it means that *agga* of *samsāra* cannot become even the object of thinking, not to mention 'not exist' as an entity. This is the reason why Pāli Buddhism lays emphasis upon the word *amata* prefixed with the emphatic particle *anu*.

In other words, the term *anu-a-mata-agga* does not represent the inferential inquiry into *agga* as entity, but the fully dynamic meaning on the empirical level. This is an attitude towards *agga* slightly different from the Mahāyānist approach to *agga* (*ādi* in a Mahāyānist terminology), to which I will refer in the section on *ādikāla*.

Anādikāla and its implication in Mahāyāna

Anādikāla compounded with *samsāra* is not found in earlier stages of Pāli Buddhism except a few instances in later stages of Pāli Abhidhamma.⁷ Moreover, *ādi* is not discussed even in later Pāli Abhidhamma from the ontological angle.

In contrast, Mahāyāna Buddhism has to treat a problem of *ādi* from the standpoint of realism in revolt against the heretic view, in which *ādi* is in the form of existence or entity (*dravya*).

In line with this antagonistic orientation Mahāyāna Buddhism also follows tentatively the realistic view of the heretics. *Ādi* taken as an entity by Mahāyānist as well as heretics denotes a finite period of time from which all events will take place in succession up to the end.

Anādi, the negation of *ādi*, means consequently a logical nega-

tion of *ādi* as an entity. Mahāyāna Buddhism, holding its own view of non-reality (*śūnyatā*), has to deny the reality of *ādi* also. For this reason the existence or the non-existence of *ādi* has been discussed by both, Mahāyānist and heretics, from the viewpoint of realism. This realistic implication is indicated by the term *anādikāla* (beginningless).

The purpose of setting the *anādikāla* conception is described in a Mahāyāna text as follows:

[A theory of] *anādikāla* is for the purpose of denying a realistic view of *hetu* (*sahetuvāda*) and also for the purpose of destroying a realistic view of *non-hetu* (*ahetuvāda*).⁸

Hetu in this passage is equated with *ādi* as far as the latter is considered as a real entity; both *sahetuvāda* and *ahetuvāda* are of the realistic view. The denial of *hetu* denotes the denial of *ādi*, both of which are based on the theory of non-reality of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Thus, *ādi* is considered as an entity on the ontological level.

Ādi and Abhidharmic interpretation

Anamatagga in Early Buddhism being a negation of 'thinking' of *agga*, the term *agga* should not be taken as a *prima causa*, but a dynamic condition, upon which our present life (*saṃsāra*) develops.

This ideation has been preserved up to the time when the Abhidharmic interpretation takes place in terms of *ādi*. Buddhaghosa, the Pāli commentator, for instance, interprets *ādi* as a term *paṭṭhāna*, which means 'importance', being quite different from 'beginning' (*ādi*). He, differentiating *ādi* (*paṭṭhāna*) from *ādimatta* (a time period), gives a detailed exposition as follows:

"avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā saṅkhārapaccayā viññānaṃ ti evaṃ hetuphalaparamparāya pariyosānaṃ n'atthi."

(Depending on ignorance karmic formation [form-energies] will take place; depending on karmic formation, consciousness will take place. This fact represents the endless series of the cause-effect relationship.) (Vism. II. p. 577.)

In connection to *ādi*, which is set forth at the beginning of the twelvefold Dependent Origination, is *avijjā*. What does *ādi* mean in terms of the Dependent Origination? Should it be a realistic

concept of *prima causa*? In response to it, Buddhaghosa proposes:

“The objection might be raised: If being so, this theory that depending on ignorance (*avijjā*) karmic formulation will take place would be opposed to [the realistic concept] of *prima causa* (*ādimatta*). But, this is not a theory of [realistic or heretic] *prima causa*. Because among three circles [*kamma-vaṭṭa*, *kilesa-vaṭṭa*, *vipāka-vaṭṭa*] the important is ignorance. Namely, when ignorance will be acquired, then, the other circles such as defilement, desires, [results], also will draw back efficiency.” (Ibid.)⁹

Ādi, as described in this passage, is taken by Buddhaghosa not as *prima causa*, but as ‘the important’ (*paṭṭhāna*), for *ādi*, as represented here by *avijjā*, is rightly the fundamental basis, upon which the human life (as illustrated by the twelvefold links of *paṭiccasamuppāda*) develops. If one, otherwise, takes it as a *prima causa*, this would lead him to a *prima causa* of *prima causa* and that to another *ad infinitum*.

Buddhaghosa, for this reason, objecting to *ādimatta*-conception of the heretics, clearly interprets *ādi* as *paṭṭhāna*.

A concept of *ādi*, as Buddhaghosa presumes, is considered as the period of time or a real entity. This way of understanding is common to both Buddhism, Abhidharma and Mahāyāna, the system of which is formulated in line with the negation of *ādi* as entity.

Ādi and Paṭiccasamuppāda

A concept of *ādi* is inclined to be taken as an entity, for it usually represents a realistic idea of the heretics. For this reason, Buddhism, whether Abhidharma or Mahāyāna, does not employ at all or critically use it, discriminating itself from the heretic concept of reality (*dravya*).

To Pāli Buddhists the twelve fold links of *paṭiccasamuppāda* aims at the mutual dependency of any mental or physical phenomenon for its own object, being thereby not interested in any sort of reality of *ādi*. For this purpose is a specific term employed to define the unthinkability of *samsāra*. It is a Pāli term *anamatagga* at issue. They do not use *anādikāla*, for *ādi* easily could be confused with a real entity.

Instead of a real *ādi*, Pāli Ābhidharmikas insist on the func-

tional relationship of the twelvefold links in view of *paccaya* (condition). *Samsāra* can be found only in a way that it would pass from one moment to the next moment, so also there is no enduring entity.

"[No consciousness] passed from the former life to this life, and yet this present embryo could not have entered into existence without the preceding causes."¹⁰

Thus, everything whatever in the world is said to be determined by conditions. Further, it is allegorically illustrated as follows:

"Many things may serve to illustrate this fact, as for example, the echo, the light of a lamp, the impression of a seal, or the image produced by a mirror. On account of continuum of *khandha* (the individual existence) neither single nor multiple causes exist."¹¹

According to Pāli Abhidharma (the Theravādins), everything mental or physical happens in accordance to laws and conditions (*hetupaccaya*): If it were otherwise, there would reign a realistic entity, i.e. the Creator or *ādimatta* (the period of time.).

As far as the critical attitude toward a realistic concept of *ādi* is concerned, there would not be any distinction between Pāli Abhidhamma and Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Moreover, the same idea as that of Mahāyāna is expressed in a definite form in the following lines:

"Who understands the [twelvefold] Dependent Origination, understands the Law (*dhamma*); and who understands the Law, understands the Dependent Origination."¹²

This idea of the Pāli Abhidhamma is also found in a Mahāyāna text. The Śālistamba runs:

"*yo bhikṣavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati, sa buddhaṃ paśyati, yo buddhaṃ paśyati sa dharmam paśyati.*"¹³

Thus, there would not be any distinction between Mahāyāna and Hinayāna in a point that the realization of both doctrines, *pratītyasamutpāda* and *dharma*, could be unified into one.

It is the same with the interpretation of *ādi*, which points to an entity. As Hinayāna takes *ādi* as a real entity, just so Mahāyāna also interprets it as a reality to be denied.

The Mahāyānist logic of negation, however, concerns itself

not only with *ādi*, but also *anādi* as well, for both *ādi* and *anādi*, as they presume, are merely the constrictions, which our concept have put on. This is called the absolute negation or *śūnyatā* going far beyond the range of dualism or the two extremes of assertion –*ādi* or *anādi*–.

In contrast, Pāli Ābhidhammikas, rejecting also *ādi* as entity like the Mahāyānists, do not, however, deny the *anādi*. Because to them the *anādi*, meaning ‘without beginning’, is rightly that which they imply.

To the Pāli Ābhidhammikas is it sufficient to show how the present suffering, but not the epistemological inquiries, has come about, and how through extinction of ignorance no more rebirth will follow, and thus the process of existence will have been realized and therewith the extinction of the human suffering.

Ādi, therefore, is not an object of epistemological concern, but simply a concept to imply an ‘important’ (*paṭṭhāna*) factor upon which other mental or physical phenomenon, being dependent¹⁴ on conditions, will arise.

In this manner, to the Pāli Ābhidhammikas the issue of *ādi*, going beyond the epistemological concern, has been turned into the problem of human existence in suffering. Hence, *anādi*, a negation of *ādi*, has not been set forth by them unlike the Mahāyānists.

Having supposed conditions (*paccaya*), they have realized how the twelvefold factors—from *avijjā* to *jarāmaraṇa*—are conditioned by each other, and how through non-ignorance the standstill of suffering existence will have been realized.

The Pāli Ābhidhammikas, for this reason, carefully keeping away from the Mahāyānistic usage of *anādi*, would have substituted *anamatagga* (–*saṃsāra*) for *anādikālika* (–*saṃsāra*).

Anamatagga differentiated from *anādi* does not simply mean a logico-epistemological negation of ‘beginning’ (*agga*), but it implies ‘the complete cessation of thinking (*anu-amata*)’ of what soever beginning or end in terms of *saṃsāra*.

However, the Mahāyānist logic of negation, going to its farthest extent, denies both *ādi* and *paccaya* (conditions) as entity on one and the same basis of *śūnyatā*. The Mādhyamika system, as for example, equates *pratītyasamutpāda* with *śūnyatā*—the conventional validity of entities (i.e., Hinayāna view) and their absolute non-entity (i.e., Mahāyāna view).

In Hinayāna tradition of Pāli and Sanskrit literature the twelve-fold Dependent Origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) occupies an important place but Mahāyānists do not attach much prominence to it. The reason will be in a fact that *paccaya* (*pratyaya*) has been re-interpreted by the Mahāyānists on an epistemological level, having been denied as a real entity.¹⁵

III. KAMMA AND ANATTA THOUGHT IN EARLY BUDDHISM

I

In this article, I will examine one of the most vehemently debated questions in connection with Buddhist Philosophy, viz. whether or not there is an inconsistency between the theories of *anatta* (not-self) and *kamma* (action). Dr. M. Falk refers to this problem also saying that the real antinomy is *ātman-karman*. “(*Nairātmya and Karman*”, Indian Historical Quarterly, 1940, p. 429-64).

When we consider the thought of *kamma* in Oriental Philosophy as indicating a continuum after death or the law of causality between good and evil actions, such a way of thinking has never been indigenous to Oriental Philosophy. This has many elements in common with the thought of transmigration, which had prevailed ever since the Orphis Order or Pythagorean philosophy. As compared with Buddhist thinking, however, the latter referred transmigration to its ethical meaning.

In the Orient, as we shall discover to the contrary, transmigration had never been restricted to its ethical meaning, but had been much more deeply considered from the religious viewpoint, and this is the theoretical construction which will be presented here in detail. Since Buddhism began with clarifying wisdom towards the reality of the worldly beings, it is naturally true that the Buddhistic theories are founded not only upon the investigation of human beings, but also upon objective reality binding those human beings.

II

In this respect, some scholars admit of an incongruity between nonself (*anatta*) and action (*kamma*) in doctrine, while others say that the Buddha preached his *dhamma* by adopting the *kamma*

doctrine prevailing at that time because of the mental tendencies, spiritual aspirations, and general behaviour characteristic of the people.

Concerning the importance of the historical background with respect to the *kamma*-doctrine's introduction into Buddhism, little need be said here.

However, by taking the further development of the *Abhidhamma* theories into consideration, we shall find a more deeply underlying relation between the two theories.

Now, the concept corresponding to "substance" and in use in the Pāli canon is the five-aggregates (*khandha*)¹. The five aggregates are transitory and not real, as properly understood. A substance as five aggregates in reality is merely a stream of thought. It contains nothing permanent or substantial; it is nothing but non-self (*anatta*). This definition of five aggregates takes away the presupposition of a deep-rooted, permanent entity, and shows that there is nothing in the world which we can cling to as real and permanent. If there is no permanent entity in the world, such as creator, substance, or agent of action, etc. then who is it that performs action and receives its results? Or does the not-self receive the results of his own action? This is meaningless. Such a conception has no meaning apart from a specifically formulated theory of *kamma*, having developed in the *Abhidhamma*-philosophy ever since the very beginning of the introduction of the *kamma* doctrine into early Buddhism. And what then is the specifically formulated concept of *kamma*?

In the *Nikāya* it is stated thus: "So then you say that body is not the self; that feeling is not the self... Then what self can those acts affect which are not self-wrought?"²

As this passage indicates, the question, "If *kamma* from the Buddhist point of view should take place, then what is the substance of this *kamma*?" has been answered by saying that "The five aggregates are not-self". That is to say that "what" has been answered by "how", but not by a substance of some sort. The question as to the incongruity between the not-self and *kamma*-doctrines has never been answered in the true sense of the word, but only by the reiteration of the meaning of not-self, as it is. If this is the case, what bearing does this argument have upon the unique relationship between the *anatta* and *kamma* doctrines?

We have the same argument concerning the incongruity bet-

ween them in the *Milindapañha*, which says that if these five aggregates should not transfer to another world, or, that they should not transfer as they are, then does not transmigration take place? In response to this question, Nāgasena replies by saying:

"Thus, O King! These five aggregates do not come into existence, and also the natural aggregates do not go to another world. Relying on these five aggregates, the beings are born in the mother-womb in their qualification of good and evil, just like the shadow in the round mirror."³

In this answer it is implied that if substance or the five aggregates should be admitted, evil would necessitate evil, and good necessitate good without the merit of religious purification whatever, and thus the basic reason for religious practice would be denied. If this were so, Nāgasena refutes the affirmation of substance with respect to transmigration as it would end in negation of moral values. The negation of moral values would be contrary to the right view of life, which is repeatedly preached by the Buddha. Thus the relation between the two doctrines, *anatta* and *kamma*, is to be interpreted positively rather than negatively.⁴

III

Those who affirm that the Buddhist view is non-self (*anatta*) are more or less incorrect if they are referring merely to the negative standpoint, in which one may consider the non-self as having no positive contents, "in vain" and "non-real" alone; but they are quite correct if the implication of non-self has reached a much more positive standpoint in which both doctrines, i.e. *anatta* and *kamma*, will be co-related, integrated, and positively interpreted.

It is to be noted that such an implication has found expression in the following passage in the *Milindapañha*:

"O Great King! These five aggregates do neither transfer to another world, nor do the five aggregates take place in themselves. By *kamma*, good and evil, shall sentient beings be born in the womb, depending upon these five aggregates just like the image in the mirror".⁵

This explanation given by Nāgasena implies that there is no valid reality in any way but for the five aggregates, and that it is not due to a substance which can transmigrate, but only to the nature of *kamma*. That there is no substance by which transmigration will be possible has been repeatedly argued, as above

stated. However, what is meant by the idea that transmigration depends upon the nature of *kamma*, instead of depending upon substance? What are the positive components? The image in the mirror is nothing but sentient beings themselves, nothing but the five aggregates which are transitory and unreal. The subject of the image has already been characterized by the term *rujjati* or "to be decayed"⁶. The mirror in this simile corresponds to the "womb" of the mother. Thus the explanation which ended with an emphasis upon the not-self theory in relation to transmigration has come to mean that the five aggregates depend upon the five aggregates and come into existence in "the womb of the mother". In other words, "energy forces (*saṅkhāra*) observe only energy forces".⁷ We may well say then that "the five aggregates observe only the five aggregates".

This explanation, however, refers only to the possibility of substance in relation to transmigration, but not to the positive determination of the relation between the *anatta* and *kamma* doctrines.

Therefore, we must direct our attention to the carefully formulated expression "by *kamma*" in the above quoted passage. It is not only due to the five aggregates but also according to *kamma* that birth takes place in the womb of the mother. Here we have two important factors:

1. "depending upon" the five aggregates, and 2. "according to" *kamma*. The first of these concerns the relation between the not-self and transmigration. This has already been explained. An examination of the evidence relevant to this first factor forces one to make a negative formulation, that is to say, the question "What is the substance of transmigration?" was answered by the postulation of the not-self doctrine: "There is only the five-aggregates" (and no valid reality as substance). This seems to be reduced to the following argument; we may say that the "what" had been answered by the "how". In this case, there was no argument on substance whatever, but only the way of transmigration of sentient beings.

On the contrary to all this, the second factor, "by *kamma*", seems to point out the positive and effective relation between the not-self and action doctrines. This effective relation between both becomes clear if certain very elemental considerations concerning the nature of questions in Buddhist Philosophy be noted. Before entering into the discussion on the implication of "by *kamma*",

let us see what is meant by formulations such as "what", "how", and "by what" from the Buddhistic point of view⁸.

IV

As pointed out by many scholars, it is not really true that the chief object of the Buddha's preaching was to realize complete cessation of all impurities and to attain the realization of Nirvāṇa. It is for this reason that the Buddhistic question refers only to practical problems, but not to the fixed, unchangeable, and ultimate essence. This is especially true of the philosophy of the *Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras*, where we very often come across the expression and refutation of dualistic conceptions⁹. This explains why Buddhistic inquiries do not assume the formula "what is it?" and thus prefer the formula "how is it?". It was in this manner that the query concerning a transmigrating substance was answered and explained, i.e. by indicating the transference by *kamma*.

Nevertheless, in order to explain the meaning proper of the question "how", the essential to be exemplified by "what" must become much more distinctive to a certain extent. The explanation or description can only be meaningful when the essential becomes revealed and described. A mere description without the essential or subject, for all its merits, is quite inadequate in accounting for the fact or question itself. This is only because without the subject, there is no description of it. Hence, in order to describe anything, the subject should be implicitly contained or manifested through a medium of some sort. To explain or to describe means in its part the manifestation of a subject in some way. The subject will at least manifest itself in this manner so far as it concerns the description.

What the five aggregates themselves reflect on themselves by *kamma* should not only explain why they are devoid of any real entity, but also the ground of which they are a non-entity, or by what and through what they are said to be a non-entity. Without grounding of the non-reality or non-self doctrine, the question as to the substance of transmigration is only accidentally answered and inadequate to explain completely substance itself. That the answer was meant to demonstrate not only the not-self doctrine, is at once apparent by the expression "by *kamma*" (*kammena*), as the former can be tested by the latter. We may therefore say that the substance of transmigration has not only been affirmed acci-

dentally from the viewpoint of not-self in the answer, but also more implicitly from the viewpoint of the *kamma* doctrine in order to ground the not-self doctrine in its nature. In order that the five aggregates may reflect the five aggregates (as an image in a mirror), they can not do so but for "through" or "by" *kamma*. Hence, the explanation by the not-self doctrine must be preceded by that of the *kamma* doctrine, i.e. we may say that "how" should be preceded by "by what".

V

That which is said to transmigrate, the human being, would be impossible to describe merely as having no validity, no reality and no self without any medium whatever; it would only be possible "through" or "by" *kamma*, as it is. The non-selfness, though it actually indicates the character of the human being, can not be immediately manifested, actually grasped, and only through *kamma* as such can it reveal itself to man. This is simply because "by what" must be given precedence to "how" as above mentioned.

Thus, we may say that in the formula of argument we can already discover a close connection, integration, and cognitivity between the two doctrines of *anatta* and *kamma*. Thus *kamma* has come to carry the positive meaning and to play the role through which the not-self doctrine can be expressed.

This fact is so important that it may be worth our while to indicate precisely how *kamma* carries the positive role. Now, concerning the fact that *kamma* itself is not a real entity, nothing need be said. *Kamma* is a function which always continues to exist. That *kamma* continues to exist uninterruptedly does not mean to continue indefinitely in time. The reason for this is that the limit in time is one of the categories to be applied to a real entity. Nevertheless in so far as *kamma* is recognized as a non-entity real, such a limit in time would also be impossible to apply to *kamma*. That *kamma* is a non-entity real means that it transcends the limits of time and space.

In the *Milindapañha* it is said: "When the continuum can not be interrupted, it is impossible to point out that these *kammas* exist here and there"¹⁰. The meaning is that it is impossible to indicate that the *kamma* be uninterrupted and that they are un-indicatable in space; in other words, *kamma* transcends any defi-

nition of time and space whatever. In these circumstances, we have to admit that the karmic continuum does not present an indefinite continuation in time, but in view of the fact that *kamma* is non-entity in its nature, we are entitled to expect from it a concrete, functional situation. In other words, there is no real subject behind *kamma*.

Subject, in Buddhism, is not a selfsame permanent entity, but merely a transitory state of karmic continuum. Not only the subject, which accepts the result of *kamma*, but also *kamma* itself is not some sort of permanent substantial reality, which the subject will receive. Subject and object, agent¹¹ and action, are each in a phase of karmic continuum. They are not parts of a valid entity in an endless series which we choose to regard as a karmic continuum. In this case, the subject or agent receiving the result of *kamma* is to be called the karmic receiver (*dāyādā*)¹².

VI

These considerations make it evident that when discussing the problem of karmic continuum, we must be perfectly clear about the meaning of "continuum", since it has not the meaning of infiniteness and indeterminateness in time and space. This consideration suggests that "continuum" is only to be realized within one's own self. Consequently, although "continuum" in the sense of a substantiality must be discharged, "continuum" in the sense of non-substantiality, or some other word denoting self-realization must be retained.

At this point the *Milindapañha* explains "continuum" thus:

"Just so, O King, is the continuum of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and it is like a thing that has no preceding, no succeeding existence. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness"¹³.

This passage indicates that it is impossible to grasp this "continuum" by such concepts as "*uppajjati*", "*nirujjhati*", "*apubbaṃ*", "*acariyaṃ*", etc.; and that, despite this, "continuum" is to be the object of consciousness. In other words, these two facts are reduced to the following effect: "Continuum can not become a subject of consciousness as a real entity, whereas it is alone an object itself. This meaning is formulated thus: "Continuum" can be objectified by itself, but can not be subjectified at all.

What is meant by this?

Generally speaking, the object of consciousness is naturally not the subject of consciousness. Even if this were the case, the conception of object need not necessarily presuppose a concept of the substance of consciousness as a reality. The concept of continuum is just something to be experienced within ourselves. Paradoxically speaking, it is to be objectified, and yet without a substantiality which is to be objectified in any way. And that it can not become a subject means, as in the case of the essential nature of *kamma*, to have no limit in time and space¹⁴.

"It has come to be included in the consciousness", as quoted in the above passage does not mean that the consciousness is like a storeroom in which something can be kept; the correct meaning is that it is to be considered as a formal unity or a phenomenal unity, in so far as it is concluded in the consciousness or it is experienced in ourselves. It is not in itself a real entity.

Some one may object and say, "In the classification of mental factors, the *Abhidhamma* Philosophy assumes a realistic orientation in such a way that each mental factor corresponds to each of the real entities". But after more detailed consideration, we shall come to understand that all the factors within a single moment of consciousness do not last a moment. That is to say, the mental factors are far from being self-contained units. From this we can guess the highly dynamic nature of the processes going on within a single moment of consciousness. The consciousness is the ground (*vatthu*, Skt. *vastu*) where the mental factors take motion and only so far; it is not a substance as a real entity¹⁵. If one is going to affirm the doctrine of a real substance underlying *saṃsāra*, that known real must not be identified with a substance as given with intuitive immediacy, but with an indirectly inferred substance. The *Mahāyāna-karma-siddhi-sāstra* puts it in this way; "The substance (of the six consciousnesses) is only the resulting consciousness. This is because the verification of consciousness takes place by inference only"¹⁶. If this be the case, then such an inferred unseen concept must be denied by the Buddhist as an illusory concept arrived at by logical methods only. It is merely an abstraction, its only reality is that of a constructed concept.

All these considerations indicate that the "continuum" and "consciousness" do not represent the *Prima Essentia*, but only

a fleeting moment of the world, and that both do not stand alone, but in relation one to the another.

The "continuum", we are told, is represented as a subject in our consciousness, but only so far as it is included in, or goes on to the last phase of consciousness. Since the consciousness is deprived of entity, the continuum also is a non-substantial.

VII

The clue to the method by which the positive or most adequate theory is selected from the problems of the relation between *anatta* and transmigration should now be obvious. It has been noted that the question as to the substance of transmigration was answered by the karmic continuum. It is of course obvious that the implication of that answer is the doctrine of *anatta*. But such a doctrine needs the so-called medium of the *kamma* doctrine, which has the capacity to include the relation leading to a constructive formulation of the *anatta-doctrine* and also the hidden implications.

But the concept of *kamma* in this answer is meant that the basic initial question is answered in the affirmative, and therefore the *anatta-doctrine* is to be interpreted as affirmative.

In the entire foregoing analysis, therefore, we called attention to the implication of the *kamma* concept answer. This combination of *anatta* and *kamma* occurs because it is impossible to formulate the philosophy of self-negation (*anatta*) in a positive way without making some assertions as to the nature of this concept, as will be seen below¹⁷.

The formula "transitoriness, painfulness, not-self", is very often repeated in the Pāli canon or *Nikāya*. Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it the Buddhistic viewpoint as Pessimism. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the positive interpretation of a way of life in Buddhism, have been disappointed and have condemned it as incongruous and pessimistic. This formula, however, could not anticipate that the illustration in a series would give rise to such a pessimism. This fact has already been seen in the concept of *anatta*¹⁸. "Not-self" is not only meant to demonstrate one of the three aspects, but also to indicate that together with the other two aspects (painfulness and transitoriness) the not-self implies the absolute, ultimate essence, i.e. the *Śūnyatā* (Non-Substantiality) of Mahāyāna Philosophy.

Nevertheless, we can not deny that such a word as "not-self" must have a negative sense of some sort. For this reason, the full definition of a negation-concept in Buddhism must now be dealt with.

Generally speaking, the concept of negation is to be analysed as follows¹⁹.

1. The negation of the possibility of existence.

We can find no such negation in the Buddhist canon. It means the impossibility of being or existence like the horn of a hare²⁰.

2. The positive negation.

This is the case of Buddhist epistemology. In Buddhist epistemology it is emphasized that object (*ālambana*) and subject (*viññāna*) must be mutually integrated, that they can not stand separately, but must exist in relation to other elements. In this case we speak of "nothing" in such a way as "without the object" or "without the subject". These expressions mean that the object without the subject or the subject without the object can not formulate the concrete situation of cognition. The fact of cognition centers in the epistemic correlation between the subject and the object. This may be called the positive negation i.e. the lack of one of the elements which would make concrete cognition possible.

3. The logical negation.

This is the negation by which the clinging to denial or affirmation is to be removed completely. The Buddhist proposition, "All things are not-self", would seemingly be a negation of the part of the entire fact, which includes another part not to be denied but to be affirmed as real. But with the Buddhist our clinging to such discriminative way of thinking as denial or affirmation should be completely excluded. Hence, no positive provision is made for the constructive construction. It is only the clinging which is to be denied. If we understand by the formula "all is not self" its replacement by some other thing excluding the self, this non-self will not be different from the thing replaced. If we understand it as simple non-existence, then it is a negation in the literal sense of the word. Hence, according to the Buddhist view, "nothing" is neither the lack of anything nor an entity separate from the non-self itself. Thus what is actually provided in these arguments is neither a simple negation nor a proposition of something, but a negation of both the denial and the affirmation on which the clinging to logically discriminative knowledge would be based.

What this analysis of negation has thus far overlooked is that there is more to negation than its three modes as above summarized. We might say that such a negation can be called negation through *kamma* or through realizing the conformity between *kamma* and *anatta*.

4. The realized negation, or the negation arrived at through the realization of the congruity between *kamma* and *anatta*.

This is the mode of negation which implies the fact that "not-self" should be considered as a positive factor rather than as a negative entity.

What then is this positive entity just mentioned? It is nothing other than *kamma* in its nature²¹.

VIII

This fact that the positive entity is nothing other than *kamma* becomes clear if certain logical inferences concerning the meaning of "negation" are noted. In order that this clarification be made, we had best begin by distinguishing the Buddhistic thesis from the judgement formulation proper.

Now, the Buddhist proposition, "All things are not-self", would seemingly be a case of the infinite judgement; "S is non-A". In this judgement, however, only A is completely excluded, that is, the possibility of all other realms, such as B, C, D, etc. are implied in non-A. Hence, the judgement does not become absolutely established since no positive provision is made for the remaining realms, B, C, D, etc; consequently, when it is said that "All things are not-self" then not-self should be considered as different from infinite judgement. Though similar in form, the Buddhist formula and infinite judgement must be distinguished.

When we said, "All things are not-self," the concept "not-self" or "is not self" never implies an entity which could be considered as existing in reality to the exclusion of the "self" itself. With the Buddhist, even if the extension of not-self, i.e. B, C, D, etc. might be conceived besides the self in itself, then, it should be nothing but a being of some sort, which is denied by the Buddhist as having a permanent entity. According to the Buddhist view, there is nothing at all, which is included in the unlimited, infinite extension, excluding the "self".

This is just because, as far as the not-self, in its turn, should exist in reality, could it be considered also as a real entity or valid

"self"; but the non-self as conceived in this manner is also to be denied in every way (just as in the case of the "self"). From these considerations it will become clear that the Buddhistic proposition "All things are not-self" is to be distinguished from both the negative judgement, which is based upon the affirmation of "self" in some way, and the infinite judgement, which does not make the positive provision whatever for the remaining realms, such as B, C, D, etc. The infinite judgement makes no positive, determined provision for any remainder at all. Hence, the infinite judgement does not become absolute or established in any way. And then the judgement of negation, in its turn, would be impossible without the presupposition of a "substance" of some sort.

Thus, it goes without saying that the Buddhistic judgement, "All things are not-self", must be more than a philosophical one; it is a practical, even an immediately apprehended factor. The not-self does not mean a separate reality at all (as it would in the case of an infinite judgement), since a separate reality, as we mentioned repeatedly, in any sense of the word is denied by the Buddhists. Not-self would have no reality and hence no validity.

In any event, certain things are clear. There is no negative meaning or factor in the nature of "non-self"²², which constitutes the fundamental component of the Buddhist doctrine. And we may go further to say that the positive something implied, means that man knows himself as being bound by *kamma*. Not-self reveals itself to man only because he is conscious of *kamma*. The fact that man knows himself as being bound by *kamma* performs a much more positive function than just negatively understanding it deterministically. In other words, "not-self", in revealing itself to man, takes on the form of *kamma*.

Although we are conscious of this fact, the process is not such a simple intuitive conception that the "not-self" directly reveals itself.

How is it possible that it reveals itself in *kamma*?

There is only one effective answer to this question. This can best be obtained from the consideration of *kamma* in relation to Buddhist psychology or mentality.

IX

Psychologically speaking, the essence of *kamma* is said to be "thinking" (*cetanā*)²³. "*Cetanā*" is derived from two root forms,

“*cint*” and “*cit*”, of which the former plays the most significant part in the psychology of Pāli Buddhism, the latter in the Sarvāstivāda School. “*Cetanā*” (thinking) as designated by “to think” is never a hypothetically formulated entity whatever, as it has been repeatedly argued. If it were a hypothetical entity, it should be merely a form of consciousness only. In the *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā*, Buddhaghosa says: “Seven or eight minds, though in one group, can not take place in only one moment. When coming into existence, they take place one by one; when going out, they go out one by one”.²⁴ Each of them is subject to the law of appearing-disappearing separately, but not together in a group. And further, “*cetanā*” is not merely “thinking” proper, but much more a function, especially when regarded as “to think”, “intend to do”, and “to occupy”. In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, it is said: “That which we think, and that which we intend to do, and that which we all are occupied with—this becomes an object for the persistence of consciousness”²⁵.

What, then, is meant by “*cetanā*” being a function without being a real unity?

It may be useful for the consideration of “function with no real entity” to know some of the meanings in which the psychological illustration is used in Pāli Buddhism. Such a specific explanation refers to the fourteen modes of functional minds²⁶. We have only to explain this “function with no reality” along the theory of the fourteen modes of functional minds. These modes denote a circle, to fulfil all of which constitutes a psychological process, beginning with the subconscious (*bhavaṅga*) and ending in the same. The subconscious is one of these modes and is considered to make the continuum of all minds possible. As far as it concerns a function, it may be understood as a reality making possible the unification of all minds, just as latter Buddhism established “impressions” (*vāsanā*) as a theory for that purpose.

The subconscious (*bhavaṅga*) is an unreal factor acting upon the other mental factors. Though not “real”, *bhavaṅga* is actual in so far as it is presently active. It is the potency or potentiality of a situation, comprising its unmanifested possibilities. That is to say, this potentiality is the codetermining factor of what may be called the fourteen mental modes, or subject-object as considered Buddhistically.

The subconsciousness situation is just a result of function but

not a functional mind in itself. It has all the functional minds as an object merely. Although the fourteen modes of functional minds are mental functions, those should be different from that of epistemological discrimination between subject and object. This is because, according to the Buddhistic view, there is no dichotomy such as subject and object, and therefore, to be known is the same as to be. In other words, the fourteen modes of functional minds are nothing but the forms, in which both subject and object should be represented as they are. Even though we should presuppose something as a real entity underlying the functional minds, then it is only one of the objects and not a real subjective entity in any way.

Thus, we must realize that in the conception of the subconscious (*bhavaṅga*) the supposed objective reality or real entity of being, in itself, is not admitted. The polarization maintained by metaphysical dualists, as subject and object in a dualistic separation, should be replaced by the Buddhistic bi-polar or multi-polar subject-object distinction in a perspective which, as a matter of fact, is usually achieved through those fourteen modes of functional minds. The function of these minds is to externalize, to objectify. The function of these minds does not impose arbitrary forms on the object; rather, its art consists in specifying in what way objective entities are formed dependently of the modes of functional minds.

At any rate, even the subconsciousness "*bhavaṅga*" in the fourteen modes of mind is not anything to be conceived as a real entity whatever.

Such are the consequences of initiating inquiry by analyzing the problem of the relation between *kamma* and *anatta*, and by following this analysis step by step to its solution. Namely, this analysis of minds leads us to the relevant fact that *kamma* is not founded upon any substantial reality as it was the same in the case of *cetanā*, the essential nature of *kamma*.

It appears that this step by step procedure can lead us to the following explicit state: the discovery by analysis of the basic theoretical root of the activity of *kamma*, which has no real entity whatever.

This *kamma* (action) is considered not merely as non-substantiality, but also as activity, which is dynamic rather than static. As it is said in the *Visuddhimagga* by Buddhaghosa:

"For the activities are causes through commission of deeds, not because they are existent or non-existent²⁷".

We may interpret the term "*saṅkhāra*" (activities) as *kamma*, as it is properly well known.

"*Kamma*" will become a cause just at the time when it has taken place or has come into activity, and not merely by its own existence in itself. If *kamma* could exist alone and produce a result, then in the very moment of existence a result should have been produced in advance. In the above passage it is implied that *kamma* is not to be conceived of as a permanent entity at all, which might lead one to negate the activity of *kamma*. The reason for this is that, generally speaking, the permanent entity is nothing but a concept as superimposed over a real entity, which had already been rejected by the Buddhist, and that, accordingly, *kamma* should be the negation of such permanent entity, i.e. it should have an active meaning or activity of some sort. In order to clarify this meaning, we may call our attention to the following passages in the *Suttanipāṭa*. It is said thus: "The person is *Brāhmaṇa* not owing to his birth (*jāti*); he is also non-*Brāhmaṇa* not owing to his birth. He is *Brāhmaṇa* owing to his *kamma* (acting). He is also non-*Brāhmaṇa* owing to his *kamma*²⁸".

The meaning of this passage is this, that the variation of birth or character does not depend upon an a priori condition, but just upon *kamma* a posteriori. It can possibly be reduced to the "Ordnung" or acting by which each sentient being may exist as he is. This "Ordnung" is nothing but *kamma* itself, as distinguished from birth (*jāti*). Consequently, such a conception of *kamma* does not indicate any determining factor whatever; even more, it represents activity as making possible the transcendence of transmigration. The *kamma* is not passively determined but always creates itself positively, since it is nothing but the "Ordnung" of active behaviour.

There is good *kamma*, there is bad *kamma*, and as the wheel of life moves on, the old *kamma* is exhausted and again fresh *kamma* is created. We would like to say that *kamma* is the man, that is, *kamma* is his own action²⁹.

Nothing is more important, therefore, than to realize that *kamma* constitutes the self-consciousness of activity by itself, with a specific theory appropriate to itself and different from the analytical method appropriate to the Sarvāstivāda School³⁰, which

entertains an idea-continuum, that is, a concept of "non-intimation" (*avijñapti*)³¹.

All these considerations lead to the following conclusion:

The basic concept of *kamma* in relation to *anatta* has two references, the one a prescriptive reference by way of theoretical reasoning to non-substantiality, the other an empirical cognitive reference by way of the ethical postulates of activity. It is the former of these two references which corresponds to the non-substantiality of *anatta*: it is the latter which is in compliance with the postulate for the positiveness of *anatta* (not-self).

Thus, the two references of *kamma* have come to correspond to those of the *anatta* concept. This fact indicates that both concepts of *kamma* and *anatta* are actually a genuine unity: *kamma*, in turn, usually finds itself involved in the experience of not-self, which could, as we have seen, not appear but through *kamma*; *kamma* is first of all tested in *anatta*; *kamma* is not separated from not-self (*anatta*), but it is the categorical form of not-self. Therefore, we may say that the *kamma*-concept may be postulated but nothing else. The thought of not-self can then be interpreted as effectively as the concept of *kamma*.

Let us examine this genuine relation between both by quoting several passages from the original texts. In the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa says:

"So fruit is not in *kamma* or out of it;
kamma is devoid of (fruit).
 Nor is the fruit in *kamma* to be found,
 But it is *kamma* and nought else
 By which the fruit is reproduced³²".

The meaning of this passage is this, that *kamma* does not merely mean "to act" without being conscious of the ground upon which *kamma* can rest, as really it is. This *kamma* is to be founded upon the non-substantiality or not-self. The paradoxical expression, "Nor is the fruit in *kamma* to be found, but it is *kamma* and nought else" vindicates the fact that the ground of *kamma* should be deeply related to the not-self conception³³.

Kamma is the field, where the not-self reveals itself to man. Not-self reveals itself to man only because he is conscious of *kamma*.

There is a congruity between both *kamma* and *anatta*; not only

that, but the self-consciousness of *kamma* takes place simultaneously with that of *anatta*. Therefore, it may be added that just like the not-self essentially transcends over the time-level, just so should *kamma* be even more over the time-level. The conception of both *kamma* and *anatta* refers to one and the same fact, differently viewed.

With respect to the relation between *kamma* and time, we have in the *Visuddhimagga* the following passage:

"There is no separate division of matter set up by *kamma*, such as past, and so on, by way of continuity. But such a division is to be understood as giving support to matter set up by the caloric order, by nutriment, by consciousness.³⁴"

The time conception is to be attributed to the things, such as forms (*rūpanāṇi*) set up by *kamma*, but not to *kamma* itself. This vindicates the statement that *kamma* is beyond the time-level. It is generally believed that *kamma* of the past determines the way of existence of all things. Strictly speaking, however, the determination of all things in the present is accomplished through the forms (*rūpa*) only and not through the characteristic nature of *kamma*. It is simply because *kamma* itself is timeless and beyond the time-level³⁵. In Buddhist Philosophy we can discover the theory of the momentariness of time, such as the past, present, and future. This explains why such a theory of momentariness is often repeated, and why *kamma* is here considered as timeless. The reason for this is that the momentariness of time may be reduced to the timelessness of *kamma* on the one side, and the timelessness of *kamma*, in turn, may be reduced to that of *anatta* on the other. As we have seen before, *kamma* is nothing other than the plane where the timeless *anatta* will reveal itself to man.

X

As we have seen above, the strongest relation of necessary connection between any two concepts, such as *kamma* and *anatta*, is that of logical implication. This is a case of the striking characteristic of the epistemological analytical systematization, the *kamma* concept has been classified in detail.

But the important point from the religious bearing on the analytical classification, however, is that the analysis should not restrict itself to *kamma*, but points even more to "not-self". The analysis of *kamma* does not mean a merely conceptual designation,

but much more the revelation of "not-self" in the karmic formulation. In other words, the analysis of *kamma* presupposes the *anatta* assumption, which can not reveal itself but through *kamma* or karmic analysis. The not-self doctrine underlies the karmic analysis³⁶. The positive counter-part of "not-self" is "self". The positive basis of this negation is, however, not the "self", but the *kamma*, through which "not-self" reveals itself and on which there is "not-self".

This congruity is according to the Buddhist understanding which is different from the merely ethical meaning of the non-Buddhistic schools.

It is of course certain that the concept of *kamma* has been introduced from non-Buddhistic schools into Buddhist Philosophy. However, it has been done in a different sense in that the former articulated *kamma* in its ethical aspect only, whereas the latter did so in its own philosophical aspect or in its necessary relation to the not-self doctrine, which is indigenous to Buddhism³⁷.

XI

Our conclusions may now be summarized.

First, a distinction must be drawn between the infinite judgement and the Buddhist proposition "All things are not-self", though similar in form. Second the positive entity, which is not involved in the infinite judgement, is nothing other than *kamma*. Third, *kamma* is not separated from not-self, but it is the categorical form of not-self.

These two doctrines were not preached from the philosophical point of view only. Therefore, more important than the admission of incongruity between the two doctrines is the fact that both are concentrated in the experience of the person as a genuine unity. It is only the human being who is able to involve both concepts of *kamma* and *anatta* as a genuine unity.

Certainly, these conclusions, if true, are important for the history of Buddhist Philosophy in the meaning that the strong necessary connection between both *kamma* and *anatta* would not require any medium between them whatever, whereas the Sarvāstivāda School has constructed the concept of *avijñapti* (non-information) in that direction³⁸. Not only the Sarvāstivāda School, but also most of the other Buddhist schools, such as Sautrāntika,

Yogācāra, etc. have considered concepts corresponding to “*avi-jñāpti*”, while Pāli Buddhism has no such equivalent concept, but instead lays its emphasis upon the congruity between *kamma* and *anatta*.

This I take to be its fundamental character, which would indicate its difference, not only from the thoughts of the non-Buddhist Schools, but also those of almost all the other schools of Buddhism.

It is not our business at present to make a detailed statement and a comparative estimate of Oriental and Western achievements in this branch of thought. We leave this to more competent hands. We can not leave without notice of a remarkable characteristic, as well as a great difference, in a specific problem of epistemological logic, between Pāli Buddhism and the Sarvāstivāda School³⁹ or later Mahāyāna Buddhism.

All the methods in the methodology of comparative study are well known. Many books have been published on this subject. But what needs to be done at the outset is to find out what indigenous items and methods are to be chosen and used. This is indispensable towards overcoming the difficulties in the scholarly examination of the original texts. This paper presents a systematically arranged way of thinking in respect to the relation between *kamma* and *anatta*. In exact text-research, the so-called difficulty experienced in comparative philosophical study is ascribed to the Oriental way of thinking and its terminology. This paper provides a step towards clarification in this direction.

IV. KARMA AND FATALISM IN MODERN SETTING

Hinduism in India has spread widely among the urban and rural areas, and among the intellectual and lay masses.

The Hindu way of life includes the worship of numerous gods, magic and animistic cults. The people believing in Hinduism also have various views and different attitudes towards Hinduism.

In order to clarify all these regional, personal and traditional varieties of Hinduism we should like to divide it into two classes; universal and parochial Hinduism.

Universal Hinduism

Universal Hinduism means here Sanskritic Hinduism, which is

sanctioned in Sanskrit texts, traditional rituals and beliefs. Even a belief in *karma* and transmigration represents a different form than that of peasant Hinduistic belief.

In most cases an Indian concept of *karma* misunderstood in a way that all human beings are predestined and bound by *karma*, result of action, in the previous life, and that they will be born in another world after death according to different *karma*. If so, the *karma* idea could not leave any room to admit freedom and responsibility for actions.

Modern Indian scholars are inclined to hold the Universal Hinduistic views, being critical not only of their own traditional interpretations, but also of the European views. They think that some of the misinterpretations in Europe are derived from the inaccurate European translations of the Sanskrit and other original texts. At the 26th International Congress of Orientalists, 1964, Professor L. Rocher of Belgium, read his paper on *The Concept of Time in Hinduism*, in which he mentioned an Indian conception of "transmigration" referring to "avatāra". Some of Indian pandits and scholars objected to the use of this English term, referring to other European terms. They took it as opposed to the orthodox Indian view in its significance. Apart from the scholarly point of view, this debate amply shows us that modern scholars in India are critical and sceptical of the European translations in an attempt to shed new light on orthodox Indian views.

According to the traditional belief, the *karma* idea has been developed in the course of time into two directions.

First, the sacrifice compulsion which can be seen in the Vedic period. One can compel a supernatural god to give one power through ascetic life and sacrifice. The Vedic sacrificial institution is still being maintained particularly in South India, even if in a restricted and slightly modified form in spite of the rapidly changing circumstances.

In the earliest portions of the Brāhmaṇas the *karma*-conception appears of small account, which was not much applied to the life. It simply referred to morality in a way that the person who has led an immoral life may be condemned to a miserable life in the future. The *karma* doctrine is thought to be formulated in the Upaniṣads for the first time.

According to this Upaniṣadic idea, one ignorant of the true nature falls into the vortex of life (*saṃsāra*). Then he must under-

go successive rebirths (*punarbhava*). If ignorance is removed then he will return to unity. It is salvation.

Secondly, the devotion-compulsion, which was emphasized in the medieval *bhakti* movements. Rāmānuja, one of the *bhakti* preachers, taught that through devotion the karmic results could be changed by the grace of God.¹

However, neither compulsions, sacrifice or devotion prevail among the contemporary intellectuals in India.

In terms of *karma*, metaphysical Hinduism insists on the activity of human beings in the modern society. They attempt to draw sources of activities from another aspect of the philosophy of *karma*. To quote the *Bhagavadgītā*:

“One should not give up the activity to which one is born, even though this should be attended by evil, for all undertakings are enveloped by evil, as is fire by smoke.” (18.48)

‘The duty incumbent on one’ means here duties predestined by birth, caste and profession. Although the freedom of social status like caste and birth are not mentioned here, *karma* is considered as activities.

In the later period, the potentiality of human action has come to appear. To witness Vedānta, which distinguishes three kinds of *karma*: (1) *Sañcita-karma*, the seeds of destiny already as a result of former acts. It refers to the past. (2) *Agami-karma*. The seeds that would be stored if one were to continue in the path of ignorance basic to the present life. It refers to the present. (3) *Prārabdha-karma*. The seeds collected and stored in the past. They have actually begun to grow. It refers to the *karma* bearing fruit in the shape of actual events referring to the future.

Thus, the activity and potentiality of *karma* have been drawn attention to and re-interpreted by the contemporary Hindus to emphasize social values in Hinduism.

In terms of freedom of action the concept of duty in *Gītā* and its philosophy have been discussed by modern scholars. However, there are some scholars who criticize the *Gītā*’s conception of freedom of action. To quote V.P. Varma’s view: “The *Gītā* tends to exaggerate the concept of divine determinism.” Further he says; “When it uses such phrases as ‘both fame and ignominy proceed from me’ it prepares the foundations of the supreme importance of human action for individual life and historical movement.”²

Yet almost all the intellectuals attempt to evaluate Hinduism in all its activities. S. Nikhilananda says: "The *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, and other secondary scriptures stress the ideal of filial piety, chastity of women, friendship, and kingly duties."³

In modern times, the Brāhmo Samāj, the Ārya Samāj, and the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda movement have been emphasizing the ability of individuals relating to *karma* on various occasions.

The modern social reformers and philosophers are convinced that Hinduism is neither anti-social nor otherworldly, the vitality of Hindu society being proved by its survival through a thousand years of foreign domination.

With the independence of India this trend of thought is advancing into the masses through the temples, *sadhus*, institutions, etc.

A report of the famous Lakshminarain Temple, New Delhi, states:

"Man must reap the fruit of actions (*karma*) performed during this life and in the previous births. *Karma* does not mean fate, but it means the actions performed by man. To sit idle, relying on fate, is condemned by Hindu religion. The theory of *karma* is based on the principle that a person is himself responsible for his good and bad deeds. Hence, every man should work with sincerity. Our happiness and sorrow are the results of our actions in this life or in the past birth. This is the eternal principle of their religion. Fate is also nothing but the result of our past actions."

Hindus' attitude toward the responsibility for action is derived from the strong conviction of *karma*. They reconcile in harmony the two apparently inconsistent elements of *karma*: fatalistic and unrestricted elements.

We should like to quote a letter from K.M. Shah, a princess of the former kingdom of Tehri, Delhi. She is a high-caste Hindu managing a social welfare association in her territory. Her letter runs: "Working as an instrument of God is a very agreeable task, life being worth living if our services are used by the needy. Perhaps it is God's will that my trip to Japan has not yet been matured as I should not yet leave the work here. When we plan things, little do we realize that all is predestined and we are only following the programme laid out by Him. We take the credit of planning it."

The highly evolved responsibility for *karma* is reflected in the preoccupation with the personal horoscope and destiny. In social

activities there is much concern with this religious sentiment which is operative in the development of modern India.

There is no doubt that if Hindus confine themselves to those Community Development plans which can be approached not through religious sentiment but through non-religious social structure, much of the complexity of their traditional socio-religious thought will be lost.

Parochial Hinduism

Theoretically 'Parochial Hinduism' represents a mixture of elements from the metaphysical traditions of Hinduism and folk elements of the rural areas.

Practically 'Parochial Hinduism' is concerned with relieving tortures and misfortunes in this society. It has not salvation, nor the happy life after death for its purpose. It is mainly due to the difficulties of environments which they were living in and are undergoing.

In terms of the religious attitude of peasants, Lewis gives an interesting report. He interviewed twenty high-caste Brahmins and Jats, and five low-caste Potters and Chamars. He asked to identify a list of Sanskritic, traditional gods and the incarnations of Vishnu. He also asked their ideas of heaven, hell, reincarnation, salvation, God, soul, illusion, the cosmos and life.

Some, mostly Brahmins, showed a traditional knowledge of *karma*, *mokṣa* and transmigration, while others, mostly Jat farmers, did not affirm belief in *mokṣa* in this world, reincarnation and the life after death, emphasizing the happy life (mostly economically) in this world. The concepts of heaven and hell are to them meaningless.⁴

Harijan Castes and Theory of Fate

Harijan castes in villages look quite different from a group of sweepers in the urban areas. Let me take one example. Members of Sevagram in Maharashtra are living under the influence of Gandhian economy, or 'self-sufficiency'. All their requirements, especially in necessities, are of local production. Their living standard is far better than we had expected. Economically, they believe that the remedy for them lies in decentralization; spiritually they are confident that economic self-control and production are the sure solution to lead the country to freedom, peace and well being.

Politically this village was the centre of the Gandhian Independence Movement, keeping still the pride with the socio-religious structure of the village. The pride is represented by the new movement '*Nava Bauddha*' (the new Buddhist movement), which provides for the liberation of the Harijan for its various activities.

They are provided with school and fields. They are intelligent and critical of the Government schemes and even the Gandhian polity and idea. Gandhi's simple residence is well kept for display and worship. Quite a few visitors come from neighbouring villages and also from foreign countries.

Under these circumstances, the villagers are so cultivated and refined as to show an example of Indian village improved in the future. They criticize even their own leader Gandhi by saying that Gandhi recognized the caste system, leaving it as it was in the medieval period. This criticism points out one of the difficulties embodied in metaphysical Hinduism, however properly it may be re-interpreted or modified in accord with the demand of modern society.

Accordingly the views of villagers are Buddhistic and Hinduistic. They believe that such results as serious illness, length of life, sex of children are derived from individual *karma*. But the other elements, birth, occupation, poverty and human virtues are not predestined by *karma*; they are to be changed and transformed into a better state. This notion is typical of Buddhism, not to mention the contemporary interpretation of Hinduism. However, they are never interested in any discussions of heaven and salvation in the next life. In this respect, they point towards the development of the character of the individual.

They emphasize the benefit of all beings, animal and non-animal; they want to be treated as a group of poor men, but not as Harijans differentiated from higher ranks. Nevertheless, they say, the Government schemes intend to make Development Plans under the name of the Harijan-Rehabilitation, which they do not like at all.

Earnest and strong is the conviction that if an individual can be highly trained and disciplined, he will find it easy to live within the economic society. Hence, many Harijans in this village have their own sons studying at the colleges.

The high standard of interest in education is rapidly changing

and transforming fatalistic *karma* into active human conduct. Education is of prime importance for rehabilitation.

The villagers believe in the existence of God or Goddess, regardless of its number in singular or plural. Even Arya Samajists, reformed religionists, do not doubt it, believing only in one God. They also think that men must follow the fate destined by God. On this point all the villagers have one and the same belief. Only different are the ways by which they liberate themselves from the misfortunes on earth.

P.M. Kolenda mentions an example of the women of Khalapur. The villagers in Khalapur do not acquiesce before the hand of fate. Instead, mothers perform acts of a magical and religious nature which they believe to be helpful in preserving the health of their children.⁵ Further, Kolenda points out the religious anxiety embedded in mothers' mind; they as members of a social community feel themselves incompatible with the Hindu philosophical teachings of non-attachment and of stoic acceptance of one's fate. In order to control the illness of children mothers in this village are not content with the philosophical acceptance of stoic contemplation; instead they appeal to the magical power or the devotion-compulsion to mother goddesses at Kankhal and Raiwala suburbs of Hardwar.

The sweepers, Kolenda similarly points out, attempt to reduce the responsibility for individual deeds to a caste history. Namely, they explain the rank of the caste not as a synthesis of multiple individual rebirths for deeds in past-lives, but rather in terms of a caste history.⁶ To them a low caste is simply a historical accident which should be changeable.

There might be a conflict between caste *dharma* and virtuous behaviour. To quote an example: caste *dharma* may include *himsā* (violence) while virtuous behaviour requires *ahimsā* (non-violence). Kolenda reports on Gopalpur villagers who tend to avoid dilemmas about virtue by shifting the responsibility for decision to the headman of the village. But in my experience in Mehrauli area around New Delhi (1964) the villagers seem to believe in conformity to caste duty and human virtue. This socio-religious attitude, although it is apparently vague, may be derived from the tolerance for religio-ethical amalgamation or harmony.

The harmony between caste duty and virtue can be traced back to the Upaniṣadic period. The Upaniṣads put forward mean-

ings on *Dharma*, namely the duties of the particular castes and orders. It says: "There are three branches of *Dharma*, one is (constituted of) sacrifice, study and charity (i.e., the state of the householder); the second (constituted of) austerities (i.e., the stage of being a hermit); the third is the *brahmacārin* dwelling in the house of his teacher and staying with the family of his teacher until the end (of his life); all these attain the world of meritorious men; one who abides finally in Brahman attains immortality." (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, ii, 23).

The meaning of *Dharma* sanctions a gospel of socialization as well as criteria of individual virtuous behaviour. It is clear that the Upaniṣads deepened *Dharma* by extending its meaning to the organic community and individual self-discipline. Thus the conflict between caste duty and human virtue is brought into unity in the Hindu mind in a way that the social interdependence (by caste system) should be based upon one's own virtue.

However, another difficult problem may arise. If a person's present fate is predestined by actions in his past life, then how can he test whether a misfortune is really the result of a bad *karma*?

The mental attitude towards *karma* is of a particular kind. One accepts *karma* and fate of life, however ugly or beautiful they may be, with indifference or non-attachment. Man on earth must acquiesce in the determinate, transitory and earthly state of affairs or *karma* in so far as he is living with attachment. On the other hand, man must dedicate himself to the indeterminate, timeless and all-embracing immediacy which is Brahman. In other words, man is in the muck of *karma*, but not of it.

Thus, Indian villagers accept *karma* or misfortune. But they do not resign themselves to misfortune. They try every method to avoid it, whether magical rites or Western medicine in case of illness. They are not really fatalists.

Now it would be clear that parochial Hinduism is concerned with preventing misfortunes in this *karmic* world, but not with a better life after death. Its purpose is common with Universal Hinduism. It is a product of the Indian genius that the people, low and high, are concerned with this world.

Only different is the attitude towards salvation. Parochial Hinduism is concerned only with the real world and material improvement rather than with the spiritual salvation. In contrast,

Universal Hinduism puts forth spiritual salvation on earth as its highest goal.

The emphasis on the reformation of this world, which is embodied in both types of Hinduism, accounts for the cooperation of the villagers with the Government Development Plan. The peasants are ready to be taught that their every act, irrespective of *karma*, affects others.

Karma and Principle of Activities

There is no doubt that *karma* is a fruit of action performed during the previous births. Man is destined by *karma*. This is true in terms of religion. The modern interpretation of *karma*, as stated above, is to emphasize another side of *karma* philosophy, in which *karma* is interpreted as a principle of activity performed by man. This is, however, a religious interpretation, which is the basis of mystical experience.

What is needed today is to give social value to a wide-spread religious sentiment. One cannot deny the fact that a fatalistic implication of *karma* is so completely accepted by all. This personal sentiment can be found in their attitude toward a social system of caste. Caste, predestined by birth and *karma*, is so tacitly accepted by all, including those who are most opposed to caste discriminations, that it is still in modern India the unit of social activity. There are thousands of communal bodies based upon castes and sub-castes. Moreover, these communal bodies are striving for economic and social uplift. Therefore, the communal bond cannot be dubbed as harmful. The radical action condemning caste-discriminations could be theoretically accepted, but practically it would confuse a traditional social order and result in ignoring the activities of communal bodies.

Under these circumstances, it appears suggestive that while retaining a religious sentiment for *karma*-destiny the contributions of caste-communities to the industrial development would receive due attention. In this connection a report seems to be relevant. According to this report,⁷ the leader of caste conferences urged "to seize the opportunities afforded under the Five-Year Plan to the fullest advantage and contribute their share to the industrial development (of the country)". It is also reported Shri S. Chenniah, President of the Mysore Pradesh Congress Committee, gave a similar statement at the conference of a particular caste in

Nanjanagud in October 1955: "Human psychology being what it is, it often was the communal bond which urged them to action."⁸ Thus, modern India is facing a real dilemma. The people who want that a religious sentiment for *karma*-destiny would be retained are at the same time aware of social activities of caste bonds. This dilemma, however, is not incapable of being overcome. The way to solve the dilemmas facing India is to recognize a traditional, human sentiment for *karma*-destiny and to extend help and patronage to caste and communal organizations. By and through the communal bond and caste fraternities *karma*'s widespread sentiment and implication will tacitly be realized. In other words, the masses will be able to understand that their every act, irrespective of *karma*, can affect others through the caste and communal organizations they belong to. It is the basis that accounts for the cooperation of the masses with the social development issue.

V. AN ANALYSIS OF EGO-CONCEPT: *māna*, *asmimāna*, *ātmamāna*

Three Sanskrit words, *māna*, *asmimāna*, *ātmamāna*, are respectively translated in Chinese by *men*, *vu men* and *tze men*. All of these Chinese words, make etymologically no distinction from each other, meaning simply 'pride'.

Sanskrit equivalents, however, being not confined to 'pride' or the psychological sphere, are based on the etymological meaning and concerned with the logical sphere. Going beyond the meaning of pride they point to the reality of the self, whatever pride or humility may be. Moreover, with the development of Buddhism old etymology of the words is forgotten or deliberately lost sight of.

Māna, *Pride*, *Conceit*

Māna generally means 'pride', under which the Theravādins divide its types of manifestation into seven. They are: *māno*, *atimāno*, *mānātimāno*, *omāno*, *adhimāno*, *asmimāno*, *micchāmāno*.¹

If one takes *māno* simply as a concept meaning 'pride', how can he understand *omāno* (*ūna-māno* in Skt.) meaning inferiority-complex? It should not be *māna* (pride), rather an opposition to pride. The same is true with *asmimāna*, literally meaning 'I am' conceit. But how could the self-awareness ('I am') be 'pride'?

Because the self-awareness as such should be neither pride nor inferiority-complex. Further, *micchāmāno* (a wrong conceit) should be common to all *māno*, when the latter could mean only pride. All *māno*, as far as it is concerned with the Buddhist idea-tion, should not be good, but evil, that is, *micchā* (wrong). Thus, a wrong conceit is not to be limited to *micchāmāno* only. The other three, i.e. *māno*, *atimāno*, *mānātimāno*, respectively corresponding to conceit, arrogance, pride and conceit, will be appeal exactly to the English 'conceit' or 'pride'.

Having a double meaning implied, i.e. superiority-conceit and inferiority-complex, *māna* has been divided into 7 types (*vidhā*), as shown above. In other words, both superiority-conceit and inferiority-complex, being involved in one and the same concept of *māna*, are in reality based upon 'imagination' or 'conception', whatever superior or inferior, which is rightly the original meaning of *māna* derived from the root 'man', 'to imagine', 'to think', 'to conceive'. This is denoted in the Mahāniddeśa as follows: *Yo evarūpo māno maññanā maññitattam unṇati unṇamo dhajo sampaggāho, ketukamyatā cittassa, ayam vuccati māno. (Māno means conception [imagination], the state of conception, haughtiness, loftiness, mark, assumption, the desire for prominence).²*

This is a designation of *māna* from the psychological point of view, for these qualities refer to *citta* as indicated in the quoted passage. Summing up these designations, it is said to be *cittassa unṇati* meaning the rising up of the mind, which represents the logical point of view, for 'the rising up of the mind' or stirring up of the mind will take place at anytime when the mind is compared with others or when one conceives of oneself in relation to others, superior or inferior.

Māna, derived from the root *man*, originally means conception, assumption, imagination, and also *Meinung*, *Vorstellung* in view of Böthlingk und Roth, having come to mean *cine hohe Meinung*, *die Achtung*.³

A Chinese rendering *men* is remarkable on the variety of meaning such as 'to neglect, to despise, to be proud of' all of which are, just like the various implications in Pāli,⁴ rightly manifestations of *māna* with the basic meaning of 'the conception of oneself in relation to others' or with the etymological meaning of the root *man* in Pāli.

Asmimāna

Asmimāna (*asmi-māna*) really implies 'to conceive that I am the five aggregates' (*rūpa, vedanā, saññā, sankhāra, viññana*). It is exemplified: *Thale ussādeti kho bhikkhu asmimānassetam adhivacanam* (Oh! Bhikkhu high, raising, this is synonym of 'I am') *Saṃyuttanikāya* 5.180. The compound 'I am' denotes the high attitude towards the individual existence. What, then, is *asmi* 'I am'? *Rūpavantam vā attānam attam vā rūpaṃ rūpaṃ vā attam. Iti ayam ceva samanupassanā asmīti cassa avigatam.*⁵ (I have *rūpa*, *rūpa* is I myself, I myself is *rūpa*. The observation such as 'I am' is not yet removed.)

The conception of 'I am', therefore, indicates that I am the five aggregates, and attach to them as real entities. Thus, the Buddhistic genuine attitude is: *Api ca me āvuso pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu asmīti adhigatam ayam aham asmīti ca na samanupassāmi.* *S III.130.* ([The Buddha says], Oh friends, I do not observe that I am the five aggregates to be attached.)

The implication of *asmi* has faithfully been inherited in the Abhidharma philosophy as is often explained: *Rūpe asmīti māno ti aham rūpan ti uppannamāno.* (*Sammohavinodanī* p. 490). (That which I am in *rūpa* means the conception arisen (*uppannamāna*) that I am just right *rūpa* itself.) The *asmi*, thus, is nothing but an abbreviation of *asmīti māna* (to conceive I myself as the five aggregates).

On the other side, this logical consideration of *asmi* is often used together with other psychological terms such as *chanda* and *anusaya*: *Atha khavassa hoti yeva pañcasu upādānakkhandesu anusahagato asmīti māno asmīti chando asmīti anusayo asamūhato.* (Conception 'I am', desire 'I am', latent bias 'I am', all these are bound by the five aggregates of clinging and not yet removed.)

Three terms here, *māna*, *chanda*, *anusaya*, represent a psychological process in a way that one will *conceive* at first, when he wants to do, then, proceed to *desire*, and finally he will be captured by *latent bias*—the most strongest affection in a Buddhist sense. *Chanda* and *anusaya* originate from *māna*. *Māna*, meaning the conception of the five aggregates of clinging, is the self-awareness of the individual existence, which is in itself neither pride nor humiliation but simply *yathābhūtaṃ* ('to see the things as

they are') or the *non plus ultra* of the teachings expounded by the Buddha.

In this connection, the English translation 'pride' for *māna* is of the secondary meaning or the psychological aspect of it as derived from the original, logical significance. The meaning of 'pride', I venture to say, is the connotation which occurs at the turning-point from the logical to the psychological sphere.

We have, though rare it is, another Pāli term equivalent to *asmimāna*. That is *attamāna* which means 'thinking on the self.' The Suttanipāṭa runs: *Anattani attamānaṃ passa lokaṃ sadeva-kaṃ niviṭṭhaṃ nāmarūpasmim 'idaṃ saccaṃ' ti maññati*. Thinking on the self in the non-self, the world of men and gods dwelling in name and form, he thinks: "This is true."

In connection to *attamānam* K.E. Neumann gives in his *Die Reden Gotamo Buddhō* (Leipzig: 1905, p. 244) the following rendering: *eigen gibt es hier*, and says:

"Uneigen, eigen gibt es hier,
Der Welt mit ihrer Götteschaar,
Gegründet in Begriff und Form,
Im Wahne, dass da Wahrheit sei."

[*Atta*]-*māna*, a term quite clear in its meaning of 'thinking on' [the self], is equal to *asmi-māna*, and suggests that *māna* in both compounds is taken for the primary meaning ('thinking on'), but not the secondary ('pride').

Of the translations to be found in *attamāna*, some misunderstand it and confuse with the Hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit *āttamana* or *āptamana*, which means 'delighted' or 'satisfied'. Suffice to quote an example of E.M. Hair's translation. The same verse in Suttanipāṭa is rendered:

"See how the worlds,
Content with what is not the self,
Convinced by name and form,

Hold it as true!" (*The Woven Cadences*, 2nd. ed. PTS. 1946) *Atta(-māna)* is wrongly taken as the past participle of *ā-pā* or *āp*. It is really a noun *ātman*. If it connotes 'content' or 'delighted', it should be *attamana*, but not *attamāna*.

Further, this Pāli term *attamāna* usually means, as mentioned above, 'thinking on the self', while *ātmamāna*, a term sanskritized

in Mahāyāna Buddhism, distinct from the Pāli *attamāna*, denotes simply 'the self-conceit' or 'the self-pride', going beyond the primary meaning of 'thinking on'. With respect to a Sanskrit *ātma-māna* it will be again discussed in detail.

The Sarvāstivādins have three Sanskrit terms for conception such as *māna*, *asmimāna* and also *asmitā*, all of which are rendered by Hūen Chien as *wu men*. This sense of *māna* is found in AKV. p. 303, while *asmimāna* and *asmitā* are found respectively in AKV. p. 456, 457, 463, and in AKV. p. 457.

Moreover, all three terms retain the original meaning of the root 'man', namely, conception or assumption. Vasubandhu, commenting on *Abhidharmakośa*, *Anuśaya-nirdeśo*, *Kārikā* 11: 'dṛṣṭipuṣṭatvāt', says as follows.

"*satkāyadrṣṭipuṣṭā hi mānavidhā asmimānaśca*" (*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, p. 286)

(*Asmimāna*, one of *māna*, grows up with a wrong view of the self-existence.)

Asmimāna does not merely connote 'pride' but the 'self-conception in the non-self' based on a wrong view of *satkāyadrṣṭi*. Further, *māna* is said to be a process of conception, for Vasubandhu explains the basis of [seven] classifications of *māna* as given below: *sa pravṛttibhedhāt saptadhā bhavati* (Seven kinds of [*māna*] depends upon the difference of process).

The conception of the self is a common nature of seven *māna*. Therefore, *māna* can represent itself sometimes as a process of conception raising up the self (*atimāna*) and sometimes as a process of turning down the self (*ūnamāna*) in adverse. The case is the same with *mithyāmāna*, which is not 'a wrong pride' but rather a wrong conception, as is explained by Yaśomitra as follows: *a-guṇānvyāsa-guṇān aham asmīti viparīta-viśayo māno mithyāmānaḥ* (AKV. p. 456) (a wrong conception means a conception contrary to the following fact. That is, with no virtue man wrongly thinks, 'I am respectable').

Thus, the common nature of seven *māna* is a self-conception in the non-self or an assumption associated with a wrong view (*dṛṣṭi*), however *śreyān* or *hīno* the conception may be. The AKV. reads: '*katham śreyān aham asmīti māna-vidhā dṛṣṭi-saṃnīśrito*' *limānaḥ*. Regarding to '*hīno*' (self-piety) it reads: '*hīno smīti māna-vidhā dṛṣṭi-saṃnīśrita ūnamānaḥ*'. (AVK. p. 456). With the original meaning of the 'self-conceptions' of *māna* alone the con-

trary concepts of *atimāna* (self-pride) and *ūnamāna* (self-piety) can be subject to the one and the same category of the seven kinds of *māna*.

Another speciality to be noted with regard to the original meaning of *māna* is the Bhadantadharmatrāta's interpretation, which is quoted by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* p. 142: *asmīti sattvamayatā'vidyēti Bhadantadharmatrātaḥ. kāmā punarasmīmānādanyā mayatā*. (Ignorance denotes man's delight in that I am [*pañcaskandha* as an entity]. Delight is not different from the [conception] of 'I am'.)⁶ Hüen Chien renders it as follows: 'This ignorance (*avidyā*) is the nature of the human beings relying upon the self. What is the nature different from the self-conception?' A Sanskrit term *mayatā* (delight) is rendered here in this passage as nature *hsin*, while *asmimāna* as self-pride *wu men*. On the other hand, a Chinese term *hsin* commonly stands for *bhāva* or *svabhāva*. In either case no Chinese term equivalent to *mayatā* is found at all. Delight (*mayatā*) in that 'I am' seems hardly to be an etymology of *māna*, but rather a derivative meaning from the root *man* ('to conceive').

Asmimāna, a compound-word of *asmīti māna*, is a synonym of *asmitā*, which is never found in the Pāli *Abhidharma* and *Nikāya*.⁷ *Asmitā* literally means the state of the self existence (*asmi-tā*), but philosophically it indicates the conception of the self as an entity (*asmīti māna*). Important is here *māna* ('to conceive' or the conception), but not *ātman* or *aham* as an object in itself, unlike a Mahāyānist term *ātmanāna*, of which *ātman* is a term objectified to be conceived. The following discussion will be centered around this term *ātmanāna*, a term commonly current in Mahāyāna tradition.

Ātmanāna

We have mentioned so far a concept of *asmimāna* developed in the Early Buddhist texts, retaining the original meaning of *asmīti māna*.

We have, however, another term of *ātmanāna* used in the later Mahāyāna texts such as *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* and *Triṃśikā*, etc. Accordingly such a Tibetan equivalent as *bdag na rgyal* also has taken place in later Tibetan commentaries.

In terms of the Chinese ideograph, *asmimāna* is commonly rendered as *men*, and *ātmanāna* as *wu men* in a different term.

Not only that, sometimes a term *māna* alone (not *asmimāna*) is translated by *wu men*, *wu* (the self) being added to *men* (*māna*) to meet the rule of stanza⁸ (Cf. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, ed. by Wogihara, p. 45 and its Chinese tr.).

Asmimāna is evidently replaced by *ātmamāna* in Mahāyāna texts. Five defilements, as for example, are enumerated in the Sthiramati's Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā.⁹ Such are *ātmadrṣṭi*, *ātma-māna*, *ātmamoha*, *ātmāsneha*, which stand respectfully for Pāli words: *attadiṭṭhi*, *asmimāna*, *moha*, *sneha*. The Mahāyāna literature attached importance to a term *ātman* in a form of the compound *ātmadrṣṭi* and others. The verbal compound *asmimāna* also was easily replaced by the noun compound *ātmamāna*.

The concept of *ātmamāna* has the same meaning as that of *asmimāna*, retaining the early Buddhistic meaning, i.e., 'to conceive that I am [*pañcaskandha*]' or 'the conception of the self as [*pañcaskandha*]'.

The Mahāyānist Sthiramati states in his Triṃśikā: *asmimānaḥ pañcasūpādānaskandheṣvātmātmanīyarahiteṣvātmīyā bhiniveśādyā cittasyonnatiḥ so' smimānaḥ*.¹⁰ *Asmimāna*, in his view, connotes the attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to a real entity of self, putting an emphasis on the psychological sphere, i.e. the elevation of mind (*cittasyonnati*). The commentator Vinītadeva, clarifying the distinction between *ātmamāna* and *asmimāna*, remarks: *bdag la ṅa rgyal ḥbyuñ ba gañ yin pa de ni bdag tu ṅa rgyal zes byaḥo ṅaho sñam paḥi ṅa rgyal śis bya ba ḥdis ni de ṅid rab tu bsgrub paḥi rnam grañs ston to*.

Ātmamāna (*bdag la ṅa rgyal*), meaning the conception of the self or the regarding the self as [*pañcaskandha*], is used in parallel to *asmimāna* (*bdag tu ṅa rgyal*), which connotes 'conceiving that I am' (*ṅaḥo sñam paḥi ṅa rgyal*). Noticeable is the remark that *ātma* (*-māna*), transcending the psychological explanation, has come to be an object of the attachment, i.e., a *viśaya* (object) to be conceived. This remark is positively clarified by Sthiramati himself, who gives the definition to it and says: *ātmaviśaye māna ātmamāno* (*ātmamāna* means conceiving the self as object). As the concept of *ātma* (*-māna*) is objectified by *viśaya*, it can tentatively be replaced by such a concept as *ālayavijñāna*, the view of which is termed *ātmadrṣṭi* (the wrong view of *ātman*). *Ātmadrṣṭi* is a concept expressing rather the philosophical sphere than the psychological one.

On the other side, from *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* (the regarding the self as [pañcaskandha] or as [ālayavijñāna]) proceeds *asmimāna*, (the elevation of mind). The process from *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* to *asmimāna*, or from the philosophical recognition to the psychological sphere, is concisely stated below: *tatrālayavijñānasvarūpe sammūdhah sannālayavijñāne ātmadr̥ṣṭimutpādayati. ātma darśanādyā cittasyonnatiḥ so'smimānaḥ*.¹² The wrong view of the self will arise at first and recognize it as *ātman*, a real entity, and then it will be followed by the elevation of mind (*cittasyonnati*), which will again give rise to such psychologically opposite elements as pride (*atimāna*) and self-piety (*ūnamāna*).

With regard to *ātmamāna*, as Monier-Williams SED., and others show, is found in the Vedic literature, meaning the regarding the self as [Brahman or others], which is strictly repudiated by Buddhists. For this reason is not used *attamāna* (Skt. *ātmamāna*) in the Early Buddhist literature. But, *asmimāna* (Pāli, Skt) took its place, completely altering the meaning of *ātman* as Brahman, turning it into *ātman* as *pañcaskandha* or the conception that I am (*aham asmi*).

This Buddhist tradition is pointedly expressed by Buddhaghosa in a passage of Papañcasūdanī¹³: '*asmimāna iti rūpādīsu asmīti māna*.' The connotation of this passage is inherited by Sthiramati, as we have discussed before. Not only that, a new interpretation of *cittasyonnati* (the elevation of mind) is added by Abhidhārmikas and the Mahāyāna commentators as well.

Although the Mahāyānists have introduced a new term of *ātmamāna* and twisted a new interpretation different from the Vedic one, they have deliberately done it, because they wanted to confirm the earlier tradition found in Pāli literature, substituting Brahman for *ālayavijñāna* (the store-consciousness) not eternal, but momentary and unreal.

We have also to remember that the nine *māna*, as enumerated in a series from *māna* to *micchāmāna*, now show the different types of conceiving the self, but not immediately pride as such.

VI. THE BUDDHA'S LAST WORDS: *dīpa* and *dvīpa*

In the Pāli Nikāya an important passage concerning the last teachings given by the Buddha says:

“*tasmāt ih’ Ānanda atta-dīpa viharatha atta-saraṇā anañña-saraṇā, dhamma-dīpā dhamma-saraṇā anañña-saraṇā.*”
(D II. 100; III. 58, 77; V. 154.165.)

(Hence, Oh, Ānanda! Take refuge in your island, in yourself, not in others, in the island of truth, in truth itself, not in others.)

The Pāli term *atta* (self) in this passage implies *dhamma*. Geiger also equalizes *atta* and *dhamma* in his book, *Pāli Dhamma* (p. 79). K. Bhattacharya is inclined to recognize Geiger’s view (Cf. *L’Ātman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien*. p. 62). As far as the early literature is concerned, this view is lucid, for we have the following passages:

“*yo kho, Vakkali dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati, yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati; Dhammaṃ hi Vakkali passanto maṃ passati, maṃ passanto dhammaṃ passati.*” (S III, p. 120)
(He who seeth the Truth, Vakkali, he seeth me: he who seeth me, Vakkali, he seeth the Truth. Verily, seeing the Truth, Vakkali, one sees me: seeing me, one sees the Truth.)

In the later literature Buddhaghosa also recognizes the equivalence *atta* = *dhamma*. However, he adds an Abhidharmic interpretation, saying:

“*ko pan’ettha attā nāma? Lokiya-lokuttaro-dhammo. ten’evāha: dhammadīpā dhammasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā ti.*”

(Sāratthappakāsinī, II, p. 268; Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, III, p. 846.)
In the Abhidharmic view, as quoted above, *atta* implies *lokiya-lokuttaradhamma* (mundane and supramundane states). The term *dīpa* compounded with *atta* and *dhamma*, therefore, should be of one and the same meaning—‘island’ (‘a resting place’).

The Pāli term *dīpa* in itself has two meanings, light (a light of lamp) and island. The former is found in J. II. 104; I. 226; III. 187; Mhvs VII. 7.41; Sn 501; A I. 55; DhA II, 548. For instance, “*dīpo lokassa nibbuto*” (Mahāvamsa, p. 17. ed. Geiger, 1908). The latter is found in the DhA II. 49.94; ThA 154. For instance, “*so karoḥi dīpaṃ attano, Khippaṃ vāyama, paṇḍito, bhava.*” (Dhp. 236, 238).

In Sanskrit literature, however, two terms, *dīpa* and *dvīpa*, are different from each other. Sanskrit *dīpa*, derived from *dī* (‘to shine’) means light (a lamp), while *dvīpa*, derived from *dvi-āp*

('double watered') means island. Both meanings are included in the Pāli term *dīpa*.

Many scholars translated *dīpa* in the Buddha's last words into 'light', while another meaning was neglected. Confer to Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of Buddha* (II. 110.), Fausböll, *English translation of Suttanipāta* (verse no. 501), etc. Other scholars such as Adikaram and Childers also follow this English translation, rendering it as 'lamp'.

Another meaning of *dīpa*, 'double watered', can be seen in the commentaries on the last words of the Buddha. Buddhaghosa says:

"atta-dīpa ti mahāsamugataṃ dīpaṃ viya attānaṃ katvā viharatha." (Sumaṅgalavilāsinī II. 548).

Atta-dīpa in the Buddha's last words means an island in the great ocean (*mahāsamugataṃ dīpaṃ*), certainly not 'a lamp-light.' More examples can also be found in the Suttanipāta (stanza 1092, 1094) and Dhammapada (verse 25, 236, 238) etc. Dhammapada (verse 236) reads: *"so karohi dīpaṃ attano. Khippaṃ vāyama, pandito bhava..."*. Commenting on *so karohi*, Buddhaghosa says: *"so karohi ti so tvaṃ samudde nāvāya bhinnāya dīpasamkhātapaṭiṭṭhaṃ viya attano kusalapatiṭṭhaṃ karohi.* (DhA III. 336). A term *dīpa* in this passage implies *dīpasamkhāta-patiṭṭhaṃ* (a resting place called island.) *Atta* is a synonym of *dīpa*, *tāṇa*, *leṇa*, *gati*, *parāyaṇa*, *paṭiṭṭha*, all of which mean 'a resting place' modifying 'island':

"atta-dīpā ti, attānaṃ dīpaṃ tāṇaṃ leṇaṃ gati parāyaṇaṃ paṭiṭṭhaṃ katvā viharathā ti attho."
(Sāratthappakāsinī, II, p 268.)

The sanskritized passage of the last words of the Buddha (D II. p. 100) appears on the Mahāvastu:

"ātmadvīpa bhikṣavo viharatha ananyadvīpāḥ ātmaśaraṇāḥ ananyaśaraṇāḥ." (Senart, Le Mahāvastu, I. p. 334.)

We have the same sanskritization of the Pāli passage in a Turfan-Handschriften of *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* edited by Waldschmidt. It reads:

"[tasmād] ānandaitarhi mam (a vā) tyayād ātmadvīpair vihartavyam ātmaśaraṇair dharmadvīpair dha (rmaśaranair anayadvīpair anayaśaraṇaiḥ/tat kasmād dhetoḥ)." (p. 200).

The Pāli term *dīpa* is sanskritized as *dvīpa* (island). Its Tibetan equivalent is also island (*glin*), but not 'mar-me' (light).

Further, a Sanskrit '*dvīpa*' is used as compounded with such terms as *taṇa*, *leṇa*, *saraṇa*, all of which demonstrate 'a resting place, reliance, basis.' We have the same example in Pāli literature (D II. p. 100; S IV, 315; V. 154, 163-5 etc). This word is also a synonym of *patiṭṭha*:

"*atta-dīpā ti mahāsamuddagataṃ dīpaṃ viya attānaṃ patiṭṭhaṃ katvā viharatha.*" (DA. II. p. 548).

'*Dīpa*' in Pāli is also expounded by *atta-saraṇā* and *atta-gatikā*: "*Atta-saraṇā ti atta-gatikā va hotha, ma añña-gaṭikā*" (ibid.)

All synonyms of the Sanskrit '*dvīpa*' are equal to that of the Pāli '*dīpa*', as far as the Buddha's last words are concerned.

Even in the Mahāyānist texts we have the equalization of *dvīpa* with 'a resting place' (or 'island') The Mahāyānist Sanskrit texts (AAV. pp 595-6; P.p. 351.)

read:

'*lokasya trāṇaṃ bhavisyāmo lokasya śraṇaṃ bhavisyāmo lokasya layaṇaṃ bhavisyāmo lokasya parāyaṇaṃ bhavisyāmo lokasya dvīpā bhavisyāmo lokasy'ālokā bhavisyāmo lokasya pariṇāyakā bhavisyāmo 'nuttaraṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambudhya lokasya gatir bhavisyāma ity evaṃrūpaṃ anuttarāyaṃ samyaksambodhāu vīryam ārabhante.*'

The Sanskrit text as quoted above deals with a Mahāyānist concept of Bodhisattva, while the Pāli texts such as Dhammapada and Dīghanikāya, in keeping with the Hinayānist idea, deal directly with the disciple of the Buddha. Besides the difference of topic there is no distinction between the Sanskrit and the Pāli sentences at all.

'*Parināyakā*' in Sanskrit appears on the Milindapanha in Pāli (Miln 257): "*dhamma-dīpa-gati parāyaṇatā.*" Another term, newly added to the Sanskrit passage, is *ālokā*. If a term *ālokā* (light) could be equal to '*dvīpa*', then, *ālokā* and *dvīpa* would have been redundant.

There is really a case, in which both *dvīpa* and *ālokā* are differently used in meaning:

'*lokasya dvīpā bhavisyāmo lokasy'ālokā bhavisyāmo.*'
(AAV. p. 586).

In this passage, *dvīpa* and *ālokā* are different in meaning, the former being 'island', the latter being 'light'.

Further, the Sanskrit text *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (AAV. pp. 599-600) comments on it, saying:

"tad-yathā'pi nāma Subhūte ye pradeśā udaka-paricchinā bhavanti nadiṣu vā mahodadhiṣu vā tā ucyante dvīpā iti."

The term *dvīpa* in this commentary denotes a land (*pradeśa*) either in the river or in the ocean, which is limited by the water (*udaka-paricchinā*). Haribhadra, commentator on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, also finds it as a place limited by water (*udaka-parikṣipta-sthala*) (AAV. p. 600).

With the Chinese literature the term *dīpa* has been translated as both 'a lamp-light' and 'island'.

Śaṅghadeva in the Hou Ch'in Dynasty (384-417 A.D.) wrongly rendered it into 'a lamp-light' in the *Mādhyamāgama*, which reads.:

"Make yourself 'a lamp-light' " (T.I. 645c).

This passage is just the same as one in the Pāli *Dighanikāya* (*atta-dīpa viharatha*) and also one in the Pāli *Dhammapada*, where *dīpa* meant island.

We have also another Chinese mistranslation by Buddhayaśa and Chu-fa-nien in the Former Ch'in Dynasty (351-394 A.D.). It is translated as follows:

"Oh Ānanda, therefore, make yourself a light, and *dhmma* a light, but not others. Make yourself a resting place, and *dhmma* a resting place, but not others." (T.I. 15b.)

With the suggestion of Dr. P.V. Bapat we can point out another misinterpretation in the Chinese version of *Dhammapada* (25, 238). The Chinese translator of the *Dhammapada* 25, as Bapat suggested, presumably did not realize the difference between *dīpa* and *dvīpa*, having rendered *dīpa* into a light of lamp. The comment on the Dh. 236 exactly says:

"samudde nāvāya bhinnāya dīpa-saṅkhātam patiṭṭham viya at-tano kusala-patiṭṭham karohi." (Dhp. Com. p. 336.)

(Just as a shipwreck finds a resting place in an island, so also you find a resting place or refuge in your own action.)

Guṇabhadra in the Liu Sung Dynasty (420-479. A.D.), how-

ever, rightly rendered it into 'island' in the Samyuktāgama (T.2. 8a), which represents a translation:

"At that time the Buddha said to the disciples. Take refuge in your island, in yourself, not in others, in the island of truth, in truth itself, not in others."

Further, Buddhayaśa in the Hou Ch'in Dynasty (384-417. A.D.) used *dīpa* as a synonym of *saraṇa* (a resting place), *grha* (house) and *parāyaṇa* (the absolute path) (T. 19.1c). The same is found in the Chinese sūtra Chi-shi-yin-pa-chin by Dharma gupta in the Sui Dynasty (581-618. A.D., T.I. 328b.)

Tibetan renderings are also 'island' (*gliñ*), but not 'a light of lamp' (*mar me*).

In the last I would like to refer to Dr. Brough's suggestive view as expressed in his *Gāndhārī Dharmapada* (pp. 209-210), in which he mentioned my view.²

Fortunately, Brough also has come to the same conclusion that "in many places the sense of 'island' is quite unambiguous." On the other hand, he leaves a subtle doubt of accepting the rendering 'lamp' as simply a mistake. To prove it, he comments as follows: "The phrase *dīpaṃ karoti* presumably recalled the name of the former Buddha Dīpaṃkara, who is understood in Sanskrit as well as in Pāli to be a 'light-bringer', not an 'island-maker'". What I presumed, however, concerned with a Pāli '*dīpa*' only in the Buddha's last words, not '*dīpa*' in proper. I quite agree with Professor Brough's view, in which he takes the former Buddha Dīpaṃkara as a 'light-bringer', not an 'island-maker'. But it is beyond the range of my topic concerned.

Referring to the Chinese translation in terms of 'light', Brough also presents a suggestive presumption, saying: "This was the sense primarily intended by the author of the verses (Dhp 235-8). A translation with 'island' reads rather quaintly." Thus, he presumes that "if forced to continue walking through the night, a sensible man will doubtless find a lamp more serviceable." This metaphorical interpretation will be suggestive and valuable, if more textual evidences will be provided.

What I am mainly concerned with is simply a limited sense of *dīpa* in the last words of the Buddha and nothing more.

NOTES TO CHAPTER-I

SECTION I

1. We should not overlook the fact that the terminology employed by those Buddhist philosophers who wrote in Sanskrit easily lends itself to misunderstanding. For example; *khanti* meaning 'to be willing to,' derived from *kam* ('to desire') is Sanskritized as *kṣānti* ('to bear'), which should (at some places in Pāli) be *kānti* in Skt. All of Pāli texts follow this etymology *kam*. It is also true of Mahāyāna Sanskrit texts: the philosophical term *anupattika-dharmakṣānti* suggests the willing acceptance that nothing has been born or created in this world. In this connection, *kṣānti* does not always mean 'to bear' indicated by the root *kṣam*. It means 'to be willing to the notion that nothing has been born' (cf. G.H. Sasaki, *A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy* [Kobundo, Tokyo], pp. 580-603).

2. The association of *nekkhamma* with *sabbe kusalā dhammā* is inherited in Pāli Abhidharma, i.e., *sabbe pi kusalā dhammā nekkhammadhātu* (Vibh. p. 86). However, it does not mean the identification of *nekkhamma* with *nibbāṇa*, although Chinese Buddhist translators often render it as *nieh p'an* (liberation). Thus, the field of Indian Buddhism is already prepared for the identification of *nekkhamma* with *nibbāṇa* by the equation of *nekkhamma* to *sabbe akusalā dhammā*.

3. *Nekkhamma* is catalogued as the opposite concept of *kāma*, which itself is subject to the six qualities (*chatudhātuyo*). *Chatu-dhātuyo* (D. III. 215, 275; Netti. 97; Th. I. 378; Vism. 481) include six qualities such as *kāma*, *vyāpāda*, *vihiṃsā*, *nekkhamma*, *avyāpāda*, *avihiṃsā*. *Nekkhammasankappa* (A. III. 146; S. II. 152; Vibh. 104, 235) is also used as the opposite of *kāmasankappa* (A. III. 259; V. 31), while *nekkhammavitakka* (A. I. 275; II. 76, 252; III. 429; It. 82) is used in opposition to *kāma* (*kāmavitakka*, D. III. 226; S. II. 151; III. 93; A.I. 148, 274 sq; II. 16.117, 252; III. 390, 428).

4. *Sat* means 'that which exists' or 'being' (the adjective). *Sattā* (Skt. *sattva*) is the abstract noun formed from this, and etymologically means 'being', or 'essence'. The Pāli word *nissattā* probably stands for *nihsattva*, although it is not found in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts. Broad as the meaning of *sattā* is, it is the subject of contention. Philosophically *sattā* in Pāli Nikāya refers merely to human being, whereas in Abhidharma it refers to human and non-human beings. It is also true of the Sarvāstivāda school and Mahāyāna Buddhism. *Sattā* is in Indian logic defined as a generic character, the broadest of all such characters. It inheres three categories, viz., substances, qualities, and actions (Prof. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-nyāya Logic* [Benares, 1905], p. 53. *Nissattā*, a negative form of *sattā*, is in Pāli Abhidharma traditionally defined as one of the categories of *dhamma*. *Dhamma* means, according to Buddhaghosa, *guṇa*, *desanā*, *pariyatti* and *nissatta*. This definition of *dhamma* is inherited from Nikāya (D.I. 99). Buddhaghosa often uses the definition of *dhamma* in Nikāya (Aṭṭhasālinī, 33. ed., by Bapat; Dha. I. 22; Sasaki, *A Study of Buddhist Psychology*, p. 162, Tokyo, 1960).

5. *Prasannapadā nāma Mādhyamikavṛtti*, XIII. 8. *Bibl. Bud.* IV (publié par L. de la Vallée Poussin; Chinese translation *li* by Kumārajīva).

6. *Daśabhūmikasūtra Glossary* (Rahder, Paris, 1928). p. 96.

7. *Uttaratantra-śāstra*, p. 88. ed., by Johnston, 1950. Tib. *Tohoku Catalogue* 225, No. 4025, 118b, line 6; Chinese translation, T. 3. 819a.

8. *Āraṇya* (Pā. *arañña*) formed from *araṇa-ya* (adj. and sust. nt.,) meaning 'free from passion' or 'freedom from passion.' In the Rig. Veda *āraṇya* still means remoteness. In the Ath. V. it has come to mean wilderness or forest (Cf. Pāli Engl. Dic. PTS.). *Ārañña-gata* means 'gone into the forest' as loneliness (M.I. 323; A. III. 353 etc). The Pāli commentaries give a wider meaning to the word, saying every place is *āraṇya* except a village and the approach thereto (Vin. III. 46; SnA. 83 etc). The meanings of *āraṇya* (*arañña*), i.e., remoteness, loneliness, passionless, are reasonably considered to be equivalent to the meaning of *naiṣkramya* ('to get out of') derived from *niskram*. Chinese translators render *āraṇya* and *naiṣkramya* alike as *ch'u chia*, meaning to get out of household' from the point of view of the philosophy, and thereby letting the distinction between *naiṣkramya* and *nekkhamma* pass unnoticed.

9. In general, the principal meaning should not, in Indian philosophy, be separated from the expression in negative form (Betti Heimann, "Form not 'a part' but a 'part' of meaning as exemplified in Sanskrit literature," *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. V. No. 2 [1947]. In reality, negation can not point out the negative fact, for negation means to drive away all things which are denied (Cf. Chandra, *Negative Fact, Negation and Truth* [University of Calcutta, 1947], p. 14). Negation in the Indian sense does not mean negation as it is. It means the expression of positive content in negative form.

10. Negation in the Indian sense represents the possibility of manifold views (Cf. Heimann, "Significance of Negation in Hindu Philosophical Thought," *B.C. Law Volume*, Part II [Poona, 1946]. Heimann refers to 'implicit negation' in the Indian sense. Prof. Raju refers to Buddhist Dharma, where he interprets Dharma as universal truth with which one can unite oneself. If that be so, would it not be contradictory to the implication of Buddhist negation?

11. The paradoxical structure of the Absolute is not expounded in Early Buddhism (Nikāya Buddhism), e.g., *evamdhammā evampaññā evamvihārī evamvimuttā* (D. II, 8. ff. 82; D. III. 99. 100 etc). Here *dhamma* represents the Absolute Truth in contrast to the Relative. The Absolute should not be separated from the Relative. In this respect, the idea of the Absolute (*nibbāna*) in the Abhidharmic sense forms the transition from Early Buddhism to Mahāyāna Buddhism. In other words, the Absolute in the Abhidharma considered as a reality looking beyond the Relative, Abhidharma separates the two in a dualistic way as do all other Hinayāna Sects. The Mahāyāna idea of the unity of the Absolute and the Relative is not found in Abhidharma. Although keeping basic thoughts developed in Early Buddhism, Abhidharma is the transitional step towards the Mahāyāna idea of the unity of the Absolute and the Relative. As for Early Buddhist Dhamma see I.B. Horner, "Early Buddhist Dhamma," *Artibus Asiae*, XI, 115, where she refers to *sa* as *sat* as well as *sva*.

1. Asl. p. 206, edited by P.V. Bapat, Bhandarkar Oriental Series, no. 3,

SECTION II

1942, Poona. Cf. G.H. Sasaki, *Bukkyō Shinrigaku no Kenkyū* (A Study of Buddhist Psychology, 1970, second edition, p. 453, Tokyo, Nippon Gakujutsu Shinko Kai, Tokyo.)

2. Ud. Com. 373, 24.

3. Nettipakaraṇa 18,300.

4. PTSD. 30.

5. SN. 263 (*anavajjāni kammāni*), Itivuttaka 102, etc., anabhāva (Vinaya 111.3).

6. Sāratthappakāsinī III. 149.

7. Ud. Com. 366.12; Vism 194.24, etc.

8. Vṛtagūḍhārthapaṇḍa-vyākhyā. Peking Edition, Tanjur, 58. 356b-424a. Otani Catalogue.

9. "Evam sati avijjā paccahā sankhārā ti idaṃ ādimattakathanam virujjati ti ce? Na-yidaṃ ādimattakathanam; paṭṭhānadhammakathanam pan'etaṃ. Tiṇṇam hi vaṭṭānam avijjā paṭṭhānā: avijjāgahaṇena hi avasesakilesavaṭṭaṃ ca kammādinī ca bālaṃ paṭibodhenti." (Vism. II. 577.)

10. Vism. p. 554. "Tad etaṃ nā pi purimabhavā idh'āgataṃ na, pi tato kammāsankhāranatavisayādi-hetuṃ vinā pātubhūtan ti veditabbam."

11. Vism. p. 554. "Siyuṃ nidassanān'ettha paṭighosādikā atha, santānabandhato n'atthi ekatā nā pi nānātā."

12. M I. 191: "yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati so dhammaṃ passati; yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādam passatīti."; Itivuttaka, Samyutta-Nikāya III, 120: "Kiṃte Vakkali iminā pūtīkāyena dīṭṭhena yo kho Vakkali dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati, yo maṃ passati, so dhammaṃ passatīti." Dhamma in these passages means the 9 sorts of the supermundane Laws (Itivuttaka Commentary p. 116, ed. 1977, London. 'Maṃ' signifies dhammakāya (Ibid.)

13. Bodhicharyāvatāra-pañjikā p. 386; Prasannapadā p. 160: "yaḥ pratītya-samutpādam paśyati sa dharmam paśyati. yo dharmam paśyati sa buddham paśyati." The doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* leads the Hinayānists to the awareness of the successive origination (*utpāda*) of the twelvefold *nidānas*, which is rejected by the Mahāyānists. In contrast, the Mahāyānists interpret it as the 'mutual' relationship. The difference in view may perhaps be better expressed if we say that the former understanding is concerned with a dynamic view, while the latter with a static view of nature. The Sarvāstivādins, opponents of Nāgārjuna, hold the opinion that the *anuloma* order (the one-sided relationship) of the Dependent Origination only is valid. This opinion is easily to be objected, for the *anuloma* order requires a reality of each *nidāna* in a successive production (*utpāda*). The Sarvāstivāda school, however, has set forth, apart from the twelvefold Dependent Origination, the theory of 6 causes and 4 conditions to meet with the 'mutual' relationship. They are: *kāraṇahetu*, *sahabhūhetu*, *sabhāgahetu*, *saṃprayuktahetu* *sarvatragāhetu*, *vipākahetu*; *adhipatipratyaya*, *ālambanapratyaya*, *samanantarapratyaya*, *hetupratyaya*. Nevertheless, these *hetupratyayas* also are rejected by Nāgārjuna as a realistic view formulated by the *svabhāva* ideation. In reality, a concept of *svabhāva* in the Sarvāstivāda school indicates *kiriya* (function), not only things material. Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra-śāstra says: "Sat (being) means that which becomes the object and gives rise to the consciousness." (T. 29. 621 C.).

The case is the same with the Theravāda school, which recognizes the twelvefold Dependent Origination just as the Sarvāstivādins do. On the other hand, it sets forth the theory of the 'mutual' relationship in the Paṭṭhāna.

That is called the theory of 24 conditions (*paccaya*). They are: *hetu*, *ārammaṇa*, *adhipati*, *anantara*, *samanantara*, *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *upanissaya*, *purejāta*, *pacchājāta*, *āsevana*, *kamma*, *vipāka*, *āhāra*, *indriya*, *jhāna*, *magga*, *sampayutta*, *vippayutta*, *atthi*, *natthi*, *vigata*, *avigata*. All these *paccaya* relationship are nothing but a static view of nature or the 'mutual' relationship—*parasparāpekṣā* in Candrakīrti's Mahāyānist conception—. The *aññamaññapaccaya* relationship, for instance, means the condition by way of mutuality, in which all mental phenomena, as well as the 4 physical elements, are at the same time conditioned by way of mutuality. Furthermore, the *aññamañña* relationship is to indicate the voidness of *sabhāva* (a reality) or something real. The following passage seems to be important in connection of the denial of *sabhāva* (a real entity)—a concept taken from the Mahāyānist interpretation. The Visuddhimagga runs: "*Tathā na anto kammaṣṣa vipāko upalabbhati, bahiddhā pi na kammaṣṣa na kammaṣṣa tattha vijjati. Phalaṇa suññamitaṃ kammaṣṣa. phalaṃ kammaṇa vijjati, kammaṃ ca kho upādāya tato nibbattate phalaṃ.*" (p. 603). The *aññamañña* relationship is clearly represented and illustrated by the relationship between *kamma* and *phala*. In view of Buddhaghosa: no *kamma* exists in *vipāka*, and no *vipāka* in *kamma*. A *kamma* is void of its *vipāka* which comes through *kamma*. *Vipāka* comes into existence on account of *kamma*. Subsequently each of them by itself is void (*suññaṃ*), being deprived of *sabhāva*. For the Mahāyānists, philosophy starts with the negative judgement or the denial of something real (*svabhāva*, *sabhāva*). But, the interpretation of *svabhāva* as something real is only subject to the Mahāyānist ideation slightly different from the Hīnayānist connotation. For the Hīnayānists (Ābhidharmika), whether the Sarvāstivādins or the Theravādins, *svabhāva* does not always mean something real or entity; Instead, it implies something, real and non-real. It may perhaps be better manifested with 'a modus of existence', which is associated with something material and non-material.

It may be suggested that both the 6-causes-and-4-conditions-theory of the Sarvāstivāda school and the 24-conditions-theory of the Theravāda school indicate a striking similarity with the *parasparāpekṣā* relationship of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, and that the Mahāyānist interpretation of *svabhāva* as entity requires the re-examination of the connotation along with the Ābhidharmika philosophy. (Regards to *svabhāva* Cf. G.H. Sasaki, *A Study of the Theory of Time in Buddhism* pp. 148-189, 1977.)

14. On the meaning of *paṭṭhāna* confer to footnote 9.

15. An interesting but intricate problem concerns the interpretation of *pratyasamutpāda* (Pāli, *paṭṭicasamuppāda*), which varies even in Hīnayāna Buddhism. It can, however, be shown that in particular, the Sarvāstivāda school, one of the Hīnayānist schools, was accused by Nāgārjuna of holding a realistic view. Accordingly, a term *pratyaya* (condition) even was condemned by him as a concept imposing a realistic idea. For this reason, Nāgārjuna and other Mahāyānist philosophers did not think much of the twelvefold Dependent Origination. By the following verses was his attitude toward the Dependent Origination clearly exemplified:

"*avidyāyāṃ niruddhāyāṃ saṃskārāṇāmasambhavaḥ | avidyāyā nirodhas tu jñānenāsava bhāvanāt*" (Prasannapadā p. 559. Ch. XXVI. Kr. 11.)

[When ignorance [the first link of the twelvefold relationship] disappears, then, karmic formation (*saṃskāra*) also does not arise. But the cessation of ignorance is dependent upon the practice of cessation by *jñāna* (wisdom)].

A term *jñāna* represented by Nāgārjuna does not imply the Hinayānistic awareness of causality depicted by the twelvefold links, but must impose the denial of links (*pratyaya*) as such, getting rid of all links as entities. When all links as entities are banished, then, the causality of the twelvefold links is subsequently impossible to be held. The Chap. XXVI. Kr. 12. reads:

“tasya tasya nirdodhena tattannābhipravartate | duḥkhaskandhaḥ kevala’yamevaṃ samyagnirudhyate ||”.

(By the cessation of [the twelvefold causality], each link [as entity] will not come into existence. Thus, the aggregate of suffering will be completely gone out.)

Upholding, thus, the sole reality of *pratyaya* against the Sarvāstivāda realism, it however accepted the non-reality (*niḥsvabhāvatva*) of it, and led the Mādhyamika to the conclusion that causality cannot rationally be explained. The following verse will suffice to prove it. The Chapt. VII. Kr. 16 (Prasannapadā pp. 159-160) runs:

“pratitya yadyadbhavati tattacchāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ | tasmādutpadyamānaṃ ca śāntamutpattireva ca ||”.

(Whatever originates dependent [upon others] is nothing by itself. Hence, presently arising and origination also are rightly nothing by themselves.)

In this manner, Nāgārjuna rejected the causality of Dependent Origination. It is because causality is nothing but the uni-directional relationship or one-sided process of causation. That is the process from *avijjā* to *jarāmaraṇa*—*avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā*, *saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ* etc.—It means that by way of ignorance karmic formation arises, by way of karmic formation [saṅkhārā] consciousness arises, etc.; but not that by way of karmic formation ignorance arises, etc. The adverse cannot be set forth. This uni-directional relationship is termed by *idappaccayatā* (*Skt. pratyayatā*), which has already been represented by the thought-patterns in the Pāli literature: *“imasmim sati, idaṃ hoti, imasāsuppādā, idaṃ uppajjati; imasmim asati, idaṃ na hoti; imassa nirodhā, idaṃ nirujjhati.”* (This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not becoming, that does not become; from the ceasing of this, that ceases.) This formula is the principle underlying the twelvefold Dependent Origination or the uni-directional relationship of conditions (*paccaya*)—the process from A to B, but not from B to A—.

This uni-directional relationship, however, has to be denied by Nāgārjuna, for it is based on the presupposition of *paccaya* as entity. Therefore, the relationship as insisted by him is not this, but the ‘mutual’ relationship, in which both the processes from A to B as well as from B to A can be established. The latter relationship is called *parasparāpekṣā* (the mutual relationship).

Although a direct argument of *parasparāpekṣā* is not found in Nāgārjuna’s treatises, the following verse could be of the foremost importance to prove the

implication of it. It runs: “*pratītya kāraṇaḥ karma taṃ pratītya ca kāraṇaṃ / karma pravartate nānyatpaśyāmaḥ siddhikāraṇaṃ* || Chapt. VIII. Kr. 12). It means: The doer is in relation to the deed (*karma*) and the deed to the doer. We cannot recognize any other cause for this establishment.

In this statement is the doubled relationship between doer and deed vindicated, i.e. the relation of doer to deed, and that of deed to doer. Candrakīrti, commentator of the *Vṛtti*, clearly gives a definition by saying that this verse means *idampratīyayātā* and also *paraspara-apekṣikī siddhiḥ* (the establishment of the mutual dependency). But, *idampratīyayātā* (*idappaccayātā* in Pāli), as has been discussed, can be found in the Pāli literature, meaning the uni-directional relationship, but not the ‘mutual’ relationship. It is not a concept genuine of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Unique is a concept of *parasparāpekṣā*, meaning the mutual relationship, for the latter alone will lead the Mādhyamikas to the complete voidness of entities, i.e. *śūnyatā*. *Parasparāpekṣā* is simply a conventional notion. Hence, *pratītyasamutpāda* in a sense of *parasparāpekṣā* is also a conventional notion (*prajñapti*) as shown in the following verse (Chap. XXIV. Kr. 18). “*yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām taṃ pracakṣmahe / sā prajñaptirupādāya pratīpatsāiva madhyamā* ||”. (We declare that Dependent Origination is *śūnyatā* and that the conventional notion (*prajñapti*), depending on each other (*upādāya*) is indeed the middle path.)

With regard to this puzzling verse we take *upādāya* as a concept showing the ‘mutual’ relationship of the counterpart such as *kāraṇa-karma*, *janya-janaka*, *ganṭṛ-gamaṇa*, *draṣṭavya-darśana*, *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa*, *utpādyā-utpādaka*, *avayava*, *avayavin*, *guṇa-guṇin*, *pramāṇa-prameya*, etc. (Prasannapadā p. 190).

A word *sā* in this Kārika 18 is replaced by *yā* by Murti. Cf. *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* p. 8. K. Inada renders *sā* by *it*. Cf. Inada’s *Nāgārjuna* p. 149. However, Murti’s amendment (*yā*) could be preferable.

Turning back to the problem at issue, the conclusion of the paper is that the term *anamatagga* (-*saṃsāra*) in the earlier Pāli texts suggests an observation of life from the conventional and experimental point of view, while *anādikāla* (-*saṃsāra*) from the logico-epistemological point of view as represented by Nāgārjuna.

SECTION III

1. The word aggregates or *khandha* (Skt. *skandha*) the group of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us and are divided into five classes: (1) *rūpa* (the four elements, the body, the senses; the so-called sense data), (2) *vedanā* (feeling), (3) *saññā* (conceptual knowledge), (4) *saṅkhārā* (synthetic mental states and functioning of sense-affections), (5) *viññāna* (consciousness). *Samyutta Nikāya* Vol. III. 86 etc. *Zo-agon* Vol. II. 13 (*Taishō-Zō-Kyō* II. 13. c; SN. 22, 48. (Vol. III, p. 47).

2. SM. Vol. III. pp. 103—104 “*Iti kira bho rūpaṃ anattā, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, viññānaṃ anattā annattakatāṇi kammāṇi katamattānaṃ phusissanti*”.

3. *Milindapañha*, Siamese Edition, p. 120. (There is no trace of this in the Royal Asiatic Society Edition).

“*Evam eva kho Mahārāja nāpi ime pañcakkhandhā uppajjanti imameva pañcakkhandham upanissaya katakusālākusalakkaṇṇena ādāsamaṇḍale chāyā viya satto mātukucchiyaṃ patisamkhādhayati*”.

4. We may summarize the theories of the six heretics in the *Nikāya*, viz. SN. Vol. III, p. 348; MN. Vol. I. p. 515; SN. Vol. III. pp. 2060: SN Vol. III. p. 317; *Zo-Agon XXII (Taishō Vol. II, 231c)*; etc.

5. *Milindapañha*, Siamese Edition, p. 120.

6. *Rūpa* among the five aggregates is derived from the root *rup*, to form, to figure, to mould. The Buddhist modified this term to *ruj*, to break to pieces. It means the impermanent nature of things. The Buddhist uses this word in varied modifications:—“*ruppanato rūpaṃ*”, “*ruppanatthēna rūpaṃ*”, “*rūpa-yati ti rūpaṃ*”. Since we have the original designation in S. Vol. III. p. 86: “*ruppate ti tasmā rūpaṃ ti vuccati*”, we may say that the Buddhistic etymology of this word has already appeared a long time ago. Chinese equivalents for the Pāli *rūpa* are ³/₄.

7. Vism. Vol. II. p. 627; S. III. p. 87: “*saṅkhatam abhisamkharenti*” Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā, p. 563.

8. It is certainly true that the Buddha referred only to Nirvāṇa and not to metaphysical problems. But it is not simple because metaphysical problems go far beyond analytical discriminative knowledge. Analytical knowledge should be applied to the true nature of worldly things, though confined to the specific Buddhist meaning. In other words, analytical knowledge should be directed towards *anattā*, *dukkha*, and *anicca* (impermanence, painfulness, and not self of all sentient beings). The negation of metaphysical problems is to place analytical knowledge within its own limits so as not to have it go beyond its own capacity. It is for this reason that we may often find the “how” manner of questioning rather than the “what” which leads one to discriminative analysis only. It is true that in later Buddhism, such as the *Prajñāpāramitā* doctrine, we can come across such expressions as “*katham*” rather than “*kim*”, however, even when “*kim*” is used, it is used in the implicit sense implied in Prima Essentia inquiry. But in this article, I would like to insist that “by what” is much more positive than the more proper “how” of the later Mahāyāna Buddhism.

9. Cf. my article “*The concept of Jñāna and Prajñā*”. The Annual Report of the Otani University No. 6. 1953.

10. *Milindapañha*, p. 120 (Siamese Ed.).

11. According to the Indian tradition, Agent (*kartā*) is that factor which makes proximate instruments operate for an effect. This notion of Agent coincides in greater extent with that of the Vedānta philosophy. According to the inner faculty of Agent, a threefold Agency is depicted in *Gītā* (XVIII/26-28). Cf. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, “Kinds of Agents as depicted by Pāṇini”, “*Vāk*”, Number 3, December 1953, Deccan College, Poona, India.

12. *Kathāvatthu* p. 552 says that *kamma* and its accumulation are not different. See also MN Vol. I. p. 390.

13. *Milindapañha* p. 40 (Trenckner) T.W. Rhys and Hardy render this differently. On the phrase “no preceding (*apubbam*) and no succeeding existence”, see Dr. Morris’s note on p. 101 of the Pāli Text Society’s Journal, 1887, and the passages he quotes there.

14. The concept of *kamma* has come to be referred to as a “continuum” (*santati*, or substances) in Buddhist Philosophy. Dr. S. Dasgupta says, “It is curious that though all dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that

they were all strictly momentary (*kṣanika*, i.e. existing only for a moment) was not emphasized in early Pāli literature". (*A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 161). But the epistemology of Pāli Buddhism is to be distinguished from the salvation theory which it expounds. We may discover passages referring to Nirvāṇa as a reality (*sabhāva*). In this instance, the meaning of "reality" is far from the realistic view, and it purposes only to deny the wrong view with respect to Nirvāṇa, i.e. the negation of Nirvāṇa. Cf. *Paramatthamañjūsā*, Vol. III, p. 200 (Siamese Edition).

Dhammapāla's *Paramatthamañjūsā* Vol. III, p. 232: *hetuphalappabhandhasaikhātassa santānassa avicchitānena. tassam tesaṃ paccayappannadhammānaṃ sambhavato uppadhanto sassatucchedasankhātam antadvayam anupagamma...* Cf. G.H. Sasaki, "Metaphysics of Being in the Buddhist Philosophy (Bukkyo ni-okeru-u-no-keijijōgaku)", Tokyo. 1946. p. 76.

15. Brahmācari Govinda's "Abhidhammaṭṭha-saṅgaha" p. 114: "Denn Bewußtsein selbst ist als Widerstandserscheinung ein stetig sich erneuerndes Beharrenwollen und in jeder Phase in xiesem Punkte mit den vorhergehenden identisch".

16. Daijō-jōgo-ron, XXXI, 785 a7.

17. Rhys Davids points out the incongruity between the *kamma* and *anatta* doctrines as does La Vallée Poussin: "Even in the days of the Buddha, there were heretics who insisted on the consistency between both". *Early Buddhism*. p. 77. See also: S. 22, 82, 14-15 (Vol. III, pp. 103-104; *Zō-agon* II, 26 (T. II, 15a).

18. Cf. G.H. Sasaki; "On the 'Three Aspects' in Pāli Buddhism" (Sanso ni tsuite). Journal of Philosophical Studies, XXVIII, II, Kyoto University.

19. This positive relation between *anatta*, *kamma*, and *paticca-samuppāda* had already been implied in the *Nikāya* in such passages as: SN. 12, 37 (Vol. II, p. 64-65). *Zō-agon* XII, 13 (T. II, 84 ff.). Ibid. 12, 24, 8 (Vol. II. p. 33). Ibid. 12, 25, 1 (Vol. II. p. 38), *Zō-agon* CIV (Taishō II, 93c).

20. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I., p. 382: "It would be natural to surmise that negative knowledge must be the product of absence of reality. Such is the view of many philosophic schools in India and in the West. But this is an error".

21. Mahāyāna thinkers lay stress especially upon the relation between *karma* and *pratītyasamutpāda*. Nāgārjuna: *Madhyamaka-Śāstra*, VIII. Chandrakīrti: *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, VIII, p. 180-191, ed. par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 1913; Etienne Lamotte: *Le traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, extrait des Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, Vol. IV. Bruges, 1936.

22. The Chinese term *wu* or *fei* is equivalent to the Pāli "a" or "ni". Those terms have the same meaning, there being no distinction between them in so far as it concerns the Chinese version of the Pāli *Nikāya*. The Sanskrit prefix "nir" indicates a stronger meaning than "a". Sometimes the prefix "nir" illustrates a quasi-explosive function of desorption. (R. Heimann: *The Significance of Prefixes in Sanskrit Philosophical Terminology*, 1951, p. 54).

In Sanskrit Buddhism the *niḥsvabhāva* has a general logical meaning, as well as a psychologico-eschatological significance. In the Chinese Buddhism, the prefix "nir" holds fast to a psychologico-eschatological significance. We

must draw our attention to the fact in Pāli Buddhism there is no equivalent term for “*niḥsvabhāva*”, while in the Mahāyāna Buddhism the negative prefix of *svabhāva* is almost all “*nir*”, i.e. “*niḥsvabhāva*”. The other negative prefix “*a*” in connection to *svabhāva* is very rarely found in the Texts of *Vijñānavāda* school. (Cf. My article “*The problem of Lakṣhaṇattaya*”, Journal of Philosophical Studies Kyōto University. Nr. 332.)

23. Sylvain Lévi translates his *cetanā* by “*la pensée pure*”, which seems to be inadequate from the standpoint of activity of *karma*. See *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra*, p. 32.

24. Dh. Cm. Vol. I. part 2. p. 304: “*Sattaṭṭhacittāni pana ekato kaṇṇika-baddhāni ekakkaṇe uppajjituṃ Samatthāni nāma natthi, uppatikāle ekekam eva cittaṃ uppajjati, tasmimṃ niruddhe pana ekekam uppajjati [niruddhati] ti ‘ekacaram’ nāma jātaṃ.*”

25. S. Vol. II. p. 65.

26. On the fourteen modes of functional minds, see the explanations in the *Vism*, Vol. II, pp. 457-460. Cf. Brahmācari Govinda: *Abhidhammaṭṭhasaṅgaha*, p. 116.

27. *Vism.*, Vol. II, p. 556. “*Katattā yeva hi saṅkhārā attano phalassa paccayā honti, na vijjāmānattā avijjāmānattā vā*”. The *saṅkhārā* should be interpreted as *kamma* according to the traditional connotation in the Pāli commentaries.

28. SN 650 (PTS).

29. *Kamma* is said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and mind. The core of this *kamma* is thinking (*cetanā*) and the states associated with it. See *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 73. Edited by P.V. Bapat, Poona, 1942; *Mahāsaṭipatṭhāna Sutta*, Dialogues of the *Buddha*, II, p. 340. The Pāli Buddhism lays stress upon this point much more than does the Sarvāstivāda School. Compare *Aṭṭhasālinī*, pp. 73-78 with *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter VI, *Karma-nirdeśa*.

30. “*Kiccā*” in Pāli Buddhism is different from “*krtyā*” which is refuted by Nāgārjuna in his *Madhyamaka-śāstra*, XVII, as a dravyatic (realistic) view; and similar to “*vyāyāmika*” *karma* (actual doing) in the Sāutrāntika School for the reason that the function (*kiccā*) or core of *kamma* (*cetanā*) involves three kinds of function i.e. *vibhāga*, *gati*, and *niccaya*; different from “*cetanā*” in the Sāutrāntika School for the reason that in Pāli Buddhism body and speech are regarded as the door of *kamma* (*Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 67).

Now we are able to know that the concept of “*vijñapti*” in Pāli Buddhism is to be distinguished from that of the Sarvāstivāda School. The “*viññatti*” in Pāli means to make known or intention, which can be recognized through any sign of body or speech. It is *kāyika kamma*, which might be identified with “*vyāyāmika karma*” in the Sāutrāntika-School. The *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Peking Edition, Bstan, Mdo. LVIII, 163b) says: “*rtsoḥ ba can gyi las ci yin she na | byed pa bohi yin mñon par hdu byed pa gañ yin paho ||* (The opponent might ask by saying, “What is the efforting action?” We will say in response: “It is thinking (*cetanā*), which would bring into practice the will of the person in acting”).

31. From the subjective standpoint, the substance of transmigration is taken into consideration although not as a substance-like entity (*dravya*). See *Abhidharmakośa* XXX. (T. 29. 156a). The concepts like *bija* or *avijñapti* might be accounted for by such a suggestion.

32. Vism. Vol. II. p. 603.

"*Tathā na anto kammaṣṣa vipāko upalabbhati | bahiddhā pi na kammaṣṣa na kammaṣṣa tattha vijjati. | phaleṇa suññaṃ taṃ kammaṃ phalaṃ kammaṇa vijjati, | kammaṃ ca kho upādāyo tato nibbattate phalaṃ*" //

33. The paradoxical expression is made possible on the basis of the *anattā* doctrine, which rests upon the concept of continuum (*santāna*). "*evaṃ kammaṃ paccayā vipāko vipākapaccayā kammaṇ ti anādikālikattā kammavipākaśantānaṣṣa pubbā koti na paññāyati*". *Paramatthamañjūsā* by Dhammapāla. Vol. III, p. 442 (Siamese Ed.)

34. Vism. Vol. II. p. 473.

35. Dhammapāla says: "*kammaṃ atītam eva kammaṣamuttāhānaṣṣa rūpaṣṣa paccayo ti*". *Paramatthamañjūsā*, Vol. III, p. 433. In this passage we should draw our attention to the phrase, "*kammaṣamuttāhānaṣṣa rūpaṣṣa*"¹⁴. The time concepts, such as present, past, future, will be recognised as attributes subjected to the things themselves (*rūpāni*), and yet *kamma* itself does neither determine the time, nor is it determined by it. *Kamma* determines the things in themselves which have resulted from the *kamma*-function alone, while it is itself beyond the time-level.

36. The necessary connection between *kamma* and *anattā* is precisely described in the *Aṭṭhasālīni* by Buddhaghosa, ed. P.V. Bapat, 1942. pp. 67-87. Vism. Vol. II. pp. 517-568.

37. The Buddhist formula "*Khinā jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ katam karaṇiyaṃ nāparam itthattāyāti*" (D. Vol. I, p. 84) indicates the state of enlightenment in Pāli Buddhism. The *brahmacariya* in this formula means not only the ethical core but also the Buddhistic *nirvāṇa* transcended beyond the worldly good and evil. Hence, Buddhaghosa, commentator of this text, explains the *itthattāya* from two kinds of etymological meaning, such as the ablative and dative case. Both cases represent the attainment of ethical merits, which are dependent upon the not-self doctrine. See *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, I. p. 226.

38. The fundamental indication of "*avijñapti*" is provided in the *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter I, (T. 21.3a).

39. The concepts corresponding to *vijñapti* in the *Sarvāstivāda* school are (Sammitiya School), (Mahāsaṅghika), (an unknown school), (Sāutrāntika). The conceptions of *cetanā* as the core of *kamma* are not so different with respect to the interpretation, but vary according to *kāya* and *vāg-kamma*. The concept corresponding to "*avijñapti*" is not found in the *Nikāya*. Hence, it will make the consideration between *kamma* and *anattā* more adequate, as has been done here. See *Abhidharmaniyāyānusāra-śāstra* by Saṅghabhadra (T. 9. 625c).

SECTION IV

1. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India*, New York, Grove Press Inc., 1954. p. 332.

2. Varma, *Studies in Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations*, Motilal Banarsidass, 1950. p. 321.

3. S. Nikhilananda, "Social Values in Hinduism", summary of the 26th International Congress of Indologists, 1964.

4. O. Lewis, *Village Life in Northern India*. Urbana; University of Illinois Press. 1958. pp. 249-259.

M.N. Srinivas proposes the multiplicity of Hinduism according to the geographical spread. That is, All-India Hinduism, Peninsular Hinduism and Regional Hinduism. (*Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952). We have proposed here the two categories of Hinduism in view of the orthodox philosophy. Regarding the methodological approach to this problem one may refer to Milton Singer's paper, "Text and Context in the Study of Religion and Social Change in India," *The Second Conference*, The Frank L. Weil Institute for Studies in Religion and the Humanities, 1961.

5. P.M. Kolenda, *Religious Anxiety and Hindu Fate*, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXXIII, June 1964. p. 78.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

7. Silver Jubilee of the Nadar Mahajana Sangam at Virudhanagar. *The Hindu*, May 29, 1956. This is quoted also in the *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays* (M.N. Srinivas, London, 1962, p. 41.)

SECTION V

1. According to the various kinds of the mind-elevation (*cittassa uṇṇati*), *māno* is divided into 10 kinds. *Mahāniddeśa* 1.80.

2. The words *maññanā maññitattam* exactly show the etymology of *māna* derived from the root *man* (op.cit.).

3. Böthlingk und Roth, *Sanskrit Wörterbuch*, p. 719.

4. A Chinese *men* and its various meanings are enumerated in *Daijiten* (in Jap.), Kodansha, 1964, p. 874; *Jigen* (in Chinese), Taiwan, Shomu-insho-kan, The year of Taiwan 60; H.A. Gilles, *A Chinese-English Dictionary*, Taipei, 1967, p. 950 c; Mathews, *Chinese-English Dictionary*, 9th printing, Harvard, p. 612c.

5. *Asmimāna* is also defined as *thale ussādo: thale ussādo ti kho bhikkhu asmimānassetam adhvavanam*, S. IV. 180. The implication of [aham] *asmi* is explained thus: *rūpavantam vā attānam attani rā rūpaṃ rūpasmiṃ vā attānam. Iti ayam ceva samanupassanā asmīti cassa avigatam hoti*. A word *avigatam* substitutes for *adhigatam* in Pāli Text Society's edition of *Samyuttanikāya*. Cf. Siamese ed. S III. 46, *Niddesa-Aṭṭhakathā* 1.209. Further, it is explained in another text: *rūpe asmīti māno ti ahaṃ rūpaṃ ti uppannamāno* (*Sammohavinodanī* p. 490).

6. Yaśomitra gives a comment on it, saying: *asmimānād anyañ saññāmaṃ anyatamaḥ sa ca mayatā nāvidyety abhiprāyaḥ*. *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* p. 303.

7. On *asmitā* and its usage see the following passage: *vibhaveccā na cārasya sambhavanti vidhādayaḥ nā'smitā dṛṣṭipuṣṭatvāt kāukṛtyaṃ nāpi cāsubhaṃ* (AKBH. p. 286). Commenting on it Vasubandhu explains: *satkāya-dṛṣṭipuṣṭā hi mānavidhā asmunānasca*. Thus, a term *asmitā*, like *asmimāna*, does not simply connote 'pride', but a wrong view of the self-existence, i.e., the 'thinking of the self in the non-self'. The latter is exactly the same as the meaning implied in the Pāli literature.

8. The Chinese terms distinguish sometimes *asmimāna* and *ātmanāna* in a way that *tze men* stands for *asmimāna*, while *wu men* stands for *ātmanāna* (MVP.).

9. Sthiramati: *Madhyāntavibhāṅgāṭikā*, ed. R.C. Pandeya (Motilal Banarsidass. 1971) p. 122.

10. *Triṃśikā*, ed. S. Lévi (Paris 1925) p. 29.

11. *Ibid.* p. 23.

12. *Ibid.* p. 23. In other words, *asmimāna* will give rise to a wrong view of the self, or the recognition of the self in the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), exciting one's own mind.

13. *Papañcasūdanī* 3.141. In the Buddhist sense the negation of *asmi* ('I am') is the denial of the equation of 'I' with *pañcaskandha*, not to mention the equation with *brahmā*. 'Le bouddhisme; qui condamne la "notion: 'je suis' " (*asmimāna*), ne peut pas accepter qu'on dise: "Je suis le *brahman*". Cf. K. Bhattacharya, *L'âtman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien* (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1973), p. 73.

SECTION VI

1. P.V. Bapat, "Atta-dīpa in Pāli Literature", *Sino-Indian Studies, Liebenthal Festschrift*, Santiniketan: Visvabharati, p. 11-13.

2. G.H. Sasaki, *A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy*, Tokyo: 1958, pp. xiv, 594ff. (J. Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 209-210).

CHAPTER II

ABHIDHARMIC CONCEPTS

I. THE MEANING OF TRUTH IN ABHIDHARMA PHILOSOPHY:

paramārtha-sat, saṃvṛti-sat, dravya-sat

The division of knowledge of truth (*Satya*) into three forms, *paramārtha*, *saṃvṛti* and *bhāva*, is one of the important subjects of discussion in all schools of Buddhism throughout the history.

There is the variety of views and interpretations of these three forms of truth. The various interpretations, however, have been motivated by the two processes: the etymological evolution and the philosophical development. The Buddhist epistemology can be considered a complex of these two processes.

Paramārtha

Parama in Pāli means, according to the commentators, *uttama* (ultimate). The *Abhidhānappadīpikā-sūci* defines *uttama* as that which has achieved its highest situation (*ubhūto atyattham uttamo*). Further, Dhammapāla defines *parama* in his *Kathāvatthu-anuṭṭikā*, as *paṭṭhāna*, meaning 'pre-eminent' or *aviparītabhāva* meaning 'irreversibility'.

Attha in Pāli, in a general sense, signifies 'meaning'. But in the compound *paramattha* it denotes not only 'meaning' of a word, but also it refers to *svabhāva* (self-existence) or *viṣaya* (object). *Attha* represents in this connection things which are to be achieved by those who seek for genuine insight. *Paramattha*, thus, means things which are obviously intelligible to one's own mind or truth in the absolute sense intelligible to one's own self.

This definition of *paramattha* by the Theravāda commentators also is expressed by the Sarvāstivāda school, i.e., the *Abhidharma-dīpa* reads: 'yadidaṃ pratyukatam vastuhetupratyayātpratītyotpannamparamāρθato vidyate pratyātmavedanīyatvāt; (the object caused by conditions can exist in view of the absolute truth, for it is to be realized by one's own self).¹

While *paramattha* means the absolute truth, *sammuti* means

'acceptable agreement' or 'conventional truth'. Both terms, *paramattha* and *sammuti*, are used not only in Mahāyāna, but also in early Buddhism, i.e., 'buddhānaṃ pana dve kathā sammutikathā ca paramatthakathā cāti tattha sātto puggalo devabrahmā ti ādikā sammutikathā nāma, aniccaṃ dukkhaṃ anattā khandhā dhālūyo āyatanāni satipaṭṭhānā sammappadhānā' ti ādikā paramatthakathā nāma.'² *Paramattha* represents a Buddhist doctrine such as *āyatana*, *dhātuyo* and the like, all of which are intelligible to one's own self. In this connection *paramattha* is defined as follows: '*paramatthavacanāṃ saccaṃ dhammānaṃ tathā lakkaṇaṃ*'ti'.³ On the other hand, *sammuti* is defined as follows: '*saṃketavacanāṃ saccaṃ lokasammutikāraṇaṃ*'.⁴

Paramattha is a true nature of things (*dhammānaṃ bhūta-lakkaṇaṃ*), which are considered existing, but not empty. The realization of a true nature anticipates the existence of things (*svabhāva*), which can not be denied.

In contrast, Mahāyāna does not permit any thing to exist in its nature. Hence *Paramārtha* is a true nature of things, which really does not exist. In view of *paramārtha*, as Mahāyāna teaches, nothing exists, all things are devoid of self-nature such as *āyatana*, *dhātu* and the like. A Mahāyāna text, the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, explains: '*sarvaṃ vidyate saṃvṛtyāṃ paramārthe na vidyate, dharmānaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ paramārthe'pi dṛṣyate, upalabdhī-niḥsvabhāve saṃvṛtistena ucyate*.' In view of the conventional truth all things exist, but in view of the absolute truth nothing exists; in absolute truth one realizes that all things are devoid of self-nature; there is, however, the conventional truth where there is no mental fancy.⁵

According to Mahāyāna Buddhism, both *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* are diametrically opposed to each other. *Paramārtha* is *śūnyatā* (emptiness), while *saṃvṛti* is like an illusion or an echo. *Paramārtha* can be realized only by those who can transcend the distinction of subject and object or the knower and the known.⁶ Therefore, a true nature of things such as *dhātu*, *āyatana* is considered *śūnyatā* (emptiness). Both *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* have no common ground with each other. Both are entirely opposed to each other. This is also true of the Sautrāntika school. According to this school, *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* refer to the entirely different knowledges. The former refers to *anāśravajñāna* (wisdom of non-defilement) or *prṣṭhalabdhajñāna* (prominent wisdom

attained by Enlightenment), while the latter means the discriminative knowledge distinguished from wisdom.

Thus, both the concepts, *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*, are used in Mahāyāna as well as Abhidharma (Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools in this context). But the approaches to these concepts are not similar. Mahāyāna approaches to them from the point of view of *śūnyatā*, anticipating no existence of things (*svabhāva*), while Abhidharma approaches to them from the point of view of *svabhāva* or the permanent existence of things.

Sammuti

The Pāli term *sammuti* is used in contrast to *paramattha*, meaning thereby 'the conventional'. Further, it is derived from *sam-man*, meaning 'to think together' or 'to think rightly'. A compound '*sammutisacca*' is not used in Older Pāli, as Edgerton suggests in his *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*.

The Pāli root *man* phonetically transfers into *mur*, i.e., '*diṭṭhaṃ sutam mutam*' (*Suttanipāta* 887). *Mutam* is obviously derived from the root *man*.

It is not unnatural to think that the etymological meaning of *sam-man* ('to think together') implies the mutual communication between man and man or the mutual relatedness. Therefrom is derived the variety of applied meanings: 'consent', 'general opinion', 'a mere name', 'fixing', 'statement', 'declaration' and 'convention'.⁷

Thus, *sammuti* (the conventional) is found in such early texts as *Suttanipāta* and *Milindapañha* and the like used in contrast to *vidvā* (the wise man) and *paramattha* (the absolute).⁸

Further, *sammuti* stands for a Sanskrit term *saṃvṛti*. Suffice it to show a few examples of this. A verse in the Pāli text *Suttanipāta* is found sanskritized in the Sanskrit text *Bodhisattvabhūmi*:

'*ya kāc'imā sammutiyo puthujjā, sabbā va elā na upeti vidvā,
anupāyo so upayaṃ kim eyya diṭṭhe sute khantim akubbamāno.*'
(SN. 897)

'*yāḥ kāścana saṃvṛtayo hi loka sarva hi tā munir nopaiti
anupago hy asau kenopādadita drṣṭa-śrute kāntim asamprakur-
van.* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, P. 48-49)

We have also another example:

'*yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti*

evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti'. (S. i. p. 135)
 (ji ltar yan lag tsogs rnams la|hrten nas shiñ rtar brjod pa ltar/
 de bśin phuñ po rnams brten nas|kun rdsob sems can śes byaho/
 Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra*. p. 258. Bibliotheca Buddhica,
 IX.)

A Tibetan terms *kun rdsob* always corresponds to a Sanskrit term *saṃvṛti*. There is, thus, no ambiguity for the correspondence between *sammuti* and *saṃvṛti*.

It is customary to assume that in the Buddhist Sanskritization of the Pāli, some of the phonological changes appear as follows: *m* and *u* change to *v* and *r* respectively. For example, a Vedic Sanskrit *śramaṇa* becomes *śravaṇa*, while *muddha* in Pāli changes to *mṛddha*, *puṭhujana* to *prthagjana* and the like. The Vedic Sanskrit is much closer to the Pāli than the Buddhist Sanskrit. Thus, *sammuti* has been sanskritized to *saṃvṛti*.

It is, however, worth noting that this Sanskritization caused a great change of meaning, for a Sanskrit term *saṃvṛti*, derived from the root *saṃvr*, indicates 'covering' or 'hiding' quite different from the original meaning of *sammuti* (statement or convention). The Pāli root *saṃ-man* is disregarded and replaced by the Sanskrit root *saṃ-vr*, meaning 'to cover' or 'to hide'. It may be noted in passing that *saṃvṛtti* (spelled with two *ts*) is a misreading for *saṃvṛti*, as Böhtlingk and Macdonell reported. (Böhtlingk, *Sanskrit Wörterbuch*; Macdonell, *Sanskrit Dictionary*.) Hence it would be unfair for some scholars to follow this misreading in an attempt to distinguish *saṃvṛti* from *saṃvṛtti* in its connotation.

But *Abhidharma*, both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools, did not take care of this etymological meaning of *saṃvṛti*, instead, took up the philosophy of *saṃvṛti*, confining thereby its significance merely to 'the conventional' in contrast to *paramārtha* (the absolute). According to the Sarvāstivāda school, Substance consists of such elements as *rūpa* (material), *vedanā* (feeling), *saṃjñā* (notion), *saṃskāra* (mental activities) and *vijñāna* (consciousness). If Substance is analyzed into an inter-play of these five elements or impersonal forces, the notion of Substance disappears. Then, Substance is called Conventional Existence (*saṃvṛti*), as is stated in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

"If Substance is analyzed by discriminative knowledge, then the very notion of Substance disappears. Substance is termed Conventional Existence⁹".

Commenting on this passage, Yaśomitra says:

“Conventional Truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) is that which is grasped by the daily activities of this world or by discriminative knowledge, defiled or non-defiled.”¹⁰

From this passage it is clear that *saṃvṛti-satya* refers to daily activities (*saṃvyavahāra*), which implies the original meaning of the Pāli term *sammutī* (the conventional).

Moreover, Yaśomitra, drawing no attention to the meaning of the root *saṃ-vr*, extends its literal meaning further to his own philosophy, classifying it into two-categories.

1. *Samvṛtyantara-vyapāśrayā* (Conventional Truth based upon another Conventional Truth). All realities have their separate existence as differentiated from others, presuming this differentiation from others (*bheda*). Every existing thing exists by and through the denial of the others. It means that all realities can exist only in relation to others. Thus, existence is relative (*anyāpoha*).

2. *Dravyantara-vyapāśrayā* (Conventional Truth based on another Reality). When a *dravya*, according to the Sarvāstivādin, originates without leaving its own nature, it is called a self-existence (*svalakṣaṇasat*). *Dravya* is permanent, remaining unchanged in both the conditions, viz., origination and decay. It is neither created nor destroyed, being eternal and changeless. The essential nature of *dravya* remains unchanged among its various modes.¹¹ But *dravya*'s existence is possible only through the denial of the others, as is the case with *saṃvṛtyantara-vyapāśrayā*.

Thus, *saṃvṛti* is that which is always in relation to other things, interrelated and co-related.

Epistemologically speaking, *saṃvṛti* means ‘to understand simply the general character of things’ while *paramārtha* means ‘to understand the special character of things’.¹² Both the concepts, *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*, are the two aspects of the one and the same object differently viewed. We can find herein a slightly different aspect from Mahāyāna, in which *paramārtha* can be realized only through the complete denial of *saṃvṛti*. In Abhidharma, as the definition of both these concepts, as represented above, is given from a positive point of view, which is based upon the positive or affirmative point of view of epistemology of the Sarvāstivādin. In other words, the Sarvāstivāda school interprets *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* as a parallel form of existence to *dravya*.

Sammuti and Paññatti

All the contents of *sammuti* are involved in, and expounded by, a term *paññatti* in the Theravāda school. That is, the meanings such as 'consent', 'general opinion', 'a mere name', 'fixing', 'statement' and 'conventional' can be easily derived from the original meaning of *paññatti* (indication). A Pāli *paññatti* is usually equal to a Sanskrit *prajñapti* and noted only in *Mahāvīyutpatti* as *prajñāpti* (Edgerton, BHS, p. 359).¹³

The *Puggalapaññatti-Atthakathā* represents a comprehensive definition of *paññatti*. According to this *Atthakathā*, term *paññatti* means 'to tell' (*ācikkhati*), 'to explain' (*deseti*), 'to make known' (*paññāpeti*) and 'to establish' (*paṭṭhāpeti*). The relative assumes always a limited form or a form of limitation. Even the absolute takes a limited form, for the absolute cannot manifest itself as a whole. The absolute reveals itself by and through limited things. It can be said that *paññatti* is the self-limitation of the absolute.

Nibbāṇa, *asankhata*, *kusala-akusala dhamma*, all these things are thought to arise and exist in reality, being established from the view-point of *paramattha* (the absolute truth). As all of them assume a form of existence (*vijjamāna*) or a form of limitation, they are also called *paññatti* (indication). This is implied in a terminology *vijjamānapaññatti* (indication of existence).

On the other hand, the relative represents the things which are considered as existents from the viewpoint of conventional usage (*lokanirutti*), but not in reality. These things are relative and transitory. They assume a form of limitation also. They reveal themselves as the relative. The relative is a form of manifestation or indication (*paññatti*).

Both the things, absolute and relative, are thus involved in *paññatti*. *Paññatti* in the Theravāda school refers to the absolute as well as the relative. In the relationship of *paññatti* and *paramattha* one is not distinguished from the other; the former includes the latter. In the Theravāda school a term *paññatti*, as indicated above, has broader sense than *sammuti*, which is used only in contrast to *paramattha*.

In contrast, *prajñapti* in Mahāyāna refers to the mundane world or the relative. In Mahāyāna there are sharp distinctions between both the absolute and the relative. There is no intermediate stage

between *prajñapti* and *paramārtha* at all. The absolute (*paramārtha*) reveals itself in the relative (*prajñapti*), while the relative represents the skilful means (*upāyakāuśalya*) by which one can arrive at the absolute reality. *Prajñapti* is termed *upādāya prajñapti* (the relative indication), which is synonymous to *saṃvṛti* (the conventional).

The reason why the Theravāda school has given to *paññatti* a broader sense than *sammutī*, including thus *paramattha* is based upon the Abhidharmic realism. They attempt to designate everything existing, material and immaterial, real and ideal, objectively from an epistemological standpoint. For this reason also, the Theravāda school does not give any sharp distinction between the absolute and the relative.

Bhāva

According to the Sarvāstivādin, *bhāva* (being) is classified into the two: *dravyasat* (substance) and *prajñapti-sat* (indication).

Bhāva denotes that which becomes objectified on the one hand, and produces perception on the other.¹⁴ *Dravyasat* means a self-existent thing producing perception, i.e., *rūpa*, *vedanā* etc.¹⁵ *Prajñapti-sat* is defined as a provisional existence producing perception.¹⁶

The existence is termed *dravyasat* in view of *paramārtha* (the absolute truth) and *prajñapti* in view of *saṃvṛti* (the conventional). The following table will show the scheme:

Bhāva— *dravyasat...paramārtha-satya*
prajñapti-sat...saṃvṛti-satya

Bhāva, as stated above, means at first a thing which becomes objectified. There from is derived the realistic attitude toward the being. That is, the Sarvāstivāda school is based upon the realistic viewpoint, believing the separate and independent existence of the objective world. On the other hand, *bhāva* denotes a things producing perception (*buddhi*). Therefrom is derived the subjective attitude toward the being. That is, the objectified, abstract world cannot describe truth as it exists by itself apart from us. Instead, the objective world will be recognized as partially imposed by man's *buddhi* (perception) and not just passively mirrored within it.

Thus, *bhāva* is the basis upon which *dravya* and *prajñapti* are

based. In other words, when *bhāva* is revealed to the conventional, impermanent, it is called Conventional Truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*); when *bhāva* is revealed to the absolute, permanent, it is called the Absolute Truth (*paramārthasatya*); when *bhāva* is revealed to the essential, substantial, it is called Substance (*dravyasat*). *Bhāva* as such is neither the absolute nor the conventional, but a synthesis which is different from both, embracing them in its fold. Both *dravya* and *prajñapti* or *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*, are not different from *bhāva* as such. Both of them are in the form of *bhāva* or rather perhaps *bhāva* is in the form of them. This existence is *bhāva*.

Both *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* are not opposed to each other in an exclusive manner, but embraced in the form of *bhāva*.

According to Mahāyāna, however, *paramārtha* is absolutely different from *prajñapti*, *prajñapti* different from *paramārtha*, having nothing underlying them to bind them together.

As the Sarvāstivāda is based upon the epistemological viewpoint, it attempts to define everything existing, real and ideal, in an objective manner, as does the Theravāda school. Therefore, the Sarvāstivāda school defines *bhāva* as a basis upon which the three-aspects are based. The three aspects, *paramārtha*, *saṃvṛti* and *dravya*, are the different manifestations of *bhāva*, which is considered as a reality, objectified and producing perception. *Bhāva* is a reality objectified and partially imposed by us. Yaśomitra describes these three aspects as the three types of *sat* (existence). In the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Yaśomitra comments:

*“trividhaṃ hi yogācārāṇāṃ sat. paramārtha saṃvṛti-sat
dravyasat ca dravyataḥ svalakṣaṇataḥ sad dravyasad iti.”*¹⁷

(For the Yogācāra there are three kinds of existence; the absolute, the conventional and the substance. Substance means that which exists in view of substance and its own essential nature.)

Saṃvṛti and its Evolution

In view of the historical development of Buddhism, however, subsequent philosophical evolutions were inevitable. The seeds of unrest sown at an earlier Abhidharma period were to grow and blossom in more abundance at a later Mahāyāna period, bearing fruit which Mahāyāna Buddhism was to reap. Mahāyāna represents effective attempts to return to the thought of Early Buddhism.

There is, however, many an instance, in which a Mahāyānist interpretation is derived from the wrong Sanskritization of a Pāli word or the intentional amendment of the original meaning. It means that the Mahāyāna philosophy had been accompanied by the linguistic amendment and it is such a combination that spells out the Mahāyāna period in philosophy's search for new direction and purpose.

This type of linguistic and philosophical amendments and upheavals marks out also a new interpretation of *saṃvṛti* in the search for the Mahāyānist thought.

When a Pāli *sammuti* is sanskritized as *saṃvṛti*, it has lost its etymological meaning, for the former is derived from the root *sam-man* ('to think together'), while the latter is derived from the different root *saṃ-vṛ* ('to cover up').

The interpretations based upon the root *saṃ-vṛ* can be found in the various Mahāyāna texts, e.g., Candrakīrti defines *saṃvṛti* as '*Samantādvāraṇaṃ saṃvṛtiḥ*', meaning 'completely covering'.¹⁸ Haribhadra comments on *saṃvṛti*: '*...yayā buddhyā tattvaṃ saṃvṛyate yasyāṃ vā buddhau sā tādrśī loka-pratītiḥ saṃvṛtir iṣṭā*'.¹⁹ *Samvṛti* denotes, as Haribhadra comments, the discriminative knowledge (*buddhi*), by which truth (*tattva*) is covered up (*saṃvṛyate*).

This etymological interpretation is included in the Candrakīrti definition of *saṃvṛti*, which has the following three aspects:

1. *Avacchādana* (covering).
2. *Anyonyasamāśraya* (mutual relationship).
3. *Lokavyavahāra* (daily activities) or *saṃketa* (agreement).²⁰

The meaning of *saṃvṛti* is given with a term *avacchādana* (covering) similar to *samantādvāraṇaṃ* (completely covering), which he designated before.

Further, the second aspect of *saṃvṛti*, namely, *anyonyasamāśraya* (mutual relationship), is implicitly maintained in the sense of a Pāli term *sammuti*, meaning 'to consent'. It is explicitly derived from the fundamental thought of the Madhyamaka school, which identifies *saṃvṛti* with the things dependently originated (*pratītyasamutpannaṃ vasturūpaṃ*).²¹ *Samvṛti* is subject to cause and condition, for a self-existent thing cannot have origin and decay. In other words, a thing which is caused and conditioned is *saṃvṛta* (covered up) or phenomenal.

According to Nāgārjuna as well as Śāntideva, the concepts in

common usage, e.g., *skandha*, *ātman*, *loka*, etc., are dependently originated. There is nothing self-existent; a thing can exist only in relation to others. Therefore, the existence of *dhātus* and *āyatana*s is conventional and not real. Thus, the mutual relationship characteristic of *saṃvṛti* is the fundamental basis for *śūnyatā*. This idea stands, however, in contrast to the Hīnayānist conception that the existence of *dhātus* and *āyatana*s is established in reality.

This aspect of *anyonyasamāśraya* (mutual relationship), therefore, indicates a Mahāyānist interpretation of a Pāli *sammuti* ('to consent') with modification or variation.

The third aspect of *saṃvṛti*, namely, *lokavyavahāra* or *saṃketa* is exactly the same as the meaning of a Pāli *sammuti*, which means 'statement' and 'acceptable agreement'.

A term *vyavahāra* compounded with *loka* clearly represents 'speech' or 'statement', as is shown below:

A Pāli *lokiya-vohāro* (general way of speech, *Suttanipāta-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 382 = a Sanskrit *lokavyavahāra*; *ariya-vohāro* (proper mode of speech). D.III. 232, etc. = *ārya-vyavahāro*; *vyavahāra* in all the following compounds means 'speech'; *aṣṭau vyavahāra-pada-caritāni*. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 389, 13; *ṣaḍ vyavahāra-pada-caritāni*. *ibid.*, 19ff; *saṃvṛti-vyavahāra*. *Sukhavatīvyūha*, 42, II, etc.

It is also rendered by the Chinese-*i-shao* (speech), which will be discussed later on in detail.

It would be interesting, especially in view of the Sanskritization of Pāli, to investigate the relationship between *vohāra* and *vyavahāra* before studying the philosophical evolution in later Buddhism.

A Pāli term *vohāra* means 1. speech and 2. business or daily activities. If it is sanskritized by *vyāhāra*, it indicates merely 'speech'. If it is sanskritized by *vyavahāra*, as shown in a compound *lokavyavahāra*, then, it represents only 'daily activities'. Both the concepts, *vyāhāra* and *vyavahāra*, have no common ground to bind them together.

Nevertheless, *vyavahāra* in all the Buddhist Sanskrit texts enumerated above denotes not 'daily activities', but 'speech'. If it could mean 'speech', it should have been *vyāhāra*, but not *vyavahāra*. If so, *vyavahāra* would be a wrong sanskritization of *vo-hāra*. The same type of sanskritization can be found also in a Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit *vyavasthāna* equivalent to a Pāli *voṭṭha-pana*, which is rightly sanskritized by *vyāsthāna*.

From the philosophical point of view also the narrow issue of this concept *vyavahāra* as 'speech' is less adequate. Instead, there are some broader issues involved in this concept. That is, the Mahāyānists held that Buddha has two types of teaching, absolute (*paramārtha*) and conventional (*saṃvṛti*), and that all what he preached about *pratītyasamutpāda* and *āryasatyas* were conventional, although they were considered absolute by the Hīnayānists. The Mahāyānist absolute truth, namely, *āryasatyas* and *pratītyasamutpāda*, are by reasons appreciated by the Mahāyānists as the method of analysis of all things existing, resulting in the cardinal tenet *śūnyatā* (non-existence). The Mahāyānists, particularly the Mādhyamikas, extended the conception of *śūnyatā* to such concepts as *Tathāgata*, *Nirvāṇa* and *Ākāśa*. Not only the Mādhyamikas, but also the Vijñānavādins held the view that there was a discrepancy between *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* diametrically opposed, e.g., '*saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca tṛtīyaṃ nāstihetukam, kalpitaṃ saṃvṛtir hyuktā tacchedād āryagocaram*' (There are the conventional and the absolute truths, but by no means the third truth; the conventional means the inferred; cutting it out one enters into the sublime sphere).²²

Thus, both the truths, *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*, are indicated as having radically differed. Therefore, *vyavahāra* equalized to *saṃvṛti* cannot be confined only to 'speech'; instead, it should denote all the existing things in the world in contrast to the absolute truth.

This basic position of the Mahāyāna thought has received adequate recognition by traditional exegetists. For example, Sthiramati has noticed the three of the broader issues involved in this concept of *saṃvṛti*. The *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*²³ refers to the three. They are:

1. *Prajñaptisaṃvṛti* (the conventional truth as indication). Referring to *prajñapti* Sthiramati comments as follows: '*saṃvṛtir-vyavahāraḥ, prajñapti ity abhidhānam. arthābhāve*' *bhidhānamātreṇa vyavahāraḥ prajñaptisaṃvṛtiḥ*.' (The conventional represents 'daily activities' [*vyavahara*]. The indication means 'a mere name'. If there is only a name without any object at all, then, *vyavahāra* denotes the conventional truth as indication.)

2. *Pratipattisaṃvṛti* (the conventional truth as admission). Further, he says, '*avidyamāne'rthe'rthābhiniveśaḥ pratipattistaya vyavahāraḥ pratipattisaṃvṛti*.' (The adherence to the object not

existing means 'admission'; Its *vyavahāra* (daily activities) is termed the conventional truth as admission.)

3. *Udbhāvanāsaṃvṛti* (the conventional as manifestation). The *Ṭikā* runs, '*tathatādisābdair nirabhilāpyasya dharmadhātoryā saṃ-sūcanā sodbhāvanā. tayā dharmadhātor vyavahāra udbhāvanāsaṃvṛtiḥ.*' (The manifestation is to express the inexpressible realm of ideas in such a technical term as 'suchness' and so forth; the daily activities or common usage (*vyavahāra*) is termed the conventional truth as manifestation.)

All of these three meanings of *saṃvṛti* do not represent merely 'speech'. But they are no other than the contents of a Pāli *sammuti* which is defined as 'permission', 'a mere name', 'communication' and the like. All of the contents of a Sanskrit *saṃvṛti* and its exegetical explanation are clearly involved in a Pāli *sammuti*. The following table will show the correspondence between *sammuti* and its Mahāyānist exegesis.²⁴

The three meanings of a Pāli <i>sammuti</i>	The aspects of a Sanskrit <i>saṃvṛti</i>
1. A mere name	<i>prajñāpti</i> (indication) <i>paññatti</i> (Pāli) = <i>sammuti</i>
2. Permission, acceptable agreement	<i>pratipatti</i> (admission)
3. Communication	<i>udbhāvanā</i> (manifestation)

Thus, the three aspects of a Sanskrit *saṃvṛti* are eschewed from all the etymological and philosophical implications of *sammuti* in Pāli.

Further, 'speech' (*abhidhāna*), as Sthiramati mentioned above, indicates not the whole content of *vyavahāra*, but a part of it. Moreover, Sthiramati designates *vyavahāra* in his *Ṭikā* as *saṃvṛti*, which has a broader sense than 'speech'.

Even more important is the fact that *vyavahāra* is different from *vyāhāra* (speech). That is, it is *vyāhāra* but not *vyavahāra* that means 'speech'. In this context, it is worth noting that both *vyavahāra* (daily activities) and *vohāra* (speech) are involved in a Pāli concept of *vohāra*. The former meaning is found in the Pāli Nikāyas (M. II. 300; S. 614, etc.) and the latter is found also in Pāli (D. III. 232; Vin. IV. 2; Vbh. 376, 387; A. II. 246; IV. 307; *Paramatthajotikā*, 382, etc.)

In view of this etymological parallelism with the Sanskrit, there

will appear the following alternative as mentioned before. If *vyavahāra* means simply 'speech', as the Chinese rendered, it seems to be a wrong sanskritization of a Pāli *vohāra*, which is rightly to be sanskritized into *vyāhāra*. If *vyavahāra* represents 'daily activities' or 'performance', it does not mean 'speech'. In the latter case it indicates merely one of the two meanings involved in the concept *vohāra* in Pāli.

From the linguistic and philosophical point of view, however, there would be no ambiguity for the fact that Sthiramati designates *vyavahāra* not as 'speech', but as 'daily activities', 'performance' or 'business' which is no other than one of the meanings of the Pāli *vohāra*.

It may be remarked in passing that the Sthiramati's conception of *saṃvṛti* identifies itself with the Sarvāstivāda view, e.g., Yaśomitra defines *saṃvṛti* in his *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (p. 520): '*saṃvṛti-sad iti saṃvyavahāreṇa sat*' (the conventional means the being (truth) of daily performance.). The term *saṃvyavahāra* stands for the Pāli *saṃvohāra*, meaning 'business' or 'traffic' (A. II. 187; S.I. 78; A. III. 77; SnA. 471; Vin. III. 239, etc.), which clearly represents one of the two meanings of *vohāra*. There is, therefore, no doubt that *vyavahāra* does not mean 'speech'. Such a conclusion obviously carries with it the suspicion that the Chinese translator had no clear conception as to the distinction between *vyāhāra* and *vyavahāra*.

From what has been discussed above regarding the term *saṃvṛti* and its evolution it will not be difficult to understand the significance of the traditional Buddhist exegesis, which is two-fold; one is due to conservation and the other due to evolution. While the conservative element shows the original meaning of the term common to both Abhidharma and Mahāyāna, evolutions correspond to the peculiar elements of thought developed in the Mahāyāna Buddhism, and thus help us in determining the mutual relationship between Abhidharma and Mahāyāna to a greater degree than pure conservations and evolutions.²⁵

Concluding Remarks

Historically speaking, the Buddhist conception of truths (*sat*, *satya*) assumes the following three aspects:

First, in Early Buddhism the absolute truth refers only to the Buddha and his teachings, while the conventional truth refers to

the daily activities such as human life, common usage of term, custom and so forth.

Second, in Abhidharma it is emphatically asserted that all existing things should be viewed as real (*svabhāva*); things are considered as having their own natures. According to the Abhidharma a real existence has its own nature (*svalakṣaṇena sat*), and it becomes the object of *pratyakṣa* (visible perception). In contrast, the common appearance (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) is merely a by-product of the discriminative knowledge or a constructed object (*samāropyamāṇam rūpam*), being an object of inference (*anumāna*).²⁶ With this basis the concept of truth has come to include the three: *bhāva*, *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*. *Bhāva* denotes a thing producing perception (*buddhi*). Both *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* are in the form of *bhāva* differently revealed. All things conceivable, ideal and real, live in the bosom of *bhāva*; they are not different from *bhāva* (existence) as such.

Third, in Mahāyāna the idea of *bhāva* has been denied; it cannot be viewed as real in any sense; nor can it be considered as having its own nature. Thus, only the two aspects, *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*, have become the basic point of view of the philosophy.

Moreover, these terms, going far beyond the epistemological approach, are applied to the religious experience, in which spiritual progress takes place, as implied by the expression *śūnyatā* (nothingness). Thus, *śūnyatā* is identified with *paramārtha* (the absolute) radically differed from *saṃvṛti* (the conventional).

II. THE THREE MODES OF KNOWLEDGE *jñāna, prajñā, prajñāpāramitā*

Generally speaking, knowledge refers to the analysis of an object, and such knowledge we can call objective knowledge. This type of knowledge can be accumulated. It cannot, however, be termed Buddhist knowledge as far as it concerns objective analysis.

Even in our daily life we sometimes make a distinction between scientific knowledge and religious knowledge (wisdom). If one possesses scientific knowledge, it does not mean that he has wisdom. We are aware of our respect for wisdom more than for

objective, scientific knowledge. Buddhism prefers wisdom based on religious intuition more than accumulated scientific knowledge.

Wisdom in the Buddhist sense is divided into two concepts: transcendental knowledge (*ñāna*) and the knowledge-to-exercised *paññā*. The study of these two concepts is an intricate and intriguing problem in the history of Buddhism. Almost all scholars today use these terms in the same meaning as intuition or insight, etc. According to their views, both concepts denote mysterious faculties, just as intuition is a transcendental knowledge. Without understanding the slightly different meaning of these concepts, however, the interpretation of intuition will easily give birth to confusion among their views.

It appears, therefore, that the key to understanding the true meaning of intuition is to define these concepts in their historically different periods and theoretically varied meaning. In the history of Buddhist thought the following periods can be taken into consideration: The Early (Nikāya) Buddhism (ca. 431-271 B.C.), Abhidharma (ca. 271 B.C.-1 A.D.) and the Early Mahāyāna Buddhism (ca. 100 A.D.).

By taking particularly the development of the Abhidharma theories into consideration, we shall find a more deeply underlying relation between the two concepts. Concerning the importance of the Abhidharmic background, somewhat neglected in the research field, with respect to the Buddhist intuition, little need be said here.

The Early Buddhism

Nāna and *Paññā* are not distinctively differentiated from each other. *Nāna* means just knowledge "in either a next to hand or a lofty sense." On the other hand, *paññā*, as Mrs. Rhys Davids pointed out, is not a mere intellectual "convulsion" of thought. It represents, "coming-to-know" and "coming-to-be". *Paññā* is not a dialectic or desultory referie, but an exercise of thought on matter of practice. The Rhys Davids's distinction between both concepts appears rather to rest upon the Abhidharmic interpretation than upon the Nikāya view. The distinction is not really found in the Nikāyas. However, her detailed investigation of *paññā* is suggestive enough to lead to further development of Abhidharma study. *Paññā* is not mere insight or intuition, but conduct accompanied by insight; it is a term of practical import.¹

Based upon the implication of *paññā* in the Nikāya we shall especially examine the Abhidharma interpretation in connection with the Nikāya.

The Abhidharma Philosophy

In this Abhidharma period we may find a multi-polar distinction between *ñāna* and *paññā*. Here I would like to confine my discussion of the schools to only two as follows.

The Theravāda School

Both concepts, *paññā* and *ñāna*, are derived from the same root *jñā*, 'to know'. The prefix *pa* indicates 'forward', 'forth', 'fore', and it is a dynamic particle. This particle implies in itself the dynamic practicality. In relation to *viññāna* (consciousness) Rhys Davids refers to this dynamic connotation by saying it means 'coming-to-be'.

In early Buddhism, however, this distinction was not so clear, as sometimes both terms were used as synonymous. Such lack of clarity stimulated the Abhidharma schools to give specific definitions to these terms.

The dynamic implication of *paññā* can evidently be found in the Mahāvedalla Sutta (M.43), where *paññā* is considered as the knowledge to be practised (*bhāvetabbā*). *Paññā* does not merely mean the final goal to be reached.

This implication came to be clarified in the Abhidharma period. In Pāli Abhidharma, *paññā* came to mean the subject's knowing (*pajāna*). In contrast, *ñāna* came to mean the object to be known (*ñāta*). Thus, *ñāna* is the object, while *paññā* belongs to the subject. The endeavour to obtain *ñāna* presupposes *paññā*. In other words, *paññā* has a broader sense than *ñāna*. This latter understanding will become clearer in the Sarvāstivāda school.

In the Pāli text, Atthasālini (ca. the fifth cent. A.D.) designates *ñāna* as product or result, and *paññā* as the way to gain a product. The Atthasālini, 3,29; 3,30,² discusses the problem of the wholesome (*kusala*), referring to both *ñāna* and *paññā*. This passage discusses at first about three meanings of *kusala*. According to this passage the wholesome (*kusala*) has three meanings: the non-ill (*ārogya*), non-sinful (*nāvajja*) and the skilfully completed (*kosalla-sambhūta*).

Nāna is called the wholesome because it includes all three mean-

ings, while *Paññā* is also called the wholesome because it means 'the skilfully completed'. This term denotes the way to the final goal or the result to be attained. On the other hand, non-ill and non-sinful, are merely attributes of *ñāṇa* to be attained by means of one's own practice. When the way is 'skilfully completed', then, these attributes spontaneously will arise. They are the products of the practical way.

In terms of the practicality of *Paññā* we have another passage in the same text: "*paññā* is the superior, fundamental and foregoer." (Asl., 3.44.). Practice denotes a forward movement, which is expressed in its synonymous use with *pajāṇana* '(to know)'. This distinction between the static and dynamic becomes more lucid during the commentarial period.

According to the commentary on Vibhaṅga, Sammohavinodanī, *paññā* operates by virtue of function (*kiicca*) and object (*ārammaṇa*) while *ñāṇa* has for its object *dhamma*.³ It means that in order to operate *paññā* must first have action on the subjective side and the object on the objective side. With the object alone, *paññā* cannot work at all as it requires action (*kiicca*) on the subjective side. *Nāṇa* consists in the object to be known and practised by *paññā*. Thus, *ñāṇa* is considered as the static product and ideal to be obtained, while *paññā* is subjective, dynamic and functional.

The commentator Buddhaghosa is aware of this distinction as he compared *paññā* with *saññā* (notion) and *viññāṇa* (consciousness). In his view, *saññā* refers to the perception of a colourful object, while *viññāṇa* means the perception of a multitude of appearances. These two terms concern the analytical perception of the object. On the other hand, *paññā* means to distinctively know (*pajāṇana*) the [religious significance] of the object. Buddhaghosa explained also in the Atthasālinī in the following manner:

Paññā has two meanings: to make known or to indicate (*paññāpana*) and to know the object from the viewpoint of impermanency, suffering and non-ego.⁴

Referring to this explanation, Buddhaghosa gave further two etymological interpretations of *paññā*: *paññāpana* (to make known) and *pakārena jānāti* (to know from the viewpoint of impermanency, suffering and non-ego). These two types of meanings are related to each other and refer to the same fact, namely, that by virtue of *paññā* the nature of existing things will be made clearly

known. This understanding of *paññā* as practicality, verified for us by the etymological significance of the term, may be regarded as the philosophical principle underlying the essence of human existence.

The essence of human existence also will be clearly made known by virtue of *paññā* as it is exemplified in one of the Pāli treatises, i.e., *Puggalapaññatti*. The title of this treatise literally represents 'the indication of types of human existence'. However, indication (*paññatti*) is etymologically derived from the root *jñā* (to know) and *paññatti* means 'to make known' or 'to indicate' (*ñāpana*). This explanation exactly corresponds to the etymological significance of *paññā* as pointed out above. This treatise analyses in fact the variety of types of human existences from the religious standpoint in compliance with their state of meditation. It is really the indication of different types of people in accordance with their stage of spiritual knowledge of *paññā*. Indication (*paññatti*) concerns the different religious practices or experiences. Thus, the Pāli treatise *Puggalapaññatti* may be regarded as the indication of different types of human existence based upon their own spiritual knowledge to be exercised. This basic notion has already been referred to since the time of Early Buddhism, in which *paññā* implied the functional knowledge to be exercised. This title of *Puggalapaññatti* is doubtless viewed in the way of early Buddhist time, depending upon the degree of spiritual development of the practitioners.

So far as *paññatti* refers to 'making known one's own character to others', *Puggalapaññatti* represents itself the treatise in which persons are variegated and classified in compliance with their own nature of making themselves known to others. Hence, the criterion of classification in this text is nothing but *paññā* itself.

This notion of *paññā* further brings up another question of the relationship between *paññā* and *ñāṇa*. In terms of spiritual exercise, the important thing is not merely the ideal or result, but rather the way to approach the ideal. In this respect, *ñāṇa* designated as only a static consequence, will be of significance only when it is considered in relation to the functional *paññā*. The ideal must be achieved by the practical: *ñāṇa* must be achieved by *paññā*. *Nāṇa* is assimilated in *paññā*. In this context, Buddhaghosa refers to the assimilation of *ñāṇa* by *paññā* in the *Visuddhimagga*.⁵ He gave *paññā* three categories: basis (*bhūmi*), faculty

(*indriya*) and essence (*sāra*). *Nāṇa* is here subject to the category of essence. The ideal, namely *ñāṇa*, is included in the practical knowledge (*paññā*) or the knowledge to be exercised. Whether the achievement of the ideal is realized or not rests on the ability of the practitioner. *Nāṇa* can be obtained only by *paññā* which is to be cultivated by human beings.

This distinction between the two concepts is also found in the Visuddhimagga, which is systematized on the basis of this distinction. Referring to the practice of *ñāṇa* the Visuddhimagga analyses *ñāṇa* into the following three classifications: stage of consciousness (*bhūmi*), basis (*mūla*) and actual (*sarīra*). These three are considered fundamental conditions for the practice of *paññā*.

1. Stage of consciousness (*bhūmi*) includes *khandha*, *āyatana*, *dhātu*, *indriya*, *sacca*, *pañiccasamuppāda*, etc. All these concepts denote the fundamental theories of Buddhism concerning human beings, truth, dependent origination respectively. A commentator Dhammapāla, commenting on the term '*bhūmi*', refers to these different types of theories, which are practised in conformity with the different stages of consciousness, i.e., the theory of *khandha* (the five aggregates) is the practice for those people ignorant of human existence (*rūpa*), that of *āyatana* (sphere) for those people ignorant of material (*rūparūpa*) and that of *dhātu* (realm) for those ignorant of both the human existence and the material. In this manner the stage of consciousness depends upon the different types of human beings.⁶ This state is explained by Dhammapāla as a functional stage (*pavaṭṭiṭṭhāna*).⁷ It is not a static object, but a dynamic process of human consciousness to be cultivated. This functional stage represents the nature of *paññā* as described above. Therefore, this stage means one of the three aspects of *paññā*.

2. Basis (*mūla*) means a fundamental ground upon which *nibbāna* will be attained. Both Dhammapāla and Buddhaghosa gave it a synonym *paṭiṭṭhāna*, meaning a fundamental basis (Dhammapāla, Praramatthamañjūsā. III. p. 19). Basis includes precept (*sīla*) and mind (*citta*). It means that both precept and mind or concentration are the fundamental elements for the practice of *paññā*. In other words, *paññā* is considered as one of the three fundamentals to be practised for the attainment of the final goal, namely, the enlightenment.

3. Actual (*sarīra*) means the quality which anything possesses of having realized possibilities. The dynamic process of conscious-

ness (*paññā*) is used in reference to a state of possibility rather than actuality (*sarīra*). In the Visuddhimagga, therefore, actual (*sarīra*) includes the five kinds of *ñāṇa*. The five are:

- (a) Beauty of right theory (*diṭṭhivisuddhi*).
- (b) Complete purification in consequence of the removal of doubt (*kankhāvitaraṇavisuddhi*).
- (c) Actual knowledge concerning the right and the wrong road (*maggāmaggañānadassana*).
- (d) Actual knowledge of the practice (*paṭipadāñānadassana-visuddhi*).
- (e) Actual knowledge (*ñāṇadassanavisuddhi*).

It is noticeable that the term *sarīra*, denoting *ñāṇa*, is used as a consequence or a product of the practical knowledge (*paññā*). *Nāṇa* is a quality, to which no temporal, possible position can be assigned. It is the absolute goal to be attained by practical knowledge.

This *ñāṇa* as a consequence is, according to Dhammapāla, termed 'quality' (*avayava*) or 'multitude' (*samudāya*), while *paññā* (the practical knowledge) is designated as a practice to be cultivated (*paribrūhetabba*) or as a practice continuously functioned (*santānavasena pavattamāna*).⁸

Regarding this distinction we have another definition in the commentaries. The Pāli commentators used to give definitions to each psychic function from the four aspects⁹:

1. Characteristic (*lakkhana*) is to penetrate into the true nature of state.

2. Function (*rasa*) is to dispel the darkness or bewilderment which covers the true nature of states.

3. Manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) is not to be bewildered.

4. Proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna*) means concentration, because of the statement: "A brother, who is concentrated, Oh Brethren, knows a thing as it really is." (S.v. 414).

Referring to *ñāṇa* the Visuddhimagga explains as follows: "*Nāṇa* means insight-knowledge (*vipassanā-ñāṇa*). It is said that in him who weighs, scrutinizes the states of matter and of non-matter there arises *ñāṇa* of unfaltering speed, sharp, heroic, exceeding clear like Indra's discharged thunderbolt."¹⁰

The Atthasālinī¹¹ presents a slightly different definition. *Paññā* has illuminating (*obhāsana*) and understanding (*pajānana*) as characteristic (*lakkhana*).

Regarding 'illuminating' the Elder's saying is expanded:

"Hence, the Elder has said: Just as when a man, your majesty, introduces an oil-lamp into a dark house, the lamp so introduced disperses the darkness, produces light, sheds lustre, makes objects visible, so, your majesty, *paññā* as it arises dispels the darkness of ignorance, produces the light of understanding (*vijjā*), sheds the lustre of *ñāṇa*, makes plain the Ariyan Facts. Thus, your majesty, *paññā* has illuminating as its characteristic."

In terms of 'understanding' (*pajānana*) the Elder further explains thus:

"And this was said by the Dhammasenāpati (Sāriputta): 'It knows; thus, brother, it is in consequence called *paññā*. And what does it know? This is ill,' and so on. Thus it should be expanded. And thus knowing should be regarded as the characteristic of *paññā*."

This explanation includes in itself the three aspects of *paññā* designated in the Visuddhimagga; its characteristic is 'illuminating', its function is to disperse the darkness, and its manifestation is to shed the lustre of *ñāṇa* or to produce the light of understanding (*vijjā*). In this passage, we can notice that *ñāṇa* is considered analogous to something to be shed or to be produced. Namely, *ñāṇa* is considered as a consequence of *paññā*, which is to produce the former.

The practicability of *paññā* is illustrated by Buddhaghosa in a skilful simile which refers to the distinction between *paññā* and *viññāṇa*. Buddhaghosa applies a simile to this distinction in his Visuddhimagga as follows:

"Because it seizes just the appearance of an object as blue-green and so forth, *saññā* (perception) is like the seeing of the coins by the undiscerning child. Because it seizes the appearance of the object as blue-green and so forth, and also leads to penetration of the characteristics, *viññāṇa* (consciousness) is like the seeing of the coins by the peasant. Because it seizes the appearance of the object as blue-green and so forth, leads to the manifestation of the Path (*maggapā tubhāva*), *paññā* (apprehension) is like the seeing of the coins by the banker. Therefore, this *paññā* is to be understood as the knowing in various ways as distinct from perceiving and being conscious."¹²

Thus, *paññā* is different from *viññāṇa* not only in its epistemological approach, but also in its practical sense. The former, go-

ing beyond the realm of perception, leads one to the manifestation of the Path to Enlightenment.

Circumstantial evidences point out that the distinction between *paññā* and *ñāṇa* in the Early Buddhism probably had a long existence underground, before, in the Theravāda school, it rose, as *paññā* 'the subject's knowing' and *ñāṇa* 'the object to be known' to the surface. Probably both meanings were in the Abhidharma period fully developed.

The Sarvāstivāda School

The Early Buddhism and the Theravāda school, as mentioned above, regard *ñāṇa* as a consequence and *paññā* as a means. This distinction is found also in the Sarvāstivāda school.

According to the Abhidharmakośa and its commentary, Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā by Haribhadra these two concepts are dealt with in the following manners.

1. Jñāna and Prajñā as related to Psychology

From the psychological viewpoint, *prajñā* (apprehension) is subject to the common stage of consciousness (*mahābhūmi*). Apprehension (*prajñā*) in this sense is only treated as a psychic factor. Therefore, this concept is even used synonymously with a Sanskrit *mati* (view) as a psychic factor.

It is to be noted that even in this sense *prajñā* does not lose its spiritual meaning of apprehension to be exercised. This concept here means 'to investigate' (*pravīcaya*) the true nature of a thing investigation concerns the psychological function of analyzing the realities (dharma), which is a means leading to the final goal of *nirvāṇa*.

Hence, this analytical apprehension is not purely scientific knowledge but rather a practical means to attain *nirvāṇa* and as such participates in religious experience. In other words, *prajñā* is immanent and refers to the way to be cultivated, while *jñāna* is transcendental and a consequence or a result to be attained.

2. Jñāna and Prajñā from the Viewpoint of Value

The Abhidharmakośa deals with both concepts in the two chapters, Pudgalanirdeśaḥ and Jñānanirdeśaḥ. The former chapter deals with *prajñā* from the standpoint of psychology; the latter from the standpoint of practice.

According to the Jñānanirdeśa, the realization of *prajñā* consists of four kinds of apprehension; hearing (*śrutamayī*), thinking (*cintamayī*), exercise (*bhāvanāmayī*) and inherence (*utpāda*). These apprehensions (*prajñā*) are termed 'defilement apprehension' (*sāśrava prajñā*), which observes the created and the non-created. These are in contrast to 'non-defilement apprehension' (*anāśrava prajñā*), which observes the truth of the three worlds and the four noble truths.

It is noticeable that three of them are repeatedly explained in the Abhidharmakośa, while 'inherence apprehension' is only found once in the first chapter of the Abhidharmakośa. Moreover, there is no mention of any form of 'inherence apprehension' by the commentator Yaśomitra. 'Inherence' is not mentioned in the Pāli Abhidhamma texts at all.

We might question why 'inherence' is neglected and what is the relationship between 'inherence' and other three apprehensions?

It is due to the characteristic of the Sarvāstivāda school in dealing with *prajñā*. *Prajñā* is dealt with in both its psychological and religious aspects. 'Inherence' (*utpāda prajñā*) is *prajñā* to be inherently obtained. This type of *prajñā* is considered as inherent or a priori from the psychological viewpoint. Confer to the following diagram.

The other three, however, concern religious practice; *śrutamayī prajñā* means the apprehension produced by hearing, *cintamayī prajñā* is produced by thinking of the truth, and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* is produced by exercise.¹³ Thus, these three *prajñā* concern only the apprehension a posteriori to be cultivated and exercised.

For this reason the Abhidharmakośa divided first *prajñā* into four forms in the chapter of Jñānanirdeśa and later only the three forms are discussed in detail, excluding 'inherence' (*utpāda prajñā*) for it represents merely a psychological function. To the Yogācārins the important thing is the religious practice, which alone depends upon the religious attitude of the practitioner.

In the Theravāda school, as we have seen, *ñāṇa* and *paññā* take a different position: the former is a consequence, while the latter the exercise-to-be developed. This distinction is also retained in the Sarvāstivāda school. In this school, however, the relationship between both becomes closer and intertwined. In other words, *jñāna* in this school is considered as one of the qualities of the

dynamic and functional *prajñā* being thus assimilated by and intertwined with *prajñā*. The diagram appearing on p. 100 attempts to clarify the interrelationship between both.

As for the three features the Sarvāstivādin suggests the following connotations. *Kṣānti* means recognition (of the fourfold noble truth) which functions to eliminate defilement. *Kṣānti* does not mean here 'forbearance' or 'endurance' for the following reasons.

The Sanskrit term *kṣānti*, derived from the root *kṣam* ('to endure'), has the two aspects involved: endurance and acceptance ('willing to'). The former meaning is always described as the opposite of *dveṣa* (hatred), *pratigha* (repugnance), *krodha* (anger) and *vyāpāda* (malice).¹⁴ It is this fundamental meaning that is employed in *kṣānti-pāramitā*, one of the ten *pāramitās* popularized in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts.

But it is also used in another subsidiary sense: 'willing to' (acceptance) of the truth in a positive way. A Mahāyāna text, *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, for instance, mentions about the great powers of a *bodhisattva*, who acquires *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*. This form of *kṣānti*, however, does not mean 'endurance' in a negative way, instead, it points out simply that existence as a whole is beyond all predicable attributes, and no definition whatsoever is, therefore, possible, and all that we can designate of it is voidness or unbornness in view of the ultimate truth. The sense of *kṣānt* in this respect should mean the positive mental disposition or a willing acceptance of the truth. The Chinese translation 'jen' for *kṣānti* is sometimes taken for 'ti nien' (recognition); but, the implication of this form of *kṣānti*, going a step further, is a positive acceptance of the Buddhist truth or a willing inclination to the ultimate truth. In other words, it denotes the mental state capable of the willing acceptance of all things existing through the denial. As for the Pāli *khānti* (Skt. *kṣānti*) we have once discussed in detail.¹⁵ The Pāli *khānti* is also considered as derived from the two roots, *kṣam* ('to endure') and *kam* ('to be willing to').

With this basis, we take the word *kṣānti*, one of the three features of *prajñā*, as 'acceptance' or 'willing to'. If so, there should be no difficulty in the Yaśomitra's interpretation. According to Yaśomitra the functions of *prajñā* consist of three types: *kṣānti*, *jñāna* and *drṣṭi*, which correspond to *upanidhyāna*, *niścita* and *saṃtiraṇa* in order. *Prajñā* performs its function as acceptance of the truth (*upanidhyāna*) at the first stage, as the decision (*niśc*

taṃ) as the second, and as the investigation (*saṃtiraṇa*) as the last one. It is noticeable that these three kinds of functions have a connecting link between each other, representing the stepping-forward of *prajñā* in function from acceptance to decision or *kṣānti* to *saṃtiraṇa*.

The second feature of *prajñā*, namely, *prajñā* equalized with *jñāna*, means decision (*niścitaṃ*), which refers to the realization of the truth. It is an object to be cultivated, and still it is assimilated by and included in the functions of *prajñā*. In the Theravāda school *jñāna* is also described as *jñāta* (the object to be known), and as the final goal to be reached. But the relationship between *jñāna* and *paññā* is not so explicitly described as in the Sarvāstivāda school. A connecting link between *kṣānti*, *jñāna* and *drṣṭi* is not represented in the Theravāda school.

The third feature of *prajñā* demonstrates the dynamic exercise of the truth by *prajñā*. In this respect, *prajñā* is viewed as a religious factor which differs from the psychological function. As a psychological factor it is subject to the mental factors (*cetasikā*). On the other hand, as a religious factor it refers to the functional and dynamic religious exercise. This diagram also shows how *prajñā* assimilates its product (*jñāna*), retaining thereby its original meaning as 'exercise to be developed' or 'knowledge to be cultivated'.

The Theravāda school, as we have mentioned before, distinguishes between both *prajñā* and *jñāna*. But this school does not attempt a combination of the two concepts. The Sarvāstivādin, however, attempts a combination and formulates the philosophy of *ākāra* (model form), by which *prajñā* and *jñāna* come into unity.

The Sarvāstivādin lays stress on the concept of *ākāra* and the combination of the two concepts. The diagram as illustrated above, will clarify the combination of the two concepts.

Dharmajñāna, as enumerated in the diagram, is a product of *prajñā*, observing the fourfold noble truth bounded by this material world, while *anvaya-jñāna* is a product of *prajñā*, observing the fourfold noble truth in the immaterial, spiritual world. This diagram shows how the knowledge-to-be-cultivated (*prajñā*) is combined and unified with its product (*jñāna*). This unification is termed *ākāra* (model form).

The term *ākāra* means 'appearance', 'sign', 'mode', 'form', etc.

Ākāra in an Abhidharmic sense does not simply mean a phenomenal appearance that will disappear with the object. This term refers to something that will remain even after the disappearance of the object.

According to the Pāli a concept of *ākāra* means a type of form (*rūpa*) which remains after the disappearance of the object.¹⁶ It might be interesting to note that the Theravādin also employs the same term with the same meaning. In Pāli this term is used in opposition to *rūpa-rūpa* meaning matter as matter. *Ākāra* in Pāli references also means the thing which remains after the object disappears.

This model form (*ākāra*) represents the mental disposition in which *prajñā* and *jñāna* come into unity. In other words, *prajñā* denotes the essential nature of *ākāra* and the basis of *jñāna*. The AK. states that "the essence of *ākāra* is *prajñā*."¹⁷ Moreover, the four kinds of *jñāna* (*duḥkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha*, *mārga*) are based upon *prajñā*, as it is demonstrated in the diagram. Thus, *ākāra* is a model form, in which *prajñā* and *jñāna* come into unity. *Ākāra* consists of these two counterparts.

An adequate comprehension of the Sarvāstivāda tradition will suffice to show us that *prajñā* includes both functions, psychological and philosophical. It is a psychological function, when *prajñā* is taken as a knowledge to determine (*pravicaya*) the characteristics of *dharma*. One must first of all understand what a *dharma* is and what the world is as distinct from a thing or a person, as it is stated in the Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā.¹⁸

On the other hand, it is a philosophical function, when *prajñā* is taken as a knowledge to be exercised. In this context *jñāna* is the last goal to be obtained by *prajñā*. *Prajñā* is the way by which a consequence (*jñāna*) will be obtained. It has a wider perspective in its nature than the psychological factors, namely, mind (*citta*) and mental properties (*cetasikā*). The Sarvāstivādin says, "The difference between *prajñā* and the mental factors lies in the fact that the essence differ in their width of perspective." *Prajñā* includes the active and the passive functions as well as the model form (*ākāra*),¹⁹ while the mental factors include simply the former two functions, excluding the last, i.e., the model form. This means that *prajñā* in a philosophical sense represents a knowledge to be cultivated, going beyond a simply psychological function. It is a means by which one can remove defilements and reach the final

goal. The Mahāsaṅghika school, preceding Mahāyāna Buddhism defines this concept as a means to remove defilements: "*Prajñā* is a means (*prayoga*) for removing the suffering of the sentient beings, giving them the spiritual pleasures." (I-pu-tsun-lun-lun by Vasumitra, Chapt. II. 36b). This notion has been developed into the Mahāyānist philosophy.

Mahāyāna Buddhism

With the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism the concept of *prajñā* has come to light.²⁰ Its original meaning 'the knowledge to be exercised', has come into focus with the basis of the Bodhisattva idea, which emphasises the human activities.

The ideal of the Bodhisattva in Mahāyāna Buddhism, in the light of the history, encouraged altruism and universal compassion. Real participation in its higher stage is in Mahāyāna Buddhism increasingly open to the layman. Thus the path of the Bodhisattva is substituted for that of the self-centredness and lack of universal compassion in the Hīnayāna schools. No longer is Buddhism primarily the faith of monks and nuns. The Mahāyānist experience provided the basis for the identification of the Buddha with ultimate reality (*prajñāpāramitā*). Moreover, the quest for that *prajñāpāramitā* experience is identical with the quest for Buddhahood (*Buddhatva*). *Prajñāpāramitā* represents in this context the devotee's recognition of his own potential Buddhahood, which is cultivated by the practitioner himself. A Bodhisattva must practise the six or ten *pāramitās*.

That is to say, with the Mahāyāna, as we have seen, there was the development of the Bodhisattva ideal, and with it a considerable growth of dynamic exercise. It may be noted that the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, the foundation of the Mahāyāna, appears with the title of *prajñā*. This title itself reveals exactly the new aspect emphasized in the Mahāyāna as distinct from the Hīnayāna. It need not be pointed out how much the development of later Buddhism depends on the idea of *prajñāpāramitā*.

The Mādhyamika school developed the intellectual self-training through knowledge, emphasizing thereby the theoretical structure built round *prajñā*. On the other hand, the Vijñānavāda school developed the inner experience through yoga accruing upon the treading of *jñāna*. According to the Vijñānavāda school, *jñāna* represents the pure knowledge realized by the Enlightenment

(*prṣṭhalābdhijñāna*). This is the spiritual attendant in which discriminative knowledge is converted into non-discriminative knowledge. Therefore, *prṣṭhalābdhijñāna* means a conversion (*paravṛtti*) from the experimental world based upon discriminative knowledge into non-discriminative knowledge.²¹

With the basis of the *prajñāpāramitā*-idea there is some contrast drawn between the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavāda, between intellectual and experiential self-training (the training of *prajñā*). But relevant investigation of the genesis of *prajñā* in the Early Buddhism, as we have seen before, shows that it is an expression merely of different emphasis. That is, there are two sides to Buddhist experience—the theoretical and the inner experiential. In other words, Buddhist experience involves not only seeing that the reality is ‘emptiness’ (*śūnyatā*) or an unknown, but also seeing this in inner experience, the ‘mind-only’ (*viññaptimātratā*). But as we have mentioned this was only a difference of emphasis, and the two schools rarely clashed with one another.

Thus, the two schools hold, in line with the idea of *prajñāpāramitā*, possibly to its origin in the Early Buddhism, that *prajñā* means the knowledge-to-be-exercised.

III. THE TIME-CONCEPT IN ABHIDHARMA PHILOSOPHY:

Theravāda Versus Sarvāstivāda, Predominance of Pratyaya

In Early Buddhism, the concept of time did not hold great significance, but later in Abhidharma it became increasingly important and was frequently discussed in relation to its psychological aspect. The time concept in Buddhism is also suggestive for the problem of human relations. Buddhism in its experimental sense is the investigation of the entirety of human relations and the human organism for coherence and meaning in all phases of being, human and non-human. Man is made for wholeness, rather than for fragmentation. Human beings are interrelated with each other in the form of the reciprocal relationship (*pratyaya*) of lives and they are not content merely with uni-directional relationships (*hetu-phala anubandha*) having no real coherence.

Theravāda School

Time is represented in the Theravāda school by the term *samaya*, meaning both ‘condition’ and ‘time’. Among the many com-

mentaries, the one referring most often to the problem of time is Buddhaghosa's *Atthasālinī*, the commentary on *Dhammasaṅgani*, in which *samaya* is divided into the following five classifications:—

1. *Kāla* (time) represents the continuity of a situation, such as the time of coldness or of an illness, etc. This term is again classified into nine sub-divisions: (a) momentary (mental) time (*cittakāra*); (b) the *dharmā* of beings, memory of *dharmā* or *dharmā* in the past, present and future; (c) the orderly process of things (*dharmapatti*), i.e., the time when seeds sprout; (d) the appearance of things (*dharmalakṣhaṇa*), i.e., the time of being born or of old age; (e) the time of reception or intimation (*dharmakicca*); (f) the action of human beings (*sattakicca*), i.e., the time of taking a bath or of eating; (g) the postures of movement (*iriyāpatha*), i.e., walking, standing, sitting and lying; (h) the proceedings of natural phenomena (*candimāsuriyādi, parivattana*) i.e.; the progress of the morning, evening or night and the day's evolution; and (i) the divisions of time (*kālasamcava*),¹ i.e., half-month, month and year.

2. *Samūha* (the group). A group in the sense of accumulation (*puñja*) of *dharmā* such as *phassa* (touch, feeling), utilized to deny the notion of an individual entity, and the single cause and effect theory since Buddhism maintains everything exists by means of conditions of causes and effects. This classification was directed against the incorrect view that one existence can arise independently of others, therefore it demonstrates mutual interdependence.

3. *Hetu* (cause) represents the mutual interdependence of existence. For example, in order to see, the eye consciousness is required as a sufficing condition.

4. *Khaṇa* (momentariness) refers to the connected situation of consciousness from the past to the present and pertains only to the meritorious mind and not to the non-meritorious. As momentariness is constantly flowing from moment to moment into the past, it is difficult to attempt to catch the moment itself. The mind itself is considered to exist in the manner of momentariness. Just as momentariness is difficult to grasp, so it is difficult for the meritorious mind to arise and remain static. This classification refers to Buddhist morality or practice, because momentariness is considered only in relation to the meritorious mind. The ethical stress is to utilize the moment in the practice of good deeds.

5. *Samavāya* (combination refers to a concord among the condi-

tions (*paccaya-sāmaggi*) and is intended to demonstrate that the consciousnesses have a mutual coordination in the present. In other words, it shows that time is dependent and interrelated (*aññamaññ upekkhā*). Time is shown to have no reality and the existence of a Creator is denied. These five above-mentioned classifications can be reduced into following two aspects in the nature of time.

(i) *The objective aspect of time*.—What we designate to be time divisions such as day, night and other phenomena exist apart from our consciousness but what we consider to be objective time actually arises in relation to our attitude. It is only by means of counting the changes in natural phenomena and accumulating these changes into designated groups that we arrive at a notion of time. The sub-human level also experiences the change of natural phenomena but there is no concept of time. We can say that without any relationship to our consciousness none of the apparently objective aspects can exist as such, for their categorization as time concepts are a product of the human reason. Or as the *Atthasālinī* (p. 49) reads:

‘Time may be clearly shown as an intimation abstracted by mere conventional usage from this or that [event].’

(ii) *The subjective aspect of time*.—Since time is created by the subjective mind, lacking its own reality or an independent creator, time is therefore dependent upon the psychological factors. The dependency of time corresponds to the dependency of consciousness, which consists of many different psychological factors. Buddhaghosa quotes in one passage of the *Atthasālinī* that Buddha said, ‘time is intimated by consciousness’ (*taṃ tam upādāya paññatto kālo*, *Asl.* p. 48). Time is considered objectively as a category. It is due to the following three processes: arising (*up-pāda*), preservation (*thiti*) and decay (*bhaṅga*).² Even if we consider time as existing separately from our consciousness, still time belongs to these three categories. Time exists only momentarily, which means ‘to connect’ (*sandahana*) one conscious moment with the next conscious moment.

We can find a similarity to this Pāli concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism; The *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra* (Chap. 16. T. 25, 65c-66a) refers to two concepts of time, *kāla* and *samaya*. They call the former concrete time (*dravya*) and the latter intimated time (*prajāñapti*). In Pāli, *samaya* is a concept which includes *kāla* and

refers to the process of consciousness but not to concrete time (*dravya*).

The Theravāda school drew attention to the subjective aspect. According to this school time is shown as being dependent on other things and interrelated to them. The dependency of time corresponds to the dependency of consciousness, which is based upon the Dependent Origination Theory (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). The *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulates a uni-directional relatedness. On the other hand, the Twenty-Four *Sarvāstivāda-School* Conditions Theory³ formulates in this school a reciprocal relatedness.

The Sarvāstivāda School deals with two aspects of relationship, uni-directional and reciprocal, in relation to time. The time concept has according to this school, also two aspects, one the causality and the other the actuality. The former aspect is represented by the Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), which according to Saṃghabhadra, is confined merely to the transmigration of the body. It thus refers to the uni-directional relationship. The latter is represented by the Six-Causes-and-Four Conditions theory, which is based upon the concept *kāritra* (actuality) of time. It thus refers to the reciprocal relationship.

The causality of time denotes the cause and effect relationship between the past, present and future. According to this conception, chronological time is considered to flow from past to present and into the future. The concept of causality is static, a uni-directional relatedness between past and present in which case the flow does not return to the source.

The activity (*kāritra*) of time, on the other hand, refers to a simultaneous relationship among the time divisions, and concerns the activity of living things in mutual relationship. These two extensive aspects of time underlie Saṃghabhadra's interpretation of the systematic view of human life, which is expounded by two theories: the Dependent Origination and the concept of the relativity of phenomena (the Six-Causes-and-Four-Conditions theory).

The formula of *pratītya-samutpāda* (the Dependent) Origination is generally summarized in the following manner⁴: when this (cause) exists, then that (effect) disappears. Based upon this logical formula the twelve links of Dependent Origination are enumerated as follows: upon ignorance (*avidyā*) depend the *karma*-formations (*saṃskāra*); thereon consciousness (*viññāna*), thereon mentality and corporeality (*nāma-rūpa*); thereon the six sense-

bases (*ṣaḍāyatana*); thereon sense (or mind) impression (*phassa*); thereon feeling (*vedanā*); thereon craving (*tṛṣṇā*); thereon clinging (*upādāna*); thereon the process of becoming (*bhava*; here *karma-bhava*); thereon rebirth (*jāti*); thereon old age and death (*jarā-maraṇa*).

Traditionally, the process of these twelve links is interpreted by Abhidharmika according to the three time divisions as follows. Ignorance (*avidyā*) and the *karma*-formations (*saṃskāra*) exist in the past; consciousness (*viññāna*) through to the process of becoming (*bhava*) is in the present; rebirth (*jāti*), old age (*jarā*) and death (*marāṇa*) are in the future. This is termed the three lives' interpretation.

In Early Buddhism this interpretation applied to the human structure alone and was not yet extended to include the relativity of phenomena. Saṃghabhadra, an exponent of the orthodox doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda school, followed the traditional psycho-physiological interpretation (the three lives' interpretation) on the one hand. Namely, he interprets it according to the three time divisions as noted above. On the other hand, he expounded the theory from the view point of time. In his own exposition the psycho-physiological interpretation of the Dependent Origination is based upon the causality of time. He also proposed a new interpretation, which is based upon the actuality of time. In regards to the latter, he divided the aphorism 'when this exists... when this occurs' into two distinct aspects for analysis. First he defines the meaning of exist (*asti*) and secondly the meaning of occurs (*utpadyati*).

First 'exist', to Saṃghabhadra, has a dual connotation which in one sense is applicable to the past and in another to the present. 'Something exists now because something existed in the past.' In this case the present and the past are connected by chronological time or causality, and we can say that chronological time or causality belongs to the domain of conventional truth.

Secondly the term 'occurs' concerns the relationship between the present and the future, for only if there is a present potentiality, can there be a future occurrence. If conditions (*pratyaya*) gather together in the present, then they can give birth to things in the future. This explanation alludes to potentiality and can be termed Absolute Truth (*paramārtha-satya*).

We can say that the first portion of the aphorism 'when this

exists' relates to the realm of conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) which does not include potentiality. The latter part of the aphorism 'when this occurs' represents Absolute Truth (*paramārtha-satya*) because potentiality is present. Thus, in his interpretation of *pratityasamutpāda*, Saṅghabhadra followed the traditional Abhidharmika's view from the standpoint of causality on the one hand. But he also drew attention to the potentiality of time on the other. It is a feature of the time aspect, namely the actuality. In regards to the actuality he entitled it *paramārtha* and gave it prime emphasis. Existents in terms of conventional truth are the opposite of actuality, in so far as all existents exist without conditions (*pratyaya*). Existents in terms of Absolute Truth are the actuality which occurs from conditions. In other words, nothing new occurs without conditions and all entities possess actuality. Saṅghabhadra's emphasis on the actuality of time as superseding the causality of time can also be found in his interpretation of *ādi* (the beginning), which refers to *avidyā* (ignorance), one of the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination. We can summarize his view of *avidyā* as found in the *Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (fascil. 28, T. 29, 499a²²-502³) as follows.

1. *Avidyā* is derived from the prefix *a* and *vidyā*, the negation of *vidyā*, but we cannot confine, its connotation merely to a negation *vidyā* (knowledge). In the Orthodox (*āgama*) *sūtras* we find sufferings such as *samyojana*, *sambandha*, *anuśaya*, etc., used as synonym for *avidyā*. These synonyms are defined as real (*dravya-sat*), therefore, *avidyā* also must be considered as real.

2. *Avidyā* in its nature is impossible to discern. It is a reality from which we must be emancipated in order to attain Enlightenment, thus as a positive obstacle to Enlightenment *avidyā* is not merely the logical negation of *vidyā*.

3. *Avidyā* is a reality which is clearly perceived and comprehended (*upalabdhya*) in that it is analogous to the comparison between darkness and light. Darkness is not merely a logical negation of light, but rather a positive affirmation of the object of the eye consciousness since we are capable of perceiving darkness as well as light. In the same way *avidyā* is the positive affirmation of the object of consciousness as far as it relates to the sufferings in consciousness. It is in this sense that *avidyā* can be considered as real.

4. *Avidyā* is said to be a cause (*hetu*) in so far as it produces

suffering. Both cause and effect are considered real since the product of suffering is apparent, thus *avidyā* is real.⁵

5. *Avidyā* is that which is to be destroyed by the arising of *vidyā*, just as wrong view (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*) will be destroyed by right view (*sammādr̥ṣṭi*).

6. *Avidyā* is said to be a real thing (*eka-dharma*) as Saṅghabhadra gave a quotation from the *Āgama* reading: 'If a Bhikkhu destroys a thing (*ekadharma*), he is declared by me to be a man who has completed all his Buddhist obligations'. This thing (*dharma*) is called *avidyā*.

This explanation of *avidyā* demonstrates that it is a real element producing suffering. It is not a simple negation of the real for it is considered as an independent actual *dharma* just as *vidyā* is an actual independent *dharma*. Thus the two terms *vidyā* and *avidyā* exist separately and in opposition. *Avidyā* possesses a specific function as the cause of suffering and it is in this capacity that *avidyā* is termed *ādi*, meaning 'from the beginning' since it represents the beginning of the Twelve Links.

The theory of Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is commonly divided into the three divisions of past, present and future. This interpretation is based upon the causality of time. This conventional truth Saṅghabhadra termed 'acceptable agreement' (*dharmasaṅketa*) to distinguish it from *paramārtha* (absolute truth). In the NY., he says 'it is said in the Paramārthaśūnyatā-sūtra (T. 2. 920c) that *dharmasaṅketa* means the causal chain of the Twelve Links, namely, *saṃskāra* originates from *avidyā*. . . *jarāmaraṇa* from *jāti*. In other words, *dharmasaṅketa* denotes the causal relationship between cause and effect (*hetu-phala-anubandha*).' (Ny. T. 29, 428c). This causal relationship Saṅghabhadra also termed 'intimation' (*prajñāpti*) since it relates to the domain of conventional truth.

Since the time of Early Buddhism the things are considered to arise by means of *pratītyasamutpāda*, depending upon conditions. We cannot actually determine which is the beginning and which is the end. The mutuality and conditionality of these things are, according to Saṅghabhadra, based upon the actuality of time. From this standpoint there can be no beginning and no end. This conception can be properly termed by him *paramārtha* (the absolute truth). Saṅghabhadra stated that the Twelve Links had a beginning (*ādi*) and were also beginningless. The former state-

ment is due to the time aspect of causality, which is termed *dharmasāṅketa*, while the latter due to another aspect of actuality, which is termed *paramārtha*. In his philosophy the latter, namely, *paramārtha*, receives prime importance. We will not find any inconsistency in his double statements that the Twelve Links had a beginning and that they are also beginningless.⁶

From these two viewpoints we can realize also that *ādi* does not mean a *causa prima* nor is it equivalent to the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya philosophy. The idea of *causa prima* is held up by the cause-and-effect relatedness in progression or causality. We normally are inclined to consider the regressive causes until we finally arrive at the last cause which we term 'the first cause'. *Avidyā* was placed at the beginning of *pratītyasamutpāda* merely because it is considered to be the most effective and mighty among the other defilements producing suffering, not because it is the last cause where we arrive by inference. It does not refer to the origin or beginning of life in the cosmic sense, but rather refers to the fundamental principle from which all the other links of *pratītyasamutpāda* come into existence. As it is the principle of defilement in actual existence, so it is real and actual in its existence although negative in form (*a-vidyā*). In Saṃghabhadra's⁷ interpretation the beginning of the psycho-physiological process still remains, but it is merely *dharmasāṅketa* in lieu of the Absolute Truth. When he considers *avidyā* to be the most important factor in the psycho-physiological process, he takes it as the actuality beyond the causality of time. He further suggested in his writings that actuality (*kāritra*) is the conditions (*pratyaya*) through which all things should be observed for no existent can exist as such without conditions.

Kāritra and Pratyaya.—The Buddhist Sanskrit term *kāritra* (actuality) plays an important role in Saṃghabhadra's epistemology. *Kāritra* is used as synonym of such words as *karma*, *kriyā* and *puruṣakāra*. Saṃghabhadra also distinguishes *kāritra* from *vyāpāra* (an efficient function) which means the ability concerning a definite object or the ability arising for a definite object, i.e., the eyes have *vyāpāra* only when they have contact with the object, the ears have it only when they encounter the sound. *Kāritra*, however, is used only in reference to the time divisions. Saṃghabhadra designated *kāritra* as the 'ability to draw forth' (*ākṣepaśakti*) the effect but not to 'produce' (*janana*) it. (Ny. 51. T. 29,

631c; *Tattvasaṃgraha* p. 506. *Gaekwad Oriental Series*; no. xxx. 1926, Baroda). This means that when the effect comes into existence, *kāritra* is not the direct cause but rather an indirect or helping cause (Ny. 52. T. 29, 631d).⁸

According to this concept of *kāritra* in reference to the time divisions, the future means the situation in which *kāritra* has not yet arisen, the present signifies that *kāritra* has just arisen and the past denotes a situation in which *kāritra* has arisen and passed away (Ny. 52, T. 29, 633a). The three time divisions are dependent upon the rise of *kāritra* and are not a category of reason since the time concept in the category of reason excludes experience while the time concept of *kāritra* includes it. In other words, the time divisions express *kāritra* experienced in concrete form. It is not time as a category of reason that gives us the conception of phenomena but rather time as *kāritra*. Buddhist time in this sense is experimental.

The arising of any single existent requires the grouping of conditions (*pratyaya*). Without the necessary conditions no existent can come into being. *Kāritra*, as we have noted, is also an auxiliary cause in its function as 'drawing forth'. The question then arises as to the difference between these two types of auxiliary causes, *pratyaya* and *kāritra*.

Regarding this distinction, Saṃghabhadra said in his Ny., 'Even if both do not completely differ, nevertheless, *kāritra* comes into existence relying upon *pratyaya* because the *dharma* itself does not come into existence depending upon *pratyaya* (Ny. 52. T. 29, 633a). *Kāritra* comes into existence depending upon conditions, therefore, conditions are the basis of the arising of *kāritra*. Even if there are many conditions present, *kāritra* does not necessarily come into existence. It is analogous to the relationship between the eye-consciousness and the conditions. Namely, even though there are such existing conditions as the eyes, object of the eye and so on, the eye consciousness does not necessarily come into existence. The reverse, however, is not true, for when *kāritra* arises, the necessary conditions must be present. *Pratyaya* as such is not equivalent to *kāritra* but rather a requirement for the arising of *kāritra*. *Pratyaya* can be called *kāritra* only when it has an efficient function (*vyāpāra*). Saṃghabhadra says, 'where *kāritra* exists, *pratyaya* exists' (*ibid.*, 633a). He also attempted to relate the *kāritra* concept in combination with *pratyaya*. He applied

kāritra in combination with *pratyaya* in his explanation of the relativity of the phenomenal world. This latter theory is represented in Abhidharma philosophy by the Six-Causes-and-Four-Conditions theory, which will be discussed later.

In the distinction between both concepts there is an apparent difference between the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools. Saṃghabhadra maintained that *pratyaya* is related to *kāritra* but not equivalent. He gave both terms a separate reality. This attitude demonstrates the character of his realism. The Sarvāstivāda position was inclined towards an analysis of reality while the Sautrāntika held a contrary position, negating and denying reality to stress the momentariness of existence. With regard to *pratyaya*, the Sautrāntika gave precedence to *pratyaya* over *dravya-sat*. Saṃghabhadra in protest against the Sautrāntika's equivalency of *kāritra* and *pratyaya* stated: 'If [Sautrāntika] says that conditions (*pratyaya*) are considered⁹ to exist, hence, *kāritra* as arising can be said to exist, this notion is false' (*ibid.*, 632a). He also quoted the Sautrāntika standpoint: 'Our school [Sautrāntika] admits that continuity (*saṃtati*, *skandha*) is transposed and relies upon *pratyaya*, hence, *saṃtati* will give rise to effect. If so [because *pratyaya* exists] we must admit that *kāritra* also exists,' (*ibid.*, 632c). This means that wherever *pratyaya* exists there *kāritra* also exists. In other words *pratyaya* and *kāritra* are one and the same thing. Thus Sautrāntikas considered *kāritra* and *pratyaya* to be equivalent while Saṃghabhadra merely considered the two terms as related in the sense that *pratyaya* is the basis of *kāritra*. The former does not have actuality (*kāritra*) but when the former functions, then at that moment the latter comes into existence. *Kāritra* cannot come into existence merely through the grouping of conditions alone.

The Predominance of Pratyaya.—Even in Saṃghabhadra's psycho-physical interpretation of *pratītyasamūtpāda* he gave predominance to *pratyaya*.¹⁰ This direction was assimilated and extended by Abhidharmika in the Six-Causes-and-Four-Conditions theory. Principally this theory dealt with the predominance of *pratyaya*. The predominance of *pratyaya* over *hetu* in line with Early Buddhist thought can be demonstrated by an analysis of this theory. In terms of time, the theory concerns simultaneity and continuity as can be seen in the following diagram.

Six causes (<i>ṣaḍhetavaḥ</i>)	Simul- taneity	{ <i>kāraṇahetu</i> (active cause) <i>sahabhūhetu</i> (accompanied cause) <i>sabhāgaḥetu</i> (corresponding cause) <i>samprayuktahetu</i> (associated cause)
	Continuity	{ <i>sarvatragahetu</i> (common cause) <i>vipākahetu</i> (resultant cause)
Four-condi- tions (<i>caturprat- yaya</i>)	Simultan- eity and Continuity	{ <i>hetupratyaya</i> (effective condition) <i>samantarapratyaya</i> (immediate con- ditions) <i>ālambanapratyaya</i> (the object as conditions) <i>adhipatipratyaya</i> (eminent condi- tions)

In this diagram we can observe that *hetupratyaya* of the Four-Conditions can embody in its contents all the Six-Causes with the exception of *kāraṇahetu*. The other three *pratyayas* (*samanantara*, *ālambana* and *adhipati*) are a diffusion of *kāraṇahetu*. In reference to time, these four *pratyayas* are based upon simultaneity as well as continuity. The former can be considered as equivalent to the actuality of time, while continuity is equivalent to the causality of time. The other five kinds of causes in the diagram (*sahabhū*, *sabhāga*, *samprayukta*, *sarvatraga* and *vipāka*) illustrate the reciprocal relationship from A to B and *vice versa*. They also represent the relationship of *pratyaya* (*hetu-pratyaya*).¹¹

The above explanation shows us that the cause-effect relationship is included in the category of *pratyaya*, and reveals a predominance of the *pratyaya*-relationship over *hetu*-relationship. It has been a primary characteristic of Buddhist philosophy from the beginning, and continues to influence present Buddhist thought. In Early Buddhism, *hetupratyaya* was inseparable in definition and connoted a mutual relationship (*sahakāra*). In the Abhidharma period, however, Buddhist thought concerned itself with the concept of *hetupratyaya* not merely as a combined term, but also established a distinction between the two. Thus the distinguished *hetupratyaya* were represented in the theory, namely, the Six-Causes-and-Four-Conditions of the Sarvāstivāda school.

In Early Buddhism intellectual thought was concerned only

with the human structure and not with the phenomenal world. Abhidharma,¹² in broadening this concept to include the latter, subsequently reduced *hetu* into *pratyaya*, or cause into condition. In the process of historical development *pratyaya* has come to include *hetu*. In other words, the reciprocal relationship has come to assimilate the uni-directional one. We can notice here that the concept of *pratyaya* in the Buddhist sense is much more important than the concept of *hetu*. The idea of assimilation is extremely important and cannot be overlooked in analysing the time concept in Buddhism. From the point of view of time the diagram can be summarized as the relationship between the actuality and causality of time, and a demonstration of how the uni-directional relationship has been included in the reciprocal one.

Dravya and Time.—According to the Sarvāstivāda school, all existing things, both material and non-material, possess a permanent entity (*svabhāva*) and are termed real (*dravya*). Sarvāstivāda philosophy is usually designated as Buddhist realism. When they consider time, however, they did not include time in the category of reality as is evinced in the *Mahāvaiśvika-śāstra*. The question then arises, why time is not included in the *dravya* category as an entity¹³

If we examine this realism¹⁴ from the view point of time, we will discover that reality is based upon the relationship between cause and effect, for it comes into existence by the law or causality from future to present, and from present to past. Causality can be possible only when cause and effect may exist in a degree of reality. The permanent reality of existents (*svabhāva*) and causality (*hetuphala-anubandha*) are interrelated on a mutual basis and this is one of the characteristics of existents as *svabhāva*. In terms of time existents (*svabhāva, dravya*) are considered as existing 'at all times' (*sarvasmin kāle*). 'At all times' differs from 'permanency' (*nitya*), which usually means eternal existence passing through the three divisions of time.¹⁵ The concept *nitya* can be possible only when *dravya* exists passing through the three divisions of time. Namely *dravya* can be considered as *nitya*, when it is observed from the view point of chronological time or the causality of time. 'At all times', however, means the absolute at this moment because existents in this respect are in the present moment which includes the past and future. Only in this sense existents are said to exist at all times (*sarvasmin kāle* or *sarvadā*). Namely *dravya*

(*svabhāva*) can be considered as existent at all times, when it is observed from the view point of the actuality of time, but not from the causality of time. The concept *nitya* can be said to refer to horizontal time while *sarvasmin kāle* refers to vertical time.

Existents (*dravya*, *svabhāva*) are in Abhidharma considered permanent or impermanent. The difference of terminology is not a discrepancy, but merely related to the aspects of time as viewed from different phases. Saṅghabhadra in his *Ny.* explains these two view points as follows.

The reason is this: Even though created things (*saṅskṛtadharma*) exist permanently, they nevertheless have variations according to their own situations (*avasthā*). These different situations come into existence according to conditions (*pratyaya*). After one moment no existent can remain (*sthiti*). For this reason *dharma-svabhāva* are impermanent for their *svabhāvas* do not differ (*vyatirikta*) from the variations of [the situations] (*Ny.* 52. T. 29, 633a).

Dharma as such is considered as permanent, but in view of its variety of situations, it is impermanent. *Dharma* depends in its nature upon the variation and changeability of situations (*avasthā*) in terms of time, these situations (*avasthā*) imply the actuality of time. Here we can note that it is in view of the actuality of time that permanent *dharma* can be termed impermanent. Therefore, the two expressions '*dharma* is permanent' and '*dharma* is impermanent' are not inconsistent as they are based upon two different standpoints. When *dharma* (*svabhāva*) is considered from the causality of time it is believed to exist at all times (*sarvadā*, *sarvasmin kāle*), while when it is considered from the actuality of time, it is impermanent (*anitya*). This logical construction of *dharma-svabhāva* is the concept upon which Buddhist realism is based.

Practically speaking, we can consider that in the future there exist multitudes of existents receiving their causes and conditions to those which momentarily arise in the present. The existents which now appear in the present will disappear momentarily and flow to the past. This type of realism demonstrates that all existing things are based upon the present moment which includes both the future and the past.¹⁶ All existent creatures have the past behind them and future potentiality before them.

IV. SAṂGHABHADRA AND SAHANTABHADRA:

Nyāyānusāraśāstra and its Author

According to Hsi yü chi¹ (*Memoirs of eminent priests under the Than dynasty*) and the *Memoirs of the venerable Vasubandhu*² a Sanskrit treatise, Abhidharmakośa-śāstra by Vasubandhu, follows faithfully the traditional doctrines of Vāibhāsika, and all of which are well condensed into 600 metrical kārīkas.

However, Abhidharmakośa-śāstra (AK.) does not always coincide with the Vāibhāsika's view; instead, it criticizes the latter from the Sāutrāntika's point of view in its prose.

Against Vasubandhu's AK. the opponent Saṁghabhadra composed the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra (NY.)³ in an attempt to criticize Vasubandhu's AK.⁴ The opponent Saṁghabhadra attempted to amend even the kārīkas in some cases and to expound the prose in a wider perspective. It might be well to say that the NY. is an important exposition of the AK., because the Vasubandhu's implication is explicitly interpreted. Moreover, the NY. quotes the names of many works and schools such as Jñānaprasthāna, Sāutrāntika, Vijñānavādins etc.

As to the translation of the NY. it was rendered by Hiün Tsang in Chinese. The NY., however, does not exist neither in Tibetan nor in Sanskrit.

Saṁghabhadra also composed the Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā (ASP.)⁵, which is extant in Chinese. It is a compendium of the NY., consisting of 40 fasciculi. The ASP. is listed in some catalogues as extant in Tibetan. That is, the Otani Catalogue, Mdo 64.109-304; the Tohoku Catalogue pp. 621-22, Tanjur, Mñon-pa, Vol. Khu, folios 95b1-266a7. Examining precisely, however, the Tibetan could not be the translation of the original Sanskrit treatise of the ASP.

The ASP. exactly follows the order of the chapters of the NY. except an introductory chapter as distinct from that of the NY.

It should be noted that the composer of the NY. is called by two names: Saṁghabhadra in most cases, and Sahantabhadra in a few cases.

In the Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṁgraha⁶ (Vol. 1. GOS. XXX. p. 506, 508; Engl. Tr., by G. Jha, II. p. 866.869. GOS. LXXXIII. 1939), Saṁghabhadra is described as Sahantabhadra. The discussion on a philosophical term *kāritra* (function), for instance, can be found in both Tattvasaṁgraha and NY. being one and the same in content.

Further, in the NY., we have both names, Saṃghabhadra and Sahantabhadra, which are reconstructed from the equivalent Tibetan, that is: ḥdus bṣaṅ or ḥdus bṣaṅs (Saṃghabhadra) and ḥdul bṣaṅ, ḥdul bṣaṅs (Sahantabhadra).⁷

In the Yaśomitra's Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (AKV.) and its Tibetan version, the name Saṃghabhadra is employed in the three chapters, namely, *dhātu*, *indriya* and *loka nirdeśas*. On the other hand, the name Sahantabhadra is used in the five *nirdeśas*: *karma*, *anuśaya*, *pudgala*, *jñāna* and *samāpatti*.

As to the Tibetan equivalents one thing is questionable. In Cordier's Catalogue (Mdo-Hgrel 64) the composer of the *Samaya-pradīpikā* is described as both ḥdus-bṣaṅ (Saṃghabhadra) and ḥdul-bṣaṅ (Vinītabhadra). Further, in this catalogue is given a Sanskrit name Binayabhadra reconstructed from the Mongolian. But, a Tibetan ḥdul-bṣaṅ, as mentioned previously, could be Sahantabhadra rather than Vinītabhadra or Binayabhadra.

Besides the two śāstras as composed by Saṃghabhadra: the NY. and the ASP., we have the Abhidharmadīpa by Dīpakāra. As to the author of the Abhidharmadīpa (AD.) the editor Dr. Jaini, for convenience, refers to him by the descriptive title Dīpakāra, which is used in Vṛtti. Although Dīpakāra is said to be the disciple of Saṃghabhadra, he does not mention the name of his teacher in the AD. However, the AD. surely is an able exposition of the basic philosophical concepts of the orthodox Sarvāstivāda school, and it alludes to the central tradition of Saṃghabhadra's views.⁸

In respect to the name of Saṃghabhadra we see, as mentioned above, the two names, Saṃghabhadra and Sahantabhadra, as used in both the Tibetan and the Sanskrit treatises. It may be noted that the original Sanskrit texts of the Chinese NY. might have been titled with the two different names, having been handed down to the Tibetan and Sanskrit Buddhist tradition.

V. THE BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF SIN AND ITS PURIFICATION: *avidyā, karma, saṃsāra*

In Buddhism there are various terms analogous to the Western term *sin*. These are, however, conceived slightly differently from that for the following reasons.

Buddhism, being non-dogmatic, admits different concepts and interpretations of its terminology. Being an empirical and affirmative religion, Buddhism has combined with the indigenous cultures of such different countries as India, Tibet, China, Japan, South Asian Countries. It has entrenched to produce in each case a unique form; its forms often differ in philosophy. Buddhist conscience, thus, is not aware of the guilt-feeling of Western man, although it acknowledges human misconduct. Oriental people do not confess before the Sacred. The Buddhist conception of sin and guilt is outlined in the following historical and terminological analysis.

We have various terms equivalent to sin in ancient philosophy, too. In the Veda, for instance, we can find *pāpa*, *pāpman*, *pāśa*, *amhas*, *enas*, *āgas*, *hedana*, *anṛta*, *viloma*, *kilvisa*, etc.

All of these terms, however, indicate a type of sin which refers to external offence such as physical actions or ritual mistakes. An offence against the highest god can be removed by the prayer for forgiveness, as the Ṛgveda remarks:

"If we as magisters cheat at play, if we have done wrong unwittingly or a purpose, thou, O Varuṇa, cast all these sins away like loosed fetters and let us to thine own beloved" (V. 85).

In the Brāhmaṇas also, sin refers to the external sacrifice (*yajña*) and its magical efficiency. Sin indicates here the ritual misbehaviours. But these sins can be consequently removed simply by a ceremonial confession or by a public declaration (*nirukta*).

Sin in the Brāhmaṇas and the Vedas, as indicated above, refers to something physical and external rather than moral and internal. It is simply a stain which can be taken away by prayers or even by water (Rg, I, 23, 22) or fire (X, 164.3). The transgression of divine law or sacrifices are more important than the internal awareness of human nature.

Further, with the growth of the Upaniṣadic idea, the interpretation of sin in India has been turned into a philosophical one. Sacrifice has become secondary, losing its primary significance. The ultimate purpose of the Upaniṣads is the realization of the unity of Brahman and Ātman. Sin (evil) means any obstacle to the realization of this unity. Sin is considered as *avidyā* (ignorance), *kāma* (desire) and *karma* (action or deed). Neither offences against Varuṇa nor mistakes in sacrificing are considered as moral transgressions. What then is important? To attain perfect knowl-

edge or the unity of Brahman and Ātman. Hence, where perfect knowledge exists, there is no notion of sin. Man who has attained perfect knowledge, has been freed from sin, from impurity and doubt. He becomes Brāhman. The difference between good and evil seems to have been destroyed. The emphasis on this transcendence is accurately expressed in the following passages: "He is not followed by good, he is not followed by evil, for then he has passed beyond all sorrows of the heart." (Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka Up. 4.3.22).

This passage points out that sin can be reduced to a consequence of ignorance. Every action, whatever good or evil, becomes deprived of the absolute value. What is valued is knowledge. This Upaniṣadic sin can be said intellectual. This Indian intellectual genius has been taken over by Buddhism.

Hinayāna Buddhism —anātman—

With the development of Buddhism a concept of sin came to denote demerit (*pāpa*). A term *pāpa* is one of the Buddhistic terms representing a sin concept. In view of sin we have a set of terms in Sanskrit literature. They are:

pāpa (demerit), *vipatti* (failure), *karma* (deed), *kleśa* (defilement), *aparādha* (offence), *doṣa* (fault), *pātak* (crime), *duṣkṛtit* (misconduct), *āgha* (misdeed), *enas* (mischief), *agas* (transgression), *durita* (evil), *pāpakarma* (wrong deed), *avidyā* (ignorance), *saṃsāra* (cycle of life).

These terms of sin can be classified into two types in view of human psychology.

The first type is a reaction to external standards. That is, when one violates the Buddhist precepts, he is said to commit *vipatti* (moral failure). But this *vipatti* can be removed simply by changing his behavior. This kind of *vipatti* is described in the Vinaya Pitaka as follows:

"The four offences involving defeat, the thirteen offences entailing a formal meeting of *saṃgha* (monks)—this is a moral failure; An offence of expiation, an offence which ought to be confessed, an offence of wrong doing, an offence of wrong speech—this is a failure of right conduct; a wrong view taking up a false view—this is a failure of right conduct." (Vinaya. I. 171; V. 98).

These failures, however, will be removed by converting one's mind and behavior.

The second type is a reaction to an internal awareness of human nature. Ignorance (*avidyā*), as considered sin, is opposed to knowledge (*vidyā*). Both ignorance and knowledge concern the intellectual, but not the offence against any kind of external law. Because knowledge means, according to Buddhist view, a religious insight. That is an insight to see things as they are, which is termed *yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti* ('to observe things as they really are'). In contrast, *avidyā* points out the unawareness of things in reality. This is the fundamental basis of defilements. Moreover, defilements are not to be purified by others, but by one's own self. The Buddhist view acknowledges neither absolute good nor absolute evil. The two are relative. Human beings exist in a world of good 'and' evil action, but not good 'or' evil actions. Buddhist thinkers in India did not say much about the conflict between the forces of good and evil. Thus, knowledge (*vidyā*) is a recognition of reality and the non-recognition is termed ignorance (*avidyā*).

Mahāyāna Buddhism —śūnyatā—

With Mahāyāna Buddhism we have a second type of sin, an internal awareness of human nature, emphasized and extended to its limits. In Mahāyāna Buddhism also, two fundamental trends of thought can be distinguished.

The first trend of thought is to equate human defilement (sin) with its purification. This idea is expressed by the famous passage Chandrakīrti's. That is '*saṃsāranirvāṇayorviśeṣasyābhāva*' (the identity of the life-cycle and the Enlightenment. Cf. Prasannapadā, p. 535, ed. by L. de la Vallée Poussin).

This Mahāyāna idea of the unity of the absolute (*nirvāṇa*) and the relative (*saṃsāra*) is not found at the early stage of Buddhism. The early Buddhism separates the two in a dualistic way as do all other Abhidharma Buddhist sects. How is, then, the unity of the two considered possible? What is the process from the early Buddhist idea to Mahāyāna Buddhist conception?

Saṃsāra (life-cycle) is, in view of Early Buddhist conception, transitory (*anitya*), suffering (*dukkha*) and egolessness (*anātman*). Through a long span of history the former two, transitory and suffering, have been remained without changing significance and content, being accepted by Early Buddhists as well as Mahāyāna Buddhists. The latter, namely, egolessness (*anātman*), has largely been expounded and amended by Mahāyānists, having finally

become synonymous with *śūnyatā*, the super-natural experience. This concept of *śūnyatā* is in Mahāyāna Buddhism nothing but *nirvāṇa* (Enlightenment).

Egolessness (*anātman*) originally meant a negation of substance. At the time of Early Buddhism there were many heretics who insisted on a reality of substance. In their views a substance originates without leaving its own nature. This kind of substance is represented by such concepts as *Brāhma*, *vedagū*, *dravya*, *prakṛti*, etc. Permanent is the essential characteristic of a substance which remains unchanged in any conditions, viz., origination and decay. A substance in any sense of the words is to be denied by the Buddhists, for it is that which binds us to this world and which we cling to. The negation of a permanent substance, this is a liberation of mind from the bondages. Thus, the negation of substance, viz., *an-ātman*, is the relative negation, which requires something to be denied. In other words, this negation is to deny the already known or to deny the realm of the experimental.¹

With the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism the significance and the content of egolessness (*anātman*) have been expounded in a wider aspect. It has been provided with the following expressions: *śūnyatā* (emptiness), *avitathatā* (not-untruth), *dharma-dhātu* (totality of things), *dharmasthiti* (substratum of things), *tattva* (the essence), *ananyatathatā* (uniqueness), *aviparyāsatathatā* (irreversible), *paramārtha* (the absolute), *acintyadhātu* (incomprehensible substance), *supraśānta* (perfectly calm), *advaya* or *advaidhikāra* (non-separable or non-divisible), *nirvikalpa* (an-discrimination), *nirvṛtti* (disappearance), *nirodha* (cessation), *nirvāṇa* (enlightenment), *tathatā* (suchness), *tattva* (truth), *svasiddhānta* (self-realization), *anutpatti* or *anupanna* (unborn), *anirodha* (non-destruction) and others.

The positive counter-part of *anātman*, as enumerated above, is *tathatā*, *paramārtha*, *śūnyatā* and *nirvāṇa*; The concept of *anātman* in its implication does not merely mean a negative side of the truth. On the contrary, it points out the absolute, ultimate essence. That is also *śūnyatā*. *Śūnyatā* represents the positive content, i.e., the realm of super-experimental, religious experience, but not simply 'emptiness' as it is usually rendered. An English term 'emptiness' literally means a lack of substance, a negative side of the truth, which is the Early Buddhist connotation, but not the Mahāyānist.

The Mahāyānist conception of *śūnyatā* has been developed into *tathatā* (suchness) or the positive aspects of the truth, which can be called a mystic truth. Suffice to quote a passage from the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra. It runs:

"When erroneous views based on the dualistic notion of assertion and negation are gotten rid of, and when the *viñānas* cease to rise as regards the objective world of names and appearances, this I call 'suchness' (*tathatā*). Mahamati, a Bodhisattva-Mahasattva who is established on suchness attains the state of imagelessness (*nirabhāsagocara*) and thereby attains the Bodhisattva-stage of Joy (*pramuditā*)."²

The implication of this passage is that all things existing in this world are essentially of the same nature, for they are all devoid of their own entities (*śūnyatā*).

The Diamond sūtra developed this conception of *śūnyatā* into *nirvāṇa* and made no distinction between *śūnyatā* and *nirvāṇa*. The sūtra states:

"As far as any conceivable universe of beings is conceived, all these should be led by me into *nirvāṇa*, into that realm of *nirvāṇa* which leaves nothing behind."³

Linguistically speaking, the positive implication of a term *śūnyatā*, as expounded by Mahāyānists, is contained in its own etymology. *Śūnyatā* is derived from the root *śvi*, to swell. The root *śvi*, according to Dr. Conze, seems to have expressed the idea that something which looks 'swollen' from the outside is 'hollow' inside.⁴

Śūnyatā, whatever hollow or swollen, is interpreted by Mahāyānists as possibilities to be filled up, to be realized in full. It is the totality of things as they are (*dharmadhātu*), the substratum of things (*dharmasthiti*) and the self-realization (*svasiddhānta*); it is not simply the voidness or the emptiness anymore; instead, it is something positive and super-experimental in content.

In the life-cycle (*saṃsāra*) there is no entity permanent (*anātman*), as mentioned in Early Buddhism; at the same time, life-cycle is full of possibilities to be filled up (*śūnyatā*), as interpreted by Mahāyānists. In other words, *anātman* or the relative negation of entity has been evolved into the absolute negation or a mystic truth (*nirvāṇa*). Thus, between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* does no distinction exist anymore. The evolution of *anātman*—*śūnyatā* corresponds to that of the relative—the absolute negation. With the

basis of terminological evolution the thought of the *samsāra-nirvāṇa* unity has been expounded and developed in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Japanese Buddhism —karma—

The first trend of thought is, as discussed above, to equate human defilement (*samsāra*) with its purification (*nirvāṇa*). In contrast to that, the second trend of thought has been developed in China and Japan in a form of the Pure Land Faith. This is a thought in which defilement or sin originally is the fact of paradoxical human nature as such.

In this respect, Shinran (1173-1262 A.D.) made an original contribution to Buddhist philosophy with the interpolation of faith between *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. The Pure Land Sect retains Indian devotionalism, and provides it with a Buddhistic foundation of compassion (*maitrī-karuṇā*). In contrast, Buddhism in India concentrated on wisdom (*prajñā*), which had, in view of Shinran, few effective means of saving less well-endowed human beings. Shinran's belief was that perfect intercommunion of the Absolute (Amitābha) and all sufferers and, thus, the salvation of all could be achieved through the mere calling of the name of Amitābha—a symbol of intercommunion—.

This faith is motivated by the self-awareness of the root of all human existence. In this view, the root is a mist of paradox. Shinran calls it the karmic existence; *karma* in here denotes the paradoxical human existence, but not merely means a man's treason against his action. *Karma* in an Indian sense is the object of moral judgement, being divided into three differences, good, evil and indeterminate.

Karma in Shinran's view denotes man's inability to rid himself of the dualistic notions of good and evil, love and hate. There cannot be determinate, eternal rules of ethical conduct, for all determinate things are transitory. We are living in a stream of paradoxical elements, good *and* evil, but not good *or* evil, for any ethical judgement cannot hold at all times for all men under all circumstances. His ethics are admittedly human and relative, not divine and absolute. Shinran said to his disciple Yuien:

"I do not know whether it is good or evil, or which is good or evil. I know enither good nor evil."⁵

In the light of the depth of human existence, he equates *karma*

as an ethical conduct with sin as the limitation of human abilities. Karmic life-cycle represents the human world of sin (*isumi* in Japanese). He states in his *Kyōgyōshinshō* thus:

"One is an ordinary person full of evil, living in the life-cycle. He is one who, since the beginning, persistently scuttles himself and wanders around, having no means to liberate himself from the karmic world."⁶

The awareness of karmic and sinful human existence requires the devotional attitude toward the absolute. By and through the vital faith to the absolute (*Amitābha*) man can attain salvation, overcoming his original sin. Thereby does the awareness of sin precede the leap of faith.⁷

The *karma* doctrine, having been taken as the sin-awareness, has been carried by Shinran, founder of the Shinshū school in Japan, into its farthest extent.

Conclusion —*anātman*, *śūnyatā*, *karma*—

Anātman is a negation of permanent entity (*ātman*). But, the judgement of negation, in its turn, would be impossible without the presupposition of an entity of some sort. Early Buddhism took all kinds of permanent things, whatever *Brāhman*, *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, as entity to be denied. It means that *ātman* is the object of contemplation at the stage of Early Buddhism. Its negation is also logical and relative, as discussed above.

On the other hand, *śūnyam*, a counterpart of *anātman*, also points to non-substance. Both concepts, *śūnyam* and *anātman*, are considered synonym. This logical and relative negation is represented by *śūnyam* and *anātman*. According to Early Buddhist reasoning both concepts of *anātman* and *karma* are actually a genuine unity. It is just because *karma* usually finds itself involved in the recognition of *anātman*, which could not appear but through *karma*; *karma* is not separated from *anātman*, but it is the categorical form of *anātman*. The thought of *anātman* can be interpreted as effectively as the concept of *karma*. The basis of *karma* should be deeply related to the *anātman* conception. We might say that *karma* is the realm, where *anātman* reveals itself to man; *anātman* reveals itself to man just because he is aware of *karma*.

With the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism *anātman* or *śūnyatā* (not *śūnyam* in Early Buddhism), going beyond the range of

the relative negation, has come to mean the absolute negation, extending further its significance to *nirvāṇa*.

With Shinshū school of Buddhism *karma*, being deeply related to *anātman*, has been taken up and emphasized more stronger than *anātman*. Finally, *karma*, going beyond the ethical judgement, has been taken as sin deeply rooted in the paradoxical structure of human beings.

The Buddhist concept of sin has been evolved into the two trends of thought, external and internal; the former is a reaction to external standards, the latter being the awareness of human nature.⁸ These trends, however, have not been left in a state of abstract inaction. Instead, they fit together, making up a great ethics of the human life.

VI. BUDDHIST MORAL CONCEPTS: *karma and avijñāpti*

1. Early Buddhism

The *Karma* theory plays one of the most important roles in the history of Buddhist thought. In Early Buddhism the emphasis is put on the human mind (*cetanā*). Mind precedes all actions and serves as the principal element both in performing and in assessing deeds. It is mind that rules and shapes action. Words (*vācika-karma*) and deeds (*kāyika-karma*) are also produced by the mind.

The *Dhammapada* reads:

“manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā, manasā ce paduṭṭhena bhāsati vā karoti vā, tato naṃ dukkham anveti cak-kam va vahato padaṃ.” (Cf. Dh. I.)

(Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; everything is mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox.)

Karma is divided into three types, i.e., physical (*kāyika*), vocal (*vācika*) and mental (*manas*).

2. Theravāda School

The definition, “mind is karma”, was peculiar to Early Buddhist thought. The Theravāda school faithfully followed this

traditional definition, interpreting it from the point of view of psychology.

3. *Sarvāstivāda School*

The Sarvāstivāda school followed the Early Buddhist texts (*Nikāyas*) as the Theravāda school did also. But this approach to the *karma* theory is different from the Theravāda. The former interpreted the *karma* theory in view of epistemology rather than psychology. It established a unique formulation in terms of *karma*. Epistemologically this school analysed the relationship between cause and effect (*hetu-phala-sambandha*). That is the concept *avijñapti* (the unmanifest faculty) peculiar to this school. It is not found in the Pāli canonical texts.

4. *The Analysis of Vijñapti and Avijñapti*

Vijñapti is derived from *vi-jñā-āp*, "making known", which is the equivalent of Tibetan *rnam par rig byed*. It means intimation, which is distinguished by *kāyavijñapti* (intimation by body) and *vācīvijñapti* (intimation by speech). Thus it denotes "the manifest gesture". *Avijñapti* means an unseen faculty of an action, which is the morally potent aspect. This concept is found in the *Jñāna-prasthāna* (cir. 200 B.C.) by Kātyāyanīputra, and *Śāriputra-Abhidharma-Śāstra*. It denotes "the unmanifest faculty".

5. *Samghabhadra's view of Vijñapti*

(A) A dynamic function of mind (*cetanā*) is not underestimated in Samghabhadra's philosophy.

According to his view, *karma* consists of three types, i.e., *kāya*, *vāca*, *mānasam*. *Kāyikakarma* (bodily action) in its nature is *kāyavijñapti* (bodily gesture), *vācīkarma* (vocal action) being "vocal gesture" (*kāyīkavijñapti*). But, "mental action" (*mānasam karma*) in its nature is not *vijñapti* (gesture), but mind (*cetanā*).

There is "the unmanifest faculty" (*avijñapti*) only in *kāya* and *vāca karmas*, but not in *mānasam karma*. Vasubandhu assumes a critical attitude to this definition, saying that this definition is opposed to the Buddha's teaching, i.e., the priority of mind to body and speech. The unrecognition of *avijñapti* in mind could be inconsistent to the system.

But, Samghabhadra's *Ny.* offers considerable evidence showing the importance of mind (*citta*). For example:

"There is a specific bodily form (*kāyasya saṁsthānaṃ*) associated with the intensive mind (*cittaprayogena*). [This bodily form], a result of the four elements continuously functioning, will give rise to the eye-consciousness without any outward appearance."

(Ny. 35. T. 29, 533c 16-19).

This passage is an exposition of a sentence quoted by Vasubandhu in his *A.K.*,—"cittavaśena kāyasya tathā tathā saṁsthānaṃ kāyavijñapti" (The bodily gesture means such and such a bodily form associated with mind. AKBH. p. 192; Chinese tr., T. 29.67b⁶).

Let me quote another example:

"*Karmajaṃ lokavāicitryaṃ cetanā tatkr̥taṃ ca tat. cetanā mānasaṃ karma tajaṃ vākkāyakarmaṇi*. [Kr. 1]

(AKBH. p. 192).

(The differences in this world are produced by *karma*. It [*karma*] consists of mind (*cetanā*) and its result (*tatkr̥taṃ*). [The nature] of mental *karma* is mind, its [result] being speech and bodily *karma*).

Bodily *karma* and speech *karma* are materialistic, as for as their natures (*vijñapti*) are based upon the four kinds of materialistic elements (earth, water, fire, wind). They are considered to be real and immediately unchangeable. But, when bodily and speech *karma* are performed, then, the unmanifested faculty (*avijñapti*) will remain. *Avijñapti* also is real and unchangeable.

Mind (*cetanā*), however, should be dynamic, free and changeable in accordance with any situation to come. Therefore, mind has no *avijñapti* (a materialistic impression). *Avijñapti* does not effect mind at all. The Buddha says that mind is just like a monkey moving from tree to tree. Mind is never a fixed entity. If mind were a fixed entity, one could not change his evil mind into a good mind in the future. If so, it will be opposed to the Buddha's preaching. There should be no meaning of morality, which requires the transformation of an evil mind to a good mind.

Samghabhadra does not recognize the *avijñapti* of mind, but claims instead to follow the Early Buddhist tenet of morality. Thus, Samghabhadra's view of *avijñapti* is not inconsistent to the Early Buddhist thought—the function of mind.

(B) Based on the realistic point of view, Saṃghabhadra attempted to give a concrete, real form to *karma*.

He just addresses the importance of outward appearance (*vijñāpti*). In order to complete a *karma*, he thought, *karma* should be associated with outward appearance. Even mental *karma*, if it is sincere, will bring with it outward appearance such as bodily and vocal actions. In reference to this, Ny. metaphorically explains:

"[The Buddha is coming to a village; one will be pleased to welcome him.] He (who is welcoming the Buddha) has a pleasant mind and a mental action (*mānasaṃkarma*). This action, however, is only temporary; it will soon disappear [for mind is momentary in its nature]. If so, there should be no mental growth [which the Sautrāntika school maintains]. Therefore, we [the Sarvāstivādin] maintain that man has in this case both actions, bodily and vocal, together with [mental *karma*]."

(Ny. 35. T. 29, 542c⁷⁻¹⁰).

"It is because [he will naturally bring into practise the following actions]: Looking out on the Buddha he will speak reverent words, cause a wholesome manifested gesture (*puṇya vijñāpti*) and a wholesome unmanifested faculty (*puṇya avijñāpti*), dress up and want personally to greet the Buddha."

(Ny. 35. T. 29.542c³⁻⁵).

These passages show us the spontaneity of mental *karma* in a way that it will manifest itself with outward appearance (*kāya-vācika-karma*) and will not remain in itself without realization.

Saṃghabhadra explains further in a positive way:

"Without an unmanifest faculty (*avijñāpti*) should not an action (*karma*) be completed. [Why is it?] In case one wants to make the other perform this and that, his manifest gestures [vocal order, hand-raising, etc.] alone would not be enough to complete his action, for a manifest action in itself does not mean the completed action. If he could completely make the other perform this and that, then, an unmanifest faculty (*avijñāpti*) will come into existence."

(Ny. 35. T. 29.542c¹⁰⁻¹²).

(C) *Avijñāpti* (an unmanifest faculty) does not continue after death. *Avijñāpti* is very often misunderstood as *bija* (*śaktiviśeṣa*),

which is an inherent power to link cause (*karma-hetu*) with effect (*karma-phala*) continuing from existence to existence (*santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*).

According to Saṃghabhadra, a link between cause and effect is of no use: when *karma* has taken place, then, effect in the present is set up. There is no link between the two.

"When [bodily and vocal actions have been performed and] *avijñāpti* (an unmanifest faculty) has been remained, then actions, bodily and vocal, give rise to effect in the present [without any kind of intermediary]."

(Ny. 35. T. 29.543a⁷⁻⁸).

What, then, is the process that gives rise to effect? Saṃghabhadra explains the process of causing effect without an intermediary as follows:

"A mental action (*mānasam karma*) which has arisen in the past will become a cause to induce the wholesome effect (*phalākṣepa*) and complete, realize, make it up, and bring it finally into completion."

(Ny. 35. T. 29.543a⁹⁻¹⁰).

In short, there are seven terms to complete an effect:

1. Mind-arising (*cetanā-utpatti*).
2. A manifest action (*viññāpti*) occurs.
3. An unmanifest faculty (*avijñāpti*) produced by *viññāpti* remains.
4. A cause to induce (*phalākṣepa*) functions.
5. The realization of karma (*karmapatha*)—but not yet complete.
6. [*mānasam karma*] co-operates (*sahakārin*).
7. Effect is definitely produced (*janana*).

(Ny. 35. T. 29.543a⁹⁻¹⁰).

Conclusion

Both Saṃghabhadra and Vasubandhu, being critical of each other, followed faithfully the Early Buddhist thought. The only difference was their approach. With his different interpretation Vasubandhu has gone over to the Mahāyāna Buddhism (the universal emptiness doctrine) by emphasizing the *bīja* idea. On the other hand, Saṃghabhadra's interpretation is realistic and epistemological. Considered of various interpretations given by *ācāriyas*, Saṃghabhadra would be regarded as the orthodox of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine.

In this field Saṃghabhadra's *Ny.* requires much more attention than *Abhidharmakośa* by Vasubandhu.

NOTE

A SIMILARITY BETWEEN BUDDHAGHOSA AND SAṂGHABHADRA

Kamma Doctrine

"Productive (*janakaṃ*) *karma* may be either meritorious or demeritorious. It produces both form and the other fruition-groups, not only at the time of conception but as long as they continue.

Supportive (*upatthambhakaṃ*) *karma* cannot produce fruit, but when rebirth has been given by other *karma*, and fruit has been produced, it supports the ensuing happiness or misery, and brings about its continuance.

Counteractive (*upapīḷakaṃ*) *karma*, when rebirth has been given by other *karma*, and fruit has been produced, counteracts the ensuing happiness or misery, suppresses it, and does not suffer it to continue.

Destructive (*upaghātaṃ*) *karma*, whether meritorious or demeritorious, destroys other weak *karma*, and, preventing it from bearing fruit, makes room for its own fruition. The fruit which thus arises is called apparitional."

(H.C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translation*, pp. 246-247).

[*Tattha janakaṃ nāma kusalam pi hoti akusalam pi, taṃ paṭisandhiyam pi pavatte pi rūpārūpavipākakhandhe janeti. Upatthambhakaṃ pana vipākaṃ janetuṃ na sakkoti. Aññena kammaṇa dinnāya paṭisandhiyā janite vipāke uppajjanakasukhadukkhaṃ upatthambheti, addhānaṃ pavatteti. Upapīḷakaṃ aññena kammaṇa dinnāya paṭisandhiyā janite vipāke uppajjanakasukhadukkhaṃ pīḷeti, bādhati, adhānaṃ pavatituṃ na deti. Upaghātaṃ pana sayam kusalam pi akusalam pi samānaṃ aññaṃ dubbalakammaṃ ghāte-tvā, tassa vipākaṃ paṭibāhitvā, attano vipākassa okāsaṃ karoti. Evaṃ pana kammaṇa kate okāse taṃ vipākaṃ uppannaṃ nāma vuccati.*]

(*Visuddhimagga*, pp. 601-602).

In this passage one of the four *karma*, *upatthambhakaṃ kamma*,

is similar to a function of *mānasaṃ karma*, which “arose in the past and will become a cause to induce the wholesome effect (*phalākṣepa*) and complete, realize, make it up, bring it finally into completion.”

(Ny. 35. T. 29.543a⁹⁻¹⁰).

VII. THE MENTAL STATE OF ENLIGHTENMENT:

—*anupattidharmakṣānti*—

For clarifying the relation between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism, it is not always sufficient merely to compare their systems, which were developed in their own defence in refutation of other systematic schools. In the historical context one must deal not only with the Hīnayāna texts but also with the later systematics of the Mahāyāna commentaries. Attention must be given in particular to the general lines of Middle Indo-Āryan development, so far as the Buddhist terminology is concerned.

We find in these effects that some of the important Buddhist Sanskrit terms have been Sanskritized incorrectly from Pāli, and that they, in turn, have undergone a great change of meaning in themselves. This supposition can be established on the basis of the *khanti* (Pāli) –*kṣānti* (Skt.) relationship.

Sanskrit *kṣānti*, meaning ‘tolerance’, ‘forbearance’, plays an important role in Buddhist thought. Besides these, we have the following renderings. Edgerton gives the meaning ‘receptivity’ (BHS. Dic. 199b). It is also rendered into Tibetan as *bzod pas* and Chinese as *jen, ju*. Sylvain Lévi, following Kern’s view, translated it as acquiescence, and observed that ‘forbearance’, a philosophical connotation, has been added to the original. (*Sūtrāṃkāraśāstra* trs. p. 123). There is no doubt about its etymology—derived from *kṣam* (‘to bear’, ‘to be able to’), as far as it is concerned a Sanskrit term *kṣānti*.

Pāli term *khanti*, however, preceded the Sanskrit *kṣānti*. The former is evidently derived from *kam*, meaning ‘to be willing to’. Moreover, *khanti* has sometimes been Sanskritized into *kṣānti*. For instance, the Pāli term *dharmānījjhānakkhanti* has incorrectly been Sanskritized into *dharmānidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* (Bodhi-sattvabhūmi, 195.10. Wogihara ed., 1930). It is also the same with the Sanskrit term *sarvadharmasvabhāvanidhyānakṣānti* (Gandavyāha. ed. by Suzuki, 1934-36, 248.4.).

The Pāli *khanti* in this context is correctly Sanskritized as *kānti* (willingness), but not *kṣānti* (forbearance). Hence, the term *dharmanijjhānakkhanti* should be translated as 'willingness to the meditation on Truth'. It points out the mental state of Enlightenment. If it were rendered as *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* it would mean 'bearance for the meditation on Truth'. The meditation on Truth, however, is a Buddhist practice to be accepted, but not to be borne against one's will. Such a translation would make little sense.

What is, then, the original meaning of *khanti*? How was the incorrect Sanskritization as *kṣānti* used in the Buddhist thought? Was this Sanskritization theoretical or practical in motivation? Let me trace the essential features of the multiple connotations of *khanti* through the following considerations.

As to the original meaning of *khanti* we have a passage in the Pāli canon Suttanipāta, which reads:

*"yā kāc'imā sammutiyo puthujjanā,
sabbā va etā na upeti vidvā.
anūpayo so upayaṃ kiṃ eyya
diṭṭhe sute khantiṃ akubbamāno."* (Sn. 897)

[The opinions that have arisen amongst people, all these the wise man does not embrace; he is of no attachment. Should he who is not pleased with what has been seen and heard resort to attachment?]

A Pāli term *upaya* in here is a synonym of *khanti*, meaning 'attachment to the profane'.

There is another example:

*"purāṇaṃ nābhinandeyya, nave khantiṃ na kubbaye.
hiyamāne na soceyya ākāsaṃ na sito siyā."* (SN 944.)

[Let him not delight in what is old, let him not take a pleasure in what is new, let him not grieve for what is lost, let him not give himself up to desire.]

The phrase 'nābhinandeyya' ('should not be delighted') implies 'khantiṃ na hiyamāne' ('does not take a pleasure in'). The same meaning can also be found in the Dhammapada:

*"Khantiṃ paramaṃ tapo titikkhā, nibbānaṃ Paramaṃ vadanti
Buddhā."* (Dhp 184 a-b).

In the above mentioned passage three kinds of the highest vir-

tue were declared by the Buddhas, e.g. willingness [to the highest achievement], patience, *nibbāṇa*. Rev. Adikaraṃ rendered *khanti* as patience, and *titikkhā* as forbearance. (Adikaraṃ. The Dhammapada, Colombo, 1955). It would, however, not be fair to take *khanti* as a synonym with *titikkhā*, for the Buddhas declared three virtues in this verse.

In the Pāli Nikāya also *khanti* represents a psychological function of inclination or willingness:

“*anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgata.*” (A III. 437, 441).

([Mind] is associated with [a psychological function] of suitability and inclination.)

In Pāli Abhidharma literature the same connotation is retained. The Dhammasaṅgani designates *khanti* as follows:

“*yā khanti khamanatā adhvāsanaṭṭhā accaṇḍikkam anasuro po attamanatā cittassa—ayaṃ vuccati khanti.*” (Dhs 1341). (*khanti* means tolerance, assent, no-anger, absence of abruptness, mind's pleasure. This is termed *khanti*).

Thus, in Pāli Abhidharma literature also it connotes ‘to be willing to’ or ‘willingness’ which denotes a positive attitude towards action rather than ‘patience’.

The adjective form *khantika* makes its original meaning much clearer, as the Dīghanikāya reads:

“*dujjānaṃ kho etaṃ Poṭṭhapāda tayā añña-diṭṭhikena añña-khantikeṇa añña-rucikena aññatrāyogena aññatthācariyakena: saññā purisassa attā “ti vā. “aññā saññā añño attā” ti vā*” (D I. 187; M I. 487).

(Hard is it for you, Poṭṭhapāda, holding, as you do, different views, different willingness, setting different perfection, trained in a different system of doctrine, to understand this matter!).

A term *añña-khantikeṇa* is clearly expounded by a term *añña-rucikena* (‘under another's free will’); *kam*, a root of *khanti*, is here explained by *ruc* (‘to please’). Thus, it would be more accurate to render *khantika* as ‘willingness to do such and such a thing’ than ‘acquiescing in such and such a belief’ (PTSD). *Khanti*, therefore, is not limited simply to ‘belief’, but can be extended to something mental and material.

As indicated previously, the Pāli *khanti* corresponds to the Sanskrit *kānti*, while Buddhist Sanskrit texts usually Sanskritized

it as *kṣānti*, while *kṣānti* in its turn denotes 'forbearance', 'patience, as it is derived from 'kṣam'.

Nevertheless, in Pāli Abhidhamma the meaning of 'forbearance' can not be found in the term *khanti*. *Khanti* faithfully follows the original meaning of 'willingness'.

In Sanskrit Abhidharma a concept *kṣānti* plays an important role in the psychological process of Enlightenment. In these cases *kṣānti*, losing its etymological meaning ('forbearance'), has come to represent its implied meaning ('willingness'). Let me select a few of Abhidharma's examples.

The various functions of *prajñā* (the Highest Knowledge) are discussed in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa (Cf. the chapter on *jñāna*). According to his interpretation, *jñāna* (intuitive knowledge) is to understand definitely the Fourfold Noble Truth, that is, *niścītam* (decision), while *kṣānti* is the function of judging (*saṃtīraṇa*). *Kṣānti* in its turn is a synonym of *upanidhāna*. (Yaśomitra's Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed., by Wogihara, p. 612). This term is derived from *upa-ni-dhā* ('to put down near' or 'to lead near to'). It is the Sanskritized equivalent of the Pāli *upanijjhāna* or *upanijjhāyāyana* (Edgerton, BHSD. p. 137b). Implicitly it connotes 'inclination to' or 'willing to'. This will become clear by noting carefully its definition by Saṃghabhadra: "*Kṣānti* means to give rise to judgement (*saṃtīraṇa*) and inclination (*adhyādaya*). It is not included in the function of *jñāna* (intuitive knowledge), for its psychological function affects [the religious practitioner] more stronger than *jñāna* in preparation for [the Enlightenment]" (Abhidharmayāyānusāra-śāstra, 72. Taisho. 29.735b).

As indicated above, *kṣānti* implies judgement as well as inclination, but neither forbearance nor patience.

The understanding of *kṣānti* as 'willingness' will help much to realize a logical and integral nexus between psychological functions and religious practices. With regard to this nexus let me take an example.

Referring to *anāśrava-jñāna* (the intuitive knowledge free from intoxications), Vasubandhu gives three kinds of functions. The Abhidharmakośa reads:

"*nāmalā kṣāntayo jñānaṃ*

*tatpraheyasya vicikitsā'nuśayasyāprahīnatvāt | dṛṣṭyastu tāh
sntīrṇatmakatvāt yathā ca kṣāntayo dṛṣṭirna jānemevaṃ punaḥ
kṣayānupādadhīrna dṛk |*

*kṣayajñānāmanutpādayjñānaṃ ca na dṛṣṭirasantiraṇāparimārga-
nāśayatvāt]*" (AKBH, ed. by Pradhan, p. 391).

The knowledge of Fourfold Truth (*anāśravajñāna*), as described in this passage, is obtained through three kinds of psychological transition, that is, *kṣānti*, *dṛṣṭi*, and *jñāna*. At the psychological stage of *kṣānti* a latent bias of doubt (*vicikitsā*) still remains. One can not definitely determine the certainty of the Truth; One's mind is simply inclined toward it. It means that *kṣānti* indicates 'will' or 'inclination', but not 'patience' in any case. At the next stage of *dṛṣṭi* (view) one thinks of the truth and judges it to be true. At the last stage one reaches the spiritual tranquility beyond inclination and judgement, that is, *jñāna* (intuitive knowledge).

We can establish an integral relationship between these three stages only when we take *kṣānti* not as patience, but as willingness or inclination. In other words, *kṣānti* in this case rightly corresponds to a Sanskrit term *kānti* (*khanti* in Pāli).

There is another example, in which *kṣānti* is clearly used as a synonym of *rocate*, meaning 'to be pleased'.

*"adhimātra satya-kṣamaṇād iti ūśmagatāvasthāyaṃ
mrdu satyam kṣamate rocate."* (AKV. p. 533).

A Sanskrit term *kṣamaṇa* is rendered by the Chinese 'jen ko' (recognition). This Chinese term, however, sounds intellectual, and is not appropriate to indicate a voluntary inclination toward the Fourfold Truth (the fact of suffering, cause, cessation, path). The commentator Yaśomitra, by putting *kṣamaṇa* together with *rocate* ('to be pleased'), correctly indicates this intentional willingness toward the stopping of profane attachment for the sake of reaching liberation or spiritual tranquility.

The term *kṣamaṇa* in the following passage also can be taken in the same sense. The passage reads:

"kṣamaṇa-rūpeṇa ca kṣantaya utpadyante." (ADV. p. 611).
(Willingness takes place because of taking pleasure.)

Now I turn to Mahāyāna Buddhism which will be dealt with in relation to Hīnayāna tradition. Specially I will examine the term *kṣānti* Sanskritized incorrectly from *khanti* and its philosophical amendment.

For clarifying the Mahāyāna philosophy we shall consider one of the fundamental spiritual experiences described in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. This sūtra refers to a spiritual value, e.g., *anutpattika-*

dharmakṣānti (the recognition of nothing born in this world), which is a spiritual experience of the ultimate truth of Buddhism. It runs:

“...*trāidhātukaṃ paśyanto’dhyātmabāhhyasarvadharmānupalabdhibhirniḥsvabhāvadārśanādupādadrṣṭivivṛttāu māyādidharma-svabhāvānugamānutpannikautpattikadharmakṣāntiṃ pratilabhante.*’ (Lañk p. 80-81).

(They [Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva] find that all things, inner and external, are beyond predicability, that there is nothing to be seen as self-nature, and that (the world) is not to be viewed as born; for this reason, when a wrong view to take the world as born will disappear, thereby, they will conform themselves to the insight that things are of the nature of an illusion, etc., and attain to the willing acceptance that things are unborn.)

As to a term *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* there are various European translations such as: acquiescence in the eternal law (Kern, *Saddharmapundarika*, Engl. Tr. XXI. p. 134), resignation to the idea of not being reborn (W.H.D. Rouse, Śāntideva’s *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 297), resignation to consequences which have not yet arisen (Max Müller, *Sukhavativyāha*, Engl. Tr. XLIX. pp. 39-40, p. 51), the recognition that things are unborn (D.T. Suzuki, *Lañkāvatāra-sūtra*, Engl. Tr. p. 71), etc.

A transliteration ‘resignation’ by Max Müller is denied by Sylvain Lévi (*Sūtrālaṃkāra*, French Tr. p. 123). In any case, these renderings would be much more accurate than ‘patience’ for *kṣānti*, as far as a philosophical connotation is concerned, for *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*, as it will be explained later, is a spiritual, positive experience, in which one willingly accepts the ultimate truth. This understanding can come only from the root *kam* of *kānti* (willingness), but not from *kṣam* of *kṣānti* (patience).

In connection with *kṣānti* it may be necessary to say a few words about the religious experience of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*, which appears quite often in Mahāyāna sūtras. It represents the fact that emptiness or the absolute experience is beyond the thinkable, and therefore in the failure of intellect, designation is impossible. One can only refer to being unborn (*anutpattika*) in the absolute sense. The inclination or willingness to make this absolute statement is called *kṣānti*. If *kṣānti* would mean simply ‘patience’, as it literally connotes, what has patience to do with this absolute

experience that is to be defined as unborn? Rather, patience implies unwillingness and opposition to this absolute experience of emptiness or unborn-ness. Buddhist *kṣānti*, however, is a willing acceptance of the unborn, which determines the whole attitude of mind keeping it serene.

In the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (S.B.E. XLIX, p. 51) three kinds of *kṣānti* are mentioned. They are:

1. *Ghosānugā-kṣānti*, meaning to listen to the Buddha's teaching.
2. *anulomikt-kṣānti*, meaning to penetrate into the truth of non-self (*anātman*).
3. *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*, meaning a state to be attained when one completely realises the truth of emptiness.

Further, the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* enumerates seven kinds of *kṣānti* as follows:

1. The knowledge of things as like *māyā* (huan jen), 2. a mirage (yen jen), 3. a dream (men jen), 4. an echo (hsiang jen), 5. a shadow (ju men), 6. a phenomenon (hua jen), 7. empty (k'ung jen). (Chapter XXIX. Cf. Suzuki's *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, p. 127).

This Mahāyānist interpretation of *kṣānti* is also the same as *kānti*, which is a correct Sanskritization of Pāli *khanti*.

Quoting another example we shall examine the positive sense of *kṣānti*. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* describes two *kṣānti*, e.g. *utpatti-kṣānti* (willingness to arising) and *dharmakṣānti* (willingness to realize the truth). The *śāstra* explains as follows.

"Owing to the practice of *utpatti-kṣānti* one gives rise to compassion for the sake of the sentient beings, destroys sins present from the unmeasurable time, and gains on the unmeasurable merit. Owing to the practice of *dharmakṣānti* one breaks ignorance of realities, and gains on the unmeasurable knowledge. Having completed these two practices, why should one not achieve whatever he wants." (T. 25.276a).

A term *dharmakṣānti* in the above sense is apparently an abbreviation for *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*, which is attained when he fully realizes the absolute truth and recognizes that all is deprived of entity.

Further, the *Daśabhūmika* says:

"Those that have no self-substance are unborn and in their

nature are like the sky; *dharma*s sought outside the concatenation are the products of discrimination by the ignorant. There is, however, an unborn reality other [than those just mentioned] which is the one attained by the wise; its birth consists in not being born, and in this not being born, there is their *kṣānti*." (Daśabhūmika, ed. by Rahder, p. 203, pp. 108-109; Suzuki, Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, pp. 227-228).

In the same sūtras we have another passage:

"The triple world thus has nothing to depend upon, either inside or outside; seeing this existence unborn there is the *kṣānti* of no-birth." (Ibid., p. 273, 67; Suzuki, Ibid., p. 228).

All these quotations adequately describe the Mahāyānist way of thinking and feeling in a positive manner. The experience of *anupattika-dharma-kṣānti* referred to in the Mahāyāna texts is precisely the highest object of the Buddhist life which all Buddhist practitioners are willing to reach. From this point of view it is unambiguous that *kṣānti* means willingness toward the state even of 'not-being-born' (*anupattikadharmakṣānti*).

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

SECTION I

1. *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*. ed. P.S. Jaini. Patna: Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. IV, 1959, p. 256.

2. Kvu. Com. London, p. 34.

3. The Buddhas did not preach first the *paramatthakathā*, which might sound rough to the disciples. Hence they preached first the *sammutikathā*, i.e., '*Pakatiyā pana paṭhamam eva paramatṭhakathaṃ kathentassa desanā lūkhākārā hoti tasmā buddhā paṭhaṃ sammutikathaṃ kathetvā pacchā paramatṭhakathaṃ kathenti*'. (Ibid.)

4. Both *paramattha* and *sammuti* are the means, in which the Buddhas preach the truth (*saccam, sabhāvam*). In *Abhidharma sabhāva* is synonymous with *sacca*. *Sacca* reveals itself in the form of *sabhāva*. It is said in Kvu. Com. (p. 34): '*Te sammutikathaṃ kathentā pi saccam eva sabhāvam eva amusā 'va kathenti. Paramatṭhakathaṃ kathentā pi saccam eva sabhāvam eva amusā va kathenti*'.

5. *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. ed. B. Nanjo. Kyoto: The Otani University Press, 1923, p. 280.

6. *Yogācāryabhūmi-śāstra*. 75, T. 30,713c; The Tibetan Otani Photographed Edition, 97,205,5, I. This *śāstra* enumerates the five of the transcendental characteristics of *paramārtha*: 1. inexpressible, 2. non-dual, 3. indiscriminative, 4. neither different nor identical and 5. equality of all things.

7. Vin. I. 123; A. IV. 347; VbhA. 164; Miln. 28. PTS.

8. The *Suttanipāta* reads:

“Yā kâc'imā sammutiyo puthujjā,
sabbā va etā na upeti vidvā,
anūpayo so upayaṃ kim eyya
diṭṭhe sute khantim akubbamāno.” (897)
“Sakaṃ hi dhammaṃ paripuṇṇaṃ āhu
aññassa dhammaṃ pana hinam āhu'
evaṃ pi viggayha vivādiyanti
sakaṃ sakaṃ sammutim āhu saccaṃ” (904)

The *Milindapañha* also runs: 'sammuti mahārāja esā: ahan ti, mamāti. na paramattho eso. Vigataṃ mahārāja Tathāgatassa pemeṃ, vigato sineho' mahaṃ ti pi Tathāgatassa gahaṇaṃ na 'tthi, upādāya pana acassayo hoti.' (*Milindapañha*. The Royal Asiatic Society, London: 1928. ed. Trenckner, p. 160).

Sammuti is equated with *samaññā paññatti*, *vohāro* and *nāmamattam*. The *Milindapañha* runs further: 'sādhu kho tvaṃ mahārāja rathaṃ jānāsi, evaṃ eva kho mahārāja mayhaṃ pi kese ca paṭicca lome ca paṭicca—pe matthalungaṃ ca paṭicca rūpaṃ ca paṭicca vedanaṃ ca paṭicca saññaṃ ca paṭicca sankhāre ca paṭicca viññāṇaṃ ca paṭicca Nāgaseno ti sankhā samaññā paññatti voharo nāma-mattam pavattai paramatthalo pañ'ettha puggalo nūpalabbhati'. (*Miln.*, pp. 27-28).

Macdonell and Keith. *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*; N.S. Sonatakke and C.G. Kashikar. *Rgvedasaṃhitā*, Vol. V. Indices. The meaning of *saṃ-vṛti* used in the Vedic literature is quite different from the Buddhist sense. In this respect I am indebted to Dr. Belvalkar of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

9. Vasubandhu. *Abhidharmakośa-śāstra*. 22, T. 29,116b.

10. Yaśomitra. *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. ed U. Wogihara. Tokyo: The Publishing Association of *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, 1932-1936, p. 524.

11. The Jaina philosophy also defines *sat* in the same way. (*Umāsvāti. Tattvārtha-sūtra*. V. 29). *Umāsvāti* made no distinction between *sat* and *dravya*. Cf. M.L. Mehta. *Outlines of Jaina Philosophy*. Bangalore: Jain Mission Society, 1954, p. 23.

12. Saṃghabhadra. *Abhidharmanyāyānusāra-śāstra*. 58, T. 29,667a.

13. *Puggalapaññatti-Aṭṭhakathā*. JPTS. 1913-1914, pp. 171-175. A Sanskrit equivalent *prajñapti* is translated into such Tibetan as *brtags* (*rtags*), *gdags* and *gtags*, meaning 'sign' or 'symbols'. These meanings are in Pāli subject to the classification of *dasana-pakāsanā-paññatti*, which is paired with *ṭhanānikkhipanāpaññatti*. Regarding the variety of *paññatti* in Pāli texts see my book, *A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy*, Tokyo: Kobundo, 1958, pp. 1-9; Sylvain Lévi. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*. Paris: 1911, p. 274-275. A Tibetan term *gdags* stands for a Sanskrit *prajñā* also. Both *prajñapti* and *prajñā* seem to be considered derived from the same meaning 'to make known'.

14. *Abhidharmanyāyānusāra-śāstra*. T. 29,621c.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. p. 524; L. de la Vallée Poussin. *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. VI. 4. Paris and Louvain: 1923-31. p. 141, note I; IV. p. 182. I.

18. Candrakīrti. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjāna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*. ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin. p. 492.

19. Haribhadra. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vyākhyā*. ed. U. Wogihara. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko. 1932-1935. p. 976.

20. Candrakīrti. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. XXIV. p. 492. The connotations of *avacchādana* and *lokavyavahāra* also are found in the non-Buddhist philosophies, e.g., the Gaudapāda *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya* explains *saṃvṛti*: 'saṃvaraṇam avidyāviśayo laukikavyavahāra'. (Karmarkar. *Gaudapāda-kārikā*. Poona: The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1953. p. 128.)

21. Prajñākaramati. *Bodhicaryāvatāra-ṭīkā*. ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin. Brussel: 1898. p. 352. It runs: 'pratītyasamutpannam vasturūpaṃ saṃvṛtir ucyate'. The absolute truth (*paramattha*) is the right view (*sammādiṭṭhi*), which means to consider things as dependently originated (*paṭiccasamuppannam*). In this respect there is no distinction between Abhidharma and Mahāyāna. The Pāli text *Visuddhimagga* (p. 513) reads: 'dukkham eva hi na koci dukkhito kāraṇaṃ na kiriyā va vijjati.' Further a term *kiriyā* connotes *suddhadhamma*, i.e. 'kammā sa kāraṇaṃ n'atthi vipākassa ca vedako, suddhadhammā pavattanti ev' etaṃ sammadassanaṃ.' (p. 602). This identification of *dhamma* with *kiriyā* in Pāli represents in the Sarvāstivāda school the identification of *dharma-saṃketa* with *pratītyasamutpāda*: the *Paramārthaśūnyatā-sūtra* reads, 'O Bhikkhu, There exists *karma*, there exists result of *karma*. There can exist no creator of another *skandha* than this one, but for *dharma-saṃketa* (*dharma* intimation).' (*Samyutta-Āgama*. T. 2.92c). This passage is quoted by a Mahāyānist Asaṅga in his *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* (p. 158): 'paramārthaśūnyatā-yāmasti karmāsti vipākāḥ kārakastu nopalabhyate ya imāṃśca skandhānnikṣipati anyāṃśca skandhānpratisaṃdadhati. anyatra dharmasaṃketād-iti deśitaṃ 'The concept *saṃketa* is clearly equated by Yaśomitra with *pratītyasamutpāda-lakṣaṇa*, i.e. 'yatra dharmasaṃketād iii pratītyasamutpāda-lakṣaṇān-ten'āha yad utāsmin satiti.' (AKV. p. 707).

22. *The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, p. 131.

23. Sthiramati, *Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra*, ed. R.C. Pandeya, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971, p. 94.

24. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* explains *saṃvṛti* in such technical terms as *saṃjñā*, *pratijñā* and *vyavahāra*. These terms can be equated to *prajñāpti*, *pratipatti* and *udbhāvanā* respectively as Sthiramati enumerates. (T. 30.824c). A term *vyavahāra* in this classification exactly denotes 'speech' in a narrow sense, but 'speech', as noted before, does not represent *vyavahāra* as the whole. In case of *vohāra* as 'speech' this Pāli term is explained as *abhiḷāpa*, *bhāsā-vohāra* and *māyādhikādayo bhāsā* and the like. (D. Kosambi. *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha of Anuruddhacārya with Navanītaṭīkā*. Banaras: Mahabodhi Society, p. 155). Another example for limited sense of 'speech' is found in a text of logic: 'kathaṇcidupalabhyatvam anyathā na hi sidhyati. vyavahārasya sādhyatve prasiddham syān nidarśanaṃ.' (A. Kunst. *Probleme der Buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṅgraha* p. 32). *Vyavahāra* in this passage indicates 'der konventionelle Sprachgebrauch' equivalent to one of the two meanings of a Pāli *vohāra*.

25. There is many an instance, in which conservations and evolutions

interwoven in India have come to formulate a particular system of philosophy in China.

Moreover, the Pāli is more nearly akin to the Vedic Sanskrit than to the Hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit. Cf. P.V. Bapat. "Vedicism in Pāli", *Siddhabhārati*, Vol. I. Nosharpur: 1950.

26. Arnold Kunst. *Probleme der Buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṃgraha* Krokow: Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1939, p. 33, 36. According to the Abhidharma the Absolute or a real existence must have its own nature (*svalakṣaṇena sat*). All other things are considered relative. Hence the Mahāyāna idea of the synthesis of the Absolute and the Relative is not found in Abhidharma.

The major purpose of Abhidharma is not simply religious, inward experience, but the becoming conscious of reality (*svabhāva*), which is epistemology to us only as long as we have not experienced it. Regarding the metaphysical and empirical character of Abhidharma confer to the relevant description of the L. Anagarika Govinda's work, *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy*. London: Rider and Company, 1961. pp. 38-41.

SECTION II

1. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*. London: Luzac and Co., 1936, p. 265.

2. Buddhaghosa, Asl. ed. by P.V. Bapat, Bhandarkar Oriental Series, No. 3, Poona: 1942.

3. *Sammohavinodani*, PTS., p. 416.

4. Asl., p. 100.

5. Buddhaghosa, Vism. p. 443. PTS.

6. Dhammapāla, *Paramatthamañjūsā*. Siamese Edition, Vol. III, p. 19.

7. "bhūmi salakkhanādiggahanavasena pavattiṭṭhānabhāvato" (Ibid., p. 18).

8. "sarīram paribrūhetabbato imissā hi paññāya santānavasena pavattamānāya pādapānīsilaṭṭhāniyā dīṭṭhivisuddhi-ādikā imā pañca visuddhiyo avaya-vena samudāyupalakkaṇanayena sarīranti veditabbā." (Ibid., p. 19).

9. Vism. p. 438.

10. Ibid., p. 635.

11. Asl. p. 101.

12. Vism. p. 437; Pe Maung Tin. *The Path of Purity*. London PTS, 1931, pt III p. 506-507.

13. Yaśomitra, AKV. ed. by Wogihara, Tokyo: 1932-1936, p. 8.

14. Asl. pp. 122-123, G.H. Sasaki, *A Study of Buddhist Psychology*. Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkokai, 1960, p. 308-401.

15. Yaśomitra, AKV., p. 629: "śeṣa-varṇa-lope esa kṛte ākāra iti rūpaṃ bhavati."

16. *Visuddhimagga-Mahātthakathā*. Ceylonese Edition, p. 448, Cf. also to *A Pāli Critical Dictionary*, Vol. II. I. pp. 4-8, Copenhagen: 1960.

17. AK. (chi. Abhidharmakośa, T. 29.137c. line 2.)

18. Ibid. Regarding a psychological function, i.e., determination (*pravicyaya*) Yaśomitra comments, "dharmapravicyaya iti. pravicinotiti pravicyayaḥ pravicyante vā anena dharmā iti pravicyayaḥ. yena saṃkīrṇā iva dharmāḥ puṣpāṇīva pravicyante ucciyanta ity arthaḥ. Ime śāsravā inte'nāsravaḥ, ime

rūpiṇaḥ ime'rūpiṇa iti. dharmāṇāṃ pravacayaḥ dharmapravacayāḥ. pratītatvāt prajñāti vaktavye śloka-bandh'anugūṇyena matir iti kārīkāyām uktam." (AKV., p. 127).

19. Yaśomitra, clarifying the definition of *prajñā* as *sākāra*, introduces in his work the Sautrāntika's view: "*ālambana-grahaṇa-prakāra ākāra iti. nai-rukta vidhir iti darśayaty ālambana śabdād ākāraṃ gṛhitvā prakāra-śabdāc ca kāra-śabdaṃ. śeṣavarṇa-lope ca kṛte ākāra iti rūpam bhavati. tad evaṃ sati prajñā'pi śākāra bhavati siddham."* (AKV., p. 629).

20. There have been various linguistic approaches to the term '*prajñāpāramitā*' among the scholars, ancient and modern. Haribhadra interprets this term in his *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*-*ālokāvyākhyā* as a compound '*pāramit-tā*', meaning thereby 'to get to the other shore (of this life).' Such scholars as Bōthlingk, Burnouf, M. Vassilief seem to take this view. The Tibetan equivalent '*pha-rol-tu-phyin-pa*' also follows this wrong interpretation. On the other hand, such scholars as F.W. Thomas, T.W. Rhys Davids, W. Stede, H. Dayal, seem to confirm the view that *pāramitā* is derived from *pāra*, meaning simply 'highest condition, highest point'. (Cf. H. Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., LTD, 1952, p. 166). The forms *pārami* and *pāramitā* are found in Pāli, i.e., in the Suttanipāta, the Nettipakaraṇa and the jātika and others, as Dayal mentions in his work. Dayal also remarks further, "The earlier and alternative form *pārāmi* also points to the derivation from *parama*. The suffix *tā* was probably added to it on the analogy of the abstract substantives ending in *tā*." He did not mention about the phonetic change of *i* (a long vowel) into *ī* (a short vowel), i.e. *pāramitā* (*īta* to *ita*). A long vowel *i* preceding the consonant is as a rule changed to *ī*. We have, in this context, the example of *pāramipatta* found in such various Pāli texts as Majjhima Nikāya, III. 28; Nd. 475; Miln. 2, etc. There is, however, an example in which both vowels occur. For example, the Atthasālinī, the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Edition (ed. by Bapat), has a Pāli '*pāramitabhāva*' (p. 85) for '*pāramitabhāva*' found in the Pāli Text Society Edition of the same text.

21. According to the investigation mentioned above the term *jñāna* concerns the knowledge, transcendental and consequential, while *prajñā* concerns the knowledge, immanent and existential. It is for this reason that the knowledge of the Buddha is always represented by the Sanskrit original, '*Buddhajñāna*' but not by '*Buddhaprajñā*'. It is because *prajñā* concerns the exercise of the practitioner, retaining thus its original meaning, immanent and existential. As far as the Chinese translation concerns, *Buddhajñāna* is rendered by 'chi', 'wei' and also 'chi wei' in a compound form. All these Chinese renderings are also applied to *prajñā*. Thus, the Chinese translation has no rigid distinction between *jñāna* and *prajñā*. *Jñāna* stands for 'chi' and sometimes for 'wei' in Chinese. It is the same with *prajñā*.

From this historical point of view we can throw a new light upon the modern Buddhism in Japan. There have been the two trends of thought developed in Japan: zen Buddhism and Shinshu Pietism. The former, in this respect, emphasises *prajñā* (to be exercised), while the latter emphasises *jñāna* attributed simply to the Amida Buddha. The Shinshu Pietism has become paramount in Japan, so that faith in the Amida Buddha or the knowledge of

Amida Buddha (*Buddhajñāna*) is the sufficient condition of salvation, and the concept of *prajñā* fades into second place or rather disappears. Both Zen intellectualism accruing on *prajñā* and Shinshu Pietism accruing on *jñāna* play considerable roles in the development of modern Buddhism in Japan. Zen intellectualism is recognized as part of the preparation of the ultimate *jñāna*. It is *praeparatio mystica*. On the other hand, Shinshu Pietism is an ancillary to *prajñā* (meditative knowledge). We might characterize this relation between intellectualism and pietism by assigning the different weights to the two forms of knowledge: *prajñā* and *jñāna*, as we have described above.

SECTION III

1. Asl. (ed., by P.V. Bapat, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1942) reads '*kālasamcaya*', while the Pāli Text Society Edition (London, 1897) reads '*kālasamaya*'. The former is preferable to the latter, for the concept of *samaya* is in this passage defined by other terms.

2. It is interesting to note that these three processes, *uppāda*, *thiti* and *bhaṅga*, are analogous to the three principles of *trimūrti*: arising (*Brahmā*), preservation (*Viṣṇu*) and decay (*Śiva*). These three also correspond with *catvāri lakṣaṇāni* or the four characteristics of the created (*saṃskṛta*) in the Sarvāstivāda School, namely, *jāti*, *sthiti*, *jarā* and *anityatā*. The Pāli concept *thiti* includes *anyathā* (*jarā* in the Sarvāstivāda school) in a compound term *thiti-anyathā*. This implication is exemplified by the Sarvāstivāda, which takes *sthiti* (*thiti* in Pāli) as a synonym for *jarā*, i.e., '*tathā jarāyā sthityanyathā-tvaṃ paryāya iti*', (*Yaśomitra*, AKV. ed., by Wogihara. p. 171-172; *Abhidharmakośa*, Chinese version, V verse 46cd).

3. The fundamental treatises in Pāli Abhidhamma are enumerated as seven, of which two, the *Vibhaṅga* and *Paṭṭhāna*, mention about the twenty four modes of causality: *hetu-paccaya*, *dhammaṇa°*, *adhipati°*, *anantara°*, *saṃanantara°*, *sahajāta°*, *aññamañña°*, *nissaya°*, *upanissaya°*, *purejāta°*, *pacchājāta°*, *āsevana°*, *kamma°*, *vipāka°*, *āhāra°*, *indriya°*, *jhāna°*, *magga°*, *saṃyutta°*, *vippayutta°*, *atthi°*, *natthi°* *vigata°* and *avigata°*. (*Paṭṭhāna*, *paccaya-vibhaṅga-vāra*; *Vism.*, pp. 532-541; also cf. L. Sadaw, 'On the Philosophy of Relations', *JPTS*. 1915-1916. pp. 21-53; U.K. Bhagawat, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Theravāda School, as embodied in the Pāli Abhidhamma*, Patna 1924-25; G.H. Sasaki, *A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy*, pp. 46-61, Kobundo, Tokyo, 1958).

4. In Mahāyāna this formula is dealt with from the view-point of *śūnya-vāda* (*Madhyamaka-kārikā* XXIV. kr. 18), which does not distinguish this formula, '*imāsmiṃ sati, idaṃ hoti.....*' from the passage: 'Upon ignorance depend the karma-formations.....'. Mādhyamika's interpretation of the twelve links is transformed into examinations of *pratītya* (*ibid.*, I.) and *Dvāsaśāṅga* (*ibid.*, XXVI). Nāgārjuna's interpretation reduced the twelve links into *pratītya* (the Relativity) in the light of *śūnya* idea. It is experimental. It concerns merely the notion of relativity (*parasparāpekṣā* or *anyonyāpekṣā*).

In other words, in Mahāyāna Buddhism '*pratītyasamutpāda*' denotes *saṃvṛti*, a state converted by ignorance, as opposed to *paramārtha*. Candrakīrti criticizes the Sarvāstivāda view that *pratītyasamutpāda* means creation (*utpāda*) by one cause or with no cause (*Prasannapadā*, *Bibl. Bud.* IV, ed. L. Vallé Poussin, pp. 10-11). Later Mahāyāna Buddhism interprets this formula 'When

this exists, that exists.....' as the 'dependence of things' confining the concrete application of the formula 'upon ignorance depend the karma-formation.....' only to the Hinayanistic idea. Saṃghabhadra's analysis of *Pratītyasamutpāda* is worthy of note.

5. This idea can be found also in the Theravāda's interpretation. 'Na-vidam ādimattakathanam; paṭṭhānadharmakathanam pan'etaṃ.' *Tiṇṇan hi vaṭṭānaṃ avijjā paṭṭhānā; avijjāggahaṇena hi avasesa-kelesavaṭṭaṇ ca kam-mādinī ca bālaṃ patibedhenti.....Iti yaṃ gaṇhato bandho muccato ca mokkho hoti, tassa paṭṭhānadharmassakathanam idaṃ, na ādimattakathanan ti. Evam idaṃ bhavacakkam aviditādi ti veditabbaṃ* (*Vism*, p. 577). *Avijjā* as *ādi* is distinguished from *pakati* (*prakṛti*) in Sāṃkhya: 'kasmā pan'ettha avijjā ādito vuttā. Kim, pakativādinam pakati viya, avijjā pi akāraṇam mūlakāraṇam lokassā ti? Na akāraṇam; āsavaśamudaya avijjā samudayo ti hi avijjāya kāraṇam vuttam' (*Vism*, p. 525).

6. The application of the two concepts (*paramārtha* and *dharmaśāṅketa*) to *āditva* is a product of the genius of Saṃghabhadra. It is possibly due to the critical attitude of the Sarvāstivāda school against heretic views. We can not overlook that the Sarvāstivāda views have been systematized and formulated to meet the heretic ones. (Cf. Chatterjee 'Problems of Knowledge and the Four Schools of later Buddhism', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*. Vol. XXII, part iii.) In contrast, the Theravāda school faithfully followed the early Buddhist tradition, interpreting it from the point of view of psychology rather than epistemology.

7. Saṃghabhadra (5th century A.D.) composed two *śāstras*: *Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra* and *Samayapradīpikā*, which are extant both in Chinese and Tibetan. The former has also the French translation for the three chapters (50-52 chapters) out of 80 chapters (translated by La Vallée Poussin, *Mélanges chinois et Bouddhique*, 1936-1937). Poussin's translation corresponds to the Chinese 'Shun-Caṇ-li-lun' (*Nyāyānusāraśāstra*), but not to the Chinese 'Choen-tcheng-luen' (*Samayapradīpikā*), which he himself wrongly identified. In these texts and commentaries the author's name is differently described. The texts mentioning the name 'Saṃghabhadra' are Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, and possibly the original Sanskrit *śāstras* of the Chinese *Pradīpa* and *Nyāyānusāra*; the texts mentioning 'Sahantabhadra' are Śāntirakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (*Gaekwad Series*. No. XXX. 1926, Baroda) and possibly the Sanskrit original of the Tibetan *Pradīpa*; the Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* mentions both Saṃghabhadra (*ḥdus bz'an*) and Sahantabhadra (*ḥdul bz'an*). The former is found in three chapters, *dhātunirdeśa*, *indriya* and *loka*, while the latter in two chapters, *karmanirdeśa* and *Samādhi*. Cordier's Catalogue (*mdo-Hgrel* 64) gives two Tibetan names to the author of *Pradīpa*: *ḥdus-bz'an* and *ḥdul-bz'an*; the latter is considered to stand for the Sanskrit name *Vinitabhadra*, which preferably stands for *Sahantabhadra*. It would not be unfair to consider the original Mongolian name as an equivalent to the Sanskrit *Sahantabhadra*. Cordier gives *Biṇayabhadra* to the Original Mongolian.

8. *Kāritra* apparently is based on Skt. *cāritra* blended with forms of *ka r*-, *kār*- (Edgerton, *Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, p. 179, Yale University Press, 1953). The Pāli *cāritta* stands for the Skt., *cāritra*, 'yāvad antaśo māloguṇa-

parikṣiptā api tadrūpa (su ha sahasa) cāritraṃsāpadya (nte) (Waldschmidt, 51). —*Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Teil II, S. 112, Akademie-Verlag, 1951). The change of a single consonant, $c > k$ can be found in numerous cases: *ci-ciketa* (aor.), *keta* (derivative), *cāru-kālu* (Aśoka edict. Queens Edict no. I, line 5), *katābhī* (i) = *kāresu* = *kṛtābhicāreṣu* (Girnar Rock Edict V), a queen *kālu-vāki* = *cāruvāki* (C.D. Chatterjee, 'Studies in the Inscriptions of Aśoka' no. 1 (c). *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, XXXVII, 1956, p. 232) etc. The Pāli *cāritta*, derived from *car*, to move, to proceed, means *cāritta-vāritta* (the manner of acting and avoiding. J. iii. 195; Th. 591. etc.). *Cāritta* denotes merely 'to move' and is not a positive term such as 'to produce', or 'to create', Saṃghabhadra designated *kāritra* as the 'ability to draw forth' (*ākṣepaśaktiḥ*) the effect but not to 'produce' (*janana*) it. (Ny. 51. T. 29, 631c; also see *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 506, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, no. XXX, 1926, Baroda). This means that when the effect comes into existence, *kāritra* is not the direct cause but rather an indirect or helping cause, (*ibid.*, 52. T. 29, 631d). *Kāritra* is used as synonym for *puruṣakāra*; *puruṣa* is used as a compound *puruṣakāra-phala*, one of the six causes (AKV., p. 201). The meaning of *puruṣa* is considered as a difficult word, but it does not denote 'strong power' as is commonly believed. It means 'human effort, manly virility (M. Williams, *SED*) or manly performance' (Edgerton, *BHD.*, p. 348b). The meaning of the Pāli *purisakāra* also is the same as the Skt. *puruṣakāra*. (D.I. 53; Miln. 96). *Puruṣakāra* denotes merely the conventional usage to express the humanly performance just like the foot of crow, the medicinal herb, the drunken elephant and the general, (*Abhidharmakośa*, 19 T. 29. 35b). Thus, *puruṣakāra* represents the manner of moving, which is the original significance of *kāritra*.

Dīpakāra (450-550. A.D.), the disciple of Saṃghabhadra, discusses about *kāritra* in his *Abhidharmadīpa*, pp. 261-296. He interprets it as 'present state' or 'dharma having the actuality', i.e., '...*labdhasāmarthyasya dharmasya yaḥ phalākṣepastatkāritramityucyate. sā ca vartamānakālā vṛttiḥ kāritramityākhyāyate.*' (*Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 281, ed. by P.S. Jaini, Kashi Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959; on the author and his text see G.H. Sasaki's article 'Abhidharmadīpa, ed. by Jaini' ...*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. University of London*, XXV; part 2, 1962).

Kāvya mīmāṃsā, Rājaśekhara, gives a suggestion; *kārayitri.....pratibhā* (creative), *bhāvayitri.....pratibhā* (reflective; *kārayitā-kāritra*, meaning 'to draw forth' (thanks to Dr. Chatterjee, Calcutta, who gave this suggestion on the occasion of the XXVI International Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi. 1964).

9. About the Sautrāntika's equivalency of *Kāritra* and *pratyaya* see Ny. T. 29.632 b¹⁰⁻¹². This idea is based upon the theory of momentariness. According to this theory all dharmas have the ability to interrelate with each other in a form of *pratyaya*; all of them have *sarūpya* (conformity). This notion of the relatedness has been expounded by Dharmakīrti, who established a presupposition: '*Sambandha* is help up by *paratantrya*'. (Frauwallner, 'Dharmakīrti's Saṃbandhaparīkṣā', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XLI Bd. 265-300 SS.). Tibetan version, of Peking Ed. 95. 357a-358b; 358-364b and also *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam*, Patna, 1953.

According to the Sarvāstivāda school *Dharmas* are interrelated with each other by means of *sabhāga-hetu* and *niṣyanda-phala*.

10. The Theravādas gave predominance to *pratyaya* since the beginning of this tradition, which concerned merely the human relationship. Hence they did not have to distinguish between *hetu* and *pratyaya*. A psychological attitude was applied to the concept of *paṭiccasamuppāda*; each of psychological factors arising is related to the twelve lines of dependence: 'When [the unwholesome mind] arises, *sankhāra* depends upon *avijjā*, etc. (*Vibh.* p. 165) Buddhaghoṣa explains the momentariness of the Dependent Origination: "*Ekacittakhaṇe ca bahū cetanā na santīti sankhārā ti avatvā sankhāro ti vuttam.* (Sammohavinodanī p. 201). "*Yasmā ca ekacittakhaṇapariyāpanno eko v'ettha phasso, tasmā tass'ānurūpaṃ paccayabhūtam āyatanam gaṇhanto salāyatanatthāne nāma-paccayā chaṭṭhāyatanan ti ekaṃ manāyatanaṃ yeva āha.* (*ibid.*

11. The Vaibhāsikas hold the view that the four *pratyayas* have their own natures, which correspond to *svabhāva* or *bhāva*. (*Pradīpa*, T. 29.822a). The Vaibhāsika's equivalency of *svabhāva* to *bhāva* sometimes gives rise to the controversy between the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika. According to the Vasubandhu's interpretation, approximating the Sautrāntika, the concept *hetu-pratyaya* is considered to be *bija*, which is based upon *ālayavijñāna*. *Ālayavijñāna*, in its turn, has a double aspect: *phalabhāva* and *hetubhāva*. *Bhāva* in this sense implies *śakti* or function. Nevertheless, Saṃghabhadra interprets it as a reality or entity, for *Bhāva* in his sense is equivalent to *svabhāva* (reality), (*Ny.* T. 29, 440b²⁰⁻²¹; 440b³⁻⁴).

12. Both schools, Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda, call the syllogism '*imasmin sati idaṃ hoti.....*' *idappaccayatā* (*idapratyayatā*), and the formula 'upon ignorance depend the karma-formations.....' *paṭiccasamuppanna-dhamma* (*pratītyasamutpādadharma*). But the Theravādin does not discuss the syllogism separated from the formula, taking both of these as two different aspects of the one and same thing. Namely, the former refers to *paṭiccasamuppāda* in view of *kāraṇa* (causing), while the latter in view of *dhamma* (the caused). *Sammohavinodanī* reads, *idappaccayatā ti sankhārādīnaṃ kāraṇāni avijjādīni angāni. Paṭiccasamuppannadhammā ti avijjādīhi nibbattā sankhārādayo dhammā* (*Sammohavinodanī*, p. 139).

13. The time concept is not considered as *dravya* (*Mahāvaiśeṣyāśāstra*. T. 27. 141b; 183; 919b. etc. also cf. the Chinese commentary on the *Mādhyamaka-kārikā*, T. 42. 130c).

14. The A.K.V. mentions three kinds of *sat*: *trividhaṃ hi yogācārāṇāṃ sat. paramārtha saṃvṛti-satdravya-sacca. dravyataḥ sva-lakṣaṇataḥ sad dravyasad iti* (A.K.V., p. 524; L de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* VI. 4. p. 141, note 1; IV, p. 18, n. 1.) The concept *svalakṣaṇena sat* (the being its own nature) is the characteristic common to these three *sat*. Buddhist realism distinguishes between *svalakṣaṇa* (abstraction and generality), placing the emphasis upon the former (cf. Arnold Kunst, '*Probleme der Buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des des Tattvasaṅgraha* Krokow, 1939, p. 33).

15. Yaśomitra mentions the distinction between *sarvāsmiṃ kāle* and *nitya*: *svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāstīti. yad rūp'ādeḥ svalakṣaṇam. tat sarvasmiṃ kāle vidyate itītyate. yadī rūp'ādeḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadā'sti tena rūp'ādi-bhāvo nityaḥ prāptoti. ata āha. bhāvo nityaś ca nēṣyate.* (A.K.V., p. 472). The fundamental

standpoint of the Sarvāstivāda school is clearly shown in the principles: *svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti* as well as *sarvadharmaḥ nityāḥ santi*. To understand these apparently inconsistent principles we must deeply investigate the two aspects of time: actuality and causality. I have got an opportunity to discuss about two modes of time with Professors Lousi and Margaret Chandler, Illinois University, U.S.A. who gave me kind suggestions.

16. The Theravāda also came to the same conclusion as the Sarvāstivāda through a different approach toward the time. The present (*paccuppanna*) in the Pāli sense, derived from *prati-uppanna*, refers to the potential future. *Uppanna* is classified into the four divisions: *vattamāna*, *bhūtāpagata*, *okāsa-kata* and *bhūmiladdha* (*Vism.*, p. 687). Beginning with *vattamān'uppanna* ('things presently arisen'), the other three divisions follow in an order of a decreasing degree of actuality (Nyanaponika, *Abhidhamma Studies*, p. 83). We would like to consider it as the transformation of reality from the objective to the subjective; *vattamān'uppanna* refers to things objectively existing, while the last division *bhūmiladdh'uppanna* to the human defilement existing in our mind, which may be conquered and overcome, or more accurately speaking, may be changed in conformity with the world of immediate phenomena. The Pāli concept of the present implies momentary actuality representing the Early Buddhist tradition. It implies also the effort to attain *Nirvāṇa* in the present. The *Dīgha Nikāya* reads: *khinā jāti, yusitam brahmacariyam, kataṃ karaṇiyaṃ, nāparam itthattāyāti abbaññāsi* (*D.i.* p. 203). This passage corresponds to the *Suttanipāta* 729. Buddhaghosa interpreted *itthabhāva* in the *Suttanipāta* as the human state (*SN. Com.*, II. 2. p. 505) meaning the Arahant attaining complete Enlightenment will not again return to this present state to remove remaining defilements because he has already removed himself from all defilements. *Nāparam itthattāya* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* is translated in the Chinese version as 'not to enter another birth'. This translation easily misleads us to the notion of a transmigration of life after death. Buddhaghosa points out two cases, the dative and the ablative. In both cases it means there no longer exists a state in which we must do further practices (*DN. Com.* I. p. 226). The usage of the concept *nāparam itthattāya* in the ablative case can be found also in the *Samyutta Nikāya* (*S. II.* p. 104); *paccudāvattati kho idaṃ viññāṇam nāmarūpamhā nāparam gacchati*. We can amend the former sentence into *itthattāya nāparam gacchati*. The *PTSD* gives *idha* as an equivalent to *ittha*. However, this could also be an equivalent to *etta*. We like to take it as *iha*, derived from the *i-tra*, meaning 'just now' or 'present state'. *Nāparam itthattāya* refers to the present state and can similarly be applied to *Nirvāṇa* in the present, but not to the life after death.

SECTION IV

1. a-tan-si-yu-ki-Taisho 51.891c-892b.
2. *Ibid.* 50.190ff.
3. Shun-can-lī-lun. Taisho 29.329a-775c. trl. by Hiüen Tsuan.
4. Nanjio Catalogue No. 1267, 1269. Two Chinese translations are extant, one by Hiüen Tsang (651-654 A.D. tr.) and the other by Paramārtha (564-567 A.D. tr.). French trl. Louis de la Vallée Poussin. 6 Vols. Paris-Louvain 1923-1931. Gokhale, V.V. *The Text of the Abhidharmakośakārikā*

of *Vasubandhu*, "The Journal of the Bombay Branch". Royal Asiatic Society N.S. Vol. 22, 1946.

5. Tsan-hhien-tsun-lun. T. 29.777a-977c. trl. by Hiüen Tsang.

6. As a provisional hypothesis, the period between 705-763 A.D. is given to the date of Śāntarakṣita. Cf. Bhattacharya's article in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Gaekward XCVI. GOS XXX. 1926. Proof. K.B. Pathak, however, suggests the 9th century A.D. Cf. his article *Dharmakīrti and Brāhmaṇa*, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, VIII. p. 372.

7. The following table will show how two names of Saṃghabhadra and Sahantabhadra are employed in both versions, Sanskrit and Tibetan, of the Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*.

Tib. AKV. Peking Ed., Tanjur 65

Skt. AKV. Wogihara's Ed.

Page	Line	Name	Page	Line	Name
31b	5	ḥdus b'zañ	30	21	Saṃghabhadra
44a	7		42	11	(dhātunirdeśa)
145a	5		140	1	(indriyanirdeśa)
154b	7		148	23	
166b	1		159	10	
225b	8		214	28	
242a	2	ḥdus b'zañs	227	32	
245b	3		229	5	
275a	4	ḥdus b'zañ	253	23	(Lokanirdeśa)
284b	6		261	1	
287b	3		263	14	
309b	7		280	20	
29b	6	ḥdul b'zañ	372	13	(karmanirdeśa)
53b	7		406	27	
5b7	1		408	13	
107a	4		450	17	(anuśāyanirdeśa)
110a	4		452	23	
150a	6		491	3	
159b	4		500	7	
162a	8		502	17	
201a	8		539	11	(pudgalamārga-
217a	1	ḥdul b'zañs	553	29	nirdeśa)
228b	4		565	1	
252	2	ḥdul b'zañ	586	6	
273a	6		602	2	
302b	1		629	27	(jñānanirdeśa)
313a	2		639	19	
318a	7		643	30	
355b	4	slob dpon gyis	656	8	
		(Peking Ed. ācārya;			
		Narthaṅg Ed. ācārya Saṃghabhadra)			
334b	1		657	28	
363a	7		682	9	(samāpattinirdeśa)

8. The central tradition of the Sarvāstivāda school took its origin from the six works of the Abhidharma, from Kātyāna's Jñānaprasthāna to the Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra. This tradition can be said to be represented by Saṃghabhadra rather than by Vasubandhu. On the relationship between the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda confer to E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, p. 40. Serie Orientale Roma VIII. Roma 1956, and to A. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* p. 154. École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Saigon, 1955.

SECTION V

1. Cf. Chapt. I. The Significance of Negation in Buddhism, footnote 10.
2. Laṅkāvatara sutra, ed. by Nanjo, Kyōto, 1923, p. 226. 11-14.
3. *Śūnyatā* is used as a synonym of such concepts as *pralītyasamutpāda*, *madhyapratipad* and *saṃsāra*. Cf. Prasannapada, p. 503; p. 535.
4. E. Conze, *Buddhism, its Essence and Development*, Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, Third Ed., 1967, p. 130.
5. Yuien (Shinran's disciple), *Tannishō* (a collection of the Shinran's oral teachings and critique on the heretic views), Chapt. 18.
6. *Kyōgyōshinshō* (teaching-action-faith-attainment), Shinshū-seiten, ed. by Kashiwabara, Kyoto: Hozokan, 1939, pp. 265-510.
7. Regarding a short history of Shinran's faith, Cf. G.H. Sasaki, "Shinran", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, USA., 1974, pp. 670-671.
8. The external reaction against sin, one of the types of sin, is also found in Shintoism in Japan. A concept of sin (Jap. *tsumi*), in contrast to Buddhistic conception, denotes something like dirt accumulated on surfaces of things. This concept of sin includes all malformations and all natural accidents. We have Shintoist terms such as *amatsu tsumi* (sins of heaven), *kunitsu tsumi* (sins of land), *kokutagu no tsumi* (miscellaneous sins), *magagoto* (bad things causing annoyance or pain). Shintoist sins are derived from a natural process and no matters to be made into cases for ethical judgement. All sins are, in terms of purification, to be carried off (*harai*) to the ocean, which is only the way of transforming them into purification. With respect to the comparison between Japanese and Indian *tsumi* and culture, Cf. G.H. Sasaki. *Social and Humanistic Life in India*, Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1971, pp. 176-180; 219-226.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

ZWEI LEHRWEISE DES GOTAMO BUDDHO

—*pariyāya* und *nippariyāya*

1. Die Bedeutung des Problems

Im folgenden möchte ich ein Problem des buddhistischen Denkens behandeln und mich dabei auf zwei verschiedene Begriffe beziehen: *pariyāya* und *nippariyāya* (in Pāli). Ich stütze mich dabei auf buddhistisches Material, entnommen dem Pāli, Sanskrit, tibetischen und chinesischen Quellen.

Ein Charakterzug, der für die Pāli-Philosophie (Theravāda-Philosophie) bezeichnend ist, ist die Unterscheidung zwischen „*pariyāya*“ (alternative Bestimmung) und „*nippariyāya*“ (definitive Bestimmung). Der ältere der beiden Begriffe wird auch Suttanta-naya genannt, d. h. die Methode, die in den Suttas gebraucht wird; der jüngere Abhidhammanaya, d.h. die Methode, die im Abhidhamma gebraucht wird.

Das Wort „*pariyāya*“ bedeutet im vedischen Sanskrit „arrangement“, während „*nippariyāya*“ (*niṣparyāya* in Skt.) nur in Bharatas Nāṭyaśāstra gefunden wird und „out of order“ bedeutet. Für die Buddhisten haben jedoch diese beiden Begriffe einen andern Sinn.¹ Wie ich oben schon gesagt habe, werden sie im Pāli-Buddhismus (Theravāda) gebraucht, um zwischen Suttanta-naya und Abhidhamma-naya zu unterscheiden. Im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus dagegen drücken sie eine metaphysische Wahrheit aus: sie bezeichnen das Verhältnis zwischen „Grund“ (*paryāya*) und „Tatsache“ (*niṣparyāya*; Pāli *nippariyāya*).

Nach F. Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary sind die verschiedenen Bedeutungen des Wortes „*paryāya*“: 1. arrangement, 2. way, 3. means, 4. alternative kind. Aber in diesem Wörterbuch findet man „*niṣparyāya*“ nicht. Im vedischen Sanskrit und in der buddhistischen Literatur des Pāli und buddhistischen Sanskrit findet man sehr oft die drei Bedeutungen „arrangement“, „way“ und „means“. Die Bedeutung „alternative kind“ findet sich jedoch nur in der buddhistischen Literatur² aber nie in der vedischen. Im Folgenden werden wir die ersten drei Bedeu-

tungen außer acht lassen und unsere Besprechung auf die letzte beschränken. Denn sie ist der Schlüssel, der die Tür zum Verständnis der buddhistischen Philosophie öffnet.

Wie wir bereits erwähnt haben, werden im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus „*pariyāya*“ und „*niṣpariyāya*“ in der Bedeutung „Grund“ und „Folge“ oder „Tatsache“ verwendet. Es muß aber darauf hingewiesen werden, daß diese Bedeutungen auch im Hinayāna nachgewiesen werden können. Und zwar finden wir in der Sammohavinodanī³, einem Kommentar zum Vibhaṅga, für *pariyāya* (Skt. *pariyāya*) die Bedeutung „Grund“ (*vatthu*) als fest umgrenzten Ausdruck. Infolgedessen will ich meine weitere Besprechung hieran anknüpfen.

2. Bedeutungen in den Pāli Texten

Der Pāli-Abhidhamma lehrt uns, daß „*pariyāya*“ dem Sutta entspricht und „*nippariyāya*“ dem Abhidhamma. Dabei hat *pariyāya* die Bedeutung „alternative Bestimmung“, während „*nippariyāya*“ definitive Bestimmung bedeutet⁴.

Die Suttas sind die Predigten des Buddha. Sie nehmen Rücksicht auf die Veranlagung der Hörer und passen sich ihnen an. Deshalb wird die Art dieser Predigten „Suttanta-naya“ oder „*pariyāya*“ (die alternative Bestimmung) genannt. Im Gegensatz dazu nehmen die Texte des Abhidhamma keine Rücksicht auf Neigung und Aufnahmefähigkeit der Zuhörer. Infolgedessen führte die Methode, derer sich der Abhidhamma bediente, zur definitiven und absoluten Zusammenfassung der Lehre des Buddha. Deshalb wird sie „*nippariyāya*“ (die definitive Bestimmung) genannt. Der Gebrauch der Begriffe eutbeht jeder Systematik; er soll nur zur Unterscheidung des Suttanta-naya und Abhidhamma-naya dienen.

Außer diesen deskriptiven Bedeutungen gibt es aber auch noch andere, die die methodischen oder systematischen genannt werden können. Wir haben bereits festgestellt, daß *pariyāya* „Grund“ bedeutet, *nippariyāya* dagegen „Folge, Tatsache“. Wie das gemeint ist, macht uns folgendes Zitat aus der Atthasālinī klar, das das Verhältnis zwischen „*magga*“ und „*suññatā*“ behandelt. Die Atthasālinī sagt:

”*tattha suttantikapariyāyena saṇṇato pi ārammaṇato pi nāmaṃ labhati. pariyāyadesanā hesā. abhidhammakathā pana nip-*

pariyāyadesanā tasmā idha sagunato vā ārammaṇato vā nāmaṇ na labhati, āgamanato va labhati.“⁵

[Nach der Methode des Sutta (alternative Bestimmung) entstammt der Name *suññatā* (Nicht-Substantialität) sowohl seiner Eigenart als auch seinem Ziel. Dies ist die alternative Bestimmung, genannt *pariyāyadesanā*. Die Erklärung nach der Methode des Abhidhamma wird die definitive Bestimmung genannt. Daher entstammt [der Name *suññatā* (Nicht-Substantialität)] weder der Eigenart, noch dem Ziel, sondern der Tatsache des Erreichens].

Hier möchte ich noch einige Zitate einfügen, um den Unterschied zwischen *pariyāya* (Grund) und *nippariyāya* (Tatsache) deutlicher zu machen. Die Sammohavinodanī sagt das Gleiche mit anderen Worten:

„[*thapetvā dukkhadukkhaṇ sesaṇ*] *dukkhasaccavibhaṅge āgataṇ jāti-ādi sabbhaṇ pitassa tassa dukkhassa vatthubhāvato pariyāyadukkhaṇ nāma. dukkhadukkhaṇ nippariyāydukkhaṇ nāma.*“⁶

[Nach der Methode des „Grundes“ (*pariyāya*) erscheinen in der „Analyse der Wahrheit des Leidens“ Geburt und so fort; denn Geburt und so fort sind der Grund des Leidens. Nach der Methode der „Tatsache“ (*nippariyāya*) wird das Leiden Leiden als solches genannt].

In diesem Satz bedeutet „*pariyāya*“ den Grund, woraus etwas zur Existenz kommen kann; die Geburt u. s. w. ist der Grund, aus dem das Leiden entsteht. Der *pariyāya* enthält den Grund (*vatthu*), worauf dessen Folge oder Tatsache (d. h. das Leiden) beruht. Der *nippariyāya* bedeutet eine Tatsache oder Folge, die aus dem Grund hervorgeht.

Dazu noch einen weiteren Satz:

„*tattha kāyikacetasikā dukkhā vedanā sabhāvato ca nāmato ca dukkhattā dukkhadukkhaṇ nāma*“. (Ibid. p. 93).

[Die körperlichen und geistigen Gefühle des Leidens werden Leiden als solches genannt, weil sie sowohl ihrer Eigenart als auch ihrem Namen nach Leiden sind].

Beide Begriffe in diesem Satz, Eigenart und Name, sind nichts anderes als die Begriffe, die ein reales Ding oder ein konkretes Ergebnis bedeuten, nämlich eine Folge oder Tatsache. Denn das,

Leiden als solches bedeutet einen wirklichen Tatbestand. Wir können diesen Tatbestand immer wirklich erleben. Deshalb sind Eigenart und Name das Leiden selbst. Auf diese Art sind Eigenart und Name nichts anderes als die Tatsache, d. h. *nippariyāya*.

Die bisherigen Ausführungen haben somit gezeigt, daß die methodische Bedeutung der beiden Begriffe „*pariyāya*“ und „*nippariyāya*“ in hīnayānistischen Texten „Grund“ und „Tatsache“ ist.⁷

3. Bedeutungen in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule

Um die methodische Bedeutung von *pariyāya* (Skt. *pariyāya*) und *nippariyāya* (Skt. *niṣpariyāya*) in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule deutlich zu machen, möchte ich mich auf eine Diskussion im Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu's beziehen, die über das Leiden (*duḥkha*) und dessen Analyse handelt.

Nach der Analyse des Leidens von Vasubandhu gibt es drei Arten des Leidens: *duḥkhaduḥkhatā* (das Leiden als solches), *samskāraduḥkhatā* (das Leiden der Seinserscheinungen)⁸ und *pariṇāmaduḥkhatā* (das Leiden der Vergänglichkeit)⁹.

An der erwähnten Stelle des Abhidharmakośa findet sich nun eine Diskussion über die Verschiedenartigkeit des Leidens zwischen Vasubandhu und einem Gegner, wie folgt.

Der Gegner protestiert gegen Vasubandhu und sagt:

„Der Buddha sagt einmal in einem anderen Sūtra, daß es drei Arten des Gefühls gebe. Diese sind *sukha*, *duḥkha* und *asukhāduḥkha*. Wenn alles leidhaft wäre, hätte der Buddha gesagt ‚Ich habe über die drei Arten des Gefühls nur aus innerer Absicht (*adhyāśaya*) gesprochen.‘ Wir können jedoch eine solche Wendung in keinem anderen Sūtra finden. Darum muß nicht immer alles leidhaft sein, wie Sie (Vasubandhu) betonen.“¹⁰

Vasubandhu versucht die Stellung des Gegners zu erschüttern und sagt:

“Nach dem Standpunkt der Tatsache (*svabhāva*) muß das Leiden in drei Arten des Gefühls geteilt werden. Ich erkläre, daß das angenehme Gefühl in zwei Arten geteilt werden muß. Nach dem Standpunkt der Tatsache würde das angenehme Gefühl nichts anderes als dieses selbst sein. Nur deswegen würde es angenehm sein, weil es so erscheint. Nach einem anderen

Standpunkt, dem des Grundes (*paryāya*), würde das angenehme Gefühl unangenehm erscheinen. Denn vom buddhistischen Standpunkt aus muß es unstat und veränderlich sein."¹¹

Das Wesentliche des oben Gesagten kann folgendermaßen zusammengefaßt werden: Gegen jenen Einwand antwortet Vasubandhu seinem Gegner von zwei verschiedenen Aspekten des Gefühls aus, nämlich der Tatsache (*svabhāva*) und ihrem Grund (*paryāya*). Nach seiner Ansicht kann nicht geleugnet werden, daß es drei verschiedene Arten des Gefühls gibt, angenehme, unangenehme und indifferente Gefühle. Diese drei Arten des Gefühls stellen die empirischen Neigungen dar, die eine nicht zu leugnende Tatsache (*svabhāva*) sind.

Nach einer weiteren Ansicht Vasubandhu's müssen wir, wenn man den Grund des angenehmen Gefühls überdenkt, des angenehmen Gefühl als unangenehm erkennen, obwohl es als angenehm erscheint. Vasubandhu sagt, wie folgt:

„Sogar das angenehme Gefühl würde unangenehm genannt werden, sofern wir dessen Grund überdenken, denn das angenehme Gefühl muß eine andere Seite der Negation haben—alles muß vergänglich und veränderlich sein.“¹²

Das oben Gesagte zeigt uns, daß die beiden Begriffe *pariyāya* und *nippariyāya* in den Pāli-Texten der Theravāda-Schule den Begriffen *paryāya* und *svabhāva*¹³ in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule entsprechen, und daß ihnen in beiden Schulen die gleiche methodische Terminologie zukommt, Grund (*pariyāya*) einerseits, Tatsache (*nippariyāya* = *svabhāva*) andererseits.

4. Bedeutungen in den Mahāyāna-Texten

Die vorhergehenden Bemerkungen zeigten, daß die mittellindische Form „*nippariyāya*“, wie sie in der Theravāda-Schule erscheint, im buddhistischen Sanskrit fast ganz verloren gegangen ist, obwohl eine Andeutung des „*nippariyāya*“ in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule in der Form des *svabhāva* erhalten geblieben ist. Wie konnten sich aber dann die beiden Begriffe *pariyāya* und *nippariyāya* im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus entwickeln?

Was zunächst *niṣparyāya* (Pāli *nippariyāya*) betrifft, so finden wir diese Sanskritform nur durch Rückschluß in einem erhalten gebliebenen tibetischen Text, der epäter besprochen werden wird (vgl. Anm. 14). Hier möchte ich nur bemerken, daß die Sanskrit-

form *niṣparyāya* aus dem tibetischen *rnam graṅs ma yin* erschlossen wurde. Dieses finden wir in Bhavyas *Dbu mahi don bsdus pa* (Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha)¹⁴. Historisch gesehen ist es ein Fehlschluß, „*aparyāya*“ anstatt „*niṣparyāya*“ zu rekonstruieren, wie es verschiedene Gelehrte tun.

Was ferner *paryāya* betrifft, so liefert uns die Vijñānavāda-Schule bedeutungsvolle Bemerkungen über den Begriff des *paryāya*. Auch in diesem Falle möchte ich mich auf die methodische Bedeutung der „alternativen Bestimmung“ beschränken.

Nach der Lehre der Vijñānavāda-Schule sind nämlich die Mittel unserer Erkenntnis in drei Stufen zu klassifizieren.

Die erste Stufe der Erkenntnis ist die bloße Vorstellung in ihrer gemeinen Art. Diese ist nichts anderes als Illusion (*parikalpita*), denn sie hat keine Beziehung zur Wirklichkeit.

Die zweite Stufe der Erkenntnis, mit der wir die Existenz analysieren, wird die abhängige Entstehung (*paratantra*) genannt. Dies ist in der Relativitätstheorie (*pratītyasamutpāda*) begründet, nach der alles Reale keine Substantialität besitzt. Nach dieser Theorie kommt es darauf an, das Individuum seiner Substantialität zu entkleiden. Danach gibt es nichts Selbstexistierendes auf der Welt, denn eine reale Sache ist in ihrer Existenz immer von irgendetwas anderem abhängig.

Die dritte Stufe der Erkenntnis, mit der wir die tatsächliche Existenz erkennen, ist das Absolute (*pariṇiṣpanna*). Sie erkennt die Dinge, wie sie tatsächlich sind; denn jenseits der Betrachtung über Sein oder Nichtsein, die zur analytischen Erkenntnis gehört, taucht sie ins Absolute, wo der Unterschied zwischen Subjekt und Objekt überhaupt nicht besteht.

Der Mahāyānasamgraha Asaṅga's schildert die Beziehung zwischen diesen drei Stufen der Erkenntnis wie folgt:

„Im Hinblick auf den Grund (*rnam graṅs* im Tibetischen, *i-men* im Chinesischen) hat die abhängige Entstehung (*paratantra*) drei verschiedene Charakterzüge. Soweit die abhängige Entstehung als solche bestehen bleibt, kann sie mit anderem (d. h. *parikalpita* und *pariṇiṣpanna*) nicht vermischt werden.“¹⁵

Flüchtig betrachtet bedeutet das Wort *rnam graṅs* (*paryāya*) in diesem Zusammenhang nur die alternative Bestimmung, die schon im Pāli-Buddhismus erscheint. Aber ein tieferes Studium des

mahāyānistischen Denkens wird uns zu einer neuen Interpretation führen, einer Interpretation als Grund.

In seinem Kommentar zum Mahāyānasamgraha wirft Vasubandhu einen Lichtstrahl auf die methodische Bedeutung von *pariyāya* als Grund. Er folgert:

“Es muß folgendermaßen kommentiert werden: ‘Dies’ bedeutet das, was schon deutlich gemacht worden ist Es (*paratantra*) ist nichts anderes als *paratantra*-selbst, da es von solchen Gründen abhängig ist, wie Fesseln des Samens und die Unreinheit u. s. w.”¹⁶

In Bezug auf *parikalpita* kommentiert Vasubandhu diesen Punkt in gleicher Weise:

“Es (*parikalpita*) ist auch nichts anderes als *parikalpita* selbst, denn es ist von solchen Gründen abhängig, wie die analytische Erkenntnis der Realität und der Sonderheit.”¹⁷

In ähnlicher Weise bezieht sich Vasubandhu auf *pariniṣpanna*:

“*pariniṣpanna* ist von solchen Gründen abhängig, wie die Vollkommenheit der Realität und Reinheit.”¹⁸

Dieser Kommentar von Vasubandhu weist auf die Deutung von *pariyāya* als Grund, wodurch sich *paratantra* und *pariniṣpanna* zu *pariniṣpanna* und *paratantra* verändern kann. Aber nicht nur der Kommentator Vasubandhu, sondern auch der Verfasser Asaṅga selbst läßt diese Interpretation zu. Asaṅga verdeutlicht den Grund, warum *paratantra paratantra* als solches bleiben soll, wie folgt:

“Aus welchem Grund (*pariyāya*) soll *paratantra paratantra* als solches bleiben? Deshalb, weil die in unsere Seele eingepprägten Anlagen (*bija*) zutage treten.”¹⁹

Pariyāya, wie es in diesem Text behandelt wird, ist gerade der Grund, warum *paratantra paratantra* als solches bleiben soll. Dieser Grund ist der, daß die in unsere Seele eingepprägten Anlagen zutage treten.

Dieselbe tiefere Bedeutung von *pariyāya* als Grund finden wir auch in der chinesischen Übersetzung von Paramārtha. Huan-tsang übersetzt *pariyāya* mit *i-men*, Paramārtha mit *tao-li* (Grund). Diese tiefsinnige Übersetzung von Paramārtha untermauert meine Ansicht, schon deshalb, weil bei der Übersetzung von Paramārtha das Hauptgewicht auf der methodischen Bedeutung liegt.

Unter diesen Umständen können wir verstehen, daß *pariyāya*

auch im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus die methodische Bedeutung als terminus technicus zukommt, so daß Paramārtha's Übersetzung mit Grund (*tao-li*) lobend hervorgehoben werden muß. Denn damit wurde die inhärente Bedeutung ganz klar.

5. Chinesische und tibetische Übersetzungen

Die chinesischen Übersetzungen sind verschiedenartig²⁰. Man kann sie ihrer Bedeutung nach in zwei Gruppen einteilen:

1. In der Bedeutung „alternative Bestimmung“ eine Gruppe von fa-shu, i-men.
2. In der Bedeutung „definitive Bestimmung“ eine andere Gruppe von tao-li, pieh-tao-li.

Wie wir früher schon gesagt haben, wurde die Bedeutung der ersten Gruppe, nämlich die deskriptive Bedeutung, in dieser Abhandlung nicht besprochen, weil sie in allen buddhistischen Systemen immer in gleicher Weise benützt wird. Nur die Bedeutung der zweiten Gruppe wurde hier behandelt; denn ihr gebührt das Verdienst, mit ihrer methodischen Bedeutung eine neue Betrachtungsweise hervorgebracht zu haben.

Auch die tibetischen Übersetzungen sind in zwei Gruppen zu teilen:

1. *nam grāns* (die alternative Bestimmung)
2. *tshig bla dags* (die konventionelle Bedeutung).

Das tibetische *nam grāns* wird in der tibetischen Literatur immer als ein dem Sanskrit *paryāya* entsprechender Terminus gebraucht. Für das tibetische *tshig bla dags* gibt H.A. Jäschke folgende unklare Erklärung: "a primitive word, an abstract noun" (?) (A Tibetan-English Dictionary p. 383b).

Das tibetische Wort *tshig bla dags* ist ein in der klassischen Periode gebräuchliches Wort und bedeutet „klar“.²¹ Außerdem wird es als terminus technicus gebraucht. In diesem Fall bedeutet es „Schluß“. Wird z. B. in einer Diskussion etwas entgegnet, so sagt man *ses bya ba ni tshig bla dags* (d. h. es bedarf keiner Diskussion mehr darüber, deshalb, Schluß!). Nach dem praktischen Gebrauch dieses Wortes möchte ich ihm lieber den Sinn: „die konventionelle Bedeutung“ geben.

Die Beschäftigung mit allen diesen Übersetzungen führt ganz eindeutig zu dem Schluß, daß *paryāya* nur mit „Grund (*tao-li*)“ übersetzt werden kann und daß der Parallel-Begriff *niṣparyāya* auf die definitive Bestimmung hinweist²².

Das Bhāṣya dazu lautet:

Skt. [abhiḥṣṇaṃ cātra śūnyatā kathyate] bahubhiḥ ca paryāyais teṣu teṣu sūtrānteṣu. tasmād bhavitavyam atra mahatā prajojanena. (Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra p. 6).

Chin. to-men-shuo-che-pi-pi-ching-chung-to-men-i-shuo-hsien-ta yao-yung). (T. 31. p. 592 b 9f.).

Prof. Lévi behandelt *paryāya* gleich *men*. Aber das chinesische Wort *to-men* ist gleich *bahumukha* in der Kārikā, und dieses Wort *men* wurde im Bhāṣya hinzugefügt. Behandeln wir *paryāya* gleich *men*, der Arbeitsweise von Prof. Lévi folgend, was soll dann im Sanskrit dem chinesischen *i-shuo* entsprechen? Also hätte es *i-shuo* sein müssen, das dem *paryāya* entspricht.

Wir haben damit den Beweis, daß *paryāya* gleich dem chinesischen *i-shuo* gesetzt werden muß. Wie schon in Abschnitt 4 erwähnt, wurde *paryāya* gewöhnlich mit *yen-shuo* oder häufig mit *i-men* übersetzt. Daher können wir uns *paryāya* möglicherweise aus *i* und *shuo* zu *i-shuo* zu-sammengesetzt denken.

Nach alledem ist klar, daß *paryāya* hier mit *i-shuo* gleichzusetzen ist, und nicht mit *men* allein, wie es Prof. Lévi tat.

Zum Schluß möchte ich noch meinen besonderen Dank Herrn Dr. Hermann Kopp, Heidelberg, aussprechen, der freundlicherweise die Mitkorrektur der vorliegenden Arbeit übernommen hat.

NOTES

1. Auf diesen Punkt hat mich Prof. S.K. Belvalkar (Poona) hingewiesen.
2. Vinayapīṭaka I, 16, 45; Dīghanikāya I. 174; Majjhimanikāya I. 24; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (ed. H. Kern und B. Nanjio) S. 110, 8; Mahāvastu I. 13 u. s. w.
3. Sammohavinodanī S. 94.
4. Atthasālinī (ed. P.V. Bapat, Poona 1942) 3. 484, 486, 652; 4. 20; Visuddhimagga S. 473, 499 u. s. w.
5. Atthasālinī 3. 484.
6. Sammohavinodanī S. 94.
7. Das Gegensatzpaar *pariyāya*—*nippariyāya* erscheint in den Abhidhamma Kommentaren, aber im Kanon nicht, z. B. „*magga-phalanibbānabhedo hi navavidho pi lokuttaradhammo nippariyāyadhammo nibbaṭṭhitadhammo yeva, na kenaci pariyāyena kāraṇena vā lesena vā dhammo*“ (Papañcasūdanī I. 89); „*āmisam pi duvidham: nippariyāyāmisam pariyāyāmisam ti*“ (Ibid. I. 89); „*samassamo ti samo eva hutvā samo. Nippariyāyena. sadiṣo te tuyham natthi*“ (Vimānavatthuattakathā IV. 320); „*Atha vā ti yathāvutten'eva nayena vihesam bhāvitattānam 'karonto' ti pāṭhaseso veditabbo, evan nippariyāyam eva sāmivacanam vijjhati*“ (Paramatthajotikā II. 310).

Es erscheint auch in nichtkanonischen Quellen, wie „*asesavacanam idam, nissesavacanam idam, nippariyayavacanam idam na'tth' añño navamo hetu mahato bhūmicālassa pātubhāvāya*“ (Milindapañha 113 etc.).

Vielfältig sind die Ausdrücke, die in den Übersetzungen von Pālitexten für *pariyāya*—*nippariyāya* gegeben werden. Diese Termini im Dīpavaṃsa S. 38 „*pariyāyadesitañ cāpi atho nippariyāyadesitaṃ, nitatthañ c' eva neyya-tthaṃ ajānitvāna bhikkhavo*...“ sind von den verschiedenen Übersetzern folgendermaßen übertragen worden:

Oldenberg: „long expositions“ (*pariyāya*) und „without exposition (*nip-pariyāya*). (Dīpavaṃsa. Engl. Trl. p. 140).

James d'Alwis: „general discourses“ (*pariyāya*) und „discourses delivered on particular occasions“ (*nippariyāya*). (An Introduction to Kachchāyana's Grammar, Colombo 1863, p. 66).

B.C. Law: „original (meaning)“ (*pariyāya*) und „apparent meaning“ (*nippariyāya*). (The Dīpavaṃsa, The Ceylon Historical Journal VII, July and Oct. 1957 nos. 1—4).

Diese Übersetzungen treffen nicht den genauen Sinn des Gegensatzpaares *pariyāya*—*nippariyāya*. Demgegenüber gibt Trenckner die instruktive dänische Übersetzung für *nippariyāya*: den strenge Methode, precision, strengt systematisk Udtryk“ (strict method, precision, strict systematic expression) (Trenckner's slips, Königliche Dänische Akademie Bibliothek, Kopenhagen); H. Kern übersetzt denselben Terminus auf Holländisch mit: „niet te wenden, onveranderlijk“ (nicht zu ändern, unveränderlich) (Kern' Addenda Vol. I. p. 176).

In Übereinstimmung mit diesen Übersetzungen von Trenckner und Kern wird unser Wort (*nippariyāya*) auch nur Bezeichnung für die definitive Bestimmung oder die absolute Methode verwendet.

Ich benütze diese Gelegenheit, um Herrn Prof. L.L. Hammerich, meinen Dank auszusprechen, dem Vorsitzenden der Kommission für „A Critical Pāli Dictionary“ (Königliche Dänische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Kopenhagen, Dänemark), der mir hiefür die materielle Basis geboten hat; ferner Herrn Möller-Kristensen, Frau Pauly aus Dänemark und Dr. Boliée aus Holland, die mir wertvolle Hilfe gewidmet haben.

8. Der Terminus *saṃskāra* ist ein zentraler Begriff des Buddhismus und hat in den Pāli- und Sanskrit-Quellen mehrfache Bedeutung. Drei Bedeutungen für *saṃskāra* gibt das Pāli-English Dictionary der Pāli Text Society an: 1. Aggregate of the conditions or essential properties for a given process or result...; 2. One of the five *khandhas*...; 3. Life, physical or material life... the world of phenomena... Die Bedeutung von *saṃskāra* unter den drei Arten des Leidens ist 'the world of phenomena' oder Seinserscheinungen, aber nicht *saṃskāra* als eine Eigenschaft der *skandha*, d. h. 'Triebkräfte'. In Bezug auf *saṃskāra* als Phänomen siehe Saṃyuttanikāya 55, 3, 8 V p. 345; Majjhimanikāya 115 III p. 64; Anguttaranikāya I, 15, 13. p. 26f.; 6, 98 III p. 441f. etc. Die Bedeutung von *saṃskāra* unter den drei Arten des Leidens in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule ist dieselbe.

9. Taisho Vol. 29, p. 114b, 116b. Lalita Vistara (ed. S. Lefmann, Halle 1902 und 1908)..... Saddharmapuṇḍarika (ed. H. Kern und B. Nanjio) p. 108, 17f.

10. Taisho Vol. 29, p. 115 a 28-b 4 (in der Übersetzung von L. de la Vallée Poussin VI, S. 131).

11. Taisho Vol. 29, p. 115 b 4-10 (bei Vallée Poussin VI, S. 132).

12. Taisho Vol. 29, p. 115 b 18f. (bei Vallée Poussin VI, S. 132).

13. *tasmāt santy eva svabhāvas tisro vedanāḥ* (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo 1932—1938, S. 519). Die *'tisro vedanāḥ'* sind *duḥkha*, *sukha* und *aduḥkha-asukha*. Diese Gefühle sind gerade die empirische psychologische Tatsache, i.e. *svabhāva* (*nippariyāya* in Pāli).

14. Der tibetische Text des Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha von, Bhavya steht in der Roten Ausgabe von Peking nach dem Exemplar der Otani Universität. Kyoto, im 19. Band des Tanjur fol. 380 b 5-381 u 7. Er besteht aus einem Śloka und einer 13-zeiligen Kārikā. Über die Verfasserschaft siehe P. Vaidya, *Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥśataka*, p. 51-52. Pandit Aiyaswāmi Śāstri's rekonstruierter Sanskrittext gibt irrtümlicher Weise *aparyāya* statt *niṣparyāya* (*rnam graṇs med pa*) (Siehe JORM Bd. 5/1931). Fragen wir uns, worum es sich handelt, so werden in diesem Text zwei Arten von Wahrheit besprochen, nämlich *paryāyaparamārtha* und *niṣparyāyaparamārtha*. Was ist nun die Bedeutung dieser beiden Arten der Wahrheit? Nach der Meinung Bhavya's bedeutet *paryāyaparamārtha* die relative Wahrheit, die nur vom logischen Denken (*rigs pa rnam graṇs don dam*) abhängig ist. *Niṣparyāyaparamārtha* dagegen bedutet die absolute Wahrheit, wobei alle weltlichen Tätigkeiten (*spros pa thams cad kyis ston pa*) und damit die beiden Extreme von Sein und Nichtsein schlechthin aufgehoben sind (*yod paḥi mthaḥ dan med paḥi mthaḥ gñis po thams cad spanḥ pa*). Diese Auslegungen bezeugen uns, daß *niṣparyāya* eine Tatsache bedeutet, wo alle die verschiedenen Fesseln ganz beseitigt werden sollen. Deshalb soll allein der *niṣparyāyaparamārtha* die Wahrheit als solche genannt werden.

15. Mahāyānasamgraha, herausg. von G. Sasaki S. 40 (in der Übersetzung von Ét. Lamotte II § 23).

16. Taisho Vol. 31, p. 190 c 17ff.

17. Ibid. p. 190 c 21ff.

18. Ibid. p. 190 c 25ff.

19. Mahāyānasamgraha S. 37 (bei Lamotte II § 17).

20. fa-shu, lui-shu, wu-shu, ming-mu, i-men (Mahāvīyūtpatti, No. 1279, 1416, 2511 usw.); yen-shuo (Laṅkāvatārasūtra SWT. 43,73, usw.); i-ming (Ibid. 192, SW); pieh-i-chih, ming) (Ibid. 192 T.); i-shuo) (Taisho Vol. 31, p. 592 b; Mahāyānasamgraha (ed. G. Sasaki) p. 40 usw.; Abhidharmakośa, Taisho Vol. 29, p. 14 a. p. 91 b, p. 115 b.)

21. Ich benütze hier einen Hinweis, den ich dem tibetischen Lama Rakra in Poona, wo ich 1955 war, verdanke.

22. Prof. Sylvain Lévi ist bestimmt ein Mißgriff unterlaufen, als er *'paryāya'* dem chinesischen *'men'* gleichsetzte (siehe Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, tome II, S. 14, A). Der Abschnitt, der von ihm falsch aufgefaßt wurde, ist der folgende:

Skt. *vicitrasyākhyānād dhruvakathanayogād bahumukhāt*

(Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra Kr. 15b. p. 6)

Chin. wu p'i-chung-chung-shuo-hsü-shuo-to

(Taisho Vol. 31, p. 592 a 25)

Appendix II

INDISCHE GRUNDLAGE DES JAPANISCHEN BUDDHISMUS

Angesichts der langen und vielschichtigen Entwicklung des Buddhismus ist es nicht immer leicht, die ursprüngliche Lehre, so wie sie den alten Schulen des Buddhismus eigen ist, aufzuspüren. Es kann jedoch kein Zweifel darüber bestehen, daß die buddhistischen Lehren von *Anātman* (Nicht-Selbst) und von *Karman* (Tat) aus sehr alter Zeit stammen, und sich wahrscheinlich bis in den ältesten Buddhismus in Indien zurückverfolgen lassen. Wir versuchen im folgenden im Hinblick auf die ursprünglichen Lehren des älteren Buddhismus die Grundanschauungen von Zen und Shin darzulegen.

In der *Anātman*-Lehre analysiert der Buddhismus das Individuum als eine Folge von psycho-physischen Faktoren und leugnet die Existenz eines ewigen Selbst, das psychologischen Seinsweisen zugrunde liegt¹. Die erfolgreiche Negierung eines ewigen Selbst bringt die Befreiung vom Verhaftetsein mit sich, bringt Nirvāṇa. Die Lösung dieser Bindung beendet das menschliche Leid. Der Buddhismus war gezwungen, in seiner geschichtlichen Umwelt, in welcher die Nicht-Buddhisten sich mit dem Vorhandensein eines ewigen Selbst oder Brahman beschäftigten, ein eigenes, auf der Logik der Negation basierendes Gedankengebäude zu errichten.

Jedoch ist der Zweck buddhistischer Negation weniger reine Negation als die positive Absicht, auf das Absolute hinzuweisen.² In Übereinstimmung mit den historischen Notwendigkeiten brachte der spätere chinesische Buddhismus dieses System der Negation zur vollen Entfaltung, indem er bis zur Erklärung der in der logischen Negation implizierten religiösen Erfahrung zurückging. Im chinesischen Buddhismus hat die Negation die größte Entfaltung erfahren und so den Begriff der Leere (*śūnyatā*) im Zen-Buddhismus gefördert, wobei jedoch bemerkt werden muß, daß Zen der *Karman*-Lehre keine Beachtung schenkte.

Der Buddhismus schuf seine eigene *Karman*-Vorstellung in Übereinstimmung mit dem indischen Glauben an eine durch *Karman* bedingte Wiedergeburt. Hinsichtlich dieses *Karman* herrschen

unter den traditionellen indischen Schulen die verschiedensten Ansichten. Einmal verstand man *Karman* ganz konkret als eine Art Schmutzflecken, der durch magische Zeremonien beseitigt werden kann. Zum anderen interpretierte man *Karman* intellektuell als Irrtum, der durch das Wissen (*vidyā*) behoben wird. Religiös sah man in *Karman* einen Verstoß gegen das Göttliche. In allen diesen Ansichten wurde *Karman* gleichermaßen als etwas empfunden, das in eigener Anstrengung und Kraft beseitigt werden muß.

Der Shin-Buddhismus schließlich interpretierte *Karman* als Widerspruch menschlicher Existenz, dem niemand mit eigener Kraft entrinnen kann. Befreiung erfolgt durch das Erbarmen Amidas, nicht auf Grund ritueller oder magischer Macht. So legt der Shin Buddhismus viel Wert auf eine Ausarbeitung der *Karman*-Lehre.

Unser Versuch soll die enge Beziehung der beiden Gedankenströme zum indischen Buddhismus aufzeigen.

Die ältere buddhistische Philosophie

Ansatzpunkt der Philosophie des älteren Buddhismus (*nikāya*-Buddhismus) war der Grundsatz der Negierung eines Ego. Die Vorstellung vom Selbst im alten Buddhismus umfaßte nicht nur menschliche Wesen, sondern auch nichtmenschliche. Das Selbst wird im frühen Buddhismus als konkret reales Sein, unveränderlich und ewig, verstanden³. Nach buddhistischer Auffassung wird das Leid in der menschlichen Existenz durch ein ständiges Verhaftetsein an ein als unveränderlich aufgefaßtes Sein verursacht, das in der Vorstellung des *Anātman* (Nicht-Selbst) zum Ausdruck kommt. Vielfach wurde aus dieser negativen Form, *Anātman*, deduziert, daß der buddhistische Standpunkt pessimistisch sei. In der Hoffnung, hierin den Schlüssel zu einer positiven Interpretation der buddhistischen Lebenshaltung zu finden, enttäuscht, wurde dann der Buddhismus als unpassend und pessimistisch verdammt. Im Hinblick auf die bloße negative Form mag diese Ansicht zutreffend sein. Aber das Urteil des Buddhismus: „Alle Wesen sind *Anātman*“ ist mehr als eine philosophische Lehre. Es ist eine praktische, sofort faßbare Vorstellung. Sie bedeutet, frei zu sein von der dualistischen Sicht, aus welcher alle Unordnung entsteht.

Die buddhistische Negierung des Nicht-Selbst ist keine logische

Negierung, sondern verneint lediglich ein Verhaftetsein mit den Dingen dieser Welt, womit jedoch weder der Verlust von irgendetwas, noch ein Sein abseits des Selbst ausgedrückt werden soll. Es ist die erfahrungsmäßige Negierung sowohl der Leugnung wie auch der Affirmation der beiden Faktoren, auf die sich logisch unterscheidendes Denken stützt. *Anātman* sollte daher eher positiv als negativ verstanden werden. Essentiell ist dieser Begriff nichts anderes als *Karman*. Jedes existierende Ding besteht aus einer Vielzahl von *Karmans* ohne eigenen realen Seinsgehalt. *Karman*-Kennzeichnung ist gleich der *Anātman*-Lehre. *Karman* ist der Bereich, in dem *Anātman* sich offenbart, während die *Karman*-Verbindungen die Konstituenten einer menschlichen, des Seins entleerten Welt darstellen. Zwischen *Karman* und *Anātman* besteht eine Kongruenz. Die Erkenntnis der durch *Karman* bedingten Welt ist zugleich die des *Anātman*. Die Vorstellungen von *Karman* und *Anātman* beziehen sich also auf ein und dieselbe Tatsache, lediglich von verschiedenen Standpunkten aus betrachtet.

Karman in seiner Beziehung zu *Anātman* bedeutet Funktion ohne Sein. *Karman* wird seiner Natur nach als *cetanā* (Denken) bezeichnet. *Cetanā* als Denken ist keine hypothetische Formulierung des Seins. Es impliziert die Funktion des *Karman*, worauf sich Ordnung und Unordnung der menschlichen Welt gründen. Die menschliche Welt ist weder von einem Schöpfer noch vom Menschen geschaffen: sie existiert lediglich durch eine Ansammlung von *Karman* ohne Seinswert.

Die echte Einheit zwischen *Karman* und *Anātman* wird von Buddhaghosa, dem großen Kommentator des *Abhidharma*-Buddhismus, in seinem Werk *Visuddhismagga* erklärt:

„Eine Folge ist nicht in *Karman* noch außerhalb von *Karman*. *Karman* kennt keine Folge, noch auch ist eine Folge in *Karman* zu finden.

Vielmehr ist es *Karman* und nichts anderes, wodurch eine Folge entsteht“.

Der Ausdruck: „Noch auch ist eine Folge in *Karman* zu finden, vielmehr ist es *Karman* und nichts anderes“ deutet darauf hin, daß das *Karman* aus der Vorstellung des *Anātman* konzipiert wurde. Durch die *Karman*-Welt enthüllt sich *Anātman* dem Menschen, und zwar nur deswegen, weil er sich seines Lebens in der

Karman-Welt bewußt wird. Die Welt, die menschliche und die nicht-menschliche, ist von *Karman* gebildet⁵. Anders ausgedrückt: jeder Teil unseres Körpers und Geistes besteht aus *Karman*. Körper und Geist können auf *Karman*-Teile in drei Zeitabschnitten zurückgeführt werden: Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft. Was existiert, ist lediglich die Funktion von *Karman*. *Karman* impliziert notwendigerweise Funktion, was in allen Phasen des menschlichen Lebens zutage tritt. Sich des *Karman* bewußt sein, bedeutet, sich der Wahrheit bewußt sein, daß in Wirklichkeit nichts existiert, d. h. der buddhistischen Wahrheit des *Anātman*. Deshalb wurde die Welt geschaffen durch menschliche und nicht-menschliche Aktionen oder Funktionen, ohne Anfang und ohne Ende.

Wir sehen, daß die *Karman*-Lehre und die des *Anātman* aus derselben Erfahrung entspringen. Die Doktrin vom *Anātman* erklärt die Welt in negativer Weise, während die *Karman*-Lehre sie in positiver Weise erklärt. So beseitigt die *Anātman*-Doktrin die oberflächliche Auffassung einer Welt als unveränderlicher Existenz, während die *Karman*-Lehre die Welt als dynamische Funktion auffaßt. Beide Theorien stellen ein und dieselbe Tatsache dar. Die *Karman*-Lehre ist das Gegenstück zur Theorie des *Anātman*.

Dieses Verhältnis zwischen *Karman* und *Anātman* stellt in Indien einen bedeutsamen Abschnitt in der Entwicklung der buddhistischen Philosophie dar. Indische Buddhisten suchten auf kontemplativem Wege, d. h. durch Meditation nach einer Synthese der *Karman*-Theorien und der Theorie des *Anātman*. Diese Einheit wird auf der praktischen Seite durch Meditation erfahren und auf der theoretischen Seite durch eine metaphysische Interpretation geklärt.

Auf der Basis der Einheit von *Karman* und *Anātman* wurde der indische Buddhismus auf chinesischen und japanischen Boden transformiert und entwickelt. In China bildeten sich zwei Denkweisen: Zen- und Jōdo-Buddhismus; hauptsächlich aus dem letzteren entsprang dann der Shin-Buddhismus.

Zen und Anātman

Wie vorher erwähnt, legt der indische Buddhismus großes Gewicht darauf, sich mittels Kontemplation praktisch des *Anātman* bewußt zu werden.⁶ Kontemplation erhielt sich bis in die heutige

Zeit in Zen als eine Askesetechnik und als Teil seiner mystischen Psychologie. Chinesischer Zen (*Ch'an*) jedoch lenkt das Augenmerk auf die praktische Seite des Lebens. Durch seine Beschreibung der Begierden des menschlichen Lebens und der Welt, wie sie sich gefühlsmäßig darstellt, hat der Zen-Buddhismus in China zur Entwicklung der buddhistischen Ontologie Bedeutendes beigetragen.

Der indische Buddhismus befaßt sich mit dem Problem, wie sich menschliche Wesen verzeitlichen (*anityatā*) oder entäußern (*anātman*). Zen-Buddhismus jedoch interpretiert in positiver Weise die Theorie des *Anātman* als einen Ausdruck der Emanzipation.⁷ Emanzipation wird in dem Zen-Ausdruck *wu nien* (Nicht-Bewußtsein), einem psychologischen Terminus, ausgedrückt. Er erläutert die Theorie des *Anātman* in psychologischer Weise, durch die der Mensch Einsicht in die geistige Welt gewinnen kann.⁸ Der chinesische buddhistische Mönch Hui-neng (?—713) erklärt „Nicht-Bewußtsein“ wie folgt:

„Was ist ‚Nicht-Bewußtsein‘? Es bedeutet, alle Dinge zu sehen, so wie sie sind, und nirgends gebunden zu sein. Es bedeutet, überall gegenwärtig zu sein und doch nirgends verhaftet zu sein... Derjenige, der die Lehren des Nicht-Bewußtseins versteht, hat die gründlichste Kenntnis aller Dinge. Der, der die Lehren des Nicht-Bewußtseins versteht, sieht in den geistigen Bereich der Buddhas.“

Wir sehen hier, daß Zen nicht allein die Negation des Selbst lehrt, so wie in Indien, sondern das Eindringen in die geistige Welt. In China entwickelte Zen ein einzigartiges Konzept vom Nicht-Bewußtsein. Wenn es auch negativ klingt, ist es doch im wahrsten Sinne der positive Ausdruck eines geistigen Ziels: „den geistigen Bereich der Buddhanatur zu sehen.“

Der negative Ausdruck im Zen basiert auf der alt-buddhistischen Vorstellung, daß man die Dinge in negativer Weise von vier Aspekten aus betrachten solle: Unbeständigkeit (*p. anicca*), Leiden (*p. dukkha*), Selbstlosigkeit (*p. anatta*) und Unreinheit (*p. asubha*). Auf der anderen Seite ist der positive Ausdruck auf die (positive) Mahāyāna-Vorstellung gegründet, die jener ersten entgegensteht, daß man nämlich die Dinge unter vier Gesichtspunkten in positiver Weise sehen solle: Beständigkeit (*nitya*), Lust (*sukha*), Selbst (*ātman*) und Reinheit (*śubha*). Es ist offensichtlich, daß die negativen wie auch positiven Zen-Ausdrücke

genau jenen beiden historischen Entwicklungen des Buddhismus, dem älteren Buddhismus und dem Mahāyāna, entsprechen.

Buddhanatur durchdringt alle Dinge, menschliche und nicht-menschliche. Dies zu erfassen heißt, über eine folgegebundene Tat (*karman*) hinauszugehen und einen Bereich zu betreten, der absolut frei von Begierden und Regungen ist. Das ist das echte Leben in der Einheit mit dem Universum. Es wird auf der Stelle verwirklicht und braucht keine Rechtfertigung seiner selbst dadurch, daß es nach irgend etwas Transzendenten suchte. Die Erfahrung von *sūnyatā* bedeutet nichts Wertloses.¹⁰ Allegorisch gesprochen, impliziert sie die Freiheit der Wolken, die nirgends hinziehen, der Bergflüsse, die still dahinfließen, der Vögel im Wald, die für niemanden singen, und der an den Strand brandenden Wellen. Hier fehlt alles Wollen und Streben.

So verleugnet der Ausdruck „Die Buddhanatur in allen Dingen sehen“ nicht das menschliche Leben und die Welt als solche. Abgelehnt wird nur das Verhaftetsein mit dem Leben und der Welt. Zen verwirft Askese und Selbstpeinigung, Pessimismus und Melancholie. Man muß die Welt genießen als der Buddhanatur teilhaftig und diese Freude ist durch die buddhistische Haltung gegenüber dem Leben ausgedrückt. Aus dem gleichen Grunde entwickelte Zen Künste wie Kalligraphie, Tuschmalerei, Teezeremonie u. ä. In solchen Künsten können wir uns der Realität des Dharma und der Freude am Leben bewußt werden.

„Nicht-Bewußtsein“ ist also positive Einstellung zum Leben. Chinesischer Zen lehrte, daß die menschlichen Begierden nicht direkt unterdrückt werden können, sondern in geistige Ziele transformiert werden müssen. Der Mensch muß wissen, was das Leben wirklich ist, bevor er es leugnet. In diesem Punkt ist Zen der chinesisch-taoistischen Mentalität nahe, die ebenfalls in der frohen Bejahung des Lebens gipfelt. Zen und Taoismus haben stets gleichermaßen der buddhistischen Wertschätzung des Universums große Bedeutung beigelegt. Wir dürfen die Tatsache nicht übersehen, daß Zen in China für seine geistige Entwicklung günstige Bedingungen in jener Atmosphäre vorfand, die den Taoismus geformt hatte.

Das Wort „Nicht-Bewußtsein“ ist jedoch vom psychologischen Terminus „unbewußt“ zu trennen. In der gegenwärtigen Psychologie ist „unbewußt“ ein psychischer Faktor, verborgen in den Tiefen des Geistes, der gewisse Naturinstinkte beinhaltet. Man

wird sich dieses Unbewußten selten bewußt, obwohl es große Teile unseres Benehmens beeinflußt. Im Zen-Buddhismus jedoch bedeutet „Nicht-Bewußtsein“ weit mehr. Wie oben ausgeführt, bedeutet es nicht weniger als Befreiung.

„Nicht-Bewußtsein“ muß ebenso von wissenschaftlicher Einsicht unterschieden werden. Wissenschaft kann die Wahrheit mittels Intuition erreichen: „Die Dinge zu sehen, so wie sie sind“, ist das Ziel wissenschaftlicher Bemühungen. Wissenschaft zielt auf die Durchdringung des Äußeren, um zur inneren Natur der Dinge zu gelangen. In diesem Zusammenhang scheinen Wissenschaft und Zen von der gleichen Art zu sein. Wissenschaftliche Intuition jedoch ist etwas Tentatives, ist ungefähre Annäherung, welche Zusammenfassen und Untersuchen auf einem größeren Maßstab benötigt. Intuition im Zen-Buddhismus andererseits ist die fehlerlose und sofortige Erfassung der Wirklichkeit.

Der Begriff: „Alle Dinge zu sehen, so wie sie sind“ (*p. yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti*) kann bis zur altbuddhistischen Vorstellung von *p. yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti*, „Dinge zu kennen, wie sie sind“¹¹, zurückverfolgt werden. Letzteres bedeutet auch Selbstlosigkeit oder selbstlose Anstrengungen¹² („*anābhoga dharmatā*“) Buddha definiert die Wahrheit (*yathābhūtaṃ*) als das Sehen der Dinge, so wie sie wirklich sind, das Gegenteil als Sehen der Dinge, so wie sie nicht sind.

Der Pali-Ausdruck „*bhūtaṃ*“, von der Wurzel *bhū* kommend, das „sein“, „werden“ bedeutet, bezeichnet die Vergangenheit. Zugleich bezeichnet er im Buddhismus die Wahrheit. Die letztere Bedeutung ist in vedischen Texten nicht zu finden. Das *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* verwendet das Wort *bhūtaṃ* (*Aitareya Br.* 4, 6; 5, 30; 6, 9 etc.), aber es bedeutet nicht Wahrheit. Der Gebrauch von *bhūtaṃ* im Sinne von „Wahrheit“ in Pälitexten ist aus verschiedenen Stellen ersichtlich. (*Sn* 387; *Pva* 34 etc.). In buddhistischen Sanskrit-texten ist es synonym zu *satya*, was Wahrheit bedeutet (*satyavādin*, *bhūtavādin*. *Dbh* 23 vl; *Sp.* 29.9; *Divy* 527.20; *Mv* iii.112.11 etc.). Weiterhin verwendet ein tibetischer Text den Satz *dharmāṇāṃ bhūtapratyavekṣā* (die richtige Beobachtung der dharma)s¹³. *Bhūtaṃ* wird ins Tibetische übersetzt als *yañ dag pa ji lta ba bśin du*. *Yañ dag* entspricht dem Sanskrit *samyak*, in der Bedeutung „wahr“, „recht“.

So bedeutet der Palisatz *yathābhūtaṃ* „die Wahrheit sehen“ oder „die wahre Natur der Dinge sehen“. Er bezeichnet die

Erfahrung der Realität in der Soheit und könnte dem biblischen Ausdruck der Unschuld entsprechen.

Das Urteil eines Zen-Gläubigen basiert auf seiner eigenen religiösen Erfahrung, welche jedoch wiederum auf der der Zen-Meister aufbaut¹⁴. Die buddhistische Tradition wird in sich selbst als ein Urteil und ein Kriterium verstanden. Weil es buddhistische Tradition ist, gibt man sich damit zufrieden. Daß der Tradition solch hoher Wert beigemessen wird, ist ebenso charakteristisch für Zen wie für seine wissenschaftliche Entwicklung im Laufe der Jahrhunderte. Schon in der alt-indischen Zeit finden wir wiederholt die Tatsache, daß Kommentatoren den Text in voller Länge zitieren und ihn dann auslegen, ihn aber nicht im Detail kritisieren. Dies ist das Merkmal der Tradition, wie sie von einem Kommentator, z.B. Hemacandra, definiert wird als *ṭikā nīrantarā vyākhyā pañjikā padabhañjika* (zitiert in *Vācaspatyam*). Trat ein Gegner auf und leugnete die Gültigkeit des Arguments, so wählte er die Aussage in einem feststehenden anerkannten Sūtra als Basis seiner Ablehnung; denn das Axiom (die Buddha-Lehre) blieb immer bestehen. Was immer Maitreya gelehrt hat, ist das Wort Buddhas (*yat kiṃ cin Maitreya subhāṣitamād buddhavacanam*)¹⁵.

Indischer Intellektualismus und Shin-Buddhismus

Die indischen Metaphysiker gingen in eine philosophische Richtung. Alle existierenden Dinge wurden als nicht-substantiell, widersprüchlich und leer betrachtet. Selbst die letzte Realität wurde gleicherweise als leer, unbeschreibbar betrachtet. So war die Lehre des indischen Buddhismus oft als *śūnyavāda*, Doktrin der Leere, bekannt. Diese philosophische Haltung gegenüber den Dingen wurde auch auf die Vorstellung von *Karman* angewandt. *Karman* war die Konstituente des menschlichen Geistes und Körpers, welche ihrerseits unsubstantiell und leer waren. Die *Karman*-Theorie war lediglich eine Methode, um die Insubstantialität der Dinge aufzuzeigen¹⁶.

Die intellektuellen Strömungen mündeten, parallel mit der Formalisierung religiöser Institutionen, im Glauben an ein Absolutes. Man glaubte, daß das Absolute die Essenz der phänomenalen Welt ausmache. Mit dem philosophischen Hintergrund und der Doktrin der Leere hielt man es für notwendig, ein Absolutes zu postulieren, das als Amitābha (das unbegrenzte Licht und

Leben) beschrieben wurde. Im Shin Buddhismus wird Amitābha mit Nirvāṇa und mit der essentiellen Natur der Buddhas identifiziert.

Die religiöse und verehrende Haltung gegenüber Amitābha wurde auf die Konzeption des *Karman* angewandt. *Karman* ist nicht mehr ein Irrtum, der durch wahres Wissen beseitigt wird, so wie er es in der indischen Sündenauffassung war, sondern ist nun im Shin-Buddhismus die menschliche Existenz als solche, die nicht durch eigene Kraft zerstört werden kann. Ebenso wenig ist es ein persönliches Vergehen, das von einem Vatergott vergeben werden müßte. Denn das höchste Wesen wurde als eine reale und substantielle Entität betrachtet, welches von den indischen Metaphysikern in der Theorie der Nicht-Substantialität (Doktrin der Leere) verneint worden war. Indem so die Existenz jeglicher Art von Gott geleugnet wurde, war im Shin-Buddhismus auch kein Platz für Gebete. Da *Karman* zum eigentlichen Wesen des Menschen gehört, können eigene Anstrengungen nicht zur Erlösung führen. Stattdessen ist lediglich die Konzentration des Geistes auf Amitābha das überragende Heilmittel gegen alles Übel, sei es physischer oder moralischer Art. Allein der ständige Gedanke an Amitābha, selbst der durch Haß motivierte, führt zur Erlösung. Das Mitleid des Amitābha für die *Karman*-bedingte menschliche Existenz kann selbst in einem bösen Herzen entzündet werden, welches dann aber durch dieses Mitleid in Rechtfchaffenheit verwandelt wird. Die religiöse Haltung des Shin-Buddhismus wird von seinem Gründer Shinran im *Tannishō* verdeutlicht. Die Übersetzung des ganzen Absatzes mag dazu dienen, Shinrans devotionale Stärke im Glauben aufzuzeigen.

“Es ist ein großer Irrtum anzunehmen, daß ich [Shinran] andere Wege konnte, die zu Amitābhas Reinem Land führen als die Wiederholung seines Namens (*nembutsu*); und auch die Annahme, ich sei ein gelehrter Mann. Wenn ihr andere Wege zur Wiedergeburt in seinem Reinen Land kennenlernen wollt, dann geht besser in die Tempel in Nara und auf den Berg Hiei, wo viele gelehrte Leute leben. Indem ich dem Rat eines geistlichen *Guru*, Hönen, folge, glaube ich ganz einfach, daß wir sicherlich durch Amitābha gerettet werden, wenn wir seinen Namen anrufen. Ich weiß nicht einmal, ob die Wiederholung seines Namens mich in die Hölle oder ins Reine Land bringen

wird. Selbst wenn ich durch Hönen betrogen worden wäre, und durch die Wiederholung von Amitābhas Namen in die Hölle käme, würde ich niemals bereuen, das *nembutsu* zu beten. Diejenigen, die versuchten, durch eigene Anstrengung Erleuchtung zu erlangen, werden vielleicht, wenn sie einmal in der Hölle sind, das *nembutsu*-Beten bereuen. Ich aber bin weit entfernt, eigene Anstrengungen zu meiner Erleuchtung zu machen. Deswegen könnte es sein, daß mir schon die Hölle als mein Aufenthaltsort bestimmt ist". (*Tannisho*, Kap. 2).

Shin-Buddhismus hat eine starke Ausrichtung auf den Glauben; die Konzentration des Geistes auf die Gnade Amitābhas bringt diese Haltung gut zum Ausdruck. Eine solche Einstellung fehlt in der Tradition des indischen Buddhismus nicht, gewinnt aber allmählich größere Intensität im japanischen Shin-Buddhismus, wo sie sogar die Übung der formellen Verehrung und die eigene Anstrengung ersetzte, und sich auf das große Mitleid des Amitābha richtete.

Das *Tannishō* vermerkt weiter:

"Je mehr wir deswegen weiter fortschreiten, desto mehr kommen wir dahin, auf die erlösende Kraft des großen Gelübdes (des Mitleids des Amitābha) zu vertrauen; denn nur aus einem solchen Vertrauen heraus entsteht spontan eine Gesinnung der Hingabe und Nachsicht". (Kap. 16).

Dieser Hinweis des Shin-Buddhismus stellt nicht nur einen metaphysischen Wechsel im Vergleich zu den Glaubensvorstellungen indischer Buddhisten dar, sondern auch eine Formalisierung religiösen Sehens, religiöser Intuition. Vom indischen intellektualismus, in welchem Gott im eigentlichen Sinne unbedeutend war, entwickelte sich der Shin-Buddhismus zu einer Religion, die der theistischen gleichkam, was beweist, daß eine Religion mit der intellektuellen Forderung nach Selbsterlösung schwerlich auf lange Sicht bestehen kann.

Auf der Grundlage der indischen Tradition scheint ein Widerspruch zu bestehen zwischen dem Shin-Buddhismus, der eine Haltung liebender Gläubigkeit zum Ausdruck bringt, und der indischen Doktrin von der Leere, worin die Insubstantialität der Dinge betont wird. Es wird sich jedoch zeigen, daß in der Doktrin der Leere die Zerstörung der Substantialität lediglich eine Vorstufe

ist zur Aufnahme von Amitābhas „Mitleid“ (*karuṇa*). Nach der Doktrin der Leere kann über die Substantialität, die letzte Realität oder das Absolute nichts ausgesagt werden als dies, daß da irgendetwas Unbekanntes vorliege. Dieses Unbekannte jedoch wird in der spirituellen Erfahrung als aus der Dialektik der Doktrin der Leere (die Negation der Substantialität) erwachsend erfahren. Diese geistige Erfahrung wird das höchste Wissen (*prajñā*) genannt. *Prajñā* verkörpert sich selbst in der Form des Amitābha. Amitābha wird spontan durch *prajñā* befähigt, die Gläubigen auf dem Weg zur Erleuchtung zu leiten. Amitābha entfaltet sein *karuṇa* (Mitleid) indem er die Gläubigen zur geistigen Erleuchtung führt. Es besteht ein Widerspruch zwischen Shin und der Doktrin der Leere zwischen religiösen und intellektuellen Entwicklungen. Weitergehende Untersuchungen dieses Widerspruchs zeigen, daß er lediglich Ausdruck verschiedener Akzentsetzung ist. In einer inneren Erfahrung sind höchstes Wissen und Großes Mitleid ein und dasselbe.

Wir haben vorstehend gezeigt, daß im Shin-Buddhismus die Verbindung von religiösen und philosophischen Entwicklungen formalisiert wurde. Diese Kombination wird vom Shin-Buddhismus in seiner Interpretation des *Karman* verdeutlicht.

Karman und die indische Sündenvorstellung

Nach dem Shin-Buddhismus bedeutet *Karman* keine physische Aktion, sondern Sünde—das Sich-Bewußtwerden der paradoxen Natur der menschlichen Existenz. Bevor der Shin-Buddhismus zu dieser Vorstellung gelangte, durchlief er in Indien eine lange historische Entwicklung, beginnend mit der vedischen Periode. Um dies zu verstehen, ist jedoch ein kurzer Blick auf den historischen Hintergrund notwendig.

In den Veden finden wir verschiedene Vorstellungen, die dem Bösen entsprechen, z. B. *pāpa*, *pāpman*, *pāśa* und *aṃhas*. Überdies gibt es noch spezifischere Begriffe, nämlich *enas* („falsch tun“) *agas*, *-heḍana*, *anṛta*, *viloma*, *kilbiśa* und andere. Alle diese Ausdrücke beziehen sich jedoch auf verschiedene Arten von Sünde, die aus physischen Taten oder rituellen Fehlern entstehen. Eine religiöse Vorstellung der Sünde als Beleidigung Gottes wird in der Beleidigung gegen *Varuṇa*, der die Welt regiert, gesehen. Der Mensch, der das göttliche Gesetz verletzt, beim Spielen betrügt oder in seiner Verehrung nachlässig ist, sündigt Es muß hier be-

merkt werden, daß ein Verstoß gegen den Willen des höchsten Gottes durch ein Gebet um Verzeihung getilgt wird. Hinsichtlich des Gebets um Verzeihung bemerkt der *Rgveda*:

„Wenn wir beim Spiel betrügen, wenn wir unwissentlich oder mit Absicht Böses tun, dann, oh *Varuṇa*, zerstreue alle diese Sünden wie lose Federn und las uns nur dich lieben“. (*Rgveda*, V, 85). Sünde bedeutet in diesem Zusammenhang lediglich eine Befleckung, die durch Gebet oder selbst durch Wasser (*Rg*, I, 23.22) und durch Feuer (X. 164,3) getilgt werden kann. Die Überschreitung des göttlichen oder moralischen Gesetzes ist bedeutsamer als das existentielle Bewußtsein der menschlichen Natur.

In den *Brāhmaṇas* bezieht sich der Begriff der Sünde auf die Opfer (*yajña*) und deren magische Wirkung. Seitdem bedeutet Sünde rituelles Fehlbetragen und wird durch eine zeremonielle Beichte oder eine öffentliche Erklärung (*nirukta*) entfernt. Wir finden ebenso, daß die Sünde in den *Brāhmaṇas* etwas Physisches und Äußerliches bedeutet eher als Moralisches und Innerliches.

Mit der Entwicklung der *Upaniṣaden* jedoch wurde die Interpretation der Sünde zu einer philosophischen. Das Opfer wird zweitrangig, verliert seine primäre Bedeutung. Nach den *Upaniṣaden* ist das letzte Ziel die Erkenntnis der Einheit von *Brahman* und *Ātman*. Deswegen bedeutet jegliches Hindernis vor der Erkenntnis dieser Einheit Sünde. Das Schlechte ist *avidyā* (Unwissen), *kāma* (Begierde) und *karman* (Tat). Weder Beleidigungen gegen *Varuṇa* noch Fehler bei den Opfern werden moralisch als Übertretungen gewertet. Wichtig ist, das höchste Wissen oder die Einheit von *Brahman* und *Ātman* zu erlangen. Deswegen gibt es, wo vollkommenes Wissen herrscht, keine Sünde. Der Mensch, der jenes höchste Wissen erlangt hat, ist frei von Bösem, Unreinheit, Zweifel. So wird er *Brahman*. Es scheint, als sei der Unterschied zwischen Gut und Böse zerstört worden. Dies wird im folgenden Abschnitt zum Ausdruck gebracht:

“Weder mit Gut noch mit Böse ist der zu bestimmen, der über alle Bedrücktheit des Herzens hinaus ist“. (*Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka Up.* 4.3.22).

Dieser Abschnitt beinhaltet keineswegs eine niedrige Freiheit, bar jeder Moral. Vielmehr betont er die Transzendenz des höchsten *Ātman*. Anders ausgedrückt: Sünde kann zu einer Folge des Unwissens reduziert werden. Wert hat nur das Wissen, während

jede Tat, ob gut oder schlecht, eines absoluten Wertes entbehrt. Dasselbe finden wir im Shin-Buddhismus, wenn das *Tannisho* sagt:

“Ich weiß nicht, ob es gut oder schlecht ist, oder was gut oder schlecht ist. Ich kenne weder gut noch schlecht” (Kap. 14).

Der Unterschied zwischen beiden Zitaten liegt jedoch darin, daß das erstere der kraftvolle Ausdruck der Transzendenz des *Ātman* ist, während das zweite der Ausdruck des existentiellen Bewußtseins der vom *Karman* bestimmten menschlichen Begrenztheit ist.

Nach der jinistischen Auffassung ist Sünde eine Art Stoff (*karma-pudgala*), der die Seele infiziert. Man muß sich von all diesen durch *Karman* bedingten Substanzen lösen. Der Jinismus beschreibt zwei Askesepraktiken, eine äußerliche und eine innerliche. In den äußerlichen Übungen verpflichtete sich das Jaina-Laiantum in zahlreichen Arten von Gelübden (*vrata*), während man in den inneren Übungen freiwillig seine Fehler bekannte (*prayaścitta*). Der Jinismus glaubt an keinerlei Gott, der die Sünden vergeben wird. Stattdessen muß man aus eigenem Antrieb religiöse Gespräche, Meditationen, Lesungen u. a. pflegen. In dieser Religion finden wir keinerlei Gebet an Gott, da es keine Hoffnung auf Verzeihung gibt. Stattdessen kennt man ein Sündenbekenntnis, das in einer Erklärung abgegeben wird.

Der Buddhismus verneint gänzlich jegliche Substanz, ob *Brahman* oder *Ātman*. Im indischen Buddhismus wird die Sünde, wie in den *Upanishaden*, als eine Folge des Unwissens (*avidyā*) angesehen. Diese Art von Sünde wird deswegen durch das rechte Wissen (der vier edlen Wahrheiten) beseitigt. Die rechte Erkenntnis bezieht sich auf das Erreichen von Nirvāṇa durch die Verneinung jeglicher Substanz, wo auch immer sie sei. Dieser ethische Intellektualismus mündet in die Ablehnung eines Gebetes zu Gott oder zu *Brahman*, die beide geleugnet werden müssen. Da die Existenz Gottes geleugnet wird, gibt es auch keinen Platz für Verzeihung. Zur Beziehung zwischen der Sünde im Buddhismus und der Vorstellung des Verzeihens bemerkt Dr. R.V. De Smet richtig, daß „Buddha selbst keineswegs ein Verzeihender oder Sünden-Vergeber gewesen war, sondern ein Erleuchtender“¹⁷. Tatsächlich lehrt der Buddhismus nicht, die menschlichen Wesen zu erlösen, sondern ihnen zu helfen, selbst zur Erleuchtung zu kommen. Deswegen legt der indische Buddhismus großen Wert auf das intellektuelle Bewußtsein der Nicht-Substantialität (*anātman*) als eines Mittels der geistigen Selbsterleuchtung.

Neben diesem indischen Intellektualismus spielt der japanische Shin-Buddhismus eine bedeutende Rolle bei der existentiellen Zurückführung der Sünde auf die essentielle Struktur des menschlichen Wesens, nicht aber auf eine bloße Folge des Nichtwissens. Das Wesen der Sünde kann so ausgedrückt werden: die menschliche Existenz ist in sich selbst widersprüchlich. Selbst wenn man andere nicht verletzen will, mag man verletzen. Das menschliche Leben ist voll von Widersprüchen, die auf den durch *Karman* der Vergangenheit bestimmten Existenzen gründen. Im *Tannishō* heißt es hierzu:

“Man tötet nicht einmal einen einzelnen Menschen, soweit keine *Karman*-Bedingung aus der Vergangenheit besteht. Nicht, weil man den guten Willen hat, nicht zu töten. Selbst wenn man nicht verletzen will, kann man Hunderte, ja Tausende töten”. (Kap. 13).

Man würde diesen Absatz jedoch falsch interpretieren, sähe man in ihm einen Freibai für Immoralität, der allen, die diese *Karman*-Bestimmtheit kennen, gewährt würde. Eher sollte man darin den Ausdruck der Realität der menschlichen Macht gegenüber der höchsten Macht Amitābhas sehen. Im Mittelpunkt der Lehre des Shin-Buddhismus steht der Glaube an die höchste Kraft von Amitābhas Mitleid: egozentrische, menschliche Taten können nichts ausrichten, nur der reine, absolute Glaube führt zur Erleuchtung.

Karman und Sündenvorstellung im Shin-Buddhismus

Die *Karman*-Vorstellung im alten Buddhismus bezieht sich auf die Unterscheidung zwischen guten und schlechten Taten hinsichtlich der Moral und betont die Notwendigkeit der Besinnung.

Nach dem Shin-Buddhismus aber ist der Mensch nicht nur für sein *Karman*, gut oder schlecht, verantwortlich, sondern auch für seine Existenz als Mensch. Der Mensch hat nicht die Freiheit, sich selbst als gut und die anderen als schlecht zu betrachten; das wäre lediglich eine andere Form der Selbstverstrickung oder des Verhaftetseins. Die Betonung von Gut oder Schlecht stellt die Existenz des Menschen in Gefahr. Wir können die durch *Karman* bedingte Menschenwelt nicht verfluchen; noch können wir der Verantwortung des Menschseins entfliehen, indem wir etwa unser *Karman* anderen anlasten. Der Schüler Shinrans, Yuien, sagt im *Tannishō*:

“Selbst Sünden, gering wie ein Staubfleck auf der Spitze eines Hasenoder Schafhaares, sind nicht ohne *Karman*”. (Kap. 13). So drückt *Karman* also die menschliche Welt aus. Es ist nicht länger Gegenstand moralischer Beurteilung nicht länger mehr Gegenstand der Kontemplation. *Karman* ist die menschliche Welt, in welcher wir leben; durch unsere Taten können wir Kampf und Konflikt nicht beseitigen, da allem menschlichen Leben eine notwendig begrenzende Bedingung eigen ist. Die menschliche Welt enthüllt die Endlichkeit und Vergänglichkeit der Menschen, die durch *Karman* gefesselt und vorbestimmt ist. Der Mensch ist von einem Nebel von Widersprüchen umgeben, und diese liegen an der Wurzel aller menschlichen Existenz und allen Seins. Deswegen kann man nicht sagen, daß wir Gutes oder Böses „tun“. *Karman* ist nicht bloße Tat, es ist in der menschlichen Existenz verankert. Im Shin-Buddhismus wird Hinfälligkeit durch *Karman* Sünde (*zaigō*) genannt¹⁸. Folglich bedeutet Sünde in diesem Sinn nicht den Verrat des Menschen gegenüber Gott oder dem göttlichen Gesetz konträre Handlungen des Menschen. Sie ist vielmehr seine Unfähigkeit, sich von den dualistischen Begriffen Gut und Schlecht, Liebe und Haß und dergleichen zu befreien. Das trifft auf Intellekt, Wissen und Bewußtsein zu—auf alles, was zu einer dualistischen Vorstellung führt.

Hierüber steht im *Tannishō*:

“Ich weiß nicht, ob etwas gut oder schlecht ist, oder was Gut und was Schlecht bedeutet. Ich kenne weder Gut noch Schlecht”. (s. o.)

Über Gut und Schlecht hinausgehen bedeutet, daß an Hand der Lehren die offensichtliche Tatsache klar wird, daß nichts beständig, alles determinierte Sein vergänglich ist. Es kann somit keine determinierten ewigen Regeln ethischen Verhaltens geben; denn alles Determinierte ist nach Ansicht des Shin-Buddhismus vergänglich. Anders ausgedrückt: jegliche Unterscheidung, die auf festgesetzten Inhalten aufbaut, kann kraft der Natur der verwendeten Begriffe nicht zu allen Zeiten, für alle Menschen und unter allen Umständen bestehen. Diese Vorstellung rührt von der frühbuddhistischen Konzeption der Vergänglichkeit (p. *anicca*) her.

Der vorstehend zitierte Abschnitt aus dem *Tannishō* zeigt uns ein weiteres Motiv des indischen Buddhismus¹⁹, nämlich die mahāyānistische Vorstellung der Bedingtheit (*pratya*). Nach dem *Tan-*

nishō hängt das, was in der Zukunft moralisch ist, von den zukünftigen Umständen ab (*pratyaya*), die wir aber bis zum Eintritt der Zukunft nicht kennen. Determinierte Dinge sind relativ in bezug auf Bedingungen und Umstände. Sie sind insofern wahr, als sie provisorisch auf Sinngehalten aufbauen, die von determinierten Fakten herrühren. Das ist im indischen Buddhismus der Begriff *saṃketa* (vereinbarte Wahrheit) oder *saṃvṛtisatya* (relative Wahrheit). Determinierte Regeln sind ein Kompromiß zwischen Gut und Schlecht. Der Shin-Buddhismus leugnet die Konzeptionen Gut und Schlecht, wie aus dem vorstehenden Abschnitt ersichtlich wurde. Die Negation basiert jedoch auf der Vermittlung oder dem mittleren Weg (*madhyā pratipad*), der über die Vorstellungen von Gut und Schlecht hinausführt.

Nach der buddhistischen Tradition ist die Wahrheit ihrer Natur nach kein ewiges, determiniertes Licht: Soweit wir uns selbst zum Mittelpunkt einer unterscheidenden Philosophie machen, können wir nicht wissen, wie wir wirklich sind. Diese intellektuelle Haltung gegenüber dem Sein stellt das Verständnis der Dinge als Gesamtheit dar. Jedes ist wahr in bezug auf den gewählten Wert, nicht aber wahr im absoluten Sinn. Indische Denker kümmerten sich nicht um die Frage, ob menschliches Tun essentiell gut oder schlecht sei. Stattdessen beschäftigten sie sich mit dem Erreichen eines jenseits von Gut und Schlecht befindlichen geistigen Zustandes. Diese Haltung tritt in der ethischen Auffassung von Gut und Schlecht im Shin-Buddhismus zu Tage. Indische Denker und Shin-Buddhisten sind sich darin gleich, daß sie beide die Existenz als relativ wahr betrachten. Für jene Denker ist die Welt und sogar das Schlechte real. Aber es gibt nichts absolut Schlechtes oder absolut Gutes. Indem Gut und Schlecht relativ sind, baut die Aufforderung, sich über das Schlechte zu erheben, gewissermaßen mehr auf einer vertikalen als einer horizontalen Analyse auf.

Der Shin-Buddhismus spricht von *Karman* auf der Basis einer ethischen Begrenzung. Er lehrt uns, daß *Karman* die Grenzen unserer Existenz enthüllt. *Karman* wird als eine unvermeidliche Konstituente der menschlichen Existenz betrachtet. Shin-Buddhisten betrachten *Karman* vom existentiellen Standpunkt aus. Sie sprechen von *Karman* in Ausdrücken der Erkenntnis der menschlichen Begrenzung. Die Erkenntnis des *Karman* ist eine Erfahrung, welche die Begrenzung aller menschlichen Fähigkeiten un-

vermeidlich mit sich bringt. Shinran (1173—1262) sagt in seinem Werk „*Kyōgyōshinshō*“:

„Ganz gewöhnliche Wesen (*prthagjana*), voll von Schlechtem, die im Kreislauf von Geburt und Wiedergeburt leben. Seit dem Anfang irren sie beständig umher und wandern, ohne sich aus der *Karman*-bedingten Welt befreien zu können“²⁰.

Das bedeutet also, daß *Karman* ein Teil der menschlichen Situation und der Existenz eines jeden Individuums ist. Jede Hoffnung auf Befreiung vom *Karman* ist nichtig. Der Mensch ist durch *Karman* gebunden und vorbestimmt. Es gibt keinen Weg zum Heil. Allegorisch gesprochen: unsere zerbrechlichen Schiffe treiben auf dem unendlichen *Karman*-See, um den herum es kein Land zum Anlegen gibt. Dies geht weit über ein ethisches Urteil hinaus. Auf der Basis dieser existentiellen Analyse lieferte Shinran eine kennzeichnende Erklärung. Er sagt:

“Je weniger ein guter Mensch für die Erlösung qualifiziert ist, desto mehr ist ein schlechter Mensch hierfür geeignet. Hierzu sagt das Volk meist: Sogar ein schlechter Mensch wird im Reinen Land wiedergeboren werden, wieviel mehr ein guter”. (*Tannishō*, Kap. 3).

Die Ethik des Shin-Buddhismus ist menschlich und relativ, nicht göttlich und absolut.

Sich selbst des *Karman* bewußt werden, heißt erkennen, daß *Karman* zum eigenen Wesen gehört²¹. *Karman* wird—nach dem Shin-Buddhismus—in diesem Sinne Sünde (*zaigō*) genannt. *Zaigō* bezeichnet wörtlich sowohl Sünde wie auch *Karman*, die Einsicht in die Paradoxität und die Widersprüche des Lebens²².

Deswegen rührt Sünde nicht von einem Mangel an Kenntnis (*vidyā*) des *Brahman* oder *Ātman* her, wie es in der Philosophie der *Upaniṣaden* vertreten wurde: eher enthüllt sie die Begrenzung des eigenen Seins. Sünde kann nicht wie ein Objekt beseitigt werden. Während in der brahmanischen Philosophie die Sünde als eine Folge von Unwissenheit (*avidyā*) verstanden wurde, betrachtet der Shin-Buddhismus sie als eine Folge des *Karman*. *Karman* ist die Existenz eines jeden Individuums als solchen. Das Individuum ist geistig und ethisch leer; es erfährt Schmerz und Lust. Im übrigen ist es nicht einmal Quelle seines eigenen Wissens. Wie aber kam die Selbsterkenntnis der menschlichen Be-

grenzung hier an die erste Stelle? Wie geschieht eine Befreiung aus der Welt des *Karman*?

Dazu sei hier ganz kurz folgendes gesagt. Nach dem Shin-Buddhismus schafft das Erkennen der *Karman*-Natur der menschlichen Begrenztheit zugleich die tiefste Verbundenheit mit dem Absoluten. Der Pfad, der zur Befreiung führt, ist der lebendige Glaube an das absolute Dharma, das Gelübde Amitābhas. Hierdurch erlangt der Mensch zum ersten Mal erkenntnismäßigen Zugang zu dem Im-*Karman*-Sein. Er fühlt, wie er kämpft, um zu entinnen. Shinran schreibt hierzu:

“Wenn man an sein [Amitābhas] Gelübde glaubt, dann wird man sich endgültig selbst zur Erleuchtung bringen²³”.

Der Glaube an Amitābhas Gelübde ist die hinreichende Bedingung für die Erlösung. Dieses Charakteristikum der Verehrung und Hingabe spricht besonders jene an, die eng mit den Geschäften dieser Welt befaßt sind.

Die Betonung der *Karman*-Konzeption im Shin-Buddhismus beruht im Vergleich zur *śūnyatā*-Vorstellung im Zen Buddhismus auf einem Unterschied in der Emphase. Das trifft auch auf die unterschiedliche Einstellung gegenüber der Erlösung zu. Für die Shin-Buddhisten übersteigt das Absolute die durch *Karman* bedingte Welt: die Vorstellung von *śūnyatā* (Leere) als eines Zieles rückt auf den zweiten Platz. Der Kult des quasi-göttlichen Amitābha bringt den Buddhismus in die Nähe des Theismus. Für die Zen-Buddhisten übersteigt das Absolute die Vernunft: die Vorstellung des göttlichen Amitābha wird der mystischen Erfahrung der Nicht-Zweiheit oder *śūnyatā* untergeordnet. Die Shin-Buddhisten kennen als Methode zur Erreichung des Transzendenten die gläubige Wiederholung von Amitābhas Namen, die Zen-Buddhisten den Gebrauch der Dialektik, d. h. die Kontrolle unterscheidenden Wissens (*vikalpa*).

Im frühen Buddhismus gab es zwei fundamentale Vorstellungen, *Karman* und *Anātman*. *Karman* bezeichnete die Konstituenten der menschlichen Welt, die ohne Sein ist; es stellt Nicht-Selbst (*anātman*) dar. So besteht eine Kongruenz zwischen den Lehren von *Karman* und *Anātman*. Beide befassen sich, nur von verschiedenem Standpunkt aus, mit ein und derselben Tatsache.

Der Zen-Buddhismus entwickelte die Vorstellung vom *Anātman* zu voller Tragweite. Er geht weiter zurück, um die darin liegende religiöse Erfahrung zu klären. Das *Anātman* des alten

Buddhismus hat sich zum Zen-Begriff der Leere (*śūnyatā*) entwickelt.

Der Shin-Buddhismus führt die *Karman*-Lehre am weitesten in den Existentialismus fort. Das *Karman*-bedingte Leben ist voller Widersprüche und Unvereinbarkeiten. Der Erfahrung dieser *Karman*-bedingten Existenz kann sich niemand entziehen. Rettung ist nur durch den Glauben an den quasi-göttlichen Amitābha möglich. Hierbei geht die bewußte Erfahrung des *Karman* dem Aufkommen des Glaubens voraus.

So bauen Zen- und Shin-Buddhismus beide auf der altbuddhistischen Vorstellung einer Synthese zwischen *Anātman* und *Karman* auf. Sie unterscheidet sich lediglich dadurch, daß ersterer Nicht-Selbst im weitesten Sinn, letzterer die *Karman*-bedingte Existenz in existentieller Perspektive betont.

NOTES

1. Wir könnten sagen, daß Buddha zwar theoretische Reflexion nicht ermutigte, Buddhas Jünger in Indien aber bei ihren Diskussionen mit Nicht-Buddhisten den philosophischen Problemen des Selbst nicht entgehen konnten. Deshalb philosophierten die indischen Buddhisten, da sie ein Selbst leugneten, über die Existenz des Selbst nur in theoretischer Weise.

2. Negation setzt Beobachtung der Welt unter zwei Perspektiven voraus: zunächst die Verneinung des schon Bekannten, sodann mittels einer entgegengesetzten Vorstellung eine positive Formulierung.

Die erste Kategorie, die Verneinung des schon Bekannten, findet sich in der Abhidharma-Philosophie in Präfixen wie *a*, *na* und *vi*; die zweite, der positive Ausdruck religiöser Erfahrung, folgt in der Entwicklung des Buddhismus später. Der positive Ausdruck geschieht in Form der Negation durch die Präfixe *nir*, *vi* und *sama*. Beide Perspektiven können auf das Verhältnis zwischen *anātman* und *karman* angewandt werden.

3. *Atta* (*ātman*) bezeichnete im älteren Buddhismus das empirische Selbst oder *puggala* und eine Seele (*p. atta*), welcher die *Upaniṣaden* letzte Realität hinter allen Phänomenen zuerkannt hatten. Im Mahāyāna bezeichnet die *Ātman*-Vorstellung ein beständiges Sein, belebt oder unbelebt, welches aber hinter *niḥsvabhāva* (Nicht-Substantialität) zurücksteht. Im Zen-Buddhismus liegt diese Art von *ātman* vor. Im älteren Buddhismus bezeichnet *atta* sowohl *puggala* (*pudgala*) wie auch *dhamma* (*dharmā*): *Atta* als *puggala* bedeutet die zu verneinende Existenz, während *atta* als *dhamma* oft für die Vorstellung des Bewußtseins gebraucht wird. Buddha sagte: „Stützt Euch nur auf Euch selbst als Eiland und Zufluchtsstätte und auf nichts anderes; auf *dharma* als Eiland und Zufluchtsstätte und auf nichts anderes.“

(D. ii. 100 S v, 163, 164 etc.) Hier finden wir den Parallelismus von *atta* und *dhamma* (I.B. HORNER, „Early Buddhist Dhamma“ in: „*Artibus Asiae*“, vol. XI. 1/2, p. 119). Im Mahāyāna wurde *ātman* als *dharma* (Bewußtsein) zu dem

Konzept von *mahātman* transformiert. Asaṅga lehrte, daß Nirvāṇa die Vereinigung mit der Großen Seele des Universums oder *mahātman* sei. (RADHAKRISHNAN, "Indian Philosophy", vol. 1, p. 603).

4. *tathā na anto kammaṣṣa vipāko uplabbhati|bahiddhā pi na kammaṣṣa na kamman tattha vijjati|phaleṇa suññaṃ taṃ kamman phalaṃ kammena vijjati: kammaṃ ca kho upādāya tato nibbattate phalaṃ*/(*Visuddhimagga* vol. II p. 603. PTS London).

5. Die Beziehung zwischen *anatta*, *kamma* und *paṭiccasamuppāda* impliziert das *Nikāya* in Abschnitten wie: S II. p. 33, 38; *Samyutta-Āgama*, Taishō-Edition, II, 84ff etc. Mahāyāna-Denker betonen die Beziehung zwischen *karman* und *pratītyasamutpāda*, indem sie die Realität des *karman* verneinen (Chandrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, VIII. p. 180-191, ed. by L.d.L. Vallée Poussin, 1913).

6. Für die Buddhisten der älteren Zeit und selbst für Nāgārjuna ist Buddha der, welcher 47 Tage meditierte und im Hirschpark predigte. Zen-Buddhisten jedoch verehren lediglich den unter dem Bodhi-Baum erleuchteten Buddha. Die Betonung liegt im Zen eher auf der Erleuchtung, wie sie von Buddha realisiert wurde, als auf der Vorstellung eines persönlichen Buddha.

7. Die chinesische Negation *wu* und *fei* entspricht dem Pāli und Sanskrit *a*, *nī* und *vi*. In chinesischen Übersetzungen scheint keine Unterscheidung zwischen *wu* und *fei* zu bestehen. Manchmal bezeichnet das Sanskrit Präfix *nir* eine stärkere Negation als *a*. (Ein Präfix *nir* hat die Funktion einer starken Verneinung.)

Cf. Chapt. I. The Significance of Negation in Buddhism, footnote 11. B. HEIMANN, "The Significance of Prefixes in Sanskrit Philosophical Terminology", 1951, p. 54). Überdies hat *nir* eine logische sowie eine psychologisch-eschatologische Bedeutung, welche auch der Ausdruck *wu-nien* impliziert. Über die Pāli-Präfixe *a* und *nir* siehe G.H. Sasaki, "The Concept of Kamma in Buddhist Philosophy", in: OE, 3. Jg. (1956), p. 196, Anm. 22).

8. Tun-huang MSS des Tan-ching, Taishō No. 20007; D.T. SUZUKI, "Essays in Zen Buddhism", London, 1958 p. 36ff.

9. Der Unterschied zwischen chinesischem Ch'an und japanischem Zen ist sehr gering; hierauf einzugehen übersteigt den Rahmen dieser Arbeit.

10. In der Pāli-Literatur kennen wir den Ausdruck *suñña* in der Bedeutung „leer“, „eitel“. Er beinhaltet lediglich das Fehlen von Sein und Nicht-Sein und hat keinerlei positive Bedeutung. Er ist eine relative Negation des Seins. Deswegen kennt man keine abstrakte Form wie *śūnyatā* im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus, das die absolute Negation bedeutet. Im Mahāyāna bezeichnen drei Wrote (*śūnya*, *śūnyatva*, *śūnyatā*) die Nichtheit, genau wie das Pāli-Wort *suñña*. Aber diese Mahāyāna-Begriffe meinen das reale Sein (*dharma*). *Śūnyatā* ist danach also gleichbedeutend mit dem, was ohne Ursache ist, was über Denken und Vorstellung hinausgeht, nicht geschaffen und ohne Maß ist. Seinem Inhalt nach ist der Begriff positiv; er bezeichnet die Abhängige Entstehung oder den Mittleren Pfad. Im *Prasannapadā* heißt es: *yah pratītyasamutpādāḥ śūnyatām taṃ pracakṣmahe | sā prajñaptirapādāya pratipat-sāiva madhyama* (*Prasannapadā*, p. 503) *Śūnyatā*, mit *nirvāṇa* gleichgesetzt, ist so gleich dem *saṃsāra* (menschlichen Leben). Die Gleichsetzung von *nirvāṇa* (*śūnyatā*) mit *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāranirvāṇayorviśeṣayābhāva*, p. 503) ges-

chieht analog der von *amata* (unsterblich) und *ñibbāna* im älteren Buddhismus. (BREWSTER, „*Dukkha und Sikkha*“, in „*Buddhistic Studies*“, ed. B.C. Law p. 292; Kha 165; Dja IV, 110). Hierbei ist aber wichtig, daß Pali-Ausdrücke manchmal in abstrakte Mahāyāna-Vorstellungen umgeformt werden; z. B. wird die Unterscheidung zwischen *idappaccayatā* und *paṭiccasamuppāda* in Pāli bei der Umformung ins Prinzip von *anyonyāpekṣya* (Abhängigkeit) ignoriert; *Bhava*, in den Pāli-Texten nicht in abstrakter Bedeutung gebraucht, wird im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus in die abstrakte Konzeption von *bhāva* eingefügt.

11. Der Satz „*yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti*“ findet sich wiederholt im Pāli Nikāya und Abhidharma (D I, 83, 162; S VI, 188; cōl. 3 und 4; S V, 144 Ps II. 63; Vism 605, etc.). Es ist die Essenz des Buddhismus. (S. Rhys DAVIDS, „*The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*“, London: 1936, p. 268.) Der Ausdruck in den *Upaniṣaden*: „*yad bhūtacca bhavacca bhavisiyacca*“ bezieht sich nur auf die Zeiteinteilung in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft.

12. Der Sanskrit-Ausdruck *anābhoga*, abgeleitet von *an-ā-bhūj*, bedeutet „Mühelosigkeit“. Er wird im Chinesischen mit *tsu-jan* (japanisch jinen) übersetzt, wie aus der chinesischen Version des *Uttaratantra* erhellt ist. (*Ratnagotravijhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra*, ed. E.H. JOHNSTON, Patna 1950, p. 24.) Alle Wirkungen Buddhas geschehen ohne Willensanstrengung. Diese ichlose Haltung ähnelt der Einstellung des chinesischen Ch'an gegenüber der Wahrheit. Diese Vorstellung findet sich auch im Shin-Buddhismus (*S. Mat-tōshō, Shinshū-seiten*, Kyōtō 1957, p. 632.) Im 5. Kapitel des *Jinenhōni-nokoto* heißt es: „Man sagt *ji*. *Ji* bedeutet, von selbst.“ Es ist nicht die ichbezogene Anstrengung dessen, der den Namen Amidas ausspricht. *Nen* bedeutet „veranlassen zu tun“. Es beinhaltet nicht die (ichbezogene) Anstrengung dessen, der den Namen Amidas ausspricht. Es ist *hōni* (*dharma-tā*), denn es wurde vom Tathāgata gelobt. So bezeichnen beide Vorstellungen, *ji* und *nen*, spontane Anstrengung. *Hōni* bezeichnet ein Ding, so wie es ist. Folglich ist der Ausdruck *jinen-hōni* in seinem ursprünglichen Sinn gleichbedeutend dem Sanskrit-Ausdruck *anābhogadharma-tā*. Die Erfahrung von *anābhoga dharma-tā* bezeichnet eine positive Haltung gegenüber der Realität. Mit dieser indischen Vorstellung als Hintergrund liegt in dem Begriff *jinen-hōni* des Shin-Buddhismus eine positive Haltung zur Wirklichkeit, so wie sie ist. Wir können vielleicht sagen, daß im Westen der Mensch die Natur (*jinen*) analysiert, während im Osten die Natur den Menschen analysiert, der Mensch seine wahre Existenz (*yathābhūtaṃ*) nur durch die Natur erkennen kann.

13. British Museum: TCRD 192 B 4661, ct. of Tibetan Mss. 9155.

14. Charakteristisch für die buddhistische Philosophie—und hierin unterscheidet sie sich von der westlichen—ist das Vertrauen in die Tradition. Ist einmal ein Gedankensystem aufgebaut, so wird derjenige, der mit dem erzielten Ergebnis nicht zufrieden ist, in der Tradition einen Schritt zurückgehen, und eine erweiterte Form zu entwickeln versuchen, ohne aber dabei die vorausgehenden Interpretationen zu zerstören. Das nennt man *anusāsana* (die gläubige Interpretation). Im Abhidharma wurde diese Methode in zwei Aspekte gegliedert: *āgama* und *nyāya*. Ersteres erfordert die Hinzuziehung des Kanons, während letzteres die Zuhilfenahme von logischen Folgerungen fordert. Der Wert der Tradition wird im Shin-Buddhismus durch die Ermah-

nung zu „hören“ (*smṛti*) in der Ledeutung „glauben,“ nicht aber „denken“, betont. Hören bedeutet annehmen, was ohne eigensüchtige Absicht gegeben wird. Die Buddhisten versuchen, die Tradition zu entwickeln, indem sie ihr folgen. Diese Haltung gegenüber *āgama* stammt aus Indien, und kann dort auch in der außer-buddhistischen Philosophie gefunden werden. Das *Vedānta Sūtra* etwa enthält einen bedeutungsvollen Ausspruch über die Tradition gegenüber dem individuellen Diskutieren. (*Vedānta Sūtra* II. 1. II) Śāṅkara kommentiert hierzu wie folgt: „In Dingen, welche im Lichte der Offenbarung verstanden werden müssen, kann man sich nicht auf bloßes Überlegen verlassen. Überlegungen stützen sich auf eine individuelle Meinung. Die Argumente einiger geschickter Menschen werden von anderen zurückgewiesen. Ausgehend von der Verschiedenheit menschlicher Meinungen ist es unmöglich, bloßes verstandesmäßiges Überlegen als eine sichere Richtschnur anzusehen. Selbst Menschen von außergewöhnlichen intellektuellen Fähigkeiten wie Kapila, Kanada u. a. widersprachen sich. „Der Autor des *Vedānta-Sūtras* und seine Kommentatoren sind der Ansicht, daß die letzte Realität auf der Autorität von *āgama* basieren müsse, und daß Überlegungen lediglich als eine Hilfe heranzuziehen seien. Wenn eine Konzeption nicht klar bis auf die *āgama* (Schrift) zurückgeführt wird, benutzt man den Verstand, um die Wahrheit zu ergänzen.“

15. *Adhyasyamcodanasūtra*, BSOAS, XXI/3, pp. 620-623.

16. LIN-CHI LU gibt im *Ku-tsun-hsü*. i. 4, p. 11, einen Zen-Aspekt von *Karman*: „Wenn irgend jemand es (das Tao) praktizieren kann, so erwirbt er sich dadurch nur *Karman* für Tod und Wiedergeburt. Ihr sprecht davon, in den sechs Sinnen und tausenderlei Verhaltensweisen vollkommen erfahren zu sein, aber wie ich es sehe, schafft Ihr dadurch ganz sicher *Karman* für die Hölle.“ Weiter heißt es dort (*ibid.* i. 4, 5, 11–12, 12): „Danach streben, ein Bodhisattva zu sein, bedeutet, *Karman* schaffen, desgleichen das Studium von Sūtren und Kommentaren. Buddhas und Patriarchen kommen ohne dergleichen künstlich Geschaffenes aus. *Karman* bedeutet hier folgegebundene Handlung und unnatürliches Streben, das es zu vermeiden gilt. Auf das Bewußtsein der paradoxen menschlichen Beschaffenheit, wie der Shin-Buddhismus sie betont, wird nicht hingewiesen.“

17. R.V. De SMET, „*Sin and its Removal in India*“, *Indian Antiquary*, vol. 1. no. 3, 1964, p. 169.

18. Der Ausdruck *zaigō* wird von Shinran an einigen Stellen gebraucht: *Shōzomatsu-wasan* (*Ibid.* p. 352) und *Mattōshō* (*ibid.* p. 674). Letzteres zitiert einen Abschnitt aus dem *Yuishinshō*. Shinran versteht *zaigō* als *tsumi* (Sünde), was lediglich dem Wort *zai* entspricht, *gō* (*Karman*) aber ausläßt. So setzt er in der Erkenntnis der Tiefe menschlicher Existenz das Kompositum *zaigō* mit dem Ausdruck *tsumi* (Sünde) gleich.

19. Zahlreiche andere, grundlegende Vorstellungen Shinrans sind ebenfalls indischen Quellen entnommen, sind aber, wenn in Shin-Schriften gebraucht und weltlich interpretiert, ihrer indischen Tradition entkleidet.

20. *Kyōgyōshin-shō*, (*Shinshū-Seiten*), Kyōto: Hōzōkan 1957, p. 325.

21. Nach der Abhidharma-Philosophie ist *Karman* eine phänomenologische Beschreibung menschlicher Existenz. Menschliche Existenz kann als die fünf Aggregate (*rūpa*, *vedanā*, *sañña*, *saṅkhāra* und *viññāna*) betrachtet wer-

den, die durch *Karman* zusammengefügt sind. (S. das Kapitel Philosophie des älteren Buddhismus; s. a. Genjun H. SASAKI "A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy", Tōkyō 1958, p. 87; G.H. SASAKI, "A Study of Buddhist Psychology", Tōkyō: Japan Society for the Promotion of Scientific Research, 1960, p. 5). Am besten wird *Karman* in der lebendigen Erkenntnis als einer Komponenten menschlichen Lebens erkannt. In diesem Sinne ist *Karman*-Bewußtsein ein Weg zur Erkenntnis des *Anātman*. Ein Weg (Mittel) ist jedoch spekulativ; das Selbst ist der Gegenstand, der analysiert werden muß, und das Selbst hat immer die Möglichkeit, gutes oder schlechtes *Karman* zu schaffen.

22. Der Ausdruck *zaigō* könnte dem Pāli *vipatti* und *kamma* entsprechen. Jedoch ist die Konnotation, die *vipatti* besitzt, etwas verschieden von *zai* (*tsumi*). Der Begriff *vipatti* ist relativ und bedeutet eher Verbrechen als Sünde, das durch einen einfachen Wechsel der Haltung beseitigt werden kann; es berührt nicht die menschliche Existenz als solche. *Zaigō* betrifft die paradoxe menschliche Natur, der man nicht entinnen kann.

23. *Kyōgyōshinshō*, op. cit., p. 325. Amithāba ist ein Symbol der zwei Prinzipien, Weisheit (*prajñā*) und Mitleid (*karuṇa*). Beide sind indischen Ursprungs. Die Transformation der Weisheit in Mitleid nennt man das ursprüngliche Gelübde Amitābhas. Aus Mitleid erwächst die Befreiung. Diese gläubige Haltung findet sich in traditionellen indischen Glaubensvorstellungen (wie im *Gīta* und *Bhaktimārga*). Über den indischen Hintergrund von *prajñā* s. G.H. SASAKI, "*jñāna, prajñā, prajñāpāramitā*", in: "Journal of the Oriental Institute", Baroda, Prof. Bhatt Memorial Number, XV, 3—4, 1966. Manchmal ersetzt diese devotionale Einstellung des Shin-Buddhismus die förmliche Verehrung und Meditation; so erweist sich ein Gegensatz zwischen der Shin-buddhistischen Haltung liebender Abhängigkeit, und der Einstellung von Zen, sich auf sich selbst zu verlassen. In Übereinstimmung mit der indischen Tradition wird der Begriff *karman* im Shin-Buddhismus auf die zugrundeliegende Bewußtsein-Schatzkammer (*ālayavijñāna*) der Vijñānavāda-Schule in Indien zurückgeführt; die *śūnyatā*-Vorstellung im Zen-Buddhismus geht zurück auf die Verwirklichung des mittleren Wegs (*mādhyamā pratipad*) in der Mādhyamika-Schule. Hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses beider zueinander, siehe die exakte Beschreibung bei N. SMART: *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1964, pp. 58-60.

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